July 5, 1996 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 95-1960
No. 95-2018
MARC E. WILDER, II, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION,
JOHN MARSHALL,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge,
Cyr and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
Marc E. Wilder, II and Russell J. Carey on brief pro se.
Nancy Ankers White, Special Assistant Attorney General, and
Margaret Melville, Counsel, Department of Correction, on brief for
appellees.
Per Curiam. Prior to its repeal in 1994, a
Massachusetts statute providing for the award of good-time
credits to state prisoners specifically withheld such credits
from inmates who had been convicted of enumerated sex
offenses. See Mass. Gen. L., ch. 127, 129. Plaintiffs
here, a group of prisoners serving sentences for sex crimes,
have brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 challenging
this statutory exclusion on various constitutional grounds.1
1
The lower court rejected each of their claims at the summary
judgment stage. On the arguendo assumption that plaintiffs'
contentions are cognizable in a civil-rights action (rather
than a habeas corpus proceeding), we summarily affirm for the
reasons recited by the magistrate-judge in his June 23, 1995
report. We add only the following.
Underlying several of plaintiffs' claims is the
assertion that their inability to obtain good-time credits
constitutes a separate "punishment" apart from that incurred
at sentencing. This is mistaken. The statutory exclusion
was enacted in 1965, see Amado v. Superintendent, 366 Mass.
45, 48 (1974) (reviewing statutory history)--long before any
of the plaintiffs had been convicted. Accordingly, their
ineligibility for such credits can only be viewed as part of
1 Of the more than fifty plaintiffs who joined in the
1
action below, only some fourteen are participating in the
instant appeals. We assume arguendo that each of the
appellants has properly invoked this court's jurisdiction.
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the punishment imposed by the sentencing court after trial.
Plaintiffs' assertion that the exclusion constitutes a bill
of attainder fails for this reason (among others). See,
e.g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 450 (1965).
Their additional claim that the exclusion violates double
jeopardy (a claim which we assume arguendo is properly before
us) falters on the same ground. Even if the exclusion were
viewed as a cumulative punishment for the same offense,
double jeopardy would not be offended. See, e.g., United
States v. Centeno-Torres, 50 F.3d 84, 85 (1st Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 208 (1995).
The allegation that the exclusion violates due process
proves equally unavailing. Plaintiffs possess no liberty
interest in receiving good-time credits. See, e.g., Sandin
v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2297 (1995); Riddle v. Mondragon,
83 F.3d 1197, 1206-07 (10th Cir. 1996). And the statutory
scheme found violative of substantive due process in Young v.
Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 748-51 (W.D. Wash. 1995), a case on
which plaintiffs rely, bears no resemblance to the one before
us. Finally, the contention that the exclusion violates
equal protection runs into a wall of caselaw indicating
otherwise. See, e.g., Riddle, 83 F.3d at 1207-08; Artway v.
Attorney General of New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235, 1267-68 (3d
Cir. 1996); Lustgarden v. Gunter, 966 F.2d 552, 555 (10th
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Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1008 (1992); Amado, 366 Mass.
at 46-51.
Affirmed. See Loc. R. 27.1.
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