Chance v. TAIWAN

May 23, 1996
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 95-1526

ASTOR D. CHANCE,
Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

TAIWAN,
Defendant, Appellee.

No. 95-1573
No. 95-1629

ASTOR D. CHANCE,
Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Selya, Cyr and Lynch,
Circuit Judges.

Astor D. Chance on brief pro se.

Per Curiam. We affirm the judgments in these

consolidated appeals substantially for the reasons recited by

the district court. We add only the following comments.

1. The Government of Taiwan is amenable to suit in the

United States only in accordance with the terms of the

Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C.

1602-11. See, e.g., Millen Indus., Inc. v. Coordination

Council for North American Affairs, 855 F.2d 879, 883 (D.C.

Cir. 1988) ("all laws, including the FSIA, [that are]

applicable to nations also apply to Taiwan"); see generally

Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S.

428, 443 (1989) (FSIA "provides the sole basis for obtaining

jurisdiction over a foreign state in the courts of this

country"). Plaintiff is mistaken in arguing that the FSIA's

applicability to Taiwan is affected by 4(b)(7) of the

Taiwan Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. 3303(b)(7), which provides

simply that the capacity of Taiwan "to sue and be sued" in

United States courts is not altered "by the absence of

diplomatic relations or recognition." His further suggestion

that Taiwan's amenability to suit is affected by the Torture

Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat.

73 (set forth in note following 28 U.S.C. 1350), is

likewise misplaced.

2. For the reasons enumerated in Saudi Arabia v.

Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993), plaintiff's attempt to invoke

the "commercial activity" exception to the FSIA proves

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unavailing. In particular, because the governmental conduct

of which he complains is "peculiarly sovereign in nature,"

id. at 361, his action cannot be regarded as one "based ...

upon an act outside the territory of the United States in

connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state

elsewhere ...." 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(2).

3. Finally, we reject the procedural objection voiced

by plaintiff in Nos. 95-1573 & 95-1629. Inasmuch as a

frivolous complaint can properly be dismissed under 28 U.S.C.

1915(d) on a sua sponte basis, see, e.g., Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324, 330 (1989), the court did not

err in dismissing these actions in advance of its indicated

twenty-day deadline. Plaintiff, we note, has made no effort

to buttress his substantive arguments in this regard on

appeal.

Affirmed.

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