UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 95-1840
ZAKIA CARTER,
Petitioner,
v.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF
THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Before
Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges,
and McAuliffe,* District Judge.
Joseph S. Callahan on brief for petitioner.
Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division,
and Philemina McNeill Jones, Assistant Director, Office of
Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, on
brief for respondent.
July 30, 1996
*Of the District of New Hampshire, sitting by designation.
SELYA, Circuit Judge. Invoking the newly enacted
SELYA, Circuit Judge.
"battered spouse" provision of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (I&N Act), 8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii) (1994), petitioner
Zakia Carter seeks judicial review of an order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (the Board) denying her motion to reopen
deportation proceedings. Discerning no cognizable error, we
decline to grant the petition.
I
I
Carter, a native and citizen of Morocco, was convicted
of assault and battery on March 8, 1981. After the victim died,
Carter pled guilty to a charge of manslaughter. The state court
sentenced her to serve 12-20 years in prison. She was not
released from the penitentiary until March 20, 1993.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
instituted deportation proceedings against petitioner on October
28, 1988 (while she was still incarcerated). In its order to
show cause, the INS charged her inter alia with committing a
crime involving moral turpitude (for which she was convicted and
sentenced to a prison term of more than one year) within five
years of her lawful entry into the United States, in violation of
section 241(a)(2) of the I&N Act, 8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(2).1
1The statute reads in pertinent part:
Any alien who (I) is convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude committed within
five years . . . after the date of entry, and
(II) either is sentenced to confinement or is
confined therefor . . . for one year or
longer, is deportable.
2
Petitioner disputed this charge, denying that the crime she had
committed involved moral turpitude.
On March 19, 1990, an immigration judge (IJ) found
petitioner deportable. While her appeal to the Board was
pending, petitioner, though still incarcerated, married Dale
Carter (a native and citizen of the United States). Following
her release, she gave birth to a child, Jamila Carter, on August
22, 1994. Six weeks thereafter, the Board affirmed the IJ's
decision and entered a deportation order. See Matter of Carter,
Interim Dec. No. 23-200-544 (BIA 1995).
Petitioner subsequently sought a divorce. She then
filed a motion to reopen the deportation proceedings. Although
the Board previously found petitioner deportable due to her
manslaughter conviction, her motion asserts an entitlement to a
waiver of excludability premised on her status as a battered
spouse.2 The Board denied her motion on July 12, 1995.
8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(2)(A)(i). Since the charge under this
provision is the only charge that INS pressed, it is the only
charge that we discuss.
2The applicable statute reads in pertinent part:
An alien who is the spouse of a citizen of
the United States, who is a person of good
moral character, who is eligible to be
classified as an immediate relative . . .,
and who has resided in the United States with
the alien's spouse may file a petition . . .
[for relief if]:
(I) the alien is residing in the
United States, the marriage between
the alien and the spouse was
entered into in good faith by the
alien, and during the marriage the
3
Petitioner now seeks judicial review. At the present time, her
divorce case is pending, as are certain domestic violence
proceedings against her husband.
II
II
We pause to emphasize the circumscribed nature of our
review. The Board originally found Carter to be inadmissible
(and, therefore, deportable) because she had committed a crime of
moral turpitude (and served more than twelve months in prison)
within five years of entering the United States. It denied her
motion to reopen for a variety of reasons (most of which related
to the absence of a prima facie showing of entitlement to
relief).
We inquire only into the Board's denial of the motion
to reopen, not its earlier adjudication of the merits of
petitioner's excludability. See Gando-Coello v. INS, 888 F.2d
197, 198 (1st Cir. 1989). Though the denial of a motion to
reopen deportation proceedings usually possesses the requisite
finality and thus triggers the judicial review provisions of the
I&N Act, see, e.g., Baez v. INS, 41 F.3d 19, 21 (1st Cir. 1994);
Goncalves v. INS, 6 F.3d 830, 831-32 (1st Cir. 1993); Athehortua-
alien . . . has been battered by or
has been the subject of extreme
cruelty perpetrated by the alien's
spouse; and
(II) the alien is a person whose
deportation would result in extreme
hardship to the alien or a child of
the alien.
8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii) (1994).
4
Vanegas v. INS, 876 F.2d 238, 240 (1st Cir. 1989), we probe that
denial solely to determine whether the Board misread the law or
otherwise abused its discretion by acting in an arbitrary or
capricious fashion. See INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323
(1992); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 105 (1988); Henry v. INS, 74
F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1996).
The Board's discretion is sprawling, but it does not go
untethered. "[A]djudicatory tribunals can exceed grants of
discretion even ringing grants of broad, essentially
standardless discretion in various ways." Henry, 74 F.3d at 4.
In exercising discretionary authority, the Board is "obliged to
weigh all the pertinent factors (both favorable and unfavorable),
to exhibit due consideration for the universe of weighted factors
when tallying the equities, to exercise independent judgment, and
to state plainly its reasons for granting or denying relief."
Bing Feng Chen v. INS, F.3d , (1st Cir. 1996) [No. 95-
2309, slip op. at 6]. Once the Board satisfies these
obligations, however, it has discretion not only to deny a motion
to reopen but also to deny a hearing thereon. See Moore v. INS,
715 F.2d 13, 16 n.2 (1st Cir. 1983).
III
III
It is settled that the Board can deny a motion to
reopen if (1) the alien fails to limn a prima facie case
warranting relief, or (2) the alien fails to introduce material
evidence that was not previously available, discoverable, or
considered at the original hearing, or (3) the Board reasonably
5
determines that the equities do not justify the application of a
discretionary balm. See 8 C.F.R. 3.2 (1996); see also Abudu,
485 U.S. at 104-05 (applying this paradigm to the Board's denial
of a motion to reopen); Gando-Coello, 888 F.2d at 198 (same).
Here, the Board had ample justification to deny the petitioner's
motion.
1. INS Approval. INS authorization of a petition for
1. INS Approval.
a status adjustment under 8 U.S.C. 1154 must occur before the
Board can grant such relief. See 8 U.S.C. 1154(b) (1994)
(placing upon the Attorney General or her designee the
responsibility to determine in the first instance "that the facts
stated in the petition are true and that the [petitioner] is an
immediate relative"). In this case, petitioner failed to present
her petition for adjusted status as a battered spouse to the INS,
and thus did not secure the requisite agency approval.
Approval by the INS is not an empty exercise, but,
rather, ensures that the agency has a meaningful opportunity to
verify a petitioner's claim that she has been subjected to
physical abuse and otherwise satisfies the statutory criteria.
Since the INS's imprimatur is a condition precedent to obtaining
relief under 8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii), petitioner's failure
to comply with this requirement means that she is unable to state
a prima facie case. Consequently, the Board's refusal to reopen
the proceedings is unimpugnable.3
3Highlighting this same deficiency, the INS challenges our
jurisdiction on the basis that petitioner failed to exhaust all
available administrative remedies in that she neglected to have
6
2. Good Moral Character; Extreme Hardship. Petitioner
2. Good Moral Character; Extreme Hardship.
also failed to establish a prima facie case under the battered
spouse provision because she did not submit adequate evidence of
either "good moral character" or "extreme hardship." We explain
briefly.
As to character, the only evidence that petitioner
proffered consists of a copy of her prison records, detailing her
good behavior and involvement in training programs while she was
incarcerated. The Board declined to accept these records as
sufficient to show good moral character, and we are not persuaded
that the Board's position is arbitrary or capricious.
We note that even appropriate extrinsic evidence of
good moral character might well be futile here due to
petitioner's conviction. In the deportation case proper, the
Board found petitioner's manslaughter offense to be a crime of
moral turpitude. The Board's judgments in such matters are not
easily dismissed, see Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 571, 573 (8th Cir.
1996) (explaining that since moral turpitude is a "nebulous"
concept, courts will only overturn the Board's determination that
a crime fits within that rubric if the determination is
unreasonable); and, in all events, we think that manslaughter
her petition verified by the INS.. "It is a familiar tenet that
when an appeal presents a jurisdictional quandary, yet the merits
of the underlying issue, if reached, will in any event be
resolved in favor of the party challenging the court's
jurisdiction, then the court may forsake the jurisdictional
riddle and simply dispose of the appeal on the merits." United
States v. Stoller, 78 F.3d 710, 715 (1st Cir. 1996) (collecting
cases). This is such a case. Hence, we take no view of the
government's jurisdictional argument.
7
stemming from assault and battery is properly classified as a
crime of moral turpitude. Compare, e.g., Asencio v. INS, 37 F.3d
614, 615 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that attempted murder is a
crime of moral turpitude); Rodriguez-Padron v. INS, 13 F.3d 1455,
1458 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that second-degree murder is a
crime of moral turpitude); Gouveia v. INS, 980 F.2d 814, 815-16
(1st Cir. 1992) (holding that rape is a crime of moral
turpitude); Thomas v. INS, 976 F.2d 786, 787-88 (1st Cir. 1992)
(holding assault and battery with a baseball bat to be crimes
involving moral turpitude). Accordingly, petitioner's conviction
for manslaughter not only would constitute a violation of 8
U.S.C. 1251(a)(2)(A)(i) but also would preclude her from
establishing the "good moral character" necessary to qualify
under the battered spouse provision. See Flores v. INS, 66 F.3d
1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that petitioner's conviction
for welfare fraud precluded her from establishing the "good moral
character" required to apply for a suspension of deportation
under 8 U.S.C. 1254(a)(1)).
Relatedly, petitioner neglected to proffer any evidence
as to how deportation would work an extreme hardship to either
herself or her child. This omission, in and of itself, prevented
the establishment of a prima facie case. This is especially true
in light of the Board's wide discretion in determining what does
and does not rise to the level of "extreme hardship." See Luna
v. INS, 709 F.2d 126, 127 (1st Cir. 1983).
IV
IV
8
We need go no further. Given the absence of a prima
facie case, the Board acted well within its discretion in
summarily denying petitioner's motion to reopen.
The petition for review is denied and dismissed. See
The petition for review is denied and dismissed.
1st Cir. R. 27.1.
9