September 11, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 95-1227
WILFREDO SANTOS ISAAC,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
Defendant, Appellee.
ERRATA SHEET
The opinion of this court issued on September 6, 1995 is amended
as follows:
On cover sheet: Change "WILFREDO SANTOS ISAAC" to "WILFREDO
SANTOS- ISAAC".
On page 2: First line. Change "Claimant, Wilfredo Santos Isaac"
to "Claimant, Wilfredo Santos-Isaac".
September 6, 1995
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 95-1227
WILFREDO SANTOS-ISAAC,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jose Antonio Fuste, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge,
Selya and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
Luis Vizcarrondo-Ortiz and Salvador Medina De La Cruz on brief
for appellant.
Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Maria Hortensia Rios-
Gandara, Assistant United States Attorney, and Robert J. Triba, Acting
Chief Counsel, Social Security Administration, on brief for appellee.
Per Curiam. Claimant, Wilfredo Santos-Isaac,
appeals from the affirmance of the decision of the Secretary
of Health and Human Services that he is not entitled to
Social Security disability benefits. The Secretary
determined that, although claimant could not return to his
past work, his high blood pressure and epilepsy did not
prevent him from performing light work. Claimant objects to
this conclusion on essentially three grounds which we address
in turn.
1. Claimant argues that the Secretary ignored the
residual functional capacity (RFC) assessment completed by an
examining neurologist. In this form, the neurologist stated
that due to claimant's epilepsy, he "is limited in lifting or
carrying any weight since he can drop object[s] and damage
them or get hurt." Claimant contends that because he cannot
lift anything, he is precluded from working at any job.
What claimant fails to mention is the neurologist's
specific finding that claimant has the capacity to
occasionally lift 10 pounds and frequently lift less than 10
pounds. Contrary to claimant's assertion, then, he is not
completely precluded from lifting and claimant does not point
to any other evidence to back his position. We also note
that although light work involves the ability to occasionally
lift 20 pounds, there is record evidence to support the
Secretary's conclusion that claimant can lift and carry this
-2-
much weight. Specifically, there are two other RFC forms
which indicate that claimant has no limitations on his
ability to lift and carry. Because these RFC assessments are
the only data in the record concerning the impact of
claimant's impairments on his exertional limitations, we
cannot say that there was insufficient evidence to support
the Secretary's decision in this regard. See Rodriguez v.
Secretary of Health and Human Services, 647 F.2d 218, 222
(1st Cir. 1981) (conflicts in the evidence are for the
Secretary).1
2. Claimant next contends that the administrative
law judge (ALJ) did not fully consider the combined effect of
all claimant's subjective complaints -- shortness of breath,
muscle aches, chest pain, somnolence, fatigue, dizziness and
difficulty with balance. In his decision, the ALJ credited
these complaints but found that they were not as severe or
disabling as claimant alleged. In particular, the ALJ
reasoned that if claimant took his medicine as prescribed,
most of the symptoms about which he complained would
disappear. As for the somnolence and balance problems --
1. A determination that an individual has the ability to do
light work encompasses a finding that that person also can do
sedentary work, 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b), and the record fully
supports the conclusion that claimant can perform such work.
That is, even the examining neurologist indicated that
claimant could lift objects weighing no more than 10 pounds;
further, claimant, by his own admission, has the capacity to
sit for extended periods of time.
-3-
side effects of claimant's medications -- the ALJ stated that
changes in the dosage or type of medicine probably could
reduce these symptoms.
"[S]ubjective symptoms must be evaluated with due
consideration for credibility, motivation and medical
evidence of impairment." Gray v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 369, 374
(1st Cir. 1985) (per curiam). The ALJ here doubted
claimant's credibility, pointing out, as an example, that
claimant gave conflicting accounts of the number of seizures
he had experienced. Specifically, claimant had informed the
examining neurologist that he had been free from seizures
during the period from mid-January to mid-July in 1992. Yet,
at the 1993 hearing, claimant submitted a statement
signifying that he had experienced over 40 seizures during
this time. We note that claimant's credibility is further
diminished in this regard by the complete dearth of evidence
in the medical record that claimant ever complained about his
subjective complaints to those treating him.
Thus, while the record shows that claimant suffers
from epilepsy and high blood pressure, it does not support
his allegations of disabling symptomatology. Given this, the
Secretary was not required to obtain a medical opinion
directed at evaluating these complaints. Finally, because
the ALJ decided to discredit the severity of claimant's
subjective symptoms, he did not err in similarly discrediting
-4-
the response of the vocational expert that a person who
actually experienced these severe complaints could not work.
3. Claimant's last argument is that the Secretary
was precluded from relying on his failure to follow
prescribed treatment in concluding that claimant was not
disabled. To support this argument, claimant points to
Social Security Ruling 82-59. This Ruling states:
An individual who would otherwise be
found to be under a disability, but who
fails without justifiable cause to follow
treatment prescribed by a treating source
which the Social . . . Security
Administration . . . determines can be
expected to restore the individual's
ability to work, cannot by virtue of such
"failure" be found to be under a
disability.
Claimant asserts that his failure to follow the prescribed
treatment was "justifiable" and should not preclude a finding
of disability. Specifically, claimant argues that the
medical personnel who treated him had failed to inform him of
the importance of taking the medication as prescribed.
We need not reach the question whether claimant was
justified in his actions, however, because he is not a person
who is "otherwise . . . under a disability." That is, the
Secretary did not determine that claimant was disabled but
that his failure to observe medical directions precluded him
from receiving disability benefits. Rather, the Secretary
found that claimant was not disabled because his condition,
as reflected in the medical record, did not prevent him from
-5-
engaging in light work. The reference by the Secretary to
claimant's failure to take his medication as prescribed was
made in the course of discussing claimant's subjective
complaints. This is not the same as relying on this factor
to establish that claimant is not under a disability.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
district court is affirmed.
-6-