October 17, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 95-1064
MAURICE D. YOUNG,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
KNOX COUNTY DEPUTY, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Gene Carter, Chief U.S. District Judge]
Before
Cyr, Boudin and Lynch,
Circuit Judges.
Maurice D. Young on brief pro se.
William R. Fisher and Monaghan, Leahy, Hochadel & Libby on brief
for appellees.
Per Curiam. Pro se plaintiff Maurice Young appeals
a district court judgment that dismissed his complaint as
frivolous within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1915(d). We have
thoroughly reviewed the record and the parties' briefs on
appeal. We are persuaded that the district court's judgment
was correct. The plaintiff's amended complaint purported to
state claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' due process requirement and
the Fourth Amendment right to be free from "unreasonable
seizures." These claims were based on the alleged actions of
defendant Hansen, the deputy sheriff who arrested plaintiff
and allegedly committed perjury while testifying against the
plaintiff at his state criminal trial.
Insofar as plaintiff seeks to recover for Hansen's
alleged perjury, his claim is barred by Briscoe v. LaHue, 460
U.S. 325 (1983)(holding all witnesses are absolutely immune
from civil suit under 1983, including those who give
perjured testimony). Insofar as the complaint seeks damages
for violation of plaintiff's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights to procedural due process, the claim is barred because
the plaintiff has adequate remedies at state law. "[A]
procedural due process claim may not be redressed under
section 1983 where an adequate state remedy exists." Reid v.
New Hampshire, 56 F.3d 332, 341 (1st Cir. 1995). As Maine
recognizes the common law torts of false arrest and malicious
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prosecution, see, e.g., Nadeau v. State, 395 A.2d 107, 116
(Me. 1978); Qualey v. Town of Wilton, 540 A.2d 479 (Me.
1988), plaintiff has adequate post-deprivation remedies and
may not recover for the alleged violation of procedural due
process under 42 U.S.C. 1983. See Reid, 56 F.3d at 341. To
the extent that plaintiff alleges violations of substantive
due process, Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994), bars
his claim. Plaintiff's
claim for the alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable seizures is barred as a
matter of law for different reasons. The plaintiff alleged
that defendant Hansen arrested him without probable cause for
operating under the influence (OUI) and operating after his
license had been revoked (OAR). Plaintiff has submitted an
arrest report which indicates that Hansen arrested him on the
foregoing charges and for illegal attachment of license
plates. The plaintiff claims that after a jury deadlocked at
his criminal trial on the OUI and OAR charges, the state
reduced these charges to illegally attaching license plates
and allowing his motor vehicle to be driven (presumably, with
the illegal plates). The plaintiff does not contend that
probable cause was lacking for these latter charges.
"Probable cause need only exist as to any offense that could
be charged under the circumstances." Barna v. City of Perth
Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 819 (3rd Cir. 1994). See also Barry v.
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Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 773 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1990); Edwards v.
City of Philadelphia, 860 F.2d 568, 576 (3rd Cir.
1988)(similar). Where plaintiff does not contend that
probable cause was lacking for his arrest for illegal
attachment of license plates, he cannot recover for an
unreasonable seizure, even if probable cause was lacking on
the OUI and OAR charges. Accordingly, as plaintiff's federal
claims lack an arguable basis in law, they were properly
dismissed as frivolous. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989).
There was no separate discussion of the state law
claims by the district court. As plaintiff has failed to
allege claims that would support federal jurisdiction, his
state law claims were also subject to dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715, 726-27 (1966). However, these claims should have been
dismissed without prejudice. See Figueroa Ruiz v. Alegria,
896 F.2d 645, 650 (1st Cir. 1990). Accordingly, the judgment
of the district court is affirmed insofar as it dismisses
plaintiff's federal claims (i.e., counts 1-4 of plaintiff's
amended complaint) as frivolous. We vacate the dismissal of
plaintiff's state law claims (i.e., counts 5-13 of the
amended complaint) and remand with instructions that these
claims be dismissed without prejudice for lack of federal
jurisdiction.
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It is so ordered.
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