United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 03-2086
KRISTIN DOUGLAS, a/k/a Tina Beth Martin,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
YORK COUNTY; YORK COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEP'T;
UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS DEPUTY SHERIFFS,
Defendants, Appellees.
YORK COUNTY SHERIFF,
Defendant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Stahl, Senior Circuit Judge, and
Lynch, Circuit Judge.
Thomas F. Hallett for appellant.
Michael J. Donlan, with whom Verrill & Dana, LLP was on brief,
for appellees.
March 11, 2004
LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Kristin Douglas brought a civil
rights action in May 2002 alleging that she was gang raped over
thirty years earlier, at age twenty-one, while she was incarcerated
for a traffic violation in the York County Jail in Maine. Her suit
claimed that a trustee prisoner who had keys to her cell entered
the cell, raped her, and then let in other prisoners to the cell
who also raped her.
Faced with the obvious question about why she had waited
so long to bring suit, Douglas argued that she had suffered from
pervasive mental illness for years and that the statute of
limitations was tolled under Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 853.
That statute provides:
If a person entitled to bring any of the actions under
sections 752 to 754, including section 752-C, and under
sections 851, 852 and Title 24, section 2902 is a minor,
mentally ill, imprisoned or without the limits of the
United States when the cause of action accrues, the
action may be brought within the times limited herein
after the disability is removed.
The defendants moved for summary judgment on limitations
grounds. To counter Douglas's claim that she had been mentally ill
within the meaning of § 853, the defendants presented an affidavit
from their expert, Dr. Carlyle Voss, a psychiatrist, who had
examined Douglas and reviewed records that Douglas had provided.
Voss concluded that Douglas fulfilled the criteria for post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) due principally to childhood abuse
and neglect. Nonetheless, Dr. Voss determined that "[s]ince the
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alleged rapes in 1971, Ms. Douglas's psychological disorders have
not resulted in an inability to function in society in a way that
prevented her from protecting her legal rights." This same theme
was repeated in Dr. Voss's reply affidavit to the affidavit
submitted by the plaintiff's expert:
It is my opinion that Ms. Douglas' psychological
disorders, did not and would not, have continuously
precluded her from bringing a lawsuit for the alleged
rapes after they occurred in 1971.
In response to the motion for summary judgment, Douglas
supported her contention that she was within the tolling statute
with an affidavit from an expert psychiatrist, Dr. Diane Schetky.
Dr. Schetky is board certified in psychiatry and forensic
psychiatry, has qualified as an expert in numerous sexual abuse
cases, and performs forensic psychiatric evaluations for the State
of Maine. She evaluated Douglas on three occasions and reviewed
the medical, psychological, and psychiatric reports of Douglas's
former doctors and of Dr. Voss. Because the resolution of this
appeal turns on the content of the Schetky affidavit, we quote it
at some length:
5. Kristin Douglas suffers from a Bi-Polar Disorder with
a current depression, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, and
Mixed-Personality Disorder, with borderline, dependent
and anti-social features. She has received various
medications over the years, and is currently being
prescribed Wellbutrin and Prozac, for antidepressant
medications.
6. Ms. Douglas grew up in a chaotic, highly
dysfunctional family in which she experienced physical,
emotional and sexual abuse, frequent rejection and
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emotional neglect. In addition, she had frequent changes
in residence and schools and was exposed to some
antisocial behavior within her home, as well. She lacked
stability and family support as a result of which, she
failed to develop coping skills and was ill equipped to
deal with the bad hand fate had dealt to her. Chronic
depression further limited her ability to reach her
potential or assert herself.
7. Her response to the rapes, like many victims, was to
blame herself. Her low self esteem, shame, guilt and
fear contributed to her difficulty taking any action at
the time of the rapes. Her family's rejection and blame
further contributed to her inability to take action. Her
trauma was compounded by her pregnancy and traumatic
abortion. Left to her own devices, she appears to have
dissociated at the time she stole the gun and car and was
not fully aware of her actions. She then tried to cope
with the rapes by self blame, distancing herself,
avoidance, repression, and by internalizing her rage.
This further fueled her depression. She went on to
develop typical signs of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
related to the rapes including emotional numbing,
intrusive symptoms, arousal and hypervigilance and
difficulty with trust.
8. She has attempted to cope by becoming dependant upon
other women. These relationships have been fraught with
difficulty owing to her neediness, her fear of rejection,
her rage, and difficulty sustaining relationships. It is
my impression that only recently (2000), with the help of
treatment for her depression and Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder, has she been strong enough to contemplate
bringing a lawsuit for the rapes. This is a brave step
on her part which requires revisiting the trauma and her
rage and one she could not have taken prior to finding
the supportive relationship she is now in and being among
people who validate her traumatic experiences and do not
blame her for them.
9. It is also my opinion that from a young age,
certainly as a child, as a result of the abusive family
upbringing imposed upon Ms. Douglas, she has been, and
continues to be, mentally ill. It is also my opinion
that as a result of this mental illness, and the
exacerbation of the rapes inflicted upon her at the York
County Jail, that Ms. Douglas has been at all pertinent
times, suffering from an "overall inability to function
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in society that prevents plaintiff[s] from protecting
[her] legal rights." It is my opinion that Ms. Douglas
has been functioning at a dramatically low level for a
person of her obvious intelligence. She has experienced
complete emotional shut-down in the past, as well as
suffered suicidal ideation on a consistent basis. Her
emotional shut-down has been such that she has not in the
past had the ability to interact on a meaningful basis
with people, or access her own feelings.
(emphasis added in paragraph 9).
The opposing expert affidavits by Voss and Schetky framed
the legal issue for both parties. The defense argued in its motion
for summary judgment that regardless of Douglas's psychological
diagnosis, she had functioned well in society both before and after
1971, when the rapes were alleged to have taken place. It asserted
that Douglas was "able to establish friendships and relationships,"
"secure employment and fulfill her responsibilities" and
"understand, and protect, her legal rights" throughout that time.
This was sufficient, argued the defense, to preclude Douglas from
tolling the statute of limitations because, under Maine law, the
term "mentally ill" in Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 853 "refers
to an overall inability to function in society that prevents
plaintiffs from protecting their legal rights." McAfee v. Cole,
637 A.2d 463, 466 (Me. 1994). In advancing this argument, the
defense conceded that Douglas had suffered from PTSD in the past,
but it did not focus on Douglas's mental capacity at the time of
the rapes.
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Douglas, not surprisingly, responded to the defendants'
motion by arguing that her "undisputed" mental illness "render[ed]
[her] unable to deal in any meaningful way with her life."
Despite this framing of the issue, the district court, on
review of a magistrate judge's recommended decision,1 changed the
focus of the inquiry to whether the plaintiff was mentally ill at
the time she was allegedly raped.2 Cf. Dasha v. Maine Med. Ctr.,
665 A.2d 993, 994 (Me. 1995) (suggesting that § 853 requires mental
illness at the time of the accrual of the action). The court held
that the affidavit from Dr. Schetky, the plaintiff's expert, was
insufficient to show that Douglas was mentally ill at that time
because of an ambiguity the court perceived in the affidavit's use
of the word "and" in paragraph 9. As the district court explained
it:
A reasonable jury could not tell from Dr. Schetky's
affidavit whether the psychiatrist is testifying that
Douglas's "overall inability to function" preceded "the
exacerbation of the rapes." The affidavit could mean
that Douglas suffered the requisite degree of mental
illness before the rapes (sufficient under the statute),
or that her mental illness reached that level only
because of the rapes (insufficient under the statute).
Because Dr. Schetky's affidavit leaves the evidence, at
best, in equipoise where Douglas has the burden of proof,
Douglas may not proceed.
1
The Magistrate Judge had stayed within the framework created
by counsel and recommended dismissal of the case on limitations
grounds on a different theory than the one offered by the district
court.
2
Neither of the parties' briefs to the district court re-
framed the issue.
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Based on this reasoning, the district court granted the defendants'
motion for summary judgment.
Douglas promptly moved for reconsideration, tendering a
supplemental affidavit from Dr. Schetky. The new affidavit made it
clear, if it was not already, that Dr. Schetky's opinion was, and
had been all along, that Douglas was mentally ill within the
meaning of the statute at the time of the rapes3 and that the rapes
had exacerbated the mental illness. The district court denied the
motion for reconsideration and granted a motion to strike Dr.
Schetky's supplemental affidavit, noting that the affidavit "could
easily have provided the necessary evidence [earlier], but it did
not, despite the plaintiff's earlier opportunities to revive it in
light of the issues raised." The court acknowledged that the
defense expert, Dr. Voss, did "not state in haec verba that Ms.
Douglas was not mentally ill at the time of the alleged rape," but
said that "the whole thrust of his affidavits . . . was that Ms.
Douglas had never met the criteria."
There are two problems with the district court's entry of
judgment for the defendants. The first concerns its initial
summary judgment decision, which we review de novo.
Rodriguez-Garcia v. Municipality of Caguas, 354 F.3d 91, 96 (1st
3
Thus, this case does not raise the issue of whether Maine law
would consider as within its tolling statute a case in which the
tort itself drove the person mentally ill where the plaintiff had
not been mentally ill before.
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Cir. 2004). The district court found an ambiguity in the
inferences to be drawn from Schetky's expert affidavit and ruled
against Douglas on summary judgment because she bore the ultimate
burden of proof on the tolling issue. But on a motion for summary
judgment all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the
non-moving party, regardless of who bears the ultimate burden of
proof. See Rosenberg v. City of Everett, 328 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir.
2003); Rodriguez v. Smithkline Beecham, 224 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.
2000). To the extent there was an ambiguity in the affidavit, it
had to be construed in Douglas's favor. In construing the
inferences from the affidavit against Douglas, the non-moving
party, the district court committed legal error.
The district court also erred in denying Douglas's motion
for reconsideration. Denials of such motions are reviewed only for
abuse of discretion. See United States v. Roberts, 978 F.2d 17, 20
(1st Cir. 1992). We conclude that this is one of those rare
instances in which the district court did abuse its discretion.
When faced with a motion to reconsider, the district
court must apply an interests-of-justice test. See id. at 21;
Greene v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 764 F.2d 19, 23 (1st Cir.
1985). It was clearly not in the interests of justice to deny
reconsideration here. The issue, as framed by the defendants and
responded to by the plaintiff, did not focus on whether Douglas was
mentally ill at the time of the rapes, but on the question whether
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any illness had precluded her from bringing suit after the alleged
rapes. The defense expert never opined that Douglas was not
mentally ill at the time of the rapes, and, in fact, seemed to
concede that she suffered from PTSD at some point before the rapes.
Despite the focus of both parties, the district court
injected a new issue into the case without giving notice and an
opportunity to respond. It was simply unfair -- and an abuse of
discretion -- for the district court, after having switched the
basic issue without giving the parties adequate warning, to refuse
to accept the prompt proffer of material relevant to the newly-
raised issue.4 This is especially true here, where a correct
application of the summary judgment standard to Dr. Schetky's first
affidavit very well might have obviated the need for a
reconsideration motion altogether. We have previously come to this
same conclusion in analogous cases in which it was clear that a
party was not given a fair opportunity to present its position.
See, e.g., Licciardi v. TIG Ins. Group, 140 F.3d 357, 364 (1st Cir.
1998) (district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence
that led to plaintiff being "prejudiced by presenting a case
addressed to one key issue, only to have defendant put on a case
addressed to a different predicate key issue"); Resolution Trust
Corp. v. N. Bridge Assocs., Inc., 22 F.3d 1198, 1200 (1st Cir.
4
This case is not even the usual case of a late filing by
counsel raising the issue of excusable neglect; there was no
neglect at all by plaintiff's counsel.
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1994) (ruling in favor of parties who were denied the opportunity
to file a third affidavit when they were "laid low . . . by a
rabbit punch"). For similar reasons, this court has found an abuse
of discretion where a district court refused to permit a party to
bring itself into compliance with an admittedly ambiguous Local
Rule. See United States v. Fraya, 145 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1998).
The defendants, perhaps anticipating our views, offer
alternative grounds to defend entry of judgment in their favor.
They argue that, notwithstanding Dr. Schetky's affidavits, the
evidence conclusively establishes that Douglas was not so mentally
ill that she could not have brought this lawsuit long before she
did. But the district court never reached this issue, and we
decline to do so in the first instance.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. Costs are awarded to plaintiff.
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