UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 94-1676
NAN TOUCH,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
MASTER UNIT DIE PRODUCTS, INC.,
Defendant, Appellant.
v.
TRUEBLOOD, INC., a/k/a MODDRN, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Cyr and Stahl,
Circuit Judges.
Mark A. McCormack, with whom Law Offices of Mark A. McCormack was
on brief for appellant.
Lenahan O'Connell, with whom O'Connell and O'Connell was on brief
for appellee.
January 5, 1995
CYR, Circuit Judge. Defendant and third-party plain-
CYR, Circuit Judge
tiff Master Unit Die Products, Inc. ("MUD"), appeals from an
adverse judgment dismissing its cross-claim for contribution
against appellees P.H. Trueblood Corporation and Trueblood, Inc.
(collectively: "Trueblood"). As the findings of fact and
conclusions of law entered by the district court do not permit
reliable appellate review, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), we vacate
its judgment and remand for further proceedings.
I
I
BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND
In 1966, Trueblood designed, manufactured, and sold a
plastic-molding press designed so that end-users could affix to
its movable shuttle table two "quick-change" frames. Once the
press was equipped with the required quick-change frames (not
manufactured by Trueblood) and each frame was fitted with a die
containing an injectable mold, the press would inject liquified
plastic into one die-mold; and after the shuttle table shifted
the first frame off to one side, the press would inject liquified
plastic into the die-mold on the second frame. From recessed
holes in the shuttle table surface, the press triggered a "knock-
out" plate built into the sidelined frame which thrust up through
the filled die-mold, thereby ejecting and purging the hardened
plastic part from the work area. After the ejection was complet-
ed, the shuttle table shifted the frame containing the empty die-
mold back into a central position for the next injection of
plastic, while the press shifted and "knocked out" the twin die-
mold in the same manner.
The console which housed the controls for the Trueblood
press was located within arm's length of the press operator and
had three settings. In the "off" mode, the press would not
operate. In "automatic" mode, the press automatically repeated
the entire cycle of functions described above, but the press
operator was required to use both hands to push two widely-spaced
buttons on the console, which meant that the operator's hands
could not be inserted into the injection or ejection areas while
the press was in operation. In the "hand" mode, however, the
press operator could perform each function in the cycle by
manually depressing one console panel button for each function,
leaving the operator with one free hand. Moreover, when first
switched from "off" to "hand," the press automatically "recy-
cled," thereby thrusting into the ejection area any knockout
plate then in position. The "hand" mode was designed to allow
the press operator to insert an implement through an opening in
the quick-change frame to dislodge a jammed knockout plate or
plastic part, while manually triggering the "eject" button
located on the control console.
By early October 1989, an unaltered Trueblood press had
come into the possession of Styletek, Inc., in Lowell,
Massachusetts, fitted with two quick-change frames designed and
manufactured by appellant MUD. On October 11, 1989, Styletek
employee Nan Touch was operating the Trueblood press in the
3
"automatic" mode when one of the MUD frame's knockout plates
became jammed in the "up" position. With his left hand, Nan
Touch reached through an opening (1.4" high x 5.25" wide) in the
front of the jammed frame to dislodge a part stuck in a die-mold,
at the same time using his right hand to change the press from
"automatic" to "off" to "hand" mode. At this point, the jammed
knockout plate "recycled" and amputated portions of two fingers
on Nan Touch's left hand.
In June 1992, Nan Touch instituted this diversity
action against MUD in the District of Massachusetts, alleging
negligence, breach of warranty, see Mass. Gen. L. Ann. ch. 106,
2-314, and unfair trade practices, see Mass. Gen. L. Ann. ch.
93A, in the design, manufacture, and sale of frames incorporating
an opening large enough to permit a press operator to insert a
hand into the ejection area during operation. MUD impleaded
Trueblood as a third-party defendant, Mass Gen. L. Ann. ch. 231B,
1 (contribution among joint tortfeasors), alleging that the
"one-handed" design of the press and its automatic recycling of
the knockout mechanism upon transition into "hand" mode contrib-
uted to Nan Touch's injury. Prior to trial, Nan Touch settled
with MUD.
MUD's third-party complaint for contribution against
Trueblood was tried to the court. The district court found for
Trueblood and entered the following findings of fact and con-
clusions of law:
As to the defectiveness of the molding press,
MUD has failed to establish that two-hand
4
operation was the industry standard for the
manufacturing of mechanical power presses in
1966. While Trueblood's molding press may
very well violate current day OSHA regula-
tions, it would be unfair to impose modern
standards on the practices of nearly thirty
years ago. Accordingly, the Court finds that
the molding press was not defective when
manufactured . . . .
Nan Touch v. Master Unit Die Prods., Inc., No. 92-11493-EFH, slip
op. at 3 (D. Mass. June 8, 1994) (emphasis added).
II
II
DISCUSSION
DISCUSSION
We review interpretations of state law de novo, see
Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233-35 (1991), and
findings of fact for clear error, see Interstate Commerce Comm'n
v. Holmes Transp., Inc., 983 F.2d 1122, 1129 (1st Cir. 1993).
MUD maintains that the district court misapplied the Massachu-
setts law governing claims for breach of warranty based in tort,
or relied on implicit findings of fact unsupported by the evi-
dence. We do not reach the merits of these contentions, for we
conclude that the district court ruling is insufficiently clear
to enable effective appellate review. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)
("In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury . . . the
court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law . . . ."). Under applicable Massa-
chusetts product liability law, negligence-based claims differ
markedly from tort-based claims for breach of warranty. The
factfinder confronted with a negligence-based product liability
5
claim focuses on whether the conduct of the designer or manufac-
turer reveals a failure "to use reasonable care to eliminate
foreseeable dangers which subject a user to an unreasonable risk
of injury." Colter v. Barber-Greene Co., 525 N.E.2d 1305, 1313
(Mass. 1989). Consequently, evidence that the defendant designer
or manufacturer met the pertinent industry safety standards
prevailing at the time of manufacture would be material, albeit
nondispositive, evidence that the defendant was not negligent,
even though its product's design might not comport with safety
criteria later embraced by the industry.
By contrast, a breach of warranty claim arising under
Massachusetts tort law is founded on strict liability principles,
see Mass. Gen. L. Ann. ch. 106, 2-314; Restatement (Second) of
Torts 402A cmt. c. (1965), and focuses exclusively "'on whether
the product [is] defective and unreasonably dangerous and not on
the [actual] conduct of the user or the seller.'" Colter, 525
N.E.2d at 1313 (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see Back v.
Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 968-70 (Mass. 1978). Because the
breach of warranty inquiry is not concerned with the reason-
ableness of the designer/manufacturer's conduct, see Correia v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033, 1040 (Mass. 1983)
(explaining that defendant may be liable for breach of warranty
even if he "[took] all reasonable measures to make his product
safe"), compliance with "state of the art" safety standards at
the time the product was designed or manufactured is usually im-
material. See, e.g., Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273, 277
6
(Mass. 1984). Instead, the factfinder may rely on the failure of
the product to conform to present-day safety standards in deter-
mining whether it is "unreasonably dangerous," under a breach of
warranty analysis, even though the risk against which the post-
design or post-manufacture safety standard was intended to
protect was unknown or not reasonably discoverable by the defen-
dant prior to the sale of the product. See id. (defendant may be
liable for breach of warranty "regardless of the knowledge of
risks that he actually had or reasonably should have had when the
sale took place").
Moreover, although nonconformance with a present-day
safety standard would be relevant evidence, it would not compel
the trier of fact to find the product "unreasonably dangerous"
per se, see, e.g., Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48, 52 (1st
Cir. 1991) (OSHA regulations do not preempt state tort law
principles), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 993 (1992). Indeed, even
the incorporation of a design feature currently perceived as a
dangerous condition might be found "reasonable" in the circum-
stances, based on the factfinder's application of the traditional
risk/utility balancing test to the particular product. See Back,
378 N.E.2d at 970 (listing the factors to be weighed in
determining whether particular product is unreasonably dangerous,
including "'the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged
design, the likelihood that such danger would occur, the mechani-
cal feasibility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost
of an improved design, and the adverse consequences to the
7
product and to the consumer that would result from an alternative
design'") (citation omitted).
Viewed against the applicable principles of Massachu-
setts law, the findings entered by the district court are plainly
deficient. The equivocal observation that "Trueblood's molding
press may very well violate current day OSHA regulations" pro-
scribing one-handed presses, coupled with the court's negligence-
based assessment that "MUD has failed to establish that two-hand
operation was the industry standard for the manufacturing of
mechanical power presses in 1966," strongly suggest that the
district court viewed any such OSHA violation as simply immateri-
al to Trueblood's liability. On the contrary, a finding that the
Trueblood press contravened the 1992 OSHA standards, a matter all
but conceded by the parties, clearly would be material to the
ultimate factual determination whether the press was "unreason-
ably dangerous," and hence gave rise to a breach of warranty.
On the other hand, such a finding would not compel the
conclusion that the Trueblood press was "unreasonably dangerous"
per se. Yet the district court's observation concerning the
"unfairness" of applying the 1992 OSHA standards to a product
manufactured in 1966, see supra p. 5, strongly suggests that the
district court perceived a need to forefend against just such a
"compelled" conclusion. But see Cosme v. Whitin Mach. Works,
Inc., 632 N.E.2d 832, 835 (Mass. 1994) (contrasting Connecticut's
ten-year statute of repose after sale, and noting that Massachu-
setts breach of warranty claims are not rendered defeasible
8
simply by the passage of time). In addition, the district
court's free-form "unfairness" exception, especially in reference
to a durable product like the Trueblood press, is out of step
with the purpose and policy of the strict product liability
principles upon which breach of warranty liability is founded.
See Colter, 525 N.E.2d at 1313 n.13 ("'[P]ublic policy demands
that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intend-
ed for consumption be placed upon those who market them, and be
treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance
can be obtained; and that the consumer of such products is
entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone,
and the proper persons to afford it are those who market the
products.'" (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts 402A cmt. c.
(1965))).
Finally, we can discern no indication in the district
court ruling as to how, or whether, the required risk/utility
balancing was performed to determine if the one-handed control
feature made the press "unreasonably" dangerous. The court
neither cites to apposite Massachusetts case law, nor adverts to
any risk/utility balancing test component, even though MUD
introduced evidence that Trueblood had available at slight
additional cost feasible, "safer" design alternatives.
Trueblood countered with evidence that one-handed control was
essential to permit a press operator to insert an implement into
the work area to unjam a knockout plate, and that it was a
"reasonably" safe design provided the manufacturers of quick-
9
change frames did not incorporate an opening large enough to
accommodate the operator's hand. We in no sense suggest which
(if either) evidentiary proffer should be credited, but simply
emphasize that appellate review is utterly impracticable when
neither the conclusions of law which guided the district court
ruling, nor the findings of fact essential to a principled
decision under the applicable law, are discernible from its
decision.
As we have stressed repeatedly in the past, the Rule
52(a) requirements that facts be stated specially, and conclu-
sions of law separately, impose on the trial court an obligation
to ensure that its ratio decidendi is set forth with enough
clarity to enable a reviewing court reliably to perform its
function; namely, to review the conclusions of law de novo and
the essential findings of fact for clear error. See, e.g.,
Thermo Electron Corp. v. Schiavone Constr. Co., 958 F.2d 1158,
1160 (1st Cir. 1992); Peckham v. Continental Casualty Ins. Co.,
895 F.2d 830, 842 (1st Cir. 1990); Applewood Landscape & Nursery
Co. v. Hollingsworth, 884 F.2d 1502, 1503 (1st Cir. 1989);
Pearson v. Fair, 808 F.2d 163, 165-66 & n.2 (1st Cir. 1986) (per
curiam) (explaining that Rule 52(a) is "mandatory, not precato-
ry") (citing Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 292
(1960)); Boston and Maine Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston,
618 F.2d 137, 143 (1st Cir. 1980); see also 9 Charles A. Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 2571, at 679
(1971) (collecting cases).
10
The parties urge us to salvage the present appeal.
Each proposes plausible interpretations of the evidence and
conclusions of law favorable to itself. But neither has met with
notable success in divining the district court's essential
findings of fact and predicate conclusions of law. We note,
further, that although all responsibility under Rule 52(a) rests
with the trial judge, and the burden is not an onerous one, see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) advisory committee's note (1946 amendment)
(requiring "brief, definite, pertinent findings" with "no neces-
sity for over-elaboration"), counsel might have avoided the un-
necessary expense and delay occasioned in this case simply by
submitting a timely request for reconsideration based on the need
for adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law as required
by Rule 52(a). As neither party sought reconsideration under
Rule 52(a), each shall bear its own costs on appeal.
The district court judgment is vacated. The case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Each party shall bear its own costs.
11