United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 06-1357
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
ARTIN H. COLOIAN,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Howard, Circuit Judge.
Mary June Ciresi, for appellant.
Donald C. Lockhart, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Robert Clark Corrente, United States Attorney, and Terrence
Donnelly, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief, for
appellee.
March 20, 2007
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. On April 2, 2001, defendant-
appellant Artin H. Coloian was indicted on charges of bribery and
conspiracy to commit bribery. The case went to trial and on
June 27, 2002, Coloian was acquitted of both counts. Three years
later, Coloian filed a motion to expunge his criminal record on
equitable grounds under the original district court case number.
The government responded that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to consider the motion and that the requested relief
was inappropriate in any event. The district court concluded that
it did have jurisdiction to expunge records, but that expungement
was not warranted in Coloian's case. After careful consideration,
we vacate the district court's order and remand for dismissal for
want of jurisdiction.
I. Factual Background
On April 2, 2001, a federal grand jury returned a
superseding indictment charging Coloian, an attorney and former
Chief of Staff for the mayor of Providence, among others, with
various public corruption offenses. Coloian's case proceeded to
trial on two counts: bribery and conspiracy to commit bribery.
Those charges were based on allegations that Coloian had been
involved in a scheme whereby Vincent A. Cianci, Jr., then mayor of
Providence, was paid $5,000 for obtaining a job for one Christopher
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Ise. On June 27, 2002, following a four-day trial, a jury
acquitted Coloian of both counts.1
On December 8, 2005, more than three years later, Coloian
filed a Motion to Expunge under the original district court case
number in the United States District Court for the District of
Rhode Island.2 In that motion, Coloian asked the court to "expunge
his record with all due dispatch." Coloian asserted that
expungement was warranted on equitable grounds because the "stigma"
of having been charged "is extreme and unusual" and his arrest and
trial resulted in impediments to "his ability to practice law and
business." Coloian also filed a related motion to seal the
records.3
The government filed a consolidated response in which it
challenged the court's jurisdiction to expunge Coloian's record on
equitable grounds and argued that, even if jurisdiction existed,
the requested expungement was inappropriate given Coloian's
circumstances. In reply, Coloian reasserted his complaints of
1
During the trial, the district court denied Coloian's motion for
judgment of acquittal.
2
The word "expunge" generally refers to the physical destruction
of information. Dubnoff v. Goldstein, 385 F.2d 717, 724 (2d Cir.
1967). With respect to criminal records, expunction refers to the
process of sealing or destroying the record of a criminal
conviction after expiration of a certain time. U.S. v. Johnson, 941
F.2d 1102, 1111 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Black's Law Dictionary at
522 (5th ed. 1979)).
3
Coloian does not appeal the district court's ruling on his
motion to seal.
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stigma and made vague allegations of "zealous prosecution" during
the course of the grand jury proceedings in his case.
At a February 10, 2006 hearing, Coloian conceded that
nothing in the criminal record had "disqualif[ied] him for anything
that he might apply for in the future," but emphasized that the
record appeared on his credit report, and that he was questioned
about it by banks, potential clients and friends. Coloian
suggested that he was different from other acquitted defendants in
that he was a "practicing attorney" and "a member of the business
community," and as such, a criminal record was particularly
damaging because character and reputation are of particular
importance in his chosen career.
In an oral disposition, the district court first
concluded that "courts do have inherent authority and inherent
control over their records and can, in appropriate circumstances,
expunge records, but that power should be very sparingly
exercised." The court noted that expungement would be appropriate
upon a showing that the proceedings had been unlawful or invalid,
or the record of the proceeding caused "extreme hardship" in a
particular case. However, the court found that Coloian had not
presented "anything even approaching satisfaction of either of
those criteria."
On appeal, Coloian contends that the district court
acquired and retained subject matter jurisdiction over this case
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once the indictment was filed against him pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3231. He further asserts that the district court has ancillary
jurisdiction to adjudicate and determine matters incidental to the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction. Coloian contends that
because his motion to expunge his criminal record relates to the
charges in the indictment and "remain[s] a public record and record
of the District Court," the district court has ancillary
jurisdiction over the expungement of the criminal records.4 We
disagree.
II. Discussion
We review the threshold jurisdictional issue de novo.
See Baella-Silva v. Husley, 454 F.3d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 2006).
4
Congress has specifically provided for expungement or related
remedies in narrowly defined circumstances. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.
§§ 552a(d), (g)(1)(C) (allowing claims to amend public records that
are inaccurate); 10 U.S.C. § 1565(e) (mandating expungement of DNA
records when military conviction is overturned); 18 U.S.C. § 3607
(c) (allowing for expungement of criminal records in certain drug
possession cases); 21 U.S.C. § 844a(j) (allowing for expungement of
civil penalty records in certain drug possession cases); 42 U.S.C.
§ 14132(d) (allowing for expungement of DNA records held by the FBI
in certain cases where conviction is overturned). Also, federal
courts have upheld the expungement of criminal records as a remedy
for arrests or prosecutions that violate federal statutes or the
constitution. See, e.g., United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734,
738-39 (5th Cir. 1967)(directing the expungement of all arrests and
prosecutions in the record as a remedy for state's violation of the
Civil Rights Act); Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 960 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (same, as remedy for government's violation of the
Constitution). Coloian does not seek expungement under any of
these statutes, nor does he seek expungement as a remedy for the
violation of his statutory or constitutional rights.
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This case presents an issue of first impression in the
First Circuit. The only case in this Circuit to have addressed
this issue, albeit indirectly, is Reyes v. Supervisor of the DEA,
834 F.2d 1093 (1st Cir. 1987). In that case, we held that "the
court below did not commit reversible error by refusing to exercise
its equitable discretion to expunge Reyes' files. That power is a
narrow one, and has been used more often to expunge records of
unconstitutional convictions." Id. at 1098 (citation omitted).
Although this holding assumes that courts are empowered to order
expungement based on equitable considerations, the question of the
district court's jurisdiction to order the expungement was not
squarely before the court. We must now determine whether a
district court has ancillary jurisdiction to adjudicate a motion to
expunge criminal records based purely on equitable grounds.
A district court has original jurisdiction over "all
offenses against the laws of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
We have held that "[o]nce subject-matter jurisdiction has properly
attached, courts may exceed their authority or otherwise err
without loss of jurisdiction." Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37,
45 (1st Cir. 1999). However, by providing for a deadline for
notices of appeal from a court's judgment, Rule 4(b) of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure "is a jurisdictional limitation upon
the powers of the district court after a judgment of conviction has
been entered." United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1013 (9th
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Cir. 2000) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3562(b); United States v. Dumont,
936 F.2d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 1991)). Still, a district court may
assert ancillary jurisdiction "to adjudicate claims and proceedings
related to a claim that is properly before the court." Black's Law
Dictionary 868 (8th ed. 2004); see also United States v. Dunegan,
251 F.3d 477, 478-79 (3d Cir. 2001) ("A federal court invokes
ancillary jurisdiction as an incident to a matter where it has
acquired jurisdiction of a case in its entirety and, as an incident
to the disposition of the primary matter properly before it. It
may resolve other related matters which it could not consider were
they independently presented.").
In Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America,
the Supreme Court shed some light on the contours of a district
court's ancillary jurisdiction. 511 U.S. 375 (1994). In that
case, the Court unanimously held that a district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement it
had approved where its accompanying order of dismissal did not
reserve jurisdiction. Id. at 378. In so holding, the Court began
by reiterating that "[f]ederal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by
Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial
decree." Id. at 377 (citations omitted). The Court went on to
state that federal courts' ancillary jurisdiction serves two
purposes: "(1) to permit disposition by a single court of claims
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that are, in varying respects and degrees, factually
interdependent; and (2) to enable a court to function successfully,
that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and
effectuate its decrees." Id. at 379-80 (citations omitted).
The Court first noted that the claim originally before
the district court -- the claim it dismissed -- had nothing to do
with the claim for breach of the settlement agreement; "it would
neither be necessary nor even particularly efficient that they be
adjudicated together." Id. at 380. As such, the district court's
assertion of jurisdiction could not be said to serve the first
purpose of ancillary jurisdiction. Id. With respect to the second
purpose, the Court stated that the "inherent power" requested in
that case -- the power to reopen the case to enforce the settlement
agreement -- was "quite remote from what courts require in order to
perform their functions," given that the district court's only
order in the underlying case was that the suit be dismissed, "a
disposition that is in no way flouted or imperiled by the alleged
breach of the settlement agreement."5 Id.
5
Examples of a district court's proper exercise of ancillary
jurisdiction "to enable a court to function successfully" include
the power to compel payment of sanctions for misconduct, Chambers
v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991), the power to fine for
contempt or imprison for contumacy, United States v. Hudson, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812), and the power to appoint an attorney
to prosecute defendants for criminal contempt, Young v. United
States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 795 (1987). See
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380 (citing also 13 Charles Alan Wright,
Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 3523 (1984)).
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In view of the Supreme Court's instruction on the
purposes of ancillary jurisdiction, we must determine whether
Coloian's request for the expungement of his criminal record, based
solely on equitable grounds,6 serves either of these purposes.
The Third, Eighth and Ninth Circuits have read Kokkonen
to preclude ancillary jurisdiction over orders to expunge criminal
records based solely on equitable grounds. These circuits have
rejected the notion that a federal court's jurisdiction under
either § 3231 or its "inherent power" provides ancillary
jurisdiction over equitable orders to expunge because such orders
do not fit within Kokkonen's purposes for ancillary jurisdiction.
6
When we refer to "equitable grounds," we mean grounds that rely
only on notions of fairness and are entirely divorced from legal
considerations. Other circuit courts have also emphasized this
distinction. See, e.g., United States v. Meyer, 439 F.3d 855, 860-
62 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that "a district court does not have
subject matter jurisdiction over a motion to expunge that is based
solely on equitable considerations," but that it "may have
ancillary jurisdiction to [expunge] in extraordinary cases to
preserve its ability to function successfully by enabling it to
correct an injustice caused by an illegal or invalid criminal
proceeding"); United States v. Dunegan, 251 F.3d 477, 480 (3d Cir.
2001) (holding that a district court did not have jurisdiction over
a motion to expunge criminal records based on equitable grounds,
but declining to decide "whether a record may be expunged on the
basis of Constitutional or statutory infirmity in the underlying
criminal proceedings or on the basis of an unlawful arrest or
conviction"); United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1014-15 (9th
Cir. 2000) (holding that expungement of a criminal record "solely
on equitable grounds, such as to reward a defendant's
rehabilitation and commendable post-conviction conduct" did not
serve the purposes of ancillary jurisdiction as articulated in
Kokkonen, and that "a district court's ancillary jurisdiction is
limited to expunging the record of an unlawful arrest or
conviction, or to correcting a clerical error").
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See, e.g., Dunegan, 251 F.3d at 479 (3d Cir. 2001) ("We do not
believe that [the ancillary jurisdiction purposes articulated in
Kokkonen] contemplate a petition for the expungement of a criminal
record."); Meyer, 439 F.3d at 859-60 (8th Cir. 2006) ("In light of
the Supreme Court's instruction narrowing the scope of ancillary
jurisdiction in [Kokkonen], we are convinced that a district court
does not have ancillary jurisdiction to expunge a criminal record
based solely on equitable grounds."); Sumner, 226 F.3d at 1014 (9th
Cir. 2000) ("Expungement of a criminal record solely on equitable
grounds . . . does not serve [the ancillary jurisdiction purposes
articulated in Kokkonen].").
The Second, Seventh, Tenth and D.C. Circuits, however,
have concluded that district courts do have ancillary jurisdiction
to expunge records based on equitable considerations.7 See, e.g.,
United States v. Flowers, 389 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 2004) ("The
test for the expungement of judicial records is a balancing test:
'if the dangers of unwarranted adverse consequences to the
individual outweigh the public interest in maintenance of the
records, then expunction is appropriate.'" (quoting United States
v. Janik, 10 F.3d 470, 472 (7th Cir. 1993)); United States v.
7
Although the Seventh and Tenth Circuits have not specifically
tied the district court's power to expunge criminal records to a
particular jurisdictional basis, we interpret the silence to mean
that the power is grounded on a district court's ancillary
jurisdiction. Cf. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380 (viewing claims of a
district court's "inherent power" as falling under ancillary
jurisdiction).
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Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536, 539 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[E]xpungement lies
within the equitable discretion of the court, and relief usually is
granted only in 'extreme circumstances.'"); Livingston v. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, 759 F.2d 74, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("It is well
established, and undisputed by the parties to this case, that
courts have the inherent, equitable power to expunge arrest
records."); U.S. v. Linn, 513 F.2d 925, 927 (10th Cir. 1975)
("Certain of the cases call for a 'balancing' of the equities
between the Government's need to maintain extensive records in
order to aid in general law enforcement and the individual's right
to privacy."). However, these cases either predate Kokkonen, or
they fail to address that decision, which raises questions as to
their continued viability.
We agree with the Third, Eighth and Ninth Circuits that
Kokkonen answers the question raised in this case. As the Kokkonen
court held, ancillary jurisdiction exists only (1) to permit
disposition of interrelated claims by a single court and (2) to
enable a court to "manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority,
and effectuate its decrees." 511 U.S. at 379-80. As in Kokkonen,
the original claims brought before the district court in this case
have nothing to do with the equitable grounds upon which Coloian
seeks the expungement of his criminal record. Moreover, "the power
asked for here is quite remote from what courts require in order to
perform their functions." Id. at 380 (emphasis added). The
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existence and availability of Coloian's criminal records do not
frustrate or defeat his acquittal. In fact, the records are
entirely consistent with and respectful of the jury's ultimate
judgment in Coloian's case, as they accurately document his arrest,
trial and acquittal. Thus, Kokkonen forecloses any ancillary
jurisdiction to order expungement based on Coloian's proffered
equitable reasons. We therefore find that the district court did
not have jurisdiction to consider Coloian's request for the
expungement of his criminal record on equitable grounds.
III. Conclusion
Because we find that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to consider Coloian's motion, we vacate the district
court's order and remand for dismissal for want of jurisdiction.
Vacated and Remanded with instructions to dismiss.
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