Touch v. Master Unit Die

USCA1 Opinion









UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________

No. 94-1676
NAN TOUCH,

Plaintiff, Appellee,

v.

MASTER UNIT DIE PRODUCTS, INC.,

Defendant, Appellant.

v.

TRUEBLOOD, INC., a/k/a MODDRN, INC., ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.

____________________


APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

____________________

Before

Selya, Cyr and Stahl,

Circuit Judges. ______________

____________________

Mark A. McCormack, with whom Law Offices of Mark A. McCormack was _________________ ________________________________
on brief for appellant.
Lenahan O'Connell, with whom O'Connell and O'Connell was on brief _________________ _______________________
for appellee.
____________________

January 5, 1995
____________________


















CYR, Circuit Judge. Defendant and third-party plain- CYR, Circuit Judge ______________

tiff Master Unit Die Products, Inc. ("MUD"), appeals from an

adverse judgment dismissing its cross-claim for contribution

against appellees P.H. Trueblood Corporation and Trueblood, Inc.

(collectively: "Trueblood"). As the findings of fact and

conclusions of law entered by the district court do not permit

reliable appellate review, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), we vacate ___

its judgment and remand for further proceedings.



I I

BACKGROUND BACKGROUND __________


In 1966, Trueblood designed, manufactured, and sold a

plastic-molding press designed so that end-users could affix to

its movable shuttle table two "quick-change" frames. Once the

press was equipped with the required quick-change frames (not

manufactured by Trueblood) and each frame was fitted with a die

containing an injectable mold, the press would inject liquified

plastic into one die-mold; and after the shuttle table shifted

the first frame off to one side, the press would inject liquified

plastic into the die-mold on the second frame. From recessed

holes in the shuttle table surface, the press triggered a "knock-

out" plate built into the sidelined frame which thrust up through

the filled die-mold, thereby ejecting and purging the hardened

plastic part from the work area. After the ejection was complet-

ed, the shuttle table shifted the frame containing the empty die-

mold back into a central position for the next injection of














plastic, while the press shifted and "knocked out" the twin die-

mold in the same manner.

The console which housed the controls for the Trueblood

press was located within arm's length of the press operator and

had three settings. In the "off" mode, the press would not

operate. In "automatic" mode, the press automatically repeated

the entire cycle of functions described above, but the press

operator was required to use both hands to push two widely-spaced ____

buttons on the console, which meant that the operator's hands

could not be inserted into the injection or ejection areas while

the press was in operation. In the "hand" mode, however, the

press operator could perform each function in the cycle by

manually depressing one console panel button for each function, ___ ____ ________

leaving the operator with one free hand. Moreover, when first ____ ____

switched from "off" to "hand," the press automatically "recy-

cled," thereby thrusting into the ejection area any knockout

plate then in position. The "hand" mode was designed to allow

the press operator to insert an implement through an opening in

the quick-change frame to dislodge a jammed knockout plate or

plastic part, while manually triggering the "eject" button

located on the control console.

By early October 1989, an unaltered Trueblood press had

come into the possession of Styletek, Inc., in Lowell,

Massachusetts, fitted with two quick-change frames designed and

manufactured by appellant MUD. On October 11, 1989, Styletek

employee Nan Touch was operating the Trueblood press in the


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"automatic" mode when one of the MUD frame's knockout plates

became jammed in the "up" position. With his left hand, Nan

Touch reached through an opening (1.4" high x 5.25" wide) in the

front of the jammed frame to dislodge a part stuck in a die-mold,

at the same time using his right hand to change the press from

"automatic" to "off" to "hand" mode. At this point, the jammed

knockout plate "recycled" and amputated portions of two fingers

on Nan Touch's left hand.

In June 1992, Nan Touch instituted this diversity

action against MUD in the District of Massachusetts, alleging

negligence, breach of warranty, see Mass. Gen. L. Ann. ch. 106, ___

2-314, and unfair trade practices, see Mass. Gen. L. Ann. ch. ___

93A, in the design, manufacture, and sale of frames incorporating

an opening large enough to permit a press operator to insert a

hand into the ejection area during operation. MUD impleaded

Trueblood as a third-party defendant, Mass Gen. L. Ann. ch. 231B,

1 (contribution among joint tortfeasors), alleging that the

"one-handed" design of the press and its automatic recycling of

the knockout mechanism upon transition into "hand" mode contrib-

uted to Nan Touch's injury. Prior to trial, Nan Touch settled

with MUD.

MUD's third-party complaint for contribution against

Trueblood was tried to the court. The district court found for

Trueblood and entered the following findings of fact and con-

clusions of law:

As to the defectiveness of the molding press,
MUD has failed to establish that two-hand

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operation was the industry standard for the ________ ________
manufacturing of mechanical power presses in __
1966. While Trueblood's molding press may ____
very well violate current day OSHA regula- _______ ___ _______
tions, it would be unfair to impose modern _____ ______
standards on the practices of nearly thirty
years ago. Accordingly, the Court finds that
the molding press was not defective when ___ _________ ____
manufactured . . . . ____________

Nan Touch v. Master Unit Die Prods., Inc., No. 92-11493-EFH, slip _________ ____________________________

op. at 3 (D. Mass. June 8, 1994) (emphasis added).



II II

DISCUSSION DISCUSSION __________


We review interpretations of state law de novo, see __ ____ ___

Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233-35 (1991), and ____________________ _______

findings of fact for clear error, see Interstate Commerce Comm'n ___ __________________________

v. Holmes Transp., Inc., 983 F.2d 1122, 1129 (1st Cir. 1993). _____________________

MUD maintains that the district court misapplied the Massachu-

setts law governing claims for breach of warranty based in tort,

or relied on implicit findings of fact unsupported by the evi-

dence. We do not reach the merits of these contentions, for we

conclude that the district court ruling is insufficiently clear

to enable effective appellate review. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ___

("In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury . . . the

court shall find the facts specially and state separately its

conclusions of law . . . ."). Under applicable Massa-

chusetts product liability law, negligence-based claims differ

markedly from tort-based claims for breach of warranty. The

factfinder confronted with a negligence-based product liability

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claim focuses on whether the conduct of the designer or manufac- _______ ________ ________

turer reveals a failure "to use reasonable care to eliminate _____

foreseeable dangers which subject a user to an unreasonable risk

of injury." Colter v. Barber-Greene Co., 525 N.E.2d 1305, 1313 ______ _________________

(Mass. 1989). Consequently, evidence that the defendant designer

or manufacturer met the pertinent industry safety standards

prevailing at the time of manufacture would be material, albeit __________ __ ___ ____ __ ___________ ________

nondispositive, evidence that the defendant was not negligent, ________ ___

even though its product's design might not comport with safety

criteria later embraced by the industry.

By contrast, a breach of warranty claim arising under

Massachusetts tort law is founded on strict liability principles, ______

see Mass. Gen. L. Ann. ch. 106, 2-314; Restatement (Second) of ___ ___________ ___________

Torts 402A cmt. c. (1965), and focuses exclusively "'on whether _____

the product [is] defective and unreasonably dangerous and not on _______ ____________ _________ ___ __

the [actual] conduct of the user or the seller.'" Colter, 525 ___ ________ _______ __ ___ ____ __ ___ ______ ______

N.E.2d at 1313 (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see Back v. ___ ____

Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 968-70 (Mass. 1978). Because the ____________

breach of warranty inquiry is not concerned with the reason-

ableness of the designer/manufacturer's conduct, see Correia v. _______ ___ _______

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033, 1040 (Mass. 1983) ____________________________

(explaining that defendant may be liable for breach of warranty

even if he "[took] all reasonable measures to make his product

safe"), compliance with "state of the art" safety standards at __

the time the product was designed or manufactured is usually im- ___ ____ ___ _______ ___ ________ __ ____________ __ _______ ___

material. See, e.g., Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273, 277 ________ ___ ____ _____ __________


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(Mass. 1984). Instead, the factfinder may rely on the failure of

the product to conform to present-day safety standards in deter- ___________

mining whether it is "unreasonably dangerous," under a breach of

warranty analysis, even though the risk against which the post-

design or post-manufacture safety standard was intended to

protect was unknown or not reasonably discoverable by the defen-

dant prior to the sale of the product. See id. (defendant may be ___ ___

liable for breach of warranty "regardless of the knowledge of

risks that he actually had or reasonably should have had when the

sale took place").

Moreover, although nonconformance with a present-day ___________

safety standard would be relevant evidence, it would not compel ______

the trier of fact to find the product "unreasonably dangerous" ____________

per se, see, e.g., Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48, 52 (1st ___ __ ___ ____ _______ _____________

Cir. 1991) (OSHA regulations do not preempt state tort law

principles), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 993 (1992). Indeed, even _____ ______

the incorporation of a design feature currently perceived as a

dangerous condition might be found "reasonable" in the circum-

stances, based on the factfinder's application of the traditional

risk/utility balancing test to the particular product. See Back, ___ ____

378 N.E.2d at 970 (listing the factors to be weighed in

determining whether particular product is unreasonably dangerous, _______ ____________

including "'the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged

design, the likelihood that such danger would occur, the mechani-

cal feasibility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost

of an improved design, and the adverse consequences to the


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product and to the consumer that would result from an alternative

design'") (citation omitted).

Viewed against the applicable principles of Massachu-

setts law, the findings entered by the district court are plainly

deficient. The equivocal observation that "Trueblood's molding

press may very well violate current day OSHA regulations" pro- ___ ____ ____ _______

scribing one-handed presses, coupled with the court's negligence-

based assessment that "MUD has failed to establish that two-hand

operation was the industry standard for the manufacturing of ________ ________

mechanical power presses in 1966," strongly suggest that the __ ____

district court viewed any such OSHA violation as simply immateri-

al to Trueblood's liability. On the contrary, a finding that the

Trueblood press contravened the 1992 OSHA standards, a matter all

but conceded by the parties, clearly would be material to the

ultimate factual determination whether the press was "unreason-

ably dangerous," and hence gave rise to a breach of warranty.

On the other hand, such a finding would not compel the ______

conclusion that the Trueblood press was "unreasonably dangerous"

per se. Yet the district court's observation concerning the ___ __

"unfairness" of applying the 1992 OSHA standards to a product

manufactured in 1966, see supra p. 5, strongly suggests that the ___ _____

district court perceived a need to forefend against just such a

"compelled" conclusion. But see Cosme v. Whitin Mach. Works, ___ ___ _____ ____________________

Inc., 632 N.E.2d 832, 835 (Mass. 1994) (contrasting Connecticut's ____

ten-year statute of repose after sale, and noting that Massachu-

setts breach of warranty claims are not rendered defeasible


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simply by the passage of time). In addition, the district

court's free-form "unfairness" exception, especially in reference

to a durable product like the Trueblood press, is out of step

with the purpose and policy of the strict product liability

principles upon which breach of warranty liability is founded.

See Colter, 525 N.E.2d at 1313 n.13 ("'[P]ublic policy demands ___ ______

that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intend-

ed for consumption be placed upon those who market them, and be

treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance

can be obtained; and that the consumer of such products is

entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone,

and the proper persons to afford it are those who market the

products.'" (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts 402A cmt. c. _______ _____________________________

(1965))).

Finally, we can discern no indication in the district

court ruling as to how, or whether, the required risk/utility

balancing was performed to determine if the one-handed control

feature made the press "unreasonably" dangerous. The court ____________

neither cites to apposite Massachusetts case law, nor adverts to

any risk/utility balancing test component, even though MUD

introduced evidence that Trueblood had available at slight

additional cost feasible, "safer" design alternatives.

Trueblood countered with evidence that one-handed control was

essential to permit a press operator to insert an implement into __ ______ __ _________

the work area to unjam a knockout plate, and that it was a

"reasonably" safe design provided the manufacturers of quick-


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change frames did not incorporate an opening large enough to

accommodate the operator's hand. We in no sense suggest which ____

(if either) evidentiary proffer should be credited, but simply

emphasize that appellate review is utterly impracticable when

neither the conclusions of law which guided the district court

ruling, nor the findings of fact essential to a principled

decision under the applicable law, are discernible from its

decision.

As we have stressed repeatedly in the past, the Rule

52(a) requirements that facts be stated specially, and conclu-

sions of law separately, impose on the trial court an obligation

to ensure that its ratio decidendi is set forth with enough _____ _________

clarity to enable a reviewing court reliably to perform its

function; namely, to review the conclusions of law de novo and __ ____

the essential findings of fact for clear error. See, e.g., ___ ____

Thermo Electron Corp. v. Schiavone Constr. Co., 958 F.2d 1158, _____________________ ______________________

1160 (1st Cir. 1992); Peckham v. Continental Casualty Ins. Co., _______ _____________________________

895 F.2d 830, 842 (1st Cir. 1990); Applewood Landscape & Nursery _____________________________

Co. v. Hollingsworth, 884 F.2d 1502, 1503 (1st Cir. 1989); ___ _____________

Pearson v. Fair, 808 F.2d 163, 165-66 & n.2 (1st Cir. 1986) (per _______ ____

curiam) (explaining that Rule 52(a) is "mandatory, not precato-

ry") (citing Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 292 ____________ __________

(1960)); Boston and Maine Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, ______________________ ___________________________

618 F.2d 137, 143 (1st Cir. 1980); see also 9 Charles A. Wright & ___ ____

Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 2571, at 679 _______________________________

(1971) (collecting cases).


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The parties urge us to salvage the present appeal.

Each proposes plausible interpretations of the evidence and

conclusions of law favorable to itself. But neither has met with

notable success in divining the district court's essential

findings of fact and predicate conclusions of law. We note,

further, that although all responsibility under Rule 52(a) rests

with the trial judge, and the burden is not an onerous one, see ___

Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) advisory committee's note (1946 amendment)

(requiring "brief, definite, pertinent findings" with "no neces-

sity for over-elaboration"), counsel might have avoided the un-

necessary expense and delay occasioned in this case simply by

submitting a timely request for reconsideration based on the need

for adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law as required

by Rule 52(a). As neither party sought reconsideration under

Rule 52(a), each shall bear its own costs on appeal.

The district court judgment is vacated. The case is _______________________________________________________

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. _________________________________________________________________

Each party shall bear its own costs. ___________________________________


















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