[NOT FOR PUBLICATION – NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 01-1193
MARGOT K. NICKERSON-MALPHER,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
MARKET FORGE GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PLAN,
PRINCIPAL MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, and
SPECIALTY EQUIPMENT COMPANIES, INC.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya and Lipez, Circuit Judges,
and Doumar, Senior District Judge.*
Matthew Cobb, on brief for appellant.
John A. Houlihan and Christopher P. Silva, on brief for
appellees Market Forge Group Life Insurance Plan and Specialty
Equipment Companies, Inc.
Margaret J. Hurley, on brief for appellee Principal Mutual
Life Insurance Company.
*
Of the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by
designation.
October 1, 2001
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PER CURIAM. Margot Nickerson-Malpher, who became
permanently disabled on August 6, 1993, claims entitlement to
inter vivos disability payments under her former employer’s Life
Insurance Plan; the defendants, her former employer and its life
insurance providers, counter that the Plan in which Nickerson-
Malpher was enrolled only entitled her to a death benefit upon
becoming permanently disabled. She appeals the District Court’s
grant of summary judgment to the defendants and denial of her
cross-motion. For the reasons that follow, summary judgment is
affirmed.
Market Forge Co. hired Nickerson-Malpher on November
27, 1989. She participated in both the company’s Life Insurance
Plan and its Retirement Plan. The Life Insurance Plan offered
two different disability benefits: 1) for people also
participating in the Retirement Plan (“Disability 1"); and 2)
for people not participating in the Retirement Plan (“Disability
2"). Disability 1 provided, in relevant part, that if an
insured “becomes totally disabled . . . the Company . . . will
pay to his beneficiary the amount of Total Disability Benefit in
effect as provided . . . [and] no payment of premium will be
required for the Person while this Benefit is in effect.”
In contrast, Disability 2 provided that if an insured
“becomes totally disabled . . . the Company . . . will pay to
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the Person in sixty consecutive installments, a monthly income
of $18.15 for each $1,000 of life insurance in force on his life
as of the date such total disability commenced; and . . . will
provide without further payment of premium . . . a death benefit
payable to his beneficiary . . . equal to the commuted value of
the unpaid installments.” The sole difference between whether
an insured is entitled to death benefits under Disability 1 or
inter vivos benefits under Disability 2 is whether the insured
participated in the company’s Retirement Plan.
Nickerson-Malpher became totally disabled, as defined
in the plan, on August 6, 1993. In November 1993, Market Forge
Co.’s parent, Specialty Equipment Co., sold Market Forge’s
assets to a group of its employees. As part of that
transaction, Specialty paid out to all non-vested employees,
including Nickerson-Malpher, their non-vested retirement
benefits under the Retirement Plan. Therefore, Nickerson-
Malpher received a lump sum payment as a non-vested participant
in the Retirement Plan.
On December 20, 1993, Nickerson-Malpher applied for the
inter vivos disability benefits under the Disability 2 provision
of the Life Insurance Plan. Through a series of correspondence
over several years, the Life Insurance Company informed
Nickerson-Malpher that she did not qualify for Disability 2, but
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approved her claim under the terms of Disability 1 on the
grounds that Nickerson-Malpher had participated in the
Retirement Plan.
On July 29, 1998, Nickerson-Malpher filed her Complaint
in this case under 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(1)(B) (1994). The
defendants moved for summary judgment, and Nickerson-Malpher
filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The District Court
held a hearing on summary judgment on March 22, 2000. In a
Memorandum of Decision dated December 28, 2000, the Court denied
Nickerson-Malpher’s motion for summary judgment and granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Nickerson-Malpher
then instituted this appeal.
A denial of benefits by an ERISA fiduciary challenged
under 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(1)(B) is reviewed de novo. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989); Hughes v.
Boston Mutual Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 264, 267 (1st Cir. 1994).
Where, as here, the parties stipulated to the material facts and
the outcome turns entirely on the interpretation of the relevant
plan documents, the de novo standard authorizes the district
court to decide the dispute “as matters of law are decided.”
Recupero v. New England Tel. and Tel. Co., 118 F.3d 820, 839
(1st Cir. 1997).
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As such, our review of the evidence stipulated to below
gives us no reason to question the District Court’s findings.
Nickerson-Malpher was unquestionably covered by her employer’s
Life Insurance Plan. According to the plain and unambiguous
language of the Life Insurance Plan documents, if Nickerson-
Malpher also participated in her employer’s Retirement Plan
then, following her disability, she was only entitled to the
Life Insurance Plan’s death benefit, not its inter vivos
benefit. The evidence shows that Nickerson-Malpher did indeed
participate in the Retirement Plan while she was employed with
Market Forge; the fact that she accepted a lump-sum payout from
the Retirement Plan several months after her disability further
demonstrates this fact. Therefore, the Life Insurance Plan
provides a plain and unambiguous benefit for Nickerson-Malpher,
and that is a death benefit, not an inter vivos one. Thus, the
evidence does not demonstrate that a genuine issue of material
fact exists to warrant trial in this case, and the District
Court properly granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
Affirmed.
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