May 23, 1996
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 95-1526
ASTOR D. CHANCE,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
TAIWAN,
Defendant, Appellee.
No. 95-1573
No. 95-1629
ASTOR D. CHANCE,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Cyr and Lynch,
Circuit Judges.
Astor D. Chance on brief pro se.
Per Curiam. We affirm the judgments in these
consolidated appeals substantially for the reasons recited by
the district court. We add only the following comments.
1. The Government of Taiwan is amenable to suit in the
United States only in accordance with the terms of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C.
1602-11. See, e.g., Millen Indus., Inc. v. Coordination
Council for North American Affairs, 855 F.2d 879, 883 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) ("all laws, including the FSIA, [that are]
applicable to nations also apply to Taiwan"); see generally
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S.
428, 443 (1989) (FSIA "provides the sole basis for obtaining
jurisdiction over a foreign state in the courts of this
country"). Plaintiff is mistaken in arguing that the FSIA's
applicability to Taiwan is affected by 4(b)(7) of the
Taiwan Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. 3303(b)(7), which provides
simply that the capacity of Taiwan "to sue and be sued" in
United States courts is not altered "by the absence of
diplomatic relations or recognition." His further suggestion
that Taiwan's amenability to suit is affected by the Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat.
73 (set forth in note following 28 U.S.C. 1350), is
likewise misplaced.
2. For the reasons enumerated in Saudi Arabia v.
Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993), plaintiff's attempt to invoke
the "commercial activity" exception to the FSIA proves
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unavailing. In particular, because the governmental conduct
of which he complains is "peculiarly sovereign in nature,"
id. at 361, his action cannot be regarded as one "based ...
upon an act outside the territory of the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere ...." 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(2).
3. Finally, we reject the procedural objection voiced
by plaintiff in Nos. 95-1573 & 95-1629. Inasmuch as a
frivolous complaint can properly be dismissed under 28 U.S.C.
1915(d) on a sua sponte basis, see, e.g., Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324, 330 (1989), the court did not
err in dismissing these actions in advance of its indicated
twenty-day deadline. Plaintiff, we note, has made no effort
to buttress his substantive arguments in this regard on
appeal.
Affirmed.
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