United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 02-1608
WILSON RUIZ-SULSONA,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jay A. García-Gregory, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Selya, Circuit Judge.
Israel Roldán-González, for appellant.
Raquel M. Dulzaides, with whom Carlos George, Sonia B. Alfaro-
de la Vega, and Jiménez Graffam & Lausell, were on brief, for
appellees.
July 3, 2003
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant, Wilson
Ruiz-Sulsona ("Ruiz"), appeals from the dismissal of his political
discrimination suit against the University of Puerto Rico and
several members of its faculty. The district court found that his
claims were time barred and lacked sufficient evidence. After
careful review, we affirm with additional clarification.
I. Background
The University of Puerto Rico, Aguadilla Campus
("University"), hired Ruiz to serve as a professor on a part-time
basis beginning in August, 1995. After Ruiz had worked at the
University for almost two years, the University did not renew his
service contract for the 1997-1998 school year. In May and June
1997, Ruiz applied for a probationary professor position at the
University. The University did not hire Ruiz to fill any position.
Ruiz then filed suit against five faculty members of the
Department of Business Administration who served on the
Department's Personnel Committee (the "Department") and the
University, claiming that Defendants1 did not renew his teaching
contract because he is a member of Puerto Rico's New Progressive
Party (NPP). In addition to asserting claims under the laws and
constitution of Puerto Rico, Ruiz filed a § 1983 action, alleging
1
Defendants include the University of Puerto Rico, Diana Ruiz
Gómez, Pedro N. González, Luis Crespo-Bello, Fernando Neris-Flores,
and Miguel González Valentín. Crespo-Bello was the Director of the
Department until he retired in 1996; he was succeeded by Diana Ruiz
Gómez ("Defendants").
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violations of his rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. The district court dismissed the case, adopting the
magistrate judge's report and recommendation, which found that
summary judgment should be granted in favor of Defendants because
Ruiz's claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations
and because Ruiz lacked trial-worthy evidence. Ruiz appeals.
II. Standard of Review
We review summary judgment decisions de novo, construing
the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Kauch v. Dep't for Children, Youth & Their Families, 321 F.3d 1, 3-
4 (1st Cir. 2003). Summary judgment is appropriate where there is
no "genuine issue as to any material fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
III. Discussion
A. Section 1983 Claims
The district court found that Ruiz's § 1983 claims were
time barred. In cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we
apply the forum state's statute of limitations period for personal
injury actions, which in Puerto Rico is one year. Rivera-Muriente
v. Agosto-Alicea, 959 F.2d 349, 353 (1st Cir. 1992). We then apply
federal law to determine when the limitations period begins to
accrue. Id. In most instances, the date of accrual occurs "when
the plaintiff knows, or has reason to know, of the injury on which
the action is based." Id. In wrongful discharge suits, such as
the case before us, "the statute of limitations begins to run when
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the plaintiff learns of the decision to terminate his employment."
Id. To qualify as the accrual date, it is only necessary that "the
employee reliably knew he had lost his job, not the date when the
employer dotted a particular 'i' or crossed a particular 't.'" Id.
As he admitted in his deposition, Ruiz learned that the
University would not renew his contract in May of 1997. However,
Ruiz did not file his complaint until June of 1998, a date falling
outside the one-year statute of limitations period. Ruiz contends,
however, that the accrual period properly begins in August, 1997
because, although he knew in May, 1997 that his earlier contract
would not be renewed, he had a reasonable expectancy of being re-
hired or of being appointed to a new position until he met with
Dean Segarra de Jaramillo in August, 1997. It was at the August,
1997 meeting that Dean Segarra de Jaramillo made it clear to Ruiz
that the University would not hire him for any teaching position.
We reject Ruiz's position. As the Supreme Court
explained, "[d]iscrete acts such as termination, failure to
promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire are easy to
identify. Each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory
adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable
'unlawful employment practice.'" AMTRAK v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,
114 (2002). "[D]iscrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if
time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely
filed charges." Campbell v. BankBoston, N.A., 327 F.3d 1, 26 (1st
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Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has distinguished
between claims involving discrete incidents of discrimination and
retaliation from hostile work environment claims. Morgan, 536 U.S.
at 110-116. "[H]ostile work environment claims do not turn on
single acts but on an aggregation of hostile acts extending over a
period of time." Marrero v. Goya of P.R., Inc., 304 F.3d 7, 18
(1st Cir. 2002). Consequently, the statute of limitations "will
not exclude acts that are part of the same unlawful employment
practice if at least one act falls within the time period."
Dressler v. Daniel, 315 F.3d 75, 79 (1st Cir. 2003). In contrast,
acts such as those alleged by Ruiz -- failure to renew his contract
and failure to hire him for a new position -- constitute discrete
acts, for which claims must be filed within the time period.
Rivera v. P.R. Aqueduct and Sewers Auth., No. 02-1349, 2003 U.S.
App. LEXIS 11459, *11 (1st Cir. 2003).
The non-renewal of Ruiz's teaching contract in May, 1997
constituted a discrete incident of alleged discrimination, and Ruiz
had an obligation to file within the appropriate time period.
While in an appropriate case we have the ability to toll the time
period by applying an equitable doctrine, Morgan, 536 U.S. at 122,
we decline to do so because applying the statute of limitations
creates no injustice to Ruiz. Ruiz claims that he knew all along
that he was being discriminated against for his political beliefs.
When he realized that his temporary contract would not be renewed,
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he had an obligation to file his claim. For us to decide otherwise
would allow a plaintiff to extend the statute of limitations merely
by applying for additional positions, even though the employer has
clearly terminated his employment.
The University's refusal to hire Ruiz for a new position
that Ruiz applied for in June, 1997 would qualify as a discrete act
of alleged discrimination falling inside the filing period.
However, Ruiz has not brought a claim for denial of a new position.
Ruiz's complaint focuses on how Defendants' actions resulted in the
non-renewal of his work contract. The first mention of his May and
June, 1997 applications for new positions is found in Plaintiff's
Motion in Opposition to Summary Judgment. Because there are no
circumstances present that warrant departure from the general rule
that arguments "not seasonably advanced below" are lost, we find
that Ruiz has waived an independent claim for denial of additional
positions. Clauson v. Smith, 823 F.2d 660, 666 (1st Cir. 1987)
(explaining that the prudential basis for not considering new
theories on appeal lies in fairness; plaintiff should not be able
to idle and then produce arguments that the defendant had no cause
to rebut and the district judge had no cause to examine).
Consequently, we find that the district court properly dismissed
Ruiz's § 1983 claims as untimely.2
2
Because we affirm based on Ruiz's failure to file within the
statute of limitations, we need not reach Ruiz's sufficiency of the
evidence claim.
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B. Pendent State Claims
We find that the district court was well within its
discretion in refusing supplemental jurisdiction over the state law
claims. As a general rule, where the district court dismisses the
federal claims before trial, the court should dismiss the state law
claims without prejudice. Rodríguez v. Doral Mortgage Corp., 57
F.3d 1168, 1177 (1st Cir. 1995).
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, we affirm the judgment
of the district court.
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