Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 04-1141
WILLIAM GONZALEZ-RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
JOANNE BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Gilberto Gierbolini-Ortiz, Senior U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
Melba N. Rivera Camacho on brief for appellant.
H.S. Garcia, United States Attorney, Camille L. Velez-Rive,
Assistant U.S. Attorney, and Dino Trubiano, Assistant Regional
Counsel, on brief for appellee.
October 7, 2004
Per Curiam. Claimant William Gonzalez-Rodriguez appeals from
the judgment of the district court affirming the denial of Social
Security disability benefits. He raises essentially three
arguments in support of his appeal, and we reject these arguments
for the following reasons.
1. Mental Impairment. In support of the argument that his
mental impairment is disabling, claimant primarily relies on the
consultative examination performed by Dr. Rivera. Claimant argues
that this evaluation shows debilitating limitations and that these
limitations have been confirmed in the notes from his treatment at
the Carolina Mental Health Center. What claimant ignores, however,
is the fact that both the consultative examination and his
treatment occurred after his insured status had expired. As a
result, these sources are of limited value in determining the
extent of claimant's mental impairment prior to the expiration of
this status. See Evangelista v. Secretary of Health and Human
Services, 826 F.2d 136, 140 n.3 (1st Cir. 1987) (the issue is
whether or not the claimant is incapacitated as of the date his
insured status expires).
Further, during the period of time when claimant was insured,
the only evidence of a mental impairment is the intake evaluation
conducted at the mental health center in December 1997. This
evaluation indicates that claimant, in the relevant time frame, was
suffering from only a mild mental condition. Claimant responds to
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this evidence by arguing that the administrative law judge (ALJ)
was interpreting raw medical data in deciding to credit the Global
Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score of 66. However, the GAF
rating system (and the explanation provided by DSM IV concerning
how the system works) simply is not raw medical data; rather, the
system provides a way for a mental health professional to turn raw
medical signs and symptoms into a general assessment,
understandable by a lay person, of an individual's mental
functioning. See Howard v. Commissioner of Social Security, 276
F.3d 235, 241 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that a GAF score may be of
"considerable help" to an ALJ in formulating a claimant's mental
RFC).
The fact that claimant did not receive any treatment for his
mental impairment during his insured status is evidence that this
impairment was not bothersome enough to require treatment. See
Irlanda Ortiz v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 955 F.2d
765, 769 (1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (gaps in the medical record
are evidence that a claimant's complaints are not as severe as
alleged). And, although the ALJ accepted for the sake of argument
that claimant did have the limitations found by the non-examining
clinical psychologist, the ALJ's ultimate finding -- that
"[m]entally, the claimant was able to perform unskilled work tasks
without significant limitations" -- was supported by substantial
evidence. That is, the ALJ was not required to conclude that
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claimant's mental condition imposed any significant limitations on
him during the relevant time.
2. The Vocational Expert's Testimony. As pointed out by
claimant, the response of the vocational expert (VE) to the ALJ's
second hypothetical containing the mental limitations imposed by
the non-examining clinical psychologist is not clear. However,
even assuming that claimant's interpretation of the VE's answer is
correct, this does not help claimant, since the ALJ made the
sustainable finding that claimant's anxiety disorder did not
significantly limit his ability to perform simple tasks. Thus, the
first hypothetical posed by the ALJ -- which did not contain any
mental restrictions -- has substantial support in the record, and,
in response to this hypothetical, the VE listed jobs that claimant
could perform.
Claimant's only other objection to the ALJ's hypothetical is
that the ALJ did not include as a limitation Dr. Cruz's opinion
that claimant could not drive. Claimant argues that this
limitation would prevent him from working as a messenger or porter
because such work involves driving. Claimant, however, cites no
support for this argument, and, in any event, claimant does not
contend that his inability to drive would prevent him from working
as a clerk, the third job mentioned by the VE.
3. Complaints of Pain. Claimant's primary complaints of pain
concern his chest and back. As for the extent of the chest pain,
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claimant contends that it is disabling because any exertion brings
on the pain, and due to the pain, he cannot lift even a gallon of
milk. The findings of claimant's treating physician, Dr. Cruz, do
not support such limitations. In particular, Dr. Cruz opined that,
despite the heart condition and the associated chest pain, claimant
occasionally could lift up to ten pounds and could walk for four
hours per day. Further, the non-examining cardiologist did not
even think that claimant's heart condition was severe.
In relation to his back condition, claimant argues that the
finding of a herniated disc at L5-S1 supports his allegations of
disabling back pain. While such a condition obviously can be
expected to produce pain, evidence of treatment for this pain is
sparse. Claimant apparently was seen for his back only once in
1995 (when an electromyographic study of his lower extremities was
normal) and once in 1996. And, aside from the February 1997 C-T
scan showing the herniated disc, claimant was seen only twice in
1997. This is evidence that claimant's back pain was not as severe
as alleged. See Irlanda Ortiz, 955 F.2d at 769.
Further, claimant gave conflicting accounts of how his pain
affected his exertional abilities. In March 1998, claimant
completed a report of daily activities, in which he indicated that
he required help with his personal needs and that he could not
perform any household chores. Yet, when he was being interviewed
by Dr. Rivera, in April 1998, claimant reported that he could take
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care of his personal needs and could do some household chores such
as dishwashing and mopping. Finally, we note that the ALJ did
credit claimant's complaints of pain to a large degree by accepting
the limitations imposed by Dr. Cruz and by including these
restrictions in the hypotheticals presented to the VE. For
example, the ALJ cited, as a limitation, claimant's inability to
bend, and this was one of claimant's primary complaints. The ALJ's
conclusion that claimant's complaints of disabling pain were not
entirely credible thus has substantial support in the record.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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