[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 96-1227
MARYANN HALL,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
LAWRENCE ALAN HALL,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Robert B. Collings, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
Before
Cyr, Boudin and Stahl,
Circuit Judges.
Anthony M. Fredella, with whom Fredella & Wheeler was on brief
for appellant.
Seth M. Kalberg for appellee.
November 6, 1996
Per Curiam. Appellant Maryann Hall, former spouse of
Per Curiam.
defendant-appellee Lawrence Hall, appeals from a district court
judgment dismissing her diversity suit for breach of their
agreement for an equal division of any remaining capital in
Merlin Machinery, a Massachusetts corporation in which each owned
shares.1 Maryann claims that the adverse jury verdict on which
the district court based its judgment is against the weight of
the evidence and that the court erred in denying her motion for
new trial.2 We affirm.
Maryann's timeous motion for new trial under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59(b) requires that we review the sufficiency of the
evidence, see Velazquez v. Figueroa-Gomez, 996 F.2d 425, 426-27
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 993 (1993), but only for abuse
of discretion. Id. at 427. Following careful review of the
entire record, we are satisfied that the district court acted
well within its broad discretion in denying the motion for new
trial. We add only these brief comments.
The district court submitted two questions to the jury.
The first inquired whether Maryann had proven that capital
remained or should have remained in Merlin Machinery as of the
1The evidence is viewed, and every reasonable inference
drawn, in the light most favorable to the verdict. J.D. Havinga
v. Crowley Towing and Transp. Co., 24 F.3d 1480, 1483 (1st Cir.
1994).
2As Maryann filed no motion for judgment as a matter of law,
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a), (b), we cannot entertain the Rule 50
claim. Hammond v. T.J. Litle & Co., Inc., 82 F.3d 1166, 1171
(1st Cir. 1996).
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agreed settlement date.3 The jury responded in the negative.
Unlike Larry, Maryann presented no expert testimony on
this accounting question. Moreover, although Maryann presented
other evidence which, if credited by the jury, may have sufficed
to demonstrate undistributed capital in the corporation, nothing
in the record suggests that the jury need have accepted her
evidence over the competing evidence offered by Larry.
Consequently, we must credit Larry's version, see J.D. Havinga v.
Crowley Towing and Transp. Co., 24 F.3d 1480, 1483 (1st Cir.
1994). Accordingly, the district court judgment is affirmed.
3We do not reach the second question.
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