Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 04-1193
NERY F. CAMACHO-RODRÍGUEZ; KATRINA M. CAMACHO-TORRES;
KATRINA N. CAMACHO; ROSE MARIE CAMACHO,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
JOHN E. POTTER, POSTMASTER GENERAL, United States
Postal Service; LUIS A. ECHEVARRIA-BEZA, M.D.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. José Antonio Fusté, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Howard, Circuit Judge.
Rafael A. Oliveras Lopez de Victoria for appellants.
Isabel Muñoz-Acosta, Assistant United States Attorney with
whom H.S. Garcia, United States Attorney and Miguel A. Fernandez,
Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Civil Division, were on
brief, for appellees.
June 3, 2005
Per Curiam. Plaintiffs Nery F. Camacho-Rodríguez, a
United States postal service letter carrier, and members of his
family sued the Postmaster General of the United States and a
postal service employee for violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. The plaintiffs
asserted that the postal service failed reasonably to accommodate
Camacho for a severe back condition that prevented him from lifting
in excess of fifty pounds.
The defendants did not respond to the complaint and were
therefore defaulted. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(e), a judgment by
default may not enter against the United States unless the claimant
establishes a right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the
court. In accord with this rule, the district court held a trial
to determine whether the plaintiff could establish an ADA
violation.
While recognizing that, as this case was postured, "the
quantum and quality of evidence that might satisfy a court can be
less than normally required," the court determined that the
plaintiffs had nevertheless failed to establish an ADA violation.
See Camacho-Rodríguez v. Potter, No. 04-1193, slip op. at 5 (D.P.R.
Dec. 5, 2003) (quoting Alameda v. Sec'y of Health Ed. and Welfare,
622 F.2d 1044, 1048 (1st Cir. 1980)). The court found that Camacho
was not disabled under the ADA because the plaintiffs did not
demonstrate that Camacho's back condition substantially limited the
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major life activities of lifting or working. See id. at 10. As
to lifting, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had produced
evidence of Camacho's lifting limitation at work but did not show
that his inability to lift was so severe that it substantially
limited his ability to lift outside the parameters of his job.
See id. at 9. As to working, the court concluded that the
plaintiffs had shown that Camacho was unable to perform his job as
a letter carrier but did not prove that Camacho was precluded from
performing a class of jobs because of his back condition. See id.
at 10.
We have considered the plaintiffs' arguments for
overturning the district court's ruling and reviewed the entire
record. The district court did not err in concluding that the
plaintiffs failed to establish that Camacho suffered a disability
under the ADA. We have no cause to add to the district court's
well-reasoned opinion and therefore affirm substantially on the
grounds stated therein. See Corrada Betances v. Sea-Land Serv.
Inc., 248 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 2001) ("Where, as here, a trial
judge astutely takes the measure of a case and hands down a
convincing, well-reasoned decision, an appellate court should
refrain from writing at length to no other end than to hear its own
words resonate.").
In addition to challenging the district court's ruling on
the merits, the plaintiffs contend that the district court abused
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its discretion by denying them a continuance so that one of
Camacho's treating physicians could testify. The plaintiffs did
not subpoena the physician and, on the day of trial, the physician
did not appear. The plaintiffs requested a continuance which the
court granted until the next day. The physician again did not
appear. The court permitted Camacho to testify concerning his care
by the physician and allowed the plaintiffs to submit certain
documentary medical information. The court asked the plaintiffs'
counsel if this evidence was a sufficient substitute for the
physician's testimony. He responded that it was and that the case
could be submitted for decision.
The plaintiffs have waived any argument concerning the
failure of the physician to testify. The plaintiffs agreed to the
court's alternate procedure for introducing the necessary evidence
and told the court that they were satisfied. After affirmatively
approving the court's handling of the physician's absence, they
cannot now complain that they were prejudiced by the court's
decision not to grant a further continuance so that they could
secure the physician's presence at trial.
Affirmed.
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