May 12, 1995
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 94-1859
AARON J. MILLER,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
KENNEBEC COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Morton A. Brody, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge,
Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
Aaron J. Miller on brief pro se.
Per Curiam. Aaron J. Miller appeals pro se from
the district court's 1915(d) dismissal of his 1983
action. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
A district court may dismiss a complaint filed in
forma pauperis if "the action is frivolous or malicious." 28
U.S.C. 1915(d). A claim is frivolous within the meaning of
1915(d) if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal
theory," lacking "even an arguable basis in law." Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Failure to state a
claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) does not necessarily
render a complaint frivolous for purposes of 1915(d). Id.
at 331. A complaint is also subject to dismissal under
1915(d) if it is "factually frivolous," i.e., "if the facts
alleged are 'clearly baseless,' a category encompassing
allegations that are 'fanciful,' 'fantastic,' and
'delusional.'" Denton v. Hernandez, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1733
(1992) (citations omitted). A district court's 1915(d)
dismissal is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. at 1734.
Due Process Claim
"When a deprivation of property interest is
occasioned by random and unauthorized conduct by state
officials, . . . the Court has repeatedly emphasized that the
due process inquiry is limited to the issue of the adequacy
of postdeprivation remedies provided by the state." Lowe v.
Scott, 959 F.2d 323, 340 (1st Cir. 1992). In reliance upon
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that rule of law, the Magistrate Judge to whom the complaint
was referred recommended dismissal of Miller's due process
claim. The Magistrate Judge's Recommended Decision
specifically noted that "an adequate remedy does exist
because Plaintiff can file a state court suit to recover
damages for the loss of his property."
In his objection to the Magistrate Judge's
Recommended Decision, Miller failed to contest that an
adequate post-deprivation remedy exists. Instead, he
disputed the Magistrate Judge's implicit finding that
Miller's deprivation of property was based upon "random and
unauthorized" conduct. Miller claimed that he was
"challenging the Sheriff's Department ordinances and customs
allowing disposal of property without notice or a hearing, or
any procedures as to how to reclaim said property." Miller
failed, however, to identify the specific "ordinances and
customs" to which he referred. Nor do the factual
allegations in Miller's complaint support his claim that the
conduct was not "random and unauthorized." G i v e n t h e
Magistrate Judge's Recommended Decision notifying Miller of
the deficiencies of his due process claim, and Miller's
failure to correct those inadequacies, the district court did
not abuse its discretion in dismissing Miller's due process
claim pursuant to 1915(d). See Purvis v. Ponte, 929 F.2d
822, 826-27 (1st Cir. 1991) (affirming 1915(d) dismissal of
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complaint for failure to state a claim where magistrate's
report notified plaintiff of complaint's deficiencies and
plaintiff failed to cure them).
Fourth Amendment Claim
The Magistrate Judge's Recommended Decision did not
address Miller's Fourth Amendment claim. Therefore, the
dismissal was proper only if Miller's Fourth Amendment claim
was based upon an "indisputably meritless legal theory,"
lacking "even an arguable basis in law," Neitzke, 490 U.S. at
327-28, or was based upon "fantastic" or "delusional" factual
allegations. Denton, 112 S. Ct. at 1733.
The complaint alleges that defendants, acting under
color of state law, searched Miller's home and seized his
property under authority of a warrant that was not supported
by probable cause. These facts, if proved, could state a
valid Fourth Amendment claim. The allegation that the
warrant was issued by a Justice of the Peace does not render
Miller's legal theory baseless. "Judicial approval of a
warrant cannot serve as an absolute bar to the 1983
liability of the officer who obtained the warrant." Briggs v.
Malley, 748 F.2d 715, 721 (1st Cir. 1984), aff'd, 475 U.S.
335 (1986).
Since the district court failed to address Miller's
Fourth Amendment claim, and since that claim is not meritless
on its face, we vacate that portion of the dismissal order.
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We remand the case for the filing of a redacted complaint
limited to the Fourth Amendment claim, for service of
process, and for further proceedings not inconsistent
herewith.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
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