Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 04-1353
04-1572
04-2504
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
FAZAL UR RAHEMAN-FAZAL,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Stahl, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
Fazal Raheman on brief pro se.
Michael J. Sullivan, United States Attorney and John T.
McNeil, Assistant U.S. Attorney on brief for appellee.
May 11, 2005
Per Curiam. We have reviewed carefully the record in
this case and the submissions of the parties. We reject
appellant's arguments, and we affirm the amended judgments and
the decision revoking supervised release. We allow the motion of
D.P. Lalwani to file amicus curiae brief. We deny appellant's
motion to strike irrelevant pleadings.
Appellant Fazal Raheman ("Raheman") did not develop any
of his current arguments below, so they are forfeited, and we
review only for plain error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.
725, 731-32 (1993). Under any standard of review, however, they
would fail. To the extent Raheman argues that the federal courts
somehow have been divested of jurisdiction, the argument is
specious. Raheman has been convicted of a federal crime, and
that conviction was affirmed. See United States v. Raheman, 355
F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2004) ("Raheman I"). The federal courts have
ongoing jurisdiction over violations of supervised release. To
the extent Raheman is saying his acts did not constitute a
federal crime in the first place, the time for making such an
argument is long past; and in any event, the argument was
rejected by this court in Raheman's first appeal. See id. at 46-
49. It still is without merit.
Raheman's attacks on the Massachusetts state court's
jurisdiction are out of place here; he must litigate that
question in the Massachusetts state courts. The federal district
court simply ordered Raheman to comply with the outstanding
orders of the state courts by returning his children to this
country. If he believes those orders are erroneous under state
law, he must take that up with the state court. It was entirely
proper for the federal district court to impose that condition of
supervised release; and we so noted in Raheman I. Raheman must
allow that process to go forward fairly; and he must not, in the
meantime, defy the order of that court to return the children
here for a determination on the custody question. Having chosen
to defy that order (as well as the district court's order to
comply), he cannot be heard to complain that he might lose some
advantage he obtained by kidnaping the children in the first
place.
We also reject Raheman's argument pursuant to Baltimore
City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549
(1990). To the extent Bouknight does place some restriction on
the conditions of supervised release that may be imposed here
(and it is far from clear that it does), the Massachusetts family
court order was issued as part of a "noncriminal regulatory
regime," id. at 555-56, that is, the system by which custody
determinations are made in the state family courts. Thus, the
Bouknight argument clearly fails.
This has been a protracted and painful matter for all
concerned. It began with Raheman's criminal act: the kidnaping
of his own children. He has been punished for his crime, and
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that matter is closed. But the American criminal justice system
offers more than punishment; it offers a convicted criminal a
chance to rehabilitate himself. In order to rehabilitate
himself, he must do what he can to undo his crime. Of course, in
a case like this, when young children are involved, the crime can
never be completely undone. But at a minimum, the convicted
criminal in any case can abandon the fruits of his crime, that
is, the advantages he gained through his criminal act. Here,
Raheman obtained an advantage by spiriting his children away from
their home to a foreign jurisdiction, where he obtained favorable
court orders under false pretenses. He must undo that harm. He
must return the children here and start over.
The federal courts have no jurisdiction, ultimately, to
decide the best interests of these children or to determine their
custody arrangements. But we have faith that the state court
here is competent to make such judgments, including a judgment as
to whether it is the appropriate court in which to decide the
substantive questions; that it will do so fairly; and that its
primary concern at all junctures will be the best interests of
the children. We also have been impressed with the efforts of
the district court judge and the U.S. probation office involved
here. Their goal is laudable: they want the children reunited
with both parents. We admonish all parties to move forward with
all due speed to achieve that goal.
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Affirmed. See 1st Cir. R. 27(c).
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