Four Corners Service Station, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 94-1616
FOUR CORNERS SERVICE STATION, INC.,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

MOBIL OIL CORPORATION,

Defendant, Appellee.

No. 94-1718
FOUR CORNERS SERVICE STATION, INC.,

Plaintiff, Appellee,

v.
MOBIL OIL CORPORATION,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Frank H. Freedman, Senior U.S. District Judge]

Before

Cyr, Circuit Judge,

Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Stahl, Circuit Judge.

David R. Schaefer, with whom Brenner, Saltzman, Wallman & Goldman

was on brief for Four Corners Service Station, Inc.
Paul D. Sanson, with whom Sheila Huddleston, Shipman & Goodwin,

and Edward H. Beck, III were on brief for Mobil Oil Corporation.

March 22, 1995

CYR, Circuit Judge. Four Corners Service Station, Inc.
CYR, Circuit Judge.

("Four Corners") appeals a district court judgment under the

Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 2801-2806 (1994)

("PMPA"), disallowing its demands for compensatory damages and

attorney fees against Mobil Oil Corporation ("Mobil") for unlaw-

ful nonrenewal of Four Corners' franchise agreement. Mobil

cross-appeals the PMPA liability judgment entered against it. We

affirm the district court judgment in all respects.

I
I

BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND

Four Corners is a retail gasoline distributor in Three

Rivers, Massachusetts. Since 1926, Four Corners had been party

to a series of renewable franchise agreements ("Agreements") with

Mobil, its exclusive gasoline supplier. The Agreements obligated

Four Corners to purchase a specified minimum gallonage per annum,

and also set maximum gallonage limits or so-called purchase

"caps." These caps permitted Mobil to plan against unpredicted

fluctuations in franchisee demands for gasoline. The caps

increased by ten percent each year to allow for normal franchisee

sales growth.

In March 1987, Four Corners discovered that the soil

beneath its Three Rivers service station was severely contaminat-

ed with gasoline. The Massachusetts Department of Environmental

Quality Engineering ("DEQE") issued a notice of responsibility,

3

citing six underground gasoline storage tanks installed by Four

Corners between 1942 and 1978 as likely sources of the contamina-

tion. Four Corners promptly notified Mobil that the DEQE-ordered

remediation, involving the removal and replacement of the storage

tanks and 250 cubic yards of contaminated soil, would require an

immediate and indefinite closure of the service station, during

which Four Corners would not be able to meet its minimum gal-

lonage purchase obligations under the Agreements. Over the next

several months, Four Corners repeatedly asked Mobil for advice

and information on possible methods for implementing and funding

the required remediation, but to no avail.

Although it promptly completed the required tank

removal, Four Corners encountered problems arranging a cost-

effective method for disposing of the contaminated soil, a

prerequisite to installing replacement tanks and reopening its

service station. The estimated costs of transporting the contam-

inated soil to an out-of-state disposal site ranged between

$70,000 and $100,000, but transporters would not provide "firm"

cost estimates without first reviewing DEQE site reports. DEQE

in turn would not release the site reports until Four Corners

signed a final contract with a transporter. Consequently, Four

Corners eventually decided to "aerate," a natural remediation

method which achieves decontamination on site by exposing the

soil to the open air for extended periods of time.

In December 1987, Mobil notified Four Corners of its

decision not to renew their sixty-year-old franchise agreement,

4

effective in March 1988, due to Four Corners' breach of certain

terms of their Agreements, specifically (1) its failure to meet

the minimum gallonage provision; (2) its dilatory cleanup of the

environmental contamination; and (3) its closure of the service

station for more than seven consecutive days.

In March 1989, Four Corners initiated the present

action in federal district court, alleging that Mobil had wrong-

fully refused to renew the franchise agreement, in violation of

PMPA, 15 U.S.C. 2801-2806, for "reasons beyond [Four Corners']

control." The complaint sought reinstatement of the franchise,

actual and exemplary damages, attorney fees and costs. Id.

2805.

In the meantime, Four Corners had opened an expanded

and modernized service station at the same site in late 1988

under new ownership and management which purchased its gaso-

line supplies from British Petroleum until December 1990, and

later from Exxon. In July 1991, Four Corners filed a voluntary

chapter 11 petition.

Following a jury-waived trial, the district court found

that Mobil had violated PMPA by refusing to renew the franchise

based on a breach "beyond the reasonable control of the franchis-

ee." Four Corners Serv. Station, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., No.

89-30044-FHF (D. Mass. Dec. 2, 1993) ("Four Corners I"). Mobil

did not prove that Four Corners actually caused the soil contami-

nation, that Four Corners had any choice but to close the station

under the mandatory DEQE remediation order, nor that Four Corners

5

unreasonably failed to take the most expeditious approach for

effecting soil decontamination. Id., slip op. at 14-15. The

PMPA violation notwithstanding, the district court declined to

grant reinstatement of the franchise and addressed Four Corners'

request for a remedy at law recovery of lost profits for the

projected ten-year residual term of the Mobil franchise. Id. at

15.1 The parties were directed to submit supplemental briefs on

the right to recover lost profits. Id. at 16.

For the five-year period immediately preceding trial,

Four Corners calculated the profits lost due to Mobil's wrongful

nonrenewal at $356,099; it estimated its future lost profits for

the ensuing five-year period at $171,290. These calculations

were based on the contention that Mobil's greater product

strength in Western Massachusetts would have enabled Four Corners

to sell 30% more Mobil gasoline than it did BP gasoline between

1988 and 1990, and 20% more Mobil gasoline than it did Exxon

gasoline between 1991 and 1993.

The district court rejected Four Corners' "lost prof-

its" calculations. It found no evidence that Mobil would have

permitted Four Corners to exceed the annual purchase caps estab-

lished in the Agreements. Four Corners Serv. Station, Inc. v.

Mobil Oil Corp., No. 89-30044-FHF, slip op. at 5-8 (D. Mass. Mar.

22, 1994) ("Four Corners II"). Moreover, Four Corners actually

succeeded in selling more BP and Exxon gasoline following Mobil's

1As the district court found that Mobil had not violated
PMPA willfully, it denied exemplary damages as well. See infra

note 3.

6

nonrenewal than it could have sold under the maximum Mobil

gallonage limits fixed by the annual caps. Thus, the court

reasoned, Four Corners experienced an increase in profits, not a

reduction. Id. at 8.2 Because Four Corners proved no actual

damages, the court exercised its discretion, under 15 U.S.C.

2805(d)(1)(C), and denied an attorney fee award. On appeal, Four

Corners challenges only the rulings denying compensatory damages

and attorney fees.3 For its part, the Mobil cross-appeal chal-

lenges the district court finding that Mobil violated PMPA.

II
II

DISCUSSION
DISCUSSION

A. Statutory Overview
A. Statutory Overview

2The court based its findings on the following evidence:

Actual Sales Potential Franchise

(gallons) Mobil Sales Caps

1989 1,100,892 1,431,159 824,602
1990 1,274,643 1,657,035 907,062
1991 1,083,253 1,299,904 997,767
1992 985,406 1,182,487 1,097,545
1993 (1st 185,335 222,402 301,825
quarter)

3Although the Four Corners' notice of appeal alludes to the
district court rulings denying equitable relief and exemplary
damages, its appellate briefs do not challenge these rulings. See

Licari v. Ferruzzi, 22 F.3d 344, 349 (1st Cir. 1994) (claims

unaccompanied by adequate argumentation are deemed waived on
appeal). As concerns the former issue, therefore, we must assume
that Four Corners concedes that an award of lost profits for the
projected ten-year residual franchise term, if proven, would have

afforded it a full and "adequate" remedy at law. Cf., e.g.,

McDonald v. Piedmont Aviation, 793 F. Supp. 75, 78 (S.D.N.Y.

1992) (plaintiff waives entitlement to equitable relief by
failing to appeal earlier court ruling that damages award would
confer an "adequate" remedy in lieu of equitable relief).

7

Congress enacted PMPA to avert the detrimental effects

on the nationwide gasoline distribution system caused by the

unequal bargaining power enjoyed by large oil conglomerates over

their service-station franchisees. See generally Veracka v.

Shell Oil Co., 655 F.2d 445, 448 (1st Cir. 1981); S. Rep. No.

731, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-19, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.

873, 875-77. PMPA attempts to level the playing field by re-

stricting the grounds upon which a franchisor can assert a

unilateral termination or nonrenewal of a franchise. Grounds

upon which unilateral termination by a franchisor is permitted

under PMPA include (1) "[a] failure by the franchisee to comply

with any provision of the franchise, which provision is both

reasonable and of material significance," 15 U.S.C.

2802(b)(2)(A); (2) "[a] failure by the franchisee to exert good

faith efforts to carry out the provisions of the franchise," id.

2802(b)(2)(B); or (3) "[t]he occurrence of an event which is

relevant to the franchise relationship and as a result of which

termination of the franchise or nonrenewal of the franchise

relationship is reasonable," id. 2802(b)(2)(C). The failure of

a franchisee to operate the marketing premises for seven

consecutive days may constitute a relevant event under PMPA

2802(b)(2)(C). Id. 2802(c)(9)(A). However, unilateral

termination or nonrenewal is not permitted under PMPA if the

failure to comply with the terms of the franchise agreement was

"beyond the reasonable control of the franchisee." Id. 2801-

(13). PMPA also allocates and shifts burdens of proof

8

between the parties to the franchise agreement. In a PMPA-based

action for unlawful franchise termination or nonrenewal, the

franchisee bears the initial burden of proving that a termination

or nonrenewal occurred, at which point the burden of proof shifts

to the franchisor to demonstrate that the termination or refusal

to renew was based on a legitimate ground enumerated in PMPA.

Id. 2805(c).

B. Liability: "Reasonable Control"
B. Liability: "Reasonable Control"

1. Cause of Environmental Contamination
1. Cause of Environmental Contamination

The Mobil cross-appeal asserts two related challenges

to the district court ruling on liability. First, it contends

that there is no record support for the finding that the actual

cause of the soil contamination at the Four Corners service

station remained "unclear." Four Corners I, slip op. at 14.

Mobil notes that Four Corners was the only gas station in the

vicinity of the contamination; Four Corners had sole responsibil-

ity for maintaining the storage tanks and was the sole target of

the DEQE notice of responsibility; Four Corners concededly did

not comply with environmental statutes and regulations requiring

periodic testing of its storage tanks for leakage, see Mass. Gen.

L. Ann. ch. 148, 10 (1994); Mass. Regs. Code tit. 527, 5.05,

9.01 to 9.24 (1983); and noticeable "wet spots" were found on the

outer shell of the storage tanks upon excavation. If Four

Corners caused the contamination, Mobil argues, nonrenewal was

not beyond Four Corners' "reasonable control."

9

We review the district court factual finding on "rea-

sonable control" and its subsidiary findings on causation only

for "clear error." See, e.g., Roberts v. Amoco Oil Co., 740 F.2d

602, 608 (8th Cir. 1984) (legislative history of PMPA suggests

that Congress intended to favor franchisees by treating "reason-

ableness" determination as an issue of fact); Serianni v. Gulf

Oil Corp., 662 F. Supp. 1020, 1024 (E.D. Pa. 1986); cf. Dedham

Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, 972 F.2d 453, 457 (1st Cir.

1992) (causation in environmental context is question of fact

subject to "clear error" review). Reversal is warranted only if,

after considering the entire record, we are left with the "defi-

nite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."

Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Holmes Transp., Inc., 983 F.2d

1122, 1129 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer

City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).

Significantly, the burden of proof on "reasonable

control" lay with Mobil, not Four Corners. See 15 U.S.C.

2805(c). On appeal, Mobil must point to evidence that fairly

compelled a finding that Four Corners and Four Corners alone

caused the contamination. See Reich v. Cambridgeport Air

Sys., 26 F.3d 1187, 1188 (1st Cir. 1994) ("'Where there are two

permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice

between them cannot be clearly erroneous.'") (citations omitted).

Since it has not done so, we find no clear error.

First, DEQE found no holes in the tanks. Nor did the

"wet spots" constitute conclusive evidence of tank leakage, since

10

they could have been caused by contamination emanating outside

the tanks. Four Corners cited a United States Environmental

Protection Agency document which suggests that gasoline spills by

oil transporters during gasoline delivery are among the most

common causes of soil contamination at service stations. See 53

Fed. Reg. 37087, 37090, 37133 (1988). Finally, the notice of

responsibility issued by DEQE rested on Four Corners' legal

status as the current owner/operator of the service station

facility for strict liability purposes only. It did not purport

to represent a determination that Four Corners caused the con-

tamination.

Likewise, the record evidence does not compel a finding

that Four Corners might have averted the bulk of the soil con-

tamination by more diligent testing of its tanks. Mobil neither

produced evidence as to when the contamination occurred, nor

asserted that the environmental "detection" statutes and regula-

tions of the 1980s were retroactive. Further, there was no

evidence which would exclude leakage from other pumping system

components (pumps, hoses, pipes); that is, leakage which could

not have been detected by testing the tanks. Finally, since

there was no evidence that Mobil investigated any of these

matters before it decided not to renew the Four Corners fran-

chise, the district court might well have treated this contention

as a post hoc rationalization. See Desfosses v. Wallace Energy,

Inc., 836 F.2d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting that PMPA notifica-

tion requirements ensure that franchisor cannot invent after-the-

11

fact justifications for termination or nonrenewal). As Mobil

failed to meet its burden of proof on the factual issues underly-

ing the district court ruling on "reasonable control," the

finding stands.

12

2. "Financial Inability" to Remediate
2. "Financial Inability" to Remediate

Mobil likewise challenges the district court ruling

that Four Corners lacked the financial ability to remediate the

soil contamination. It contends that the ruling was infected by

legal error, in that the court wrongly regarded Four Corners'

financial inability to pay for out-of-state disposal, the costli-

er but more expeditious method of remediation, as a circumstance

beyond the franchisee's reasonable control. If this were true,

Mobil argues, any franchisee who came upon hard times and could

not afford to pay Mobil for its oil purchases would be exempt

from unilateral termination. See, e.g., California Petroleum

Distribs. v. Chevron U.S.A., 589 F. Supp. 282, 288 (E.D.N.Y.

1984); Cantrell v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 574 F. Supp. 313, 317 (M.D.

Tenn. 1983). Even if we were to agree with the reasoning of the

two decisions cited by Mobil, however, the district court simply

did not find that Four Corners' choice of a less expeditious

remediation program was beyond its reasonable control because

Four Corners could not afford more expeditious measures. Indeed,

Four Corners itself adduced evidence that its then owner, Richard

Tenczar, could have obtained financing for out-of-state disposal

if necessary.

Mobil's contention is a thinly veiled attempt to frame

the present "clear error" challenge, see Roberts, 740 F.2d at

608, as an issue of law subject to de novo review. See Cumpiano

v. Banco Santander Puerto Rico, 902 F.2d 148, 154 (1st Cir. 1990)

("The 'clearly erroneous' rule cannot be evaded by the simple

13

expedient of [the] creative relabelling . . . by dressing factual

disputes in 'legal' costumery."). The central inquiry that of

"reasonableness" must be undertaken in light of all the cir-

cumstances. In that vein, we cannot ignore the subsidiary

finding by the district court that Mobil repeatedly ignored Four

Corners' pleas for guidance and assistance on how best to reme-

diate service-station soil contamination. See Four Corners I,

slip op. at 14 ("Mobil offered no assistance that was refused by

Four Corners which would evidence a lack of desire on the part of

Four Corners to remedy the problem as expeditiously as possi-

ble."); cf., e.g., Malone v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 474 F.

Supp. 306, 311 (D. Md. 1979) (upholding franchise termination

where franchisee deliberately failed to heed franchisor's warn-

ings or accept its "good faith" advice about more profitable

marketing strategies). Four Corners was left entirely to its own

devices, in the awkward position of having to determine the most

cost-effective remediation method, which involved balancing

projected future service-station revenue losses occasioned by a

more prolonged closure, against the unconfirmable but

unquestionably higher immediate costs of a more expeditious

remediation. In these circumstances, the district court reason-

ably could find that Four Corners acted in good faith, and that

Mobil's reticence to assist was prompted by its desire to rid

itself of the franchisee requesting its assistance. As there was

no clear error, the liability judgment against Mobil must stand.

14

15

C. Damages
C. Damages

1. The Maximum Gallonage Provision
1. The Maximum Gallonage Provision

Four Corners impugns the district court's reliance on

the annual gallonage caps as the basis for finding that Four

Corners lost no profits as a result of the nonrenewal. It argues

that the district court was required to predict whether Mobil

would have waived the caps in each successive year had the

franchise not been wrongfully terminated in 1988. It points out

that a Mobil manager testified that Mobil had an "internal

mechanism" for authorizing such waivers where franchisees have

renovated or expanded service stations in order to increase their

gasoline sales by more than ten percent over the previous year.

Consequently, Four Corners contends, were Mobil to have refused a

waiver in these circumstances its action would have been arbi-

trary and discriminatory, in violation of PMPA.

Normally, the plaintiff must bear the burden of proving

actual damages. See, e.g., Wells Real Estate, Inc. v. Greater

Lowell Bd. of Realtors, 850 F.2d 803, 816 (1st Cir.) (citing

cases), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955 (1988). Four Corners has not

suggested that a different burden allocation obtains under PMPA.

Therefore, we assume that the burden of proof rested with Four

Corners. A challenge to the district court's findings on the

actual amount of damages sustained by a claimant presents a

question of fact, which we review only for "clear error." See,

e.g., American Title Ins. Co. v. East West Fin. Corp., 16 F.3d

449, 461 (1st Cir. 1994).

16

The record evidence did not compel a finding that Mobil

would have waived the 1988-91 caps on Four Corners' gasoline

purchases. Judy Schultz, district sales manager for Mobil,

testified that Mobil imposed these contractual caps to protect

itself from the considerable expense which would attend unpre-

dictable or unanticipated increases in franchisee demand for on-

hand gasoline supplies. She further noted that the gallonage

caps automatically increased by ten percent per year. A franchi-

see which wanted a waiver of the cap would need to obtain prior

approval from the general manager for the Mobil region, the

wholesale manager, and the district sales manager. When pressed

by Four Corners, however, Schultz testified that she did not know

of any Mobil franchisee which had actually obtained a waiver.

Even assuming, arguendo, that Four Corners' burden of

proof could have been sustained by showing that Mobil had an

established "internal mechanism" for affording relief from the

gallonage caps beyond the automatic ten-percent annual increase,

and that Four Corners itself met the criteria for such a waiver

in the years 1988-91, the Schultz testimony fell well short of

such a showing. It identified no criteria, nor did it indicate

that any such waiver procedure had ever been invoked, either by

Mobil or a franchisee. Moreover, Four Corners proffered no

independent evidence that any Mobil franchisee, let alone a

franchisee in a position comparable to Four Corners', had ever

requested or been granted any such extraordinary waiver. Cf.,

e.g., Ewing v. Amoco Oil Co., 823 F.2d 1432, 1438 (10th Cir.

17

1987) (noting existence of factual dispute whether franchisor

offered plaintiff less favorable terms than its other

franchisees); Valentine v. Mobil Oil Corp., 614 F. Supp. 33, 39

(D. Ariz. 1984) (finding no evidence that franchisor treated

plaintiff differently than franchisor's other franchisees),

aff'd, 789 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1986). Thus, there is no record

evidence even suggesting that the district court finding that

Four Corners would not have been granted a gallonage cap waiver

constituted clear error. See Four Corners II, slip op. at 8.

2. Lost Profits for 1992 and 1993
2. Lost Profits for 1992 and 1993

Next, Four Corners contends that it lost profits in

1992, and during the first quarter of 1993, when the gallonage

caps under its wrongfully terminated Mobil franchise first began

to exceed its actual Exxon gasoline sales or its potential Mobil

gasoline sales. See supra note 2. For example, in 1992, Four

Corners could have sold 112,139 more gallons (viz., the differ-

ence between its 1,097,545 gallon Mobil cap and its actual Exxon

sales of 985,406 gallons) even assuming that Mobil refused to

waive its cap. Thus, Four Corners claims, it was entitled to

recover these discrete losses, which were proximately caused by

Mobil's wrongful nonrenewal under PMPA.

This claim can succeed only if the measure of compen-

satory damages under PMPA may exceed the level required to make

the plaintiff-franchisee whole for whatever injury or loss flowed

from the franchisor's wrongful conduct. But cf., e.g., Linn v.

Andover Newton Theological Sch., 874 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1989)

18

(noting that plaintiff failed to suggest that either the ADEA or

contract law entitled him to be made "more than whole"). Four

Corners points to no authority for this counterintuitive assump-

tion, nor is there anything in PMPA's language or legislative

history to suggest that Congress intended to deviate from the

normal presumption, uniformly applied to numerous other causes of

action arising under federal remedial statutes, that compensatory

damages may not exceed the amount necessary to make the injured

party whole. See, e.g., Midwest Petroleum Co. v. American

Petrofina Mktg., Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1067, 1071 (E.D. Mo. 1986)

(noting PMPA franchisee is not entitled to "double recovery"

where it has otherwise mitigated harmful effects of defendant's

violation); see also Russo v. Texaco Inc., 630 F. Supp. 682, 687

(E.D.N.Y.) (PMPA is a diminution of franchisors' common-law

contract rights, and its remedial provisions should not be unduly

extended beyond statute's express language and purpose), aff'd,

808 F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1986).

Since Four Corners requested the district court to

presume that its sixty-year-old Mobil franchise would have

remained in force another ten years but for Mobil's wrongful

nonrenewal, the court was required to determine the aggregate net

profits Four Corners would lose during the entire ten-year

period. The record evidence reveals that Four Corners actually

realized an overall increase approximating $215,000, in total net

profits and interest, as a consequence of having been freed from

the Mobil gallonage caps during the five years immediately

19

preceding trial.4 Thus, the profits allegedly lost in 1992-93

clearly were not recoverable as discrete losses over and above

the incidental profits gained during the entire five-year period.

3. Future Profits
3. Future Profits

Four Corners insists that the district court simply

ignored its claim to $171,290 in future lost profits. See

Thompson v. Kerr-McGee Ref. Corp., 660 F.2d 1380, 1388 (10th Cir.

1981) (future lost profits recoverable under PMPA), cert. denied,

455 U.S. 1019 (1982); cf. Wallace Motor Sales, Inc. v. American

Motor Sales Corp., 780 F.2d 1049, 1062 (1st Cir. 1985) (automo-

bile dealership entitled to claim damages for lost profits over

projected life span of franchise). Although Four Corners would

incur these damages in each future year because the gallonage

caps would continue to outstrip Four Corners' actual sales of

Exxon gasoline, or its projected sales of Mobil gasoline, until

1998, this claim too is flawed.

4Assuming constant retail prices and operating costs, the
following would approximate Four Corners' profits (losses) during
each of the five years immediately preceding trial:

Change in Estima- Interest Total
Net Profits ted Int- on Gain or
as Mobil Sta- erest Profit Loss
tion with Rate
Caps in Force

1988: ($ 1,004) 52% ($ 528) ($ 1,532)
1989: $ 69,571 45% $ 31,306 $100,877
1990: $100,426 34% $ 34,144 $134,570
1991: $ 21,655 22% $ 4,764 $ 26,419
1992: ($ 19,568) 10% ($ 1,956) ($ 21,524)
1993: ($ 22,872) 3% ($ 686) ($ 23,558)

Total $148,208 $ 67,044 $215,252

20

In truth, the district court was fully cognizant of

Four Corners' claim for future profits, as it explicitly acknowl-

edged in its opinion. See Four Corners II, slip op. at 3.

Moreover, the record evidence discloses that there was little

likelihood that Four Corners could have remained in business

until 1998. Furthermore, there were serious deficiencies in its

forecasts of future lost profits. See Levy v. FDIC, 7 F.3d 1054,

1056 (1st Cir. 1993) (appellate court is free to affirm on any

ground supported by record).

Four Corners extrapolated its estimates of future lost

profits based on its performance during the two years immediately

preceding trial; that is, it assumed that Mobil's refusal to

renew its franchise was alone responsible for the dismal profit

picture during the time Four Corners was in serious financial

straits and selling Exxon gasoline.5 During the first quarter

of 1993 alone, Four Corners lost $47,754, compared with a $107-

,154 net profit in 1990, this notwithstanding the infusion of

approximately $215,000 in profits and interest income which could

not have been realized but for Mobil's termination of the fran-

chise in 1988. See supra note 4. Thus, Four Corners projected

continued future business operations despite such severe losses

5The chapter 11 filing constituted an event of default under
the Agreements, see Agreement 24(B)(4), and may have afforded

Mobil an independent basis for termination or nonrenewal in 1991.
Although it is questionable whether a franchisor could rely on
such an event to cut off PMPA damages if it appeared that the

franchisor wrongfully refused to renew prior to the chapter 11
petition, thereby causing the franchisee's financial problems,

Four Corners' greater profits in the years 1988-91 tend to

undercut such a causal connection.

21

as would make its prospects for continued operation until 1998

highly speculative. See Midwest Petroleum Co., 644 F. Supp. at

1070 ("To warrant a recovery of lost profits, the [franchisee]

must present proof sufficient to bring the issue outside the

realm of conjecture, speculation or opinion unfounded on definite

facts.").

Finally, even if Four Corners had been able to continue

in business until 1998, its claim to $171,000 in future lost

profits would be groundless given the record evidence that it had

already realized an aggregate net increase in profits and inter-

est approximating $215,000 during the five-year period immediate-

ly prior to trial. See supra note 4. Accordingly, even if the

district court had allowed all speculative lost future profits

claimed, Four Corners still would have realized approximately

$44,000 in aggregate net profits ($215,000 net increased profits,

less $177,000 future profits) during the projected ten-year life

span of the franchise following Mobil's wrongful refusal to

renew.

D. Attorney Fees Under PMPA
D. Attorney Fees Under PMPA

Lastly, Four Corners challenges the denial of its

request for an attorney fee award against Mobil based on the PMPA

violation. First, it claims that the district court's factual

findings were inadequate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52. Second, it

says that the district court was somehow constrained to allow a

fee award because Congress meant to encourage prevailing franchi-

sees to vindicate their rights under PMPA.

22

A denial of an attorney fee award is reviewed only for

abuse of discretion. See Catullo v. Metzner, 834 F.2d 1075, 1085

(1st Cir. 1987). Under PMPA, see 15 U.S.C. 2805(d)(1)(C), an

attorney fee award is discretionary where the plaintiff recovers

neither actual nor exemplary damages. Not only did Four Corners

sustain no provable damages, but the record evidence indicates

that it generated approximately $44,000 more in aggregate net

profits during the projected remaining life span of the Mobil

franchise as a consequence of having been freed from the Mobil

franchise gallonage caps since 1988. Four Corners likewise

failed to win equitable reinstatement of its Mobil franchise.

Cf. Chestnut Hill Gulf, Inc. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 749 F.

Supp. 331, 333 (D. Mass. 1990) (plaintiff which obtains equitable

relief under PMPA is entitled to attorney fee award even absent

recovery of actual or exemplary damages).

Without in any sense diminishing Mobil's clear viola-

tion of PMPA, we cannot say that the district court abused its

discretion in denying an attorney fee award on the present

record. Nor do we think that Congress intended to compel attor-

ney fee awards under PMPA as an inducement to franchisees to

pursue vindication in these circumstances.

The district court judgment is affirmed. Costs are
The district court judgment is affirmed. Costs are

awarded to cross-appellee in appeal No. 94-1718.
awarded to cross-appellee in appeal No. 94-1718.

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