March 27, 1996
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 95-2094
BERNARDO FIGUEROA,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
GEORGE A. VOSE, JR., ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Ronald R. Lagueux, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge,
Stahl and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
Bernardo Figueroa on brief pro se.
Michael B. Grant, Senior Legal Counsel, Rhode Island Department
of Corrections, on Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Disposition, for appellees.
Per Curiam. Bernardo Figueroa, who is incarcerated
in the Maximum Security prison at the Adult Correctional
Institution in Rhode Island, appeals from the district
court's dismissal of his suit against state prison officials
under 42 U.S.C. 1983. We affirm, substantially for the
reasons given in the magistrate judge's report dated July 11,
1995, which the district court adopted as its decision. We
add only the following comments.
1. Figueroa suggests that Sandin v. Conner, 115 S.
Ct. 2293 (1995), would not bar his due process claims because
the disciplinary decision against him could affect future
classification or parole decisions. The chairman of the
state parole board testified below that inmate misconduct is
only one of the factors considered in granting or denying
parole and that an inmate may explain adverse disciplinary
decisions to the parole board. Thus, the disciplinary
decision against Figueroa will not "inevitably" affect the
length of his sentence and its existence does not give rise
to a protected liberty interest. See id. at 2302 (dictum).
2. Although the complaint asserted that defendants
had harassed Figueroa because of his race or for retaliatory
reasons, Figueroa failed to raise that claim at the hearing
before the magistrate. Nor did he raise it with sufficient
clarity in his objections to the magistrate's report and
recommendation. We therefore deem that claim abandoned. See
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Borden v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 836 F.2d 4,
6 (1st Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
3. The district court did not err in failing to
address Figueroa's claim that defendants had violated the
Morris v. Travisono consent decree. We have held that
inmates may not bring individual section 1983 actions for
injunctive or declaratory relief which are based on consent
decree violations. See Martel v. Fridovich, 14 F.3d 1, 3 n.4
(1st Cir. 1993).
4. The magistrate judge was authorized to conduct
all necessary hearings and to issue a report and
recommendation for review by the district court, which he
did. Because he was not authorized to and did not enter
judgment in this case, the parties' consent was not required.
See 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(B) & (c)(1).1
1
1We note one problem with Magistrate Judge Boudewyns'
1
report and recommendation to the district court which does
not affect the disposition of this appeal. At the end of his
report, the magistrate judge stated that the "[f]ailure to
file specific objections in a timely manner constitutes a
waiver of the right to review by the district court." In a
footnote, he cites Park Motor Mart, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,
616 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1980), and United States v. Valencia-
Copete, 792 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam). The quoted
language accurately states our holding in Park Motor. But it
does not encompass our holding in Valencia-Copete, where we
directed all magistrates to include in their reports a notice
that failure to timely object to a report would waive "the
right to appeal the district court's decision." 792 F.2d at
6 (emphasis added). We reiterate that all magistrate judges
in this Circuit are required to include in their reports the
statement that failure to file specific objections to reports
in a timely manner waives both the right to review by the
district court and the right to appeal the district court's
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Affirmed.
decision.
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