Harrington v. Chao

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 04-1144

THOMAS J. HARRINGTON; RICHARD S. NEVILLE; THOMAS FORDHAM;
FRANCIS J. FERGUSON; JOHN A. BIGGINS; MARK J. DURKIN,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,

JOSEPH D. FLEMMING, III,
Plaintiff,

v.

ELAINE L. CHAO, Secretary of Labor,
Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]

Before
Torruella, Lynch and Lipez, Circuit Judges.

William Kanter, with whom John S. Koppel, Appellate Staff,
Civil Division, Michael J. Sullivan, U.S. Attorney, Peter D.
Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Gary K. Stearman, Senior
Appellate Attorney, Department of Labor, Nathaniel I. Spiller,
Deputy Associate Solicitor, Allen H. Feldman, Associate Solicitor,
and Howard M. Radzely, Solicitor of Labor, were on brief, for
appellant.
Michael A. Feinberg, with whom Jonathan M. Conti and Feinberg,
Campbell & Zack, P.C. were on brief, for appellees.
Alan Hyde for the Association for Union Democracy, amicus
curiae.
Daniel J. Hall, with whom DeCarlo, Connor, & Selvo was on
brief, for the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America, amicus curiae.

June 21, 2004
 LYNCH, Circuit Judge. In 1996 the United Brotherhood of

Carpenters (UBC) reorganized its system of local unions and state

and district councils to create larger "Full Services Regional

Councils." These new councils were given "all legislative and

executive powers on all matters relating to the general interest

and welfare of affiliated Local Unions and their members." The

UBC's reorganization was largely a response to the accelerating

regionalization of the construction industry. Construction work

had become dominated by fewer and larger employers who increasingly

handled out-of-state projects. As a result, the UBC determined

that its old network of local unions and state and district

councils was no longer capable of bargaining effectively with

employer associations.

This case involves a challenge by seven dissatisfied

rank-and-file members of one regional council, the New England

Regional Council of Carpenters ("NERCC"), to the procedure by which

their officers are elected. The NERCC members do not directly

elect their officers. Rather, the regional council's officers are

elected every four years by delegates who are themselves elected by

the members of the local unions. The plaintiffs claim that the

Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. §§

401-531, requires the direct election of the NERCC's officers

because the NERCC is a "local labor organization" within the

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meaning of the Act, id. § 481(b), notwithstanding the UBC's

designation of it as an intermediate body.

The Secretary of Labor initially determined that the

NERCC is an "intermediate" rather than a "local" union body and is

thus not required by the Act to conduct direct elections. In

Harrington v. Chao, 280 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2002) (Harrington I), we

found the Secretary's explanation inadequate and remanded the case

to her. A new Secretary reviewed the matter and reached the same

conclusion, which she explained in a Supplemental Statement of

Reasons ("SSR"). Plaintiffs again sued. The district court,

interpreting Harrington I, found the conclusion as explained in the

SSR to be arbitrary and capricious and issued injunctive relief.

The Secretary appealed and at her behest this court stayed the

district court's injunctive order. We now hold that the

Secretary's determination was not arbitrary and capricious. We

reverse the district court and order entry of judgment for the

Secretary.

I. Background of LMRDA

Concerned about "instances of breach of trust,

corruption, disregard of the rights of individual employees, and

other failures to observe high standards of responsibility and

ethical conduct" by entrenched union officials, 29 U.S.C. § 401(b),

Congress in 1959 enacted the LMRDA. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat.

519 (1959). Title IV of the Act regulates the election of union

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officers. 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-83. It requires that the officers of

all "local labor organizations" be elected directly by secret

ballot of their members and that these elections take place not

less than every three years. Id. § 481(b). If an organization is

an "intermediate bod[y],"1 by contrast, Title IV allows the union

to choose between direct elections of the organization's officers

and election by representatives who are themselves elected,2 and

provides that these elections must occur at least every four years.

Id. § 481(d). These requirements are designed "to protect the

rights of rank-and-file members to participate fully in the

operation of their union through processes of democratic

self-government, and . . . to keep the union leadership responsive

to the membership." Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees Union,

391 U.S. 492, 497-98 (1968).

The LMRDA does not define the terms "local labor

organization" or "intermediate bodies." The only explicit guidance

provided in the statutory text for categorizing union bodies as

intermediate or local is the Act's specification of several example

"intermediate bodies." These include "general committees, system

boards, joint boards, or joint councils." See 29 U.S.C. § 481(d).

1
Similar provisions in Title IV regulate the election of
officers for national or international bodies. 29 U.S.C. § 481(a).
2
The LMRDA thus does not prohibit elections for officers of
intermediate union bodies, but merely does not mandate them. See
29 U.S.C. § 481(d).

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 Given the lack of specific definitions of intermediate

and local bodies in the Act, the possibility existed that labor

organizations would attempt to label their constituent entities as

"local" or "intermediate" for the purpose of dictating which method

of election would be used. To curb this potential, Congress

authorized the Secretary to promulgate regulations concerning how

she would determine whether an organization was local or

intermediate. Id. § 489(b). Pursuant to this authorization, the

Secretary has supplemented the Act's limited guidance on the

definitions of local and intermediate bodies with regulations

providing that:

The characterization of a particular organizational unit
as a "local," "intermediate," etc., is determined by its
functions and purposes rather than the formal title by
which it is known or how it classifies itself.

29 C.F.R. § 452.11.

Congress also made a union's designations of its

constituent entities subject to review by the Secretary at the

request of union members. 29 U.S.C. § 482(b). To initiate the

review process, aggrieved union members who have exhausted internal

union remedies file a complaint with the Secretary. Id. § 482(a).

If, after investigating the complaint, the Secretary finds probable

cause to believe that a violation of Title IV occurred and that it

probably infected the outcome of the election, she must bring suit

to set aside the election. Id. § 482(b); Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass

Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 472 (1968). In that sense, the

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Secretary has no discretion. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,

834 (1985) (section 482(b) "quite clearly withdrew discretion from

the agency and provided guidelines for exercise of its enforcement

power"). If she decides there is no probable cause, she must

explain the rationale for that result in writing. Dunlop v.

Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 571-72 (1975).

At the same time that Congress was working to ensure

effective union democracy, it was simultaneously taking steps to

safeguard against excessive interference in the internal structure

of unions. Most notably, Congress limited the ability to sue for

violations of Title IV to the Secretary. See Calhoun v. Harvey,

379 U.S. 134, 140 (1964). Dissatisfied union members, as a result,

are forced to proceed through the Secretary rather than the courts.

Congress believed that this requirement would not only curb the

potential for excessive litigation, but also facilitate the

resolution of labor disputes by promoting uniformity. S. Rep. No.

86-187, at 19 (1959), reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2318, 2338.

Given the centrality of the Secretary's role in

monitoring union democracy, the Act allows dissatisfied union

members to challenge in federal court the Secretary's decision not

to sue. Bachowski, 421 U.S. at 565. This is quite unusual.

Normally, the federal courts cannot review the decision of an

administrative agency not to bring an enforcement action. Heckler,

470 U.S. at 831. Such decisions are often inherently policy driven

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and thus best left to the discretion of the agency. See Bachowski,

421 U.S. at 572-73. Largely for that reason, the Secretary's

decision whether to sue a union for violating Title IV is reviewed

only under the highly limited arbitrary and capricious standard

contained in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706.

Bachowski, 421 U.S. at 572-73; Harrington, 280 F.3d at 56. Under

that standard, a court reviews the Secretary's stated reasons for

not suing only to determine whether they are "arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance

with law." See Bachowski, 421 U.S. at 565 n.5 (quoting 5 U.S.C. §

706(2)(A)); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512

(1994) (same).

In this case, the plaintiff dissident union members argue

that the NERCC, while labeled an intermediate body by the UBC,

really performs all the functions and purposes of a local union and

thus, under the applicable regulations, that the Secretary must sue

to bring about direct elections. The Secretary's decision to the

contrary, the plaintiffs argue, is arbitrary and capricious because

it failed to apply properly the "functions and purposes" test of

the applicable regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 452.11. Each side is

supported by able amicus.3

II. Procedural History

3
Both the Association for Union Democracy (AUD) and the UBC
have participated as amici and we are grateful for their
assistance.

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 This is the second time that this case is before us. In

Harrington I we reviewed the decision of the then-Secretary that

the NERCC was an intermediate body. We held that the decision was

arbitrary and capricious in the limited sense that the Secretary's

statement of reasons was inadequate given the applicable

regulations and the Secretary's position in other cases. 280 F.3d

at 59-60. The Secretary's Statement of Reasons in Harrington I did

not cite the applicable regulations and used language that appeared

to disavow a functional approach. Id. at 57. While the Secretary

had "perhaps appli[ed] the test in the regulations," the limited

explanation in her Statement of Reasons made us unable to "say

whether the Secretary ha[d] changed her interpretation or departed

from the regulation." Id. at 57-58. Relatedly, the Statement of

Reasons did not discuss, much less distinguish, two applicable

precedents that were arguably inconsistent with the Secretary's

decision not to sue. Id. In both cases, the functions and

purposes of the entity to be classified appeared to be the central

focus of the court and the Secretary. Id. at 57-58 & n.10.

We did not then reach the issue of whether the

Secretary's conclusion that the NERCC was an intermediate

organization was arbitrary and capricious. See id. at 60. Rather,

we remanded to the Secretary to reopen and advised her that if she

again decided not to sue, a new statement of reasons "which

addresses both the application of the functions and purposes test

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of 29 C.F.R. § 452.11, and whether her decision is consistent with

her precedents" would be required. Id. at 60-61.

On January 31, 2003, the Secretary issued a Supplemental

Statement of Reasons ("SSR") that found, once again, that the NERCC

is an intermediate body under the LMRDA and is thus not required to

conduct direct elections. The complainants challenged this

determination in district court and quickly moved for summary

judgment. Relying largely on Harrington I, the district court

granted the motion on October 8, 2003, holding that the Secretary's

decision not to sue was arbitrary and capricious. Harrington v.

Chao, 286 F. Supp. 2d 80, 85-86 (D. Mass. 2003). The district

court subsequently ordered the Secretary "to take appropriate

action" consistent with its determination. On February 20, 2004,

we stayed the district court's order pending the resolution of the

Secretary's appeal.

III. The Secretary's Supplemental Statement of Reasons

In explaining the Secretary's conclusion that the NERCC

is an intermediate body, the SSR outlined three "basic principles

[that] may be discerned from the language and purpose of the LMRDA

and the applicable regulations." SSR, at 3.

First, the Secretary stated that she had not abandoned

the applicable regulations and explained that classifying a union

entity as intermediate or local does indeed require looking to the

entity's "functions and purposes" rather than "its formal title or

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nominal placement within [the] organization." Id. The critical

inquiry, the SSR continued, is thus "whether the intermediate body

has taken on so many of the traditional functions of a local union

that it must in actuality itself be considered a local union." Id.

Second, the SSR explained that the legislative history of

the Act made clear "that 'intermediate bodies' are permitted to

wield real and significant authority within a labor union without

being treated as 'local' bodies for purposes of the LMRDA." Id. at

4. The SSR identified those powers as including the negotiation of

collective bargaining agreements and the discipline of union

members.

Third, the SSR stated that an entity's placement within

the structure of a union is also "highly relevant" in determining

whether it is local or intermediate.4 Id. at 5. As a consequence,

the SSR concluded that "although the Secretary will not defer to a

union's own characterization of an entity as an intermediate body

or a local labor organization, it is proper for the Secretary to

take account of an entity's placement in the union's structure in

making the determination whether it is an intermediate body or

local labor organization." Id.

4
The SSR also noted that "in the 44-year history of the
LMRDA, the Department has never brought suit contending that an
intermediate body that supervised other entities that were
indisputably labor organizations was itself a local labor
organization subject to the direct election requirements." SSR, at
8. The SSR nonetheless allowed for such a possibility.

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 From these principles, the Secretary concluded that the

NERCC is indeed an intermediate body. The SSR noted that the NERCC

is structurally in the middle tier of the UBC; it undeniably

supervises numerous local union organizations while itself being

subordinate to the UBC International body. This fact was not

determinative, however.5 Rather, the SSR looked to the "functions

and purposes" of the NERCC, which it described as follows:

[The NERCC] negotiates collective bargaining agreements.
It has exclusive authority to hire, discipline, promote,
and fire all organizers and business representatives
within the New England region. The NERCC's Executive
Secretary-Treasurer supervises and directs all
representatives and organizers. The stewards are
appointed by the NERCC's representative, must report all
problems arising at the job site to the representative,
and serve at the representative's discretion.

Id. at 9-10. Although many of these functions may be traditionally

associated with local unions, the SSR noted that several of them,

most notably the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements,

were increasingly handled by intermediate unions throughout the

1950s, when the Act was passed. But the SSR declined to articulate

a list of functions exclusively performed by an intermediate

organization as contrasted to a local body.

5
At one point, the SSR does state that "a labor organization
at the middle tier of a union is presumptively an intermediate
organization." SSR, at 9 (emphasis added). We do not understand
this language to create a presumption in the sense that the
complainant carries the burden of overcoming that fact. The
Secretary is charged by statute with independently determining
whether a union is violating Title IV of the Act. See 29 U.S.C. §
482(b).

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 The SSR also looked to the functions and purposes of the

local unions, on the theory that if "the middle tier subsume[d] so

much authority from its subordinate unions . . . it must be deemed

to have itself also become a local labor organization subject to

the Act's direct election requirements." Id. at 9. In this case,

the SSR opined that the subordinate locals are not "mere

administrative arms" of the NERCC but instead play "a significant

role in dealing with their members." Id. at 10. The locals are

independently chartered, have identifiable memberships, elect their

own officers, have their own by-laws, keep separate offices and

bank accounts, and may hold their own meetings. They also

determine and collect monthly dues, and may make rules consistent

with the UBC constitution and laws. Moreover, the local unions

also have various responsibilities and liabilities: they are

responsible for the carelessness or negligence of their officers;

they collect fines for dues or fees in arrears; and most grievances

are resolved by local stewards (although those stewards are

appointed by the NERCC). Local unions also exert influence over

the UBC International and the activities of the regional councils.

Changes to UBC by-laws can be initiated when three local unions

join together and locals play a role in ratifying collective

bargaining agreements. Based on consideration of these functions,

the SSR determined that there was "no basis for concluding that the

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NERCC must . . . be considered a local to carry out the purpose of

the statute." Id.

The SSR also distinguished the two cases noted in

Harrington I, in which the Secretary had taken the position that a

union entity was local because it performed traditionally local

functions. In Donovan v. International Brotherhood of

Boilermakers, 736 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1984), the labor body at

issue occupied the bottom level of the union's organizational

structure.6 Id. at 623. Similarly, while the labor organization

at issue in Shultz v. Employees' Federation of the Humble Oil &

Refining Co., No. 69-C-54, 1970 U.S. Dist. Lexis 12288 (S.D. Tex.

March 31, 1970), was nominally intermediate in the union's

structure, in reality the so-called "locals" that it supervised

were "merely administrative arms" of the entity itself and had no

significant independent authority. Id. at *11.

IV. Analysis

Review of the district court's grant of summary judgment

is de novo. Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir.

2003). Here, we decide whether the Secretary's decision that the

NERCC is an intermediate body falls within the narrow band of

6
In distinguishing Boilermakers, the SSR suggested that a
body must be in an intermediate structural position in order to be
considered an intermediate body. This rule does not appear in the
the Secretary's analysis of the status of the NERCC and we assume
that there might, under the Secretary's view, be some circumstances
in which a union body could be an intermediate even if it had no
subordinate entities.

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administrative determinations that fail the deferential arbitrary

and capricious test.

We begin our analysis of the plaintiffs' claim by making

a basic but important point: the Secretary was entitled to consider

where the NERCC was located in the UBC's organizational structure

when determining whether the NERCC was an intermediate or local

body, so long as that factor was not conclusive on its own.7 The

consideration of the NERCC's place in the overall union structure

is consistent with the LMRDA's use of the term "intermediate."

When Congress uses a statutory term that it does not expressly

define, that term should normally be construed according to its

ordinary or natural meaning. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223,

228 (1993). The term "intermediate" is most naturally understood

to refer to the body's placement in the union hierarchy. See

Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1180 (1993) (defining

intermediate as "lying or being in the middle place or degree");

Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (defining intermediate as

"coming or occurring between two things, places"). Moreover the

statute defines "labor organization" as including a "general

7
At times, the plaintiffs' arguments suggest that the fact
that there exist numerous local unions within the UBC that are
separate from and subordinate to the NERCC is irrelevant to
determining whether the NERCC is itself a local or intermediate
body. At other times, the plaintiffs' arguments appear not to
embrace this position. To the extent that plaintiffs do make the
argument that the Secretary cannot consider a union's structure, it
is plainly incorrect.

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committee, joint or system board, or joint council" -- all of which

are explicitly defined in 29 U.S.C. § 481(d) as "intermediate" --

that is "subordinate to a national or international labor

organization." 29 U.S.C. § 402(i) (emphasis added). The

description of each of these illustrative intermediate labor

organizations as "subordinate" to the national or international

bodies lends further support to including a structural element in

categorizing a union body as intermediate or local. See Webster's,

supra, 2277 (defining subordinate as "placed in a lower order,

class or rank"); Black's Law Dictionary 1439 (7th ed. 1999)

(defining subordinate as "placed in or belonging to a lower rank,

class or position").

The "functions and purposes" to which the regulations

refer do not exclude looking at the placement of a body within the

union structure. Much to the contrary, as the Secretary observed

in the SSR, a body's location in the union's structural hierarchy

may well inform the determination of what its functions and

purposes are. Because the constituent parts of any union are

organized together to achieve the desired results, the placement of

an entity in the union hierarchy and the functions of other union

bodies both below and above it are relevant to determining the

functions and purposes of the entity at issue. Consideration of

the structural placement of an entity in a union is inherent in the

regulatory test of functions and purposes.

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 But even if the union's structure were unrelated to the

test in the regulations, the Secretary could still consider it.

The regulation does not purport to list an exclusive set of

permissible considerations, but only to require that a union

entity's status as local or intermediate be determined by its

"functions and purposes" rather than merely its formal title or

nominal classification. See 29 C.F.R. § 452.11. An agency is not

deemed to have acted inconsistently when it considers a matter upon

which the applicable regulation is silent. Thomas Jefferson Univ.,

512 U.S. at 512 (the Secretary's view is entitled to less deference

if it conflicts with a "prior interpretation," but the petitioner

can not "infer from [] silence the existence of a contrary

policy"). Given the substantial deference that we afford an

agency's interpretation of its own regulations, Martin v.

Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 150-51

(1991), as well as its interpretation of a statute that it

implements, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,

Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984), the Secretary's consideration of

the UBC's overall structure was clearly permissible.

The real issue in this case is not whether the Secretary

was permitted to consider a union's structure in addition to the

functions and purposes of the body at issue, but whether, when the

Secretary applied the functions and purposes test, she did so in an

impermissible manner. The parties share common ground, as the

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Secretary's reply brief notes, on "the basic point that when an

intermediate's role becomes so overwhelming or omnipresent in union

affairs, the requirements for direct elections must apply." The

difference between the parties is "not one of principle, but over

where to draw the line."

The plaintiffs' key argument is that the SSR departed

from the applicable regulation because it did not analyze the

functions and purposes of the entity to be classified -- the NERCC.

Rather, the plaintiffs claim that the Secretary focused on the

functions and purposes of the locals themselves. This approach,

according to the plaintiffs, contradicts the regulation's language

as well as the Secretary's prior application of that regulation in

Boilermakers and Humble Oil. The plaintiffs claim that the

Secretary was required to categorize various functions and purposes

as either intermediate or local, and then to determine with which

characterization the NERCC's functions and purposes are more

closely aligned.

The SSR, however, does look to the functions and purposes

of the NERCC, and it finds that some of those functions and

purposes -- most notably, collective bargaining -- are historically

associated with "intermediate" bodies, even if they are associated

with local bodies as well. The SSR notes that the Senate Committee

Report to the LMRDA stated that intermediate bodies can "exercise

responsible governing power," though the precise contours of that

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power are not elaborated on in the report. See S. Rep. No. 86-187

(1959), at 18, reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2318, 2336. Such

legislative history plays a particularly important role in

interpreting the LMRDA. See Wirtz, 389 U.S. at 468 (The "proper

construction [of a labor statute] frequently requires consideration

of its wording against the background of its legislative history

and in the light of the general objectives Congress sought to

achieve. The LMRDA is no exception." (citation omitted)).

Understood against the backdrop of union organizations at

the time the LMRDA was adopted in 1959, it is clear that the

"responsible governing power" referenced in the Senate Report

includes the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements and

member discipline. Before 1959, it was not uncommon for

intermediate bodies to engage in both collective bargaining and

member discipline. Herbert J. Lahne, The Intermediate Union Body

in Collective Bargaining, 6 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 163, 163-64

(1953). That fact was also reflected in various court cases and

NLRB decisions at the time. See, e.g., May Dep't Stores Co. v.

NLRB, 326 U.S. 376, 380 (1945); NLRB v. Brown & Root, Inc., 203

F.2d 139, 141-43 (8th Cir. 1953); Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 100 N.L.R.B.

101, 104 n.8 (1952). Indeed, the primary motivation for creating

intermediate bodies was so that they could negotiate collective

bargaining agreements. See Lahne, supra, 6 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev.

at 164. Intermediate bodies originated "under circumstances where

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the nature of an industry and its economics [had] been such as to

make it imperative for several locals of the same international in

an area to act in concert in collective bargaining and grievance

handling." Id. These bodies prevented splits and conflicts

between local unions and provided "a means of insuring unified

action in the area of collective bargaining."8 Id. at 166. As the

Secretary reasonably concluded, "[h]istorically, unions have not

restricted the authority or responsibility for important

representational activities -- for example, collective bargaining

and the discipline of union members -- to local unions."

Plaintiffs challenge the relevance of this argument based

on historical context by arguing that Congress did not have in mind

these intermediate bodies because their officers were directly

8
Interestingly, the Lahne article discusses at length the
intermediate bodies within the Carpenters union during the early
1950s. Lahne, supra, 6 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. at 165-66. These
District Councils, as they were then known, formulated the
collective bargaining demands of the union, negotiated with their
counterpart, the Master Builders Association, and approved the
ultimate agreement. Id. at 165. Moreover, only these Councils
could call for a strike and business agents of the councils policed
all agreements. Id.
By contrast, the Lahne article describes the local Carpenter
union bodies as being "left only with the collection of dues,
administration of benefit plans, and social activities." Id.
Lahne concludes that "[i]t is clear that the district councils of
the Carpenters are the real governing and bargaining bodies of the
union. Hardly a ripple would be caused if the locals lost their
legal entities entirely . . . ." Id. at 166.
It would be very odd, in light of this history, to conclude
that the Secretary was mandated to find that the replacement
organization, the NERCC, made up of old District Councils that were
themselves intermediate, is a local entity.

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elected by union members. This argument, in our view, is a non

sequitur. The issue is what powers Congress, at the time it passed

the LMRDA, believed intermediate bodies exercised. Congress was

well aware that many intermediate bodies were responsible for

collective bargaining and member discipline when it chose to let

them decide for themselves whether to have direct elections by

their membership.

The plaintiffs' more substantial argument appears to be,

at root, that collective bargaining and member discipline have

previously been classified by both the Secretary and the courts in

Boilermakers and Humble Oil as intrinsically local, rather than

intermediate, functions. Indeed, the Boilermakers court described

the functions of the union body at issue, which included

negotiating the basic terms of collective bargaining agreements and

grievance handling (which may have included member discipline), to

be the functions of a local. See 736 F.2d at 623. And the court

in Humble Oil similarly classified collective bargaining and member

discipline as "local" functions. 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12288, at

*13. Even the SSR included collective bargaining and disciplinary

functions as within a "common core of functions" performed by local

unions.

But as the Secretary points out, in Boilermakers the

entity being reviewed was at the lowest level of the union because

there were no subsidiary entities. See 736 F.2d at 622-23.

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Moreover, the issue in Boilermakers was whether the entity in

question was a labor organization at all and if so whether it was

national or local; the entity did not claim to be intermediate.

See id. As such, the court was not confronted with the possibility

that the union organization's functions might be associated with

intermediate as well as local bodies. Humble Oil is also

distinguishable: the entity at issue had no subordinate

organizations and claimed that it could not be a local because its

divisions were themselves separate locals, a contention the court

rejected when it found the divisions to be "mere administrative

arms." See 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12288, at *11-*12.

More fundamentally, the plaintiffs' argument falsely

assumes that because some locals exercise bargaining and member

discipline powers, it follows that all organizations that exercise

those powers, regardless of their placement in the union hierarchy,

must also be locals. This assumption is inconsistent with the

explicit Congressional determination that entities that exercise

responsible governing powers may be intermediate. And nothing in

the statute requires the Secretary to come up with a taxonomy of

functions that may only be exercised by one type of entity and not

another.9 Indeed, such a categorical and inflexible approach would

9
The AUD argues that it would not be difficult for the
Secretary to compile a list of "core functions and purposes of an
intermediate body, and then [compare] the functions and purposes of
a contested body to that definition." The AUD proffers two
potential sources: 1) scholarship, such as that contained in Derek

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tie the Secretary's hands in an evolving labor market and most

likely would upset the carefully calibrated system of checks and

balances in the statute.10 As the SSR points out, "the line between

local and intermediate functions is not fixed and immutable." SSR,

at 9. From this, the SSR reasonably concludes that "Boilermakers

and Humble Oil do not purport to address precisely which functions

and purposes are so intrinsically local in nature that any labor

organization having those functions and purposes must be a 'local

union' for purposes of the LMRDA." Id.

Plaintiffs' final major argument takes issue with the

SSR's conclusion that the functions and purposes of the subordinate

local unions should also be scrutinized to ensure that they are

"performing meaningful functions" and "continue to exist for

purposes associated with local labor organizations." SSR, at 4.

According to the plaintiffs, the functions and purposes of the UBC

locals are irrelevant in determining whether the NERCC is an

C. Bok & John T. Dunlop, Labor and the American Community 150
(1970), and 2) definitions that further the purpose of the LMRDA.
Finally, AUD suggests that if the Secretary is to employ any
presumption at all, she should presume the organization at issue is
local and must hold direct elections. These expressions of policy
may or may not be sensible, but they are choices that are committed
to the discretion of the Secretary and not the courts.
10
The plaintiffs say that in the absence of a fixed standard
there is little guidance to the parties on how to act and so the
result is arbitrary. But the law repeatedly uses flexible and
multi-factor tests, eschewing categorical approaches as ill-suited
to handle the infinite variations in potential problems to be
solved.

-22-
intermediate body. There is a certain irony in the plaintiffs'

taking this position;11 the Secretary's examination of the locals

actually benefits potential plaintiffs by acting as a check on the

powers of entities labeled as intermediate and ensuring that locals

have meaningful responsibilities.12 Nothing in Harrington I or in

the text of LMRDA precludes the Secretary's approach. In fact, it

is entirely consistent with the Secretary's position in Humble Oil,

which asked if the entity asserted to be a "local" was nothing more

than an administrative arm of a local. 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

12288, at *11. The Secretary's examination of the relative power

of the locals is hardly unreasonable.

11
In fact, counsel for AUD refused to join plaintiffs'
position at oral argument. Instead, AUD argued that it was
permissible to look at the functions of the locals but that here
they "perform no labor relations functions." As to AUD's argument,
we think that the Secretary was not arbitrary and capricious in
coming to the conclusion that the locals here do play a
sufficiently significant role in the UBC's overall operation. As
the Secretary noted, the UBC locals, inter alia, ratify collective
bargaining agreements, are involved in the resolution of
grievances, can initiate changes in UBC by-laws, and determine and
collect monthly dues.
12
The AUD, citing to Alice H. Cook, Union Democracy: Practice
and Ideal. An Analysis of Four Large Local Unions 183-89 (1963),
argues that the Secretary's focus on whether there are subsidiary
organizations could be dangerous. It could permit "many hitherto
unquestioned locals to exempt themselves from the LMRDA's
requirement of direct elections, by creating subdivisions holding
'the irreducible minimum' of functions." Such a risk exists, but
it also existed under the regulations simpliciter. Our task is not
to decide a hypothetical case about a local fracturing its
functions downward, see Humble Oil, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12288, at
*13, but to decide this case, which concerns aggregation and
consolidation of functions upward to an intermediate organization.

-23-
 Still, we think there is something to the plaintiffs'

argument that the Secretary's approach to applying the functions

and purposes test in the regulations, as articulated in the SSR,

has apparently shifted in emphasis. As the district court noted,

the Secretary's regulation does not say anything about looking to

the overall union structure to determine whether a union entity is

local or intermediate. But, as we explained in Harrington I, the

Secretary is permitted some flexibility, so long as she provides

some explanation for shifting her emphasis. 280 F.3d at 58. We

see nothing arbitrary in the Secretary's shift here, which she

thoroughly explained. The question before us is not whether the

Secretary could have permissibly reached the opposite conclusion,

but whether the conclusion she did reach was "so irrational as to

constitute the decision arbitrary and capricious." Bachowski, 421

U.S. at 573.

The interests in union democracy that the plaintiffs seek

to vindicate are of great importance. But Congress, perhaps

mindful that intermediate organizations may choose to adopt a

system of direct elections on their own,13 imposed strict

constraints on the scope of review by courts under the LMRDA.

13
The LMRDA allows UBC, on its own, to decide that the NERCC
officers will be directly elected by union members. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 481(d). But the UBC, as amicus, notes that direct elections
impose financial and other costs that a given union may decide
outweigh the benefits.

-24-
 V.

The judgment of the district court is reversed and the

case is remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the

Secretary. No costs are awarded.

(Concurring and Dissenting Opinions Follow.)

-25-
 LIPEZ, Circuit Judge, (Concurring). Recognizing the

deferential standard that we must apply, I agree with Judge Lynch

that the Secretary of Labor's characterization of the NERCC as an

"intermediate" union body was not arbitrary and capricious.

Nevertheless, drawing on scholarship about union organization at

the time of the LMRDA's enactment and the LMRDA's legislative

history, I write separately to register my concern that the

Secretary's approach may be a departure from the more ideal form of

union democracy that Congress sought to protect through its

enactment of the LMRDA.

The SSR stated that an organization "at the middle of a

union's structure" becomes a local union only if it "take[s] over

so many of the functions and purposes of the local labor

organizations such that the entity should itself also be treated as

a local organization for purposes of the LMRDA." SSR, at 3. The

Secretary acknowledges in her reply brief that this standard sets

a high threshold for concluding that an intermediate is, in

reality, a local, but claims that it is "strongly supported" by the

LMRDA's legislative history. The SSR explained that when the LMRDA

was passed, intermediate bodies engaged in a wide range of

representational activities, including collective bargaining and

the discipline of union members. Therefore, it concluded that

Congress associated the extensive labor relations functions of the

-26-
NERCC with intermediate as well as local bodies when it adopted

Title IV's election provisions.

I agree with Judge Lynch that it was reasonable for the

Secretary to conclude that when Congress adopted the LMRDA,

intermediate bodies were already performing representational

activities such as the coordination and negotiation of collective

bargaining agreements. However, the legislative history of the

LMRDA and contemporary scholarship on union government suggest that

Congress did not associate intermediate bodies with a full range of

functions historically performed by local unions. Rather, there is

reason to believe that Congress understood that local unions would

continue to exercise primary or exclusive authority over most

traditionally local functions, particularly those that directly

affected ordinary union members. Thus, by requiring local unions

to select local officers by direct membership election, Congress

protected the rights of rank-and-file union members to exercise

control over the decisions and activities that affected their daily

working lives. Consequently, the Secretary's willingness to allow

intermediate bodies to assume an ever-increasing number of local

union functions without subjecting them to the LMRDA's direct

election requirements represents a threat to union democracy and

may eventually stray too far from Congress's intent in adopting

Title IV of the LMRDA.

-27-
 I.

In the United States, the local was long considered "the

basic building block of the union."14 Leonard R. Sayles & George

Strauss, The Local Union 2 (1953) (rev. ed. 1967); see also Derek

C. Bok & John T. Dunlop, Labor and the American Community 51-52

(1970) (explaining that strong local unions are a unique feature of

American unionism not experienced in Europe or Australia). Its

daily functions included holding meetings, collecting and spending

dues, bargaining with employers, handling grievances, responding to

employer concerns, sending delegates to district councils and state

and city central labor bodies, and doing "one hundred other

things." Jack Barbash, Labor's Grass Roots 3-4 (1961).

At the same time, "the reach of a local's collective

bargaining functions invariably extend[ed] to collaboration with

other locals of its international union and with locals of other

14
The local union typically consisted of a substructure of
smaller units, which "in contrast to the local, usually lack[ed]
some attribute of self-contained government in that it [did] not
have authority to tax, discipline, or enter into a formal agreement
with management." Barbash, American Unions: Structure, Government,
and Politics 42 (1965). The NERCC's subordinate locals appear to
lack authority to enter into collective bargaining agreements,
appoint trial committees, and preside over formal disciplinary
procedures, suggesting, perhaps, that they are more akin to a sub-
local unit than a local union. See SSR, at 4 (explaining that in
determining whether a union is local or intermediate, the functions
and purposes of its subordinate unions should be examined to
determine whether they "exist for purposes traditionally associated
with local labor unions").

-28-
internationals," usually through intermediate bodies such as

district councils, joint boards, and regional, district, or

industry councils. Id. at 2. Intermediate bodies were

representative bodies made up of delegates from subordinate locals

that shared a similar territorial location or employment industry

or trade. Id. at 14, 134. Their purpose was "to join the local

unions in larger governmental units for cooperative action and to

regulate and administer their joint activities." William M.

Leiserson, American Trade Union Democracy 316 (1959). "The

intermediate body [was] utilized most commonly by a group of locals

to achieve a common objective in collective bargaining." Barbash,

American Unions, at 55. District or area councils, for example,

were typically formed "to coordinate bargaining throughout a local

or regional product market, or simply to achieve an organization of

sufficient size to support a full-time staff." Bok & Dunlop, Labor

and the American Community, at 150. Some intermediate bodies were

little more than advisory bodies. Leiserson, American Trade Union

Democracy, at 315. Others, like the Carpenters District Councils,

"had a primary role in the negotiation of the [collective

bargaining] agreement." Barbash, Labor's Grass Roots, at 138. By

the 1960s, although the view that "local bargaining predominates .

. . represent[ed] the consensus, . . . the drift – it would be

wrong to characterize it as a trend or tendency – [was] probably

away from exclusive local control of the negotiation of the

-29-
agreement." Id. at 145 (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted).

Contract negotiation was only one aspect of the

collective bargaining process, however, and other representational

functions remained distinctly local.15 In particular, contract

enforcement, described as "[t]he enforcement of the agreement

through a grievance procedure or through informal adjustment

procedures [was] overwhelmingly in the precinct of the local

union."16 Id. at 144; see also Bok & Dunlop, Labor and the American

Community, at 51 (stating that even in sectors where "control over

collective bargaining has gravitated to the national or regional

level . . . local unions still retain considerable influence over

the administration of the contract"); Donald R. Anderson, Note,

Landrum-Griffin and the Trusteeship Imbroglio, 71 Yale L.J. 1460,

1464 (1962) (noting that despite increased centralization within

some unions, "the grievance machinery necessarily remains in local

hands, primarily run by on-the-job stewards"). Similarly, union

constitutions generally vested in local unions the power to

15
Professor Jack Barbash defines collective bargaining as a
process that involves "the negotiation of the agreement, the
enforcement of the agreement including arbitration, and the strike
as the fundamental sanction through which the union is able to
bargain collectively." Barbash, Labor's Grass Roots, at 2.
16
The railroad industry represented a notable exception to the
rule of local control over contract enforcement; in that industry,
the intermediate body exercised control over both "the negotiation
of the contract and . . . the adjustment of grievances under the
contract." Barbash, Labor's Grass Roots, at 138.

-30-
authorize strikes, either independently or subject to international

approval.17 While wage issues were sometimes settled at the level

of the intermediate or international organization,"the issue of

work rules remain[ed] for local negotiation." Id. It appears that

local unions also retained control over the discipline of union

members; as one scholar noted, "analysis of the disciplinary

process indicates that prevailingly (1) the power to discipline

rests with the local union, and (2) that within the local the power

rests with the local union membership." Barbash, Labor's Grass

Roots, at 29. While some intermediate bodies participated in the

disciplinary process, they did so by hearing appeals from the

decision of the local executive board or trial committee. Id. at

29. In short, "[d]espite . . . continuing concentration of power,

the local union remain[ed] a basic structural unit of the labor

movement, performing the day-to-day functions that most closely

affect[ed] the individual workers." Anderson, Trusteeship

Imbroglio, at 1463-64.

17
In the mid-1950s, the National Industrial Conference Board
reported that seventy-four percent of union constitutions gave
local unions the power to authorize strikes. In fifty-three
percent, the international held the final authority to approve
strikes initially authorized by the local. Most of the remaining
union constitutions either prohibited strikes or did not include
provisions governing strike authorization. Less than four percent
of unions vested sole power to authorize local strikes in the
international union, and apparently none vested such authority in
intermediate bodies. Barbash, Labor's Grass Roots, at 151 & n.37
(citing National Industrial Conference Board, Handbook of Union
Government and Structure 42 (1955)).

-31-
 On the other hand, in some unions, the intermediate body

began to "acquire[] a life of its own," occasionally to the extent

that it assumed many of the functions traditionally associated with

local unions. See Herbert J. Lahne, The Intermediate Union Body in

Collective Bargaining, 6 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 163, 164 (1953).

Scholars were critical of this trend because of the effect that it

had on local unions and consequently on union democracy. See,

e.g., Barbash, Labor's Grass Roots, at 234 (noting that "[s]ome

intermediate bodies, particularly the joint-board type or joint-

council type in the larger city, have gone too far in reducing the

local union to nothing more than a union meeting" and calling upon

such bodies to "appropriate only the functions which are intrinsic

to [them]"); Lahne, The Intermediate Union Body in Collective

Bargaining, at 164 ("When the role of the individual local in

collective bargaining and grievance handling is reduced to

participation in the deliberations of a delegate body, an important

source of local union vitality is surrendered to a species of

outsider."). This criticism reflected a concern that the

appropriation by intermediate bodies of most or all of the

representational activities traditionally performed by local unions

denied an important measure of participation in union affairs to

rank-and-file members, who could participate in intermediate bodies

only indirectly through representatives of their locals.

-32-
 II.

After considering the legislative history of the LMRDA

against this historical backdrop of union organization, I believe

that there is reason to question whether Congress intended to

endorse an expansive role for non-membership-based intermediate

bodies within a labor union when it enacted the LMRDA, a statute

that was intended to restore and strengthen union democracy,

largely through the election provisions of Title IV. Indeed, my

review of the LMRDA's legislative history suggests that Congress

envisioned a more circumscribed role for intermediate bodies than

the SSR describes. Senator Barry Goldwater vigorously lobbied to

include intermediate bodies in the LMRDA's definition of labor

organizations so that they would not be exempt from the statute's

prohibitions and sanctions. The original Senate Committee bill had

defined a labor organization as one in which "employees participate

and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of

collective bargaining." Senator Goldwater argued that this

definition afforded a dangerous loophole for intermediate bodies,

some of which had become infamous for their corruption and abuse of

power:

Conferences, such as the Western Conference of Teamsters,
formerly headed by the notorious Frank Brewster, joint
boards, and councils are not composed of employees and do
not engage in collective bargaining. The committee
bill's definition thus does not include any conference,
joint board, joint council, or other association or
aggregation of representatives of labor unions, thus

-33-
 freeing them from the sanctions, prohibitions, and other
requirements of the bill.

86 Cong. Rec. S. 5847 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 1959) (statement of Sen.

Goldwater), in National Labor Relations Board, 2 Legislative

History of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of

1959, 1121 (1959) (emphasis added). Senator Goldwater proposed to

include in the definition of "labor organizations" the phrase: "and

any conference, joint board, joint council, or other association or

aggregation of labor organizations other than a State federation or

central labor council or an association formed to carry on

educational activity or to represent its members before any

judicial, administrative, or legislative body." Id. Senator

Goldwater's proposed amendment was adopted on the Senate floor.18

18
Following the passage of the LMRDA, Senator Goldwater
reiterated his earlier view of the importance of including
"intermediate bodies" in the act's definition of a labor
organization:

Section 3(1) defines a labor organization to include "any
conference, general committee, joint or system board, or
joint council."
Organizations or associations of this type were not
defined as labor unions in the bill reported by the
Senate Labor Committee to the Senate. In executive
session, I offered an amendment to include them which was
rejected. On the floor, I again offered this amendment,
which was, in substantial part, approved.
Failure to include such an amendment would have
meant that those so-called intermediate labor bodies
would have been exempted from the bill's many
restrictions, requirements, and sanctions designed to
achieve the minimum of necessary reform in labor unions.

Id. at 1843.

-34-
Thus, the author of the amendment that brought intermediate bodies

under the purview of the LMRDA viewed them as organizations that 1)

were composed of representatives of local unions rather than

employees, and 2) did not engage in collective bargaining

activities.

Although the LMRDA does not define the terms "local labor

organization" or "intermediate bodies," the final act clearly

distinguished between the two kinds of union bodies in its

definition of "labor organizations." For the purposes of the act,

a labor organization is one that is

engaged in an industry affecting commerce and includes
any organization of any kind, any agency, or employee
representation committee, group, association, or plan
so engaged in which employees participate and which
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing
with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes,
wages, rates of pay, hours, or other terms or
conditions of employment and any conference, general
committee, joint or system board, or joint council so
engaged which is subordinate to a national or
international labor organization, other than a State or
local central body.

29 U.S.C. § 402(i). Notably, intermediate bodies are not included

among those organizations composed of employees or dealing with

employers "concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of

pay, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment." Rather,

they are described in terms of their formal label ("conference,

general committee, joint or system board, or joint council"), their

structural position in the union hierarchy ("subordinate to a

national or international labor organization"), and their general

-35-
function ("engaged in an industry affecting commerce"). See Julius

Rezler, The Definitions of LMRDA, in Symposium on LMRDA 267 (1961)

(noting that the LMRDA divided labor organizations into two groups:

"first, organizations in which employees participate and which

exist for the purpose of dealing with employers concerning the

terms and conditions of employment; and second, the so-called

intermediate bodies not necessarily composed of employees or

dealing with employers, but subordinated to national or

international unions"). Although this definition does not prevent

intermediate bodies from engaging in collective bargaining

activities, neither does it include intermediate bodies in its

description of labor organizations that interact directly with

union members and participate in such activities as settling

grievances and negotiating with employers over issues concerning

the terms or conditions of employment.

As the SSR noted, the Senate Committee Report to the

LMRDA stated that intermediate bodies can "exercise responsible

governing power," without elaborating upon the nature or scope of

that power. See S. Rep. No. 86-187, at 20 (1959), reprinted in

1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2318, 2336. However, the report also included a

broader statement of Congress's objectives in enacting the LMRDA,

and in particular Title IV's election provisions:

It needs no argument to demonstrate the importance of
free and democratic union elections. Under the National
Labor Relations and Railway Labor Acts the union which is
the bargaining representative has power, in conjunction

-36-
 with the employer, to fix a man's wages, hours, and
conditions of employment. The individual employee may
not lawfully negotiate with his employer. He is bound by
the union contract. In practice, the union also has a
significant role in enforcing the grievance procedure
where a man's contract rights are enforced. The
Government which gives unions this power has an
obligation to insure that the officials who wield it are
responsive to the desires of the men and women whom they
represent. The best assurance which can be given is a
legal guarantee of free and periodic elections.

S. Rep. No. 86-187, at 20 (1959), reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N.

2318, 2336. This statement demonstrates that Congress sought to

"protect the rights of rank-and-file members to participate fully

in the operation of their union through processes of democratic

self-government, and, through the election process, to keep the

union leadership responsive to the membership." Wirtz v. Hotel,

Motel & Club Employees Union Local 6, 391 U.S. 492, 497 (1968); see

also Am. Fed. of Musicians v. Wittstein, 379 U.S. 171, 181 (1964)

("As a part of the [LMRDA's] purpose of protecting and fostering

participation by the rank and file in the affairs of the union,

Title IV contains elaborate statutory safeguards for the election

of union officers."); Clyde W. Summers, Judicial Regulation of

Union Elections, 70 Yale L.J. 1221, 1221 (1961) (The LMRDA

"recognizes the key role of union elections," which "are the main

nerve centers of union democracy, for it is through the officers

that the will of the members is translated into effective

action."). As Senator Robert Griffin, co-sponsor of the Senate

bill that ultimately became the LMRDA, later commented: "Landrum-

-37-
Griffin focused upon a basic precept -- the principle that each

individual member should be able to play a participatory role in

the affairs of his union." Robert P. Griffin, The Landrum-Griffin

Act: Twelve Years of Experience in Protecting Employee Rights, 5

Ga. L. Rev. 622, 622 (1971).

The local union logically served as the organizational

unit through which members could most effectively participate in

union affairs. Since the LMRDA required the election of local

officials "at least every three years by secret ballot membership

referendum, union members [could] have direct control over their

local leaders, assuming an honest count." Herman Benson, The Fight

for Union Democracy, in Seymour Martin Lipset, Unions in

Transition: Entering the Second Century 326 (1986). Local unions

"offered the maximum potential for direct membership control"

because through those local organizations, "dues-payers c[ould]

assess their leadership with reasonable accuracy, watching how

grievances are processed [and] how local meetings are conducted,"

and "express their dissatisfaction . . . [with union policies] by

defeating local incumbents and electing oppositionists." Id.

Thus, in promoting union democracy through Title IV's election

provisions, the LMRDA relied on the existence of local unions which

maintained direct ties to rank-and-file union members and exercised

meaningful control over functions that directly affected those

members' working lives. Cf. Anderson, Trusteeship Imbroglio, at

-38-
1464 ("The worker's power to affect overall union policy

necessarily starts in the local union; it is at this level that the

member actively participates in the life of the union."); Barbash,

Labor's Grass Roots, at 240 (noting that "the superior democratic

performance of the local union is due" in part to "the closeness of

the union member physically and socially to the governmental

process" and "the meaningfulness and concreteness of the issues

which the local union deals with"). Considering the LMRDA's

"overriding objective of democratic union governance," Sheet Metal

Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347, 353 (1989) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted), it seems likely that the

LMRDA required the direct election of local but not intermediate

body officers precisely because the local was understood to

exercise primary control over activities such as contract

enforcement, member discipline, strike authorization, job

referrals, and the collection of dues, that most directly affected

the daily working lives of union members.19

19
The NERCC presently performs many of these traditionally
local functions. For example, it negotiates collective bargaining
agreements, which are submitted for ratification by the general
union membership rather than by the locals. It controls the
enforcement of contracts through the appointment and supervision of
grievance stewards. In addition, the NERCC has exclusive authority
over all organizers and business representatives in the New England
region, appoints all disciplinary trial committees, levies a
portion of union members' dues, and approves dues levied by the
local unions.

-39-
 In light of the historical context and congressional

history of the LMRDA, I believe that there is some force to the

plaintiffs' claim that the Secretary's decision not to recognize

the NERCC as a local union is inconsistent with the LMRDA,

considered as a whole. Although intermediate bodies engaged in

representational activities at the time that the LMRDA was enacted,

many important labor union functions were perceived as distinctly

"local," and the trend toward centralization was criticized for its

effect on union democracy. Senator Goldwater's view that

intermediate bodies did not engage in collective bargaining, the

LMRDA's definition of labor organizations, and the Act's underlying

goal to encourage participation of ordinary members in union

affairs and assure the responsiveness of their representatives

further suggest that Congress understood intermediate bodies to

possess limited powers.

As Judge Lynch ably explains, we must uphold the

Secretary of Labor's decision not to sue under the LMRDA unless it

is "so irrational as to constitute the decision arbitrary and

capricious." Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 573 (1975). The

Secretary's approach and conclusion survive review under this

highly deferential standard. Nevertheless, I believe it is

incumbent upon the Secretary to remain vigilant that her

enforcement actions are consistent with the principles of union

-40-
democracy that Congress sought to vindicate when it required the

direct election of local union officials in Title IV of the LMRDA.

-41-
 TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge (Dissenting). In Harrington I,

I concurred to express my view that the Secretary's decision not to

bring suit under Title IV of the LMRDA departed from her

established policies and practices. Therefore, the two options

legitimately available to the Secretary following remand were (1)

to initiate suit, or (2) to decline to do so and to "acknowledge

that she is adopting a new enforcement policy and interpretation of

the Act, and provide her reasons for altering her prior policy."

Harrington v. Chao, 280 F.3d 50, 61 (1st Cir. 2002)("Harrington

I")(Torruella, J., concurring). I suggested that it would be

futile for the Secretary to "decline to initiate suit and [to]

attempt to clarify for the court why she believes her decision is

consistent with the governing regulations and established past

practice." Id. Nevertheless, this is precisely the path the

Secretary has chosen. I dissent because I continue to believe that

the Secretary's decision represents a departure from precedent and

that such "[a] deviation from prior interpretations without

sufficient explanation may be considered arbitrary and capricious

and therefore subject to judicial reversal." Harrington I, 280

F.3d at 58-59; Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. NLRB, 253 F.3d 119, 123

(D.C. Cir. 2001)("Without more, the [agency's] departure from

precedent without a reasoned analysis renders its decision

arbitrary and capricious.").

-42-
 While acknowledging that a union's structure is not

determinative of the "intermediate" or "local" character of an

entity under the LMRDA, the majority opinion persuasively defends,

as within the Secretary's discretion, the SSR's consideration of

the NERCC's location within the UBC's organizational hierarchy. I

do not disagree. In fact, the NERCC's placement within the UBC's

organizational structure is precisely what brings us to the

question before us: whether the NERCC has assumed the functions and

purposes of a local labor organization regardless of its

"intermediate" position within the UBC's structure. As the

regulation specifies, "[t]he characterization of a particular

organizational unit as a 'local,' 'intermediate,' etc., is

determined by its functions and purposes rather than the formal

title by which it is known or how it classifies itself." 29 C.F.R.

§ 452.11. The question, then, is not whether the Secretary was

forbidden to consider where the NERCC was situated within the UBC's

structure but whether the Secretary's application of the

regulation's functions and purposes test represented a departure

from precedent.

The SSR acknowledges that the functions and purposes

approach has required determination of "whether the intermediate

body has taken on so many of the traditional functions of a local

union that it must in actuality itself be considered a local

union." SSR, at 3. As the Secretary points out, "[a]ny other rule

-43-
would enable intermediate bodies to completely devalue members'

direct participation in officer elections in a manner that is

inconsistent with key purposes and provisions of the Act." SSR, at

9. Regardless of an entity's position in the middle tier of a

union, the Secretary concedes, "there must be some point at which

an entity at that middle tier subsumes so much authority from its

subordinate unions that it must be deemed to have itself also

become a local labor organization subject to the Act's direct

election requirements." Id.

The majority notes, quoting the Secretary's reply brief,

that both parties agree on this "basic point that when an

intermediate's role becomes so overwhelming or omnipresent in union

affairs, the requirements for direct elections must apply" and that

the dispute is therefore "not one of principle, but over where to

draw the line." The question the SSR needed to answer, then, was

whether the NERCC's functions and purposes are so overwhelming and

omnipresent in union affairs that the statutory requirement of

direct elections applies. It is my opinion that if the SSR had

indeed addressed this question, the Secretary's own description of

the NERCC's functions would have led inevitably to the conclusion

that the NERCC "has taken on so many of the traditional functions

of a local union that it must in actuality itself be considered a

local union." SSR, at 3.

-44-
 The SSR acknowledges that "the NERCC performs a number of

important responsibilities, some of which may be traditionally

associated with local unions." SSR, at 9.

[The NERCC] negotiates collective bargaining
agreements. It has exclusive authority to
hire, discipline, promote, and fire all
organizers and business representatives within
the New England region. The NERCC's Executive
Secretary-Treasurer supervises and directs all
representatives and organizers. The stewards
are appointed by the NERCC's representative,
must report all problems arising at the job
site to the representative, and serve at the
representative's discretion. The NERCC
determines and levies a portion of the
members' dues not determined and levied by the
locals, and approves all monthly dues levied
by the local unions. The NERCC's Executive
Secretary-Treasurer appoints all trial
committees.

Id. at 9-10. Rather than proceeding to address whether these

functions and purposes of the NERCC demonstrate an assumption of

authority sufficient to render the NERCC subject to the LMRDA's

direct election requirements, however, the SSR concludes that

because "[t]he locals that are subordinate to the NERCC . . . are

not 'merely administrative arms' of the union but play such a

significant role in dealing with their members . . . there is no

basis for concluding that the NERCC must also be considered a local

to carry out the purpose of the [LMRDA]." SSR, at 10 (internal

citation omitted).

The SSR thus ultimately formulates the issue as a

question "of the irreducible minimum that must remain in local

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unions if higher bodies are not also to be subject to the direct

election requirement." SSR, at 9. The NERCC locals meet that

minimum, in the Secretary's opinion, because

the NERCC locals are independently chartered,
have identifiable memberships, elect their own
officers, and have their own bylaws. Although
initially appointed by a NERCC representative,
stewards are local members, and resolve most
grievances without the participation of or
input from the NERCC representative. The
locals also administer all job referrals on a
local, rather than a regional, basis. (The
referral process, which is determined by the
NERCC representative, may vary from local to
local.) The locals determine and collect
monthly dues. A person joins the UBC by
becoming a member of a local union, and a
member's journeyman level is determined by the
local upon admission. A member can withdraw
from the union only "by submitting a clear and
unequivocal resignation in writing to the
Local Union." Although the UBC Constitution
provides that charges shall be filed and tried
by a Regional Council, NERCC's trial procedure
requires that alleged violations first be
referred to the relevant local's executive
board for an informal hearing with the goal of
an informal resolution before charges are
filed with the NERCC. Although collective
bargaining agreements may be negotiated by the
NERCC on a multi-local basis, locals are
parties to the agreement and conduct
ratification votes among local members. In
addition to these functions, the locals also
hire their own clerical employees, maintain
offices, maintain bank accounts, hold
meetings, engage in voluntary organizing
drives, lobby, and administer scholarship and
disability funds.

SSR, at 10. The SSR rests its decision on the grounds that "the

local unions that are subordinate to the NERCC continue to perform

functions and purposes traditionally associated with local unions,"

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and "[i]n these circumstances, neither the Department's regulation,

nor any applicable precedent, compel a conclusion that the

Secretary should require the NERCC to conduct elections in

accordance with the LMRDA's election rules for local unions." SSR,

at 10.

The SSR summarizes this new test as follows:

If the subordinate organizations in fact
continue to perform functions and exist for
purposes traditionally associated with local
labor unions, the union's characterization of
an entity placed structurally between such
organizations and the international union as
an 'intermediate body' will be upheld even
though the intermediate body also performs
some other functions traditionally associated
with local unions.

SSR, at 4. The SSR thus concludes that the NERCC can be deemed an

intermediate body because the subordinate locals continue to serve

some functions and purposes of traditional locals.20

20
Appellees dispute the factual basis of the Secretary's
conclusion that the NERCC's subordinate locals retain traditional
functions of local unions of any real significance. For example,
the Secretary states that the locals ratify collective bargaining
agreements and levy dues. The significance of the local's
involvement in the ratification of collective bargaining agreements
negotiated by the NERCC is tempered, however, by the fact that all
of the locals' members' votes are counted within the regional unit;
in other words, even if one local's members were to reject the
contract unanimously, it would still become the contract for that
local if its members' votes were in the minority among the total of
votes cast within the NERCC. The locals' role in the ratification
process, then, appears primarily clerical. Appellees also note
that while the locals may establish monthly dues, those dues must
be approved by the NERCC. It is thus unclear to what extent the
NERCC's locals do in fact perform the modicum of traditional
functions of locals relied upon by the Secretary.

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 This determination of the NERCC's intermediate status

based on the functions retained by the locals clearly constitutes

a departure from the traditional functions and purposes test, which

asked not whether the locals retained any of their traditional

functions and purposes but whether the "entity at that middle tier

subsumes so much authority from its subordinate unions that it must

be deemed to have itself also become a local labor organization

subject to the Act's direct election requirements." SSR, at 9. The

district court, drawing from this court's analysis in Harrington I

and from the SSR itself, accurately identified this departure from

the traditional functions and purposes test:

The issue under the traditional test, as
defined by the Court of Appeals, is not
whether the NERC[C]'s locals perform some of
the tasks associated with a labor union, but
rather (in the Secretary's own words) whether
the NERC[C] as an intermediate body, "has
taken on so many of the traditional functions
of a local union that it must in actuality
itself be considered a local union."

Harrington v. Chao, 286 F. Supp. 2d 80, 85 (D. Mass. 2003)

(citations omitted).

Near its conclusion, the majority opinion concedes that

what the district court refers to as the SSR's "functions plus

structure" approach demonstrates a shift in emphasis in applying

the functions and purposes test but concludes that "the Secretary

is permitted some flexibility, so long as she provides some

explanation for shifting her emphasis" and that "nothing [is]

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arbitrary in the Secretary's shift here, which she thoroughly

explained." I do not dispute the Secretary's power to alter her

interpretation of the regulation but, as this Court noted in

Harrington I, she cannot do so without the explanation required by

the APA, and "[a] deviation from prior interpretations without

sufficient explanation may be considered arbitrary and capricious

and therefore subject to judicial reversal." Harrington I, 280

F.3d at 58-59.21

The SSR before us is certainly lengthier than the

Statement of Reasons in Harrington I and contains references to the

governing regulations and relevant caselaw ignored by the original

Statement. Still, the SSR simply echoes the approach taken in the

original Statement of Reasons and fails to provide sufficient

explanation for the Secretary's reliance on the minimum of

traditional local functions retained by the locals instead of the

NERCC's functions and purposes. The Secretary attempts to gloss

over the departure from precedent by feebly distinguishing the

relevant caselaw. The SSR distinguishes Boilermakers on the

grounds that the entity at issue in that case was not

"intermediate," as it had no subordinate entities within the union

structure. SSR, at 6. Similarly, Humble Oil is distinguished by

21
Under the APA, courts have the power and the duty to "hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusion
found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C § 706(2)(A); Dunlop
v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975).

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the negligible subordinate bodies determined by the court to be

"merely administrative arms" of the entity at issue. SSR, at 6-7.

The SSR thus again focuses on the functions and purposes of the

subordinate entities, or lack thereof, instead of acknowledging the

evidence these cases provide of the Secretary's and the courts'

prior recognition of collective bargaining and member discipline as

among the quintessential functions and purposes of local unions.

The majority opinion does not deny the thrust of this caselaw:

Indeed, the Boilermakers court described the
functions of the union body at issue, which
included negotiating the basic terms of
collective bargaining agreements and grievance
handling (which may have included member
discipline), to be the functions of a local.
See 736 F.2d at 623. And the court in Humble
Oil similarly classified collective bargaining
and member discipline as "local" functions.
(citations omitted)

Regardless, the majority finds reasonable the SSR's conclusion that

"Boilermakers and Humble Oil do not purport to address precisely

which functions and purposes are so intrinsically local in nature

that any labor organizations having those functions and purposes

must be a 'local union' for the purposes of the LMRDA." SSR, at 9.

Admittedly, these cases may not have framed the issue in precisely

these terms. They represent clear precedent, however, regarding

which functions and purposes the Secretary previously identified as

traditional functions and purposes of local unions.

The majority's reversal relies heavily on a

characterization of the historical context of the LMRDA's passage

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and specifically the contention that Congress expected intermediate

organizations to perform some functions traditionally associated

with local labor unions, among them collective bargaining.

Legislative history indicating that intermediate bodies were

expected to "exercise responsible governing power" is thus read by

the majority "against the backdrop of union organizations at the

time" to include negotiation of collective bargaining agreements

and member discipline. This allows the majority to argue that the

SSR does in fact consider the functions and purposes of the NERCC,

and not only those of the local bodies, in compliance with the

traditional functions and purposes test. The SSR could thus, in

the majority's view, reasonably conclude that the NERCC is an

"intermediate" entity because some of the functions and purposes it

serves that are historically associated with locals were also

associated with intermediate bodies at the time of the LMRDA's

passage.

Judge Lipez's concurrence successfully undermines this

historical argument, demonstrating that it is unclear whether

Congress intended "intermediate" bodies to include entities

performing the functions assumed by the NERCC and that precisely

this sort of usurpation of power without direct democratic

participation of the rank-and-file membership may have contributed

to legislators' motivation in enacting the LMRDA. The unequivocal

message of the legislative history, however, is that the

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congressional purpose in passing the LMRDA was to provide rank-and-

file union members with frequent, direct elections of the officers

whose actions determine the most fundamental aspects of their

working lives. As Judge Lipez notes, "by requiring local unions to

select local officers by direct membership election, Congress

protected the rights of rank-and-file union members to exercise

control over the decisions and activities that affected their daily

working lives." Since July 1996, the rank-and-file members of the

UBC have not been able to elect directly the officers who negotiate

agreements with their employers, enforce these agreements, and

ultimately oversee member discipline. This is precisely the

scenario the LMRDA sought to prohibit and what the regulation's

"functions and purposes" test was meant to identify, as recognized

in the prior practice of the Secretary and affirmed by the courts.

As appellees' brief laments, "[i]f every union could infuse so-

called intermediate bodies with the functions and purposes of a

local labor organization without having to be held accountable

under the same elections law of a local, then the intent of the

LMRDA in this regard would be emasculated and millions of union

members would be effectively disenfranchised." Surely, this was

not Congress's intent.

I respectfully dissent.

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