United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 06-1117
MICHAEL CAPUTO,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
KENNETH NELSON, Superintendent,
Bridgewater State Hospital,
Respondent, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch and Howard, Circuit Judges,
and Stafford,* Senior District Judge.
John J. Courtney for appellant.
Maura D. McLaughlin, Assistant Massachusetts Attorney General,
with whom Thomas F. Reilly, Massachusetts Attorney General, was on
brief, for appellee.
July 26, 2006
*
Of the Northern District of Florida, sitting by designation
Stafford, Senior District Judge. In 1991, a
Massachusetts Superior Court jury convicted Michael Caputo
("Caputo") on two counts of first-degree murder. Caputo appeals
the district court's order denying his petition for writ of habeas
corpus by a person in state custody. Because the state court
decision affirming his conviction was neither contrary to, nor an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, we
affirm.
I.
In the early morning hours of November 2, 1989, two
Boston police officers were dispatched to a second-floor apartment
in the Jamaica Plain neighborhood of Boston.2 In the apartment's
bedroom, the police found the bodies of Caputo's estranged wife and
mother-in-law. Caputo's wife had been stabbed twenty-two times,
his mother-in-law seventeen times. Caputo's two young daughters,
who were unharmed, were also found in the apartment.
Noting an open kitchen window that led to the back porch,
the police discovered that the telephone wires to the apartment had
been cut. There was no sign of forced entry. On the dining room
table, the police found a protective order dated July 31, 1989,
ordering Caputo to refrain from abusing his wife and to stay away
2
The facts, which are not challenged by Caputo, are taken from
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's recitation of the facts.
Commonwealth v. Caputo, 786 N.E.2d 352, 355-58 (Mass. 2003).
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from the Jamaica Plain apartment. The order contained Caputo's
address in Plymouth, Massachusetts.
After the Boston police notified the Plymouth Police
Department that Caputo was a suspect in a double homicide, six
Plymouth police officers, including Sergeant Thornton Morse
("Morse") and Sergeant Richard Dorman ("Dorman"), arrived at
Caputo's house. Caputo opened the front door after the officers
repeatedly knocked on the front and rear doors. Morse and Dorman
introduced themselves, then asked whether they could enter the
house to speak with Caputo. Caputo acquiesced.
Once inside the house, Dorman informed Caputo that they
were investigating a double homicide on behalf of the Boston Police
Department. From a printed card, Dorman read Caputo his rights
under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966). When Dorman
asked Caputo whether he understood his rights, Caputo initially
replied: "No." Dorman then repeated each right, asking after each
whether Caputo understood. Caputo replied affirmatively to each,
then said that he thought it best if he said nothing further. The
officers immediately stopped all questioning of Caputo. They were
not, however, asked to leave the house.
After Dorman informed Caputo that they were investigating
a double homicide, Caputo asked Dorman who had died. Dorman
replied that he did not know. Soon thereafter, wanting to obtain
more information about the investigation to pass along to Caputo,
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Morse asked whether he could use Caputo's telephone to call the
Plymouth police station. Caputo agreed that Morse could use his
phone. At the conclusion of his call to the station, Morse
informed Caputo that the Plymouth police could not then supply any
additional information about the double homicide.
Leaving some of the officers inside the house, Dorman
went outside to examine the automobile parked in Caputo's driveway.
The vehicle matched the description given to the Plymouth police.
The hood was warm to the touch, and a registration plate with a
number other than Caputo's registration number covered the
automobile's assigned registration plate. It was later learned
that the outer registration plate had been stolen from a vehicle in
the Jamaica Plain section of Boston.
When he re-entered the house, Dorman asked whether he
could use Caputo's telephone to again call the Plymouth police
station. Caputo again agreed. Within Caputo's hearing, Dorman
informed the lieutenant on the line that Caputo was at his
residence, that the engine of Caputo's automobile was warm, and that
there were two different registration plates on the automobile.
Spontaneously, Caputo stated that he did not want to incriminate
himself but that he had a story to tell. He then proceeded to tell
the officers that two men kidnapped him after forcing their way into
his home the night before and that he later awoke "in a daze" in the
Braintree area wearing only his underwear. The officers did not ask
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any questions in response to Caputo's unelicited statements.
At the request of the officers, Caputo agreed to
accompany the officers to the Plymouth police station. At the
station, Caputo was once more advised of his Miranda rights.
Indeed, he was given a written copy delineating each right. Caputo
read the form, making a check mark after each right. When asked
whether he wished to talk to the officers, Caputo replied: "I'm not
sure; I don’t know if I should say anything or not. What should I
do?" Morse responded: "I can’t tell you that, but I want you to be
aware of your rights and that you do not have to say anything to
me."
Yet again, Morse informed Caputo of his Miranda rights,
ascertained that Caputo understood his rights, and asked Caputo
whether he wished to speak to the police. Then, and only then,
Caputo began to elaborate on the statement he had previously made
in his home. Among other things, Caputo told the officers that he
remembered having blood on him, throwing an object out of his
automobile, and, at some point during the night, being outside his
mother-in-law's home.
At approximately 9:20 A.M., Sergeant Detective Charles
Horsley ("Horsley") of the Boston Police Department arrived at the
Plymouth police station. Informed that Caputo had been read his
Miranda rights, Horsley interviewed Caputo for approximately forty-
five minutes. When asked whether he had anything to do with the
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murders, Caputo became upset and stopped talking. Caputo asked to
leave the police station but was informed that he was under arrest.
Later that same afternoon, the police executed a search
warrant at Caputo's residence. They recovered a knife set from
which one knife was missing. A pair of "tin snips" capable of
cutting telephone wires was found in Caputo's automobile.
On November 17, 1989, Caputo was charged in two
indictments with the first-degree murders of his wife and mother-in-
law. Before trial, Caputo moved to suppress the statements that he
made at his home and at the police station. After an evidentiary
hearing, the motion judge denied Caputo's motions. The judge found
that, on entering Caputo's house, the officers immediately informed
Caputo of his Miranda rights, then ceased all questioning when
Caputo indicated that he did not want to speak to them. The judge
also found that, at the Plymouth police station, after he again
received full and complete Miranda warnings, Caputo knowingly waived
his Miranda rights before he voluntarily answered police questions.
On March 21, 1991, a jury found Caputo guilty of two
counts of first-degree murder. He was sentenced that same day to
two consecutive life sentences. The judgments were affirmed by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ("SJC") on April 15, 2003.
In rejecting Caputo's claims on appeal, the SJC
explained:
First, before he made any statement, [Caputo]
received and acknowledged that he understood
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his Miranda rights. Second, when [Caputo]
indicated a wish not to speak to the police,
all questioning ceased. It was only after he
overheard the police conversation that
[Caputo] stated, unprovoked, that he had been
kidnapped the previous night. We do not agree
with [Caputo] that his statement should be
suppressed because the police officer's
request to use his telephone was "reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response"
from [Caputo], and therefore the "functional
equivalent" of an interrogation. The
telephone call was a report and request for
further information, an action "normally
attendant" to police procedures. [Caputo's]
statement occurred only after and apparently
because he had overheard the telephone
conversation that tended to implicate him, not
because of any "interrogation."
. . . [Caputo] gave his consent to the
police to enter his home, he did not ask them
to leave, and spoke to them only after he
recognized that the police had seen
potentially incriminating evidence outside.
A defendant who is "nervous" because he is in
the presence of police within hours of
committing murder and who chooses to give
false information to the police in an attempt,
however clumsy, to throw them off the trail as
he perceives their attention focusing on him
as a suspect, cannot resort later to a claim
of coercion.
. . .
Because we reject [Caputo's] claims that
his statements to the police at his home
should have been suppressed, we need not
consider his argument that his later
statements should have been suppressed as
"fruit of the poisonous tree."
Commonwealth v. Caputo, 786 N.E.2d 352, 358-59 (Mass. 2003)
(footnote and citations omitted).
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On April 12, 2004, Caputo filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus in federal court. The district court entered judgment
for the respondent on December 5, 2005, and this timely appeal
followed. The district court thereafter issued a certificate of
appealability, limiting the appeal to Caputo's claim that his
privilege against self-incrimination was violated when his
statements were introduced at trial.
II.
We review the federal district court's denial of Caputo's
petition for writ of habeas corpus de novo. Correia v. Hall, 364
F.3d 385, 387 (1st Cir. 2004).
Because Caputo's habeas petition was filed after April
24, 1996, this court's review is governed by the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996). As amended, AEDPA precludes the granting
of habeas relief to a state prisoner unless the state court decision
(1) "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;" or (2)
resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Notably, the federal
habeas court shall presume that the state court's determination of
factual issues is correct, although the petitioner may rebut the
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presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
A state court acts "contrary to" clearly established
Supreme Court precedent if it "arrives at a conclusion opposite to
that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law" or if it
"decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set
of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 413 (2000) (Justice O'Connor's Part II majority opinion).
A state court's decision involves an "unreasonable application" of
clearly established federal law if it correctly identifies the
governing legal principle from the Supreme Court's decisions but
then unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the
prisoner's case. Id. An "unreasonable" application, moreover, is
an "objectively unreasonable" application. Id., 529 U.S. at 409.
III.
Caputo contends that his conviction was obtained through
evidence that was obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Specifically, he argues that
the statements he gave to the police at his house were not the
product of a voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights but were the
product of police tactics intended to elicit an incriminating
response from him. He also argues that the statements he made at
the police station, after he signed a waiver form, were the "fruit
of the poisonous tree," his earlier statements having been
involuntarily made.
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In Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-73, the Supreme Court held
that a person in custody must be warned prior to interrogation that
he has certain rights, including the right to remain silent. Once
a person in custody invokes his Miranda protections, the government
cannot use any evidence obtained through custodial interrogation
unless the suspect knowingly waives his rights. Id. at 479. The
term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express
questioning but also "to any words or actions on the part of the
police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody)
that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect." Rhode Island v. Innis,
446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
Here, Caputo contends that the police officer's use of
Caputo's telephone, in Caputo's presence, to relay information about
what the officers found at Caputo's residence was the functional
equivalent of interrogation because it was "reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response" from Caputo after he had claimed
his right to remain silent. Citing Miranda, Caputo maintains that
the story he blurted out upon hearing the officer's telephone
conversation should have been suppressed as the product of that
allegedly unlawful interrogation. Like the SJC, we are not
persuaded.
In Innis, in the presence of a man arrested on suspicion
of armed robbery, while conversing about the missing shotgun used
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in the robbery, two police officers expressed concern that a child
might injure herself if, by chance, she found the missing weapon.
This musing between the officers prompted the suspect to reveal the
location of the weapon. In holding that the police officers did not
engage in the functional equivalent of interrogation, the Supreme
Court wrote:
The case thus boils down to whether, in the
context of a brief conversation, the officers
should have known that the respondent would
suddenly be moved to make a self-incriminating
response. Given the fact that the entire
conversation appears to have consisted of no
more than a few off hand remarks, we cannot
say that the officers should have known that
it was reasonably likely that Innis would so
respond. This is not a case where the police
carried on a lengthy harangue in the presence
of the suspect. Nor does the record support
the respondent's contention that, under the
circumstances, the officers' comments were
particularly "evocative." It is our view,
therefore, that the respondent was not
subjected by the police to words or actions
that the police should have known were
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from him.
Innis, 446 U.S. at 303.
Since Innis, a number of courts have considered whether
police may confront a suspect with evidence against him without
engaging in the functional equivalent of interrogation. For
example, in United States v. Payne, 954 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 988 (1992), the defendant made incriminating
statements after a law enforcement officer informed the defendant
that the FBI possessed inculpatory evidence against him. Rejecting
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the defendant's argument that the officer's statement constituted
the functional equivalent of interrogation, the Fourth Circuit
observed: "[T]he Innis definition of interrogation is not so broad
as to capture within Miranda's reach all declaratory statements by
police officers concerning the nature of the charges against the
suspect and the evidence relating to those charges." Id. at 202.
The court went on to explain:
That no comment on the evidence in a case
will ever issue in the presence of a criminal
suspect seems to us neither realistic nor
desirable as an absolute rule derived from the
Fifth Amendment. Indeed, it may even be in
the interest of a defendant to be kept
informed about matters relating to the charges
against him. . . . Information about the
evidence against a suspect may also contribute
to the intelligent exercise of his judgment
regarding what course of conduct to follow.
Id.; see also United States v. Thomas, 11 F.3d 1392, 1397 (7th Cir.
1993) (finding no functional equivalent of interrogation where a
police officer provided information about the results of his
investigation to a suspect who had herself asked the officer to let
her know such results).
Similarly, in Plazinich v. Lynaugh, 843 F.2d 836 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1031 (1989), the Fifth Circuit
rejected the defendant's argument that a policeman engaged in the
functional equivalent of interrogation when he informed the
defendant-–after the defendant invoked his Miranda rights--that the
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defendant's accomplice had attempted suicide by slashing her wrists
in the jail. Citing Innis, the court wrote:
[The officer's] information concerning [the
defendant's accomplice] was not objectively
likely to elicit an incriminating response
from the suspect, who had just minutes before
declined to be interrogated. In the brief and
informal context in which it was made, the
comment could at most be characterized as
offering [the defendant] food for thought
rather than seeking to provoke an
incriminating response.
Id. at 840 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Enoch v.
Gramley, 70 F.3d 1490, 1500 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding no functional
equivalent of interrogation where the police identified the victim
to the suspect and briefly stated the evidence against him), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 829 (1996).
In this case, Caputo volunteered false exculpatory
information after hearing Dorman report to his shift commander that
Caputo was at his residence, that the engine of Caputo's automobile
was warm, and that there were two different registration plates on
the automobile. Dorman did not pose any questions to Caputo, and
he did not otherwise engage in subtle efforts to get Caputo to talk.
Instead, he simply related to another law enforcement officer non-
evocative facts about what he saw at Caputo's residence. Dorman had
no reason to know or even suspect that, in response to his brief
telephone call to the Plymouth police station, Caputo would
spontaneously blurt out a fabricated story intended to be
exculpatory and explanatory. Consistent with the case law set out
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above, the SJC determined that Caputo was not subjected to the
functional equivalent of interrogation, and his Fifth Amendment
right against compelled self-incrimination was not violated, when
Dorman used Caputo's telephone, in Caputo's presence, to report what
was found at Caputo's residence. Finding no Fifth Amendment
violation when Caputo made his initial statements, the SJC
determined that Caputo's later statements could not have been "fruit
of the poisonous tree." The SJC thus upheld the trial court's
denial of Caputo's motion to suppress.
When reviewing the SJC's decision upon Caputo's petition
for federal habeas corpus relief, the district court concluded that
the SJC properly applied the holdings of Miranda and Innis and,
consequently, reached a decision that was neither contrary to, nor
an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. We agree
with the district court's conclusion and, accordingly, AFFIRM the
judgment of the district court, denying Caputo's petition for writ
of habeas corpus.
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