[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 01-1436
LUIS ESPADA-ROSADO,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Aida M. Delgado-Colón, U. S. Magistrate Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Lipez, Circuit Judges.
Melba N. Rivera Camacho on brief for appellant.
Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Camille Velez Rive,
Assistant U.S. Attorney, and Robert M. Peckrill, Assistant
Regional Counsel, Social Security Administration, on brief for
appellee.
December 18, 2001
Per Curiam. We have reviewed the record and the
briefs of the parties in this Social Security disability
benefits case and have carefully considered claimant Luis
Espada Rosado’s arguments that the administrative law judge
(ALJ) erred by employing the incorrect legal standard in
evaluating his application for reinstatement of withdrawn
disability benefits and that the ALJ’s decision is not
supported by substantial evidence. Espada is incorrect that
the ALJ should have employed the legal standard applicable
to evaluating “medical improvement” in disability benefits
cessation cases. The cessation of benefits in Espada’s case
was not based on a finding of medical improvement. Rather,
the cessation of benefits was initiated by a change in the
social security laws, namely 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)2)(C) and
1382(a)(3)(J). The ALJ correctly employed the applicable
standards embodied in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535 and 416.935 to
evaluate Espada’s request for reinstatement of his disability
benefits.
After determining, based on the medical evidence
provided by both treating and consulting psychiatrists, that
Espada’s emotional disorder left him unable to perform his
past relevant work, the ALJ solicited the testimony of a
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vocational expert (VE). The VE testified at the
administrative hearing that there were other jobs in the
national economy which Espada could perform despite his
emotional disorder. Thus, the ALJ had specific evidence -
the VE’s testimony - that there were actual jobs in the
national economy which claimant could perform. Therefore,
the decision of the Commissioner that claimant was not
disabled is supported by substantial evidence.
The final judgment of the magistrate judge is
affirmed. See Local Rule 27.1.
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