United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 03-1012
03-1013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
JOSÉ ARIEL CRUZ-RIVERA,
Defendant, Appellant.
No. 03-1014
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
JULIO SANTIAGO-ADAMS,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Juan Pérez-Giménez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Lynch, Circuit Judge, and
Lipez, Circuit Judge.
Rafael F. Castro Lang, for appellant Cruz-Rivera.
David Ramos-Pagan, for appellant Santiago-Adams.
Nelson Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
H.S. Garcia, United States Attorney, and Sonia I. Torres-Pabón,
Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Criminal Division, were on
brief, for appellee.
January 22, 2004
LYNCH, Circuit Judge. On July 9, 1997, appellants Julio
Santiago-Adams and José Ariel Cruz-Rivera, accompanied by two
others, broke into the home of Carlos Flores-Rodríguez in Juana
Diaz, Puerto Rico; the robbery ended with Flores-Rodríguez dead,
shot seven times. Both Santiago-Adams and Cruz-Rivera were
carrying revolvers during the shooting. The intruders took from
the home $2,000 in cash, which was one day's proceeds from a Texaco
gas station that Flores-Rodríguez owned. Because of the death of
its owner, the gas station was forced to close.
Both defendants pled guilty to carrying a firearm during
and in relation to a robbery affecting interstate commerce and
causing the death of Carlos Flores-Rodríguez. 18 U.S.C. §
924(j)(1).1 As to each defendant, a separate count in the
indictment under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, was dismissed.
In Santiago-Adams's plea agreement, the government agreed
to recommend imprisonment at the lower end of the applicable
guidelines range. He was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment, five
years supervised release, and a special monetary assessment of
$100, in November 2002. Cruz-Rivera's plea agreement allowed him
to argue for a sentence of 360 months, while the government was
permitted to seek a sentence of up to 516 months. The court was
1
Cruz-Rivera also pled guilty to obstructing interstate
commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)(2). This charge was
based on a separate robbery with which Cruz-Rivera, but not
Santiago-Adams, had been charged. Cruz-Rivera's argument on appeal
is focused on the robbery of Flores-Rodríguez.
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persuaded by the government and imposed a 516 month sentence in
December 2002. The maximum statutory penalty available for both
defendants was at least life imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. §
924(j)(1).2 Neither man sought to withdraw his plea before the
district court.
Although saved from possible life imprisonment, the
defendants were apparently unhappy with their sentences. Each
appealed, launching an attack on his plea based on the limits
imposed by the Commerce Clause on the reach of federal criminal
statutes. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995). Cruz-Rivera argues that his plea colloquy was deficient
under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 and that he did not knowingly and
voluntarily enter the plea; this argument is premised on the
judge's alleged failure to explain fully the interstate commerce
elements of the crime. Santiago-Adams attempts to invalidate his
plea by arguing that the district court did not have jurisdiction
over the case because the robbery of a private house lacks a
sufficient nexus to interstate commerce. Neither defendant ever
presented these arguments to the district court as a basis to
vacate his plea. Indeed, the court had earlier denied a motion to
dismiss by Cruz-Rivera, and joined by Santiago-Adams, that was
based on the alleged lack of a nexus to interstate commerce.
2
The statute also authorizes the death penalty for such
violations. 18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1).
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Neither defendant presents circumstances that warrant vacating his
plea on appeal.
Cruz-Rivera
Because Cruz-Rivera did not move to withdraw his plea,
review is for plain error. United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 63-
66 (2002); United States v. Corporan-Cuevas, 244 F.3d 199, 202 (1st
Cir. 2001). There was no such error here.
We agree with Cruz-Rivera that the plea hearing,
conducted before a court with a heavy criminal docket, might well
have been more carefully done. Cruz-Rivera correctly points out
that, at one point during the plea colloquy, the district court
misdescribed the crime with which he was charged as "a robbery from
a Texaco gas station in Penuelas." The court later read to Cruz-
Rivera the relevant count in the indictment, but, because of the
indictment's summary description of the crime, that did not fill in
the gap.3 Nor did the government, in its description of the
evidence, shed much light on the facts supporting its proof of the
elements of the crime. The government said that "the United States
3
This language was that "on or about July 9, 1997, aided and
abetted by other individuals, [Cruz-Rivera] did knowingly
wrongfully, unlawfully use[] and carr[y] a firearm during and in
relation to a crime of violence, which is a felony that may be
prosecuted in a court of the United States and that this aiding and
abetting and the carrying of the unlawful use and carrying of a
firearm was done with intention to affect interstate commerce by
robbery and during course of said robbery, defendants caused the
death of Carlos Flores Rodriguez through the use of a firearm in
violation of the laws of the United States."
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would be relying on first and foremost physical evidence consisting
of a fingerprint placing the defendant at the home of the victim,
Carlos Flores Rodriguez . . . [and] bullet wounds actually found in
the defendant that matched up with a 357 Magnum revolver." It then
added only that it would also present the testimony of two
cooperating witnesses, including one "who actually participated in
the home invasion robbery of Carlos Flores Rodriguez and testified
as to what occurred on that date."
Still, we have no doubt that the defendant was aware of
the facts underlying the crime to which he pled guilty. Cruz-
Rivera early on in the proceedings filed a motion to dismiss,
arguing that the alleged crime lacked a sufficient nexus to
interstate commerce. When the motion to dismiss was denied, he
decided to plead guilty. The statement of facts attached to the
plea agreement stated that Cruz-Rivera, along with Nelson Aviles-
Aviles, Julio Santiago-Adams, and Hector Jimenez-Torres, had
"participated in the home invasion robbery of Carlos Flores-
Rodriguez at his residence in Juana Diaz, Puerto Rico." It said
that the four had entered the house after Santiago-Adams forced
open a bottom-floor window, that each was wearing a t-shirt over
his head, and that Cruz-Rivera was carrying a magnum revolver. And
it stated that the defendants took money from the residence and
that during the robbery Flores-Rodriguez was shot seven times and
killed. At the plea hearing, Cruz-Rivera told the court that he
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had reviewed these facts and that they were accurate. Both Cruz-
Rivera and his attorney told the court that they had discussed the
government's evidence with each other.
Given the evidence that Cruz-Rivera understood the
conduct to which he pled guilty, there was no plain error in the
district court's acceptance of his guilty plea. See United States
v. Ramirez-Benitez, 292 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 2002) (no plain error
where the district court's description of the offense, taken in
conjunction with the statement of facts attached to the plea
agreement and the defendant's description of his involvement in the
conspiracy, was sufficient to inform defendant of the nature of the
charged offense where the offense was not complicated).
Cruz-Rivera's argument that there was plain error relies
on our statement in United States v. Mack, 635 F.2d 20, 25 (1st
Cir. 1980), that reading an indictment will usually not suffice to
satisfy Rule 11. But the Mack court recognized that the operative
question is whether the defendant understood the law in relation to
the facts and that "no simple or mechanical rule" can be applied to
answer this inquiry. Id. (quoting United States v. Dayton, 604
F.2d 931, 939 (5th Cir. 1979)). As such, even a simple recitation
of the indictment can be sufficient to satisfy Rule 11 in less
complex cases. Ramirez-Benitez, 292 F.3d at 27. There is no need
to determine whether this is such a case: here, the district court
did more than simply read the indictment. Cruz-Rivera told the
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court that the government's statement of facts, which was attached
to the plea agreement, was accurate. He also told the court that
he had reviewed with his attorney the evidence in the government's
possession as to the charges. The court assured itself that Cruz-
Rivera understood his discussions with his attorney by questioning
him extensively on the application of the sentencing guidelines to
his case and on the rights that he waived by pleading guilty.
Cruz-Rivera also argues that the plea colloquy was
deficient because the judge did not explain the requirement that
his conduct affect interstate commerce. But nothing in Rule 11 or
in the cases cited by Cruz-Rivera suggests such a bright-line rule.
Rule 11 requires, in relevant part, only that the district court
ensure that the defendant understands "the nature of each charge"
to which he is pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G). It
does not require the court to explain the technical intricacies of
the charges in the indictment. Assuming arguendo that there could
be cases in which a judge's failure to discuss the interstate
commerce link renders the plea colloquy plainly deficient, this is
not such a case; Cruz-Rivera understood the nature of the charge
against him.
The question here is not whether the plea colloquy
satisfied Rule 11, but whether it was so deficient that it affected
substantial rights and seriously affected the fairness, integrity,
or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. See United
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States v. Savinon-Acosta, 232 F.3d 265, 268 (1st Cir. 2000). It is
clear that the answer to this question is no. That does not mean
that there were no problems with the plea colloquy. But Cruz-
Rivera is not entitled to relief based on such imperfections on a
plain error standard of review.
Santiago-Adams
Santiago-Adams argues that he is entitled to de novo
review because the alleged failure of the interstate commerce nexus
deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. See
Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64, 72 (1st Cir. 2003) (the
existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law
subject to de novo review). But this argument confuses the
constitutional limits on Congress's power with the jurisdiction of
the federal courts: whether the facts of a given case present a
sufficient nexus to interstate commerce to be regulated by Congress
is not an issue of the federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction.
See United States v. Rayborn, 312 F.3d 229, 231 (6th Cir. 2002)
("Although the interstate commerce requirement is frequently called
the 'jurisdictional element,' it . . . is not jurisdictional in the
sense that it affects a court's subject matter jurisdiction, i.e.,
a court's constitutional or statutory power to adjudicate a
case."); United States v. Carr, 271 F.3d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Martin, 147 F.3d 529, 531-32 (7th Cir. 1998); cf.
Wells Real Estate, Inc. v. Greater Lowell Bd. of Realtors, 850 F.2d
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803, 811 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting that the interstate commerce nexus
is not "strictly jurisdictional"). The link to interstate commerce
that is required by 18 U.S.C. § 924 is merely an element of the
offense, albeit a constitutionally mandated one. See Rayborn, 312
F.3d at 231; Carr, 271 F.3d at 178. And Santiago-Adams has made no
claim that the statute is facially unconstitutional.
Properly understood, Santiago-Adams's argument on appeal
is that the district court did not have before it sufficient
evidence of a link to interstate commerce to accept his guilty
plea. But by unconditionally pleading guilty, Santiago-Adams
waived this argument and cannot now advance it on appeal. See
United States v. Cordero, 42 F.3d 697, 698 (1st Cir. 1994).
Even were we to apply a plain error standard of review,
Santiago-Adams would still not prevail. There are significant and
interesting questions about whether mere robbery from a private
house of monies derived from the owner's interstate business would
be sufficient to create a federal crime. Compare United States v.
Diaz, 248 F.3d 1065, 1087-91 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding sufficient
evidence of an affect on interstate commerce to support Hobbs Act
convictions where the defendants robbed and extorted individuals
who were engaged in interstate commerce), with United States v.
Collins, 40 F.3d 95, 99-101 (5th Cir. 1994) (insufficient evidence
to support Hobbs Act conviction where defendant robbed an
individual employee of a business engaged in interstate commerce,
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but no direct effects on interstate commerce were shown). The
resolution of such questions will await an appropriate case. We
doubt that there is any serious claim of a constitutionally
insufficient interstate commerce connection where a robbery
directly results in the shutting down of an interstate business.
In any event, there was certainly no plain error here and it would
be contrary to the interest of justice to vacate this plea.
The guilty pleas of both defendants are affirmed. So
ordered.
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