Fernandez-Vargas v. Pfizer

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 06-2632

EMMA FERNÁNDEZ-VARGAS,
IN REPRESENTATION OF HER MINOR SON; C. J. P. F.,

Plaintiff,

v.

PFIZER (PARENT CORPORATION); JOHN DOE;
and/or FULANO DE TAL; ABC INSURANCE COMPANY;
LUIS ADORNO-CABÁN,

Defendants,

&

E. P. S., MINOR; R. P. S. MINOR
REPRESENTED BY THEIR MOTHER; ANABEL SÁNCHEZ-VALLE,

Defendants/Cross-Claimants, Appellants,

v.

PFIZER PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,

Cross-Defendant, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Jose Antonio Fuste, U.S. Chief District Judge]

Before

Lipez, Circuit Judge
Baldock, * Senior Circuit Judge
and Howard, Circuit Judge.

*
Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
 Mireya Baltazar-Suazo, with whom Orlando I. Martínez-
Garcia and Abogados de América Law Offices were on brief for
appellants.

Mariela Rexach-Rexach, with whom Teresa M. Seda-Ramos
and Schuster Aguilo LLP were on brief for appellees.

April 3, 2008
 BALDOCK, Senior Circuit Judge. Vital to our resolution

of this appeal is an understanding of the controversy’s

extensive and convoluted procedural history. Our story

begins in August 2003 when Luis Adorno-Cabán (Adorno)

fatally shot Jaime Pagán-Avilés (Pagán). The unfortunate

incident occurred while both men were working at Pfizer’s

facility in Barceloneta, Puerto Rico. Pagán’s common law

wife, Emma Fernández-Vargas (Fernández), and their minor

son, C.J.P.F., survived him. Pagán also left behind E.P.S.

and R.P.S., two minor daughters from his prior marriage to

Anabel Sánchez-Valle (Sánchez). Pfizer is the Appellee in

this appeal. Sánchez is the Appellant. Sánchez asserts the

district court (1) lacked subject matter jurisdiction from

the outset, (2) improperly dismissed her wrongful death

cross-claim, (3) issued a judgment that was null and void,

and (4) erroneously enjoined her from suing Pfizer in

commonwealth court. We exercise jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.

I.

Shortly after Pagán’s death, Fernández filed a workmen’s

compensation claim with the Puerto Rico State Insurance Fund

(SIF) on behalf of herself and C.J.P.F. See 11 P.R. Laws,

§ 8. In submitting her claim, Fernández disclosed the

dependent status not only of Pagán’s son, C.J.P.F., but also

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of Pagán’s two daughters, E.P.S. and R.P.S. Sánchez did not

file a separate claim with the SIF on behalf of E.P.S. and

R.P.S. After an investigation, the SIF denied Fernández’s

claim in a terse order:

From the investigation conducted it is established
that the aggression occurred when [Pagán’s] co-
worker, in a joking manner, threatened the injured
party with a firearm that accidentally went off.
Said aggression has no bearing whatsoever with
the functions performed by the employee, nor with
the functions performed by the assailant, it does
not constitute an occupational risk nor a risk
of the work environment, and the assailant was in
violation of a . . . company rule, of not bearing
arms on the employer’s premises.

In re Pagán-Avilés, No. 04-07-00733-2, Order (P.R. State

Ins. Fund, July 22, 2004) (Certified Translation MC-2007-

330). Because, according to the SIF, Pagán’s death was “not

related to his occupation,” his death was not compensable

under Puerto Rico’s Work Accident Compensation Act (WACA).

Id. Fernández did not appeal the SIF’s decision to the

Puerto Rico Industrial Commission as permitted by the WACA.

See 11 P.R. Laws § 11.

Instead, in August 2004, Fernández and Sánchez commenced

separate lawsuits in Puerto Rico commonwealth court seeking

damages related to Pagán’s death. Sánchez’s wrongful death

lawsuit named as plaintiffs herself and her two minor

daughters, as well as Pagán’s father, aunt, uncle, and

brother. Named defendants included Pfizer, Adorno, and the

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medical personnel responsible for treating Pagán. Sánchez

did not join Fernández or C.J.P.F. See Pagán-Valentín v.

Pfizer Pharm., LLC, No. CDP-04-0212(403), Amended Complaint

(Arecibo Sup. Pt., Oct. 27, 2004) (Certified Translation MC-

2006-137).

Fernández filed a lawsuit on behalf of herself and

C.J.P.F. Fernández named, among others, Pfizer and Adorno

as defendants. Importantly, she also named E.P.S. and

R.P.S. as defendants through their mother, Sánchez.

According to the complaint, Fernández named E.P.S. and

R.P.S. as defendants because (1) Sánchez had not authorized

their joinder as plaintiffs, and (2) they might be entitled

to share in a recovery as Pagán’s heirs. See Fernández-

Vargas v. Pfizer Pharm., Inc., No. CDP-04-0209(404),

Complaint (Arecibo Sup. Pt., Aug. 3, 2004) (Certified

Translation MC-2004-765).

Fernández’s complaint alleged two theories of recovery.

First, like Sánchez, Fernández alleged wrongful death

against Pfizer and Adorno. Second, unlike Sánchez,

Fernández alleged Pfizer had wrongfully denied her

disability benefits. The latter claim arose from

Fernández’s status as a Pfizer employee. Fernández alleged

she suffered emotional damages because Pfizer, instead of

providing her with disability benefits, forced her to return

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to work after Pagán’s death.

Pfizer removed Fernández’s action to federal district

court in November 2004. Pfizer argued ERISA’s preemption of

Fernández’s employee benefits claim made the claim removable

under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B);

see also Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 207-08

(2004) (explaining that because ERISA completely preempted

a state law cause of action, a claim coming within the scope

of that cause of action, even if pleaded in terms of state

law, was actually based in federal law). The district

court’s supplemental jurisdiction extended to Fernández’s

wrongful death claim, which arose under Puerto Rico law.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c).

Once in federal court, Pfizer moved to dismiss

Fernández’s complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Pfizer argued ERISA preempted Fernández’s denial of benefits

claim. Notwithstanding the SIF’s prior decision that

Pagán’s death was “not related to his occupation,” Pfizer

further argued that because Pagán’s death occurred in the

course of his employment, Pfizer was immune from Fernández’s

wrongful death claim under WACA § 21. Section 21 provides:

When an employer insures his workmen or employees
in accordance with this chapter, the right herein
established to obtain compensation shall be the
only remedy against the employer, even in those
cases where maximum compensations and benefits have
been granted in accordance thereof; but in case of

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 accident to, or diseased or death of, the workmen
or employees not entitled to compensation under
this chapter, the liability of the employer is, and
shall continue to be, the same as if this chapter
did not exist.

11 P.R. Laws § 21 (emphasis added). The district court

granted Fernández leave to file an amended complaint, while

reserving ruling on Pfizer’s immunity defense pending

submission of an English translation of the SIF’s decision.

Fernández filed her amended complaint in February 2005.

Fernández again named Pagán’s two daughters as defendants,

through Sánchez, their mother. Fernández alleged wrongful

death against Pfizer and Adorno. She also alleged Pfizer

had improperly denied her disability benefits under an

ERISA-covered plan: “Under 29 U.S.C. § 1132 plaintiff Emma

Fernández is entitled to seek from Pfizer the benefits owed

to her under the long term disability plan offered to her as

an employee of Pfizer.” Fernández-Vargas v. Pfizer Pharm.,

Inc., Civ. No. 04-2236 (JAF), Amended Complaint (D.P.R.

February 22, 2005). “[A]s a further violation of ERISA,”

Fernández alleged Pfizer had wrongfully refused to tender

the proceeds from Pagán’s profit-sharing and stock-option

plans. Pfizer answered by renewing its motion to dismiss

Fernández’s wrongful death claim. Pfizer again asserted

employer immunity under WACA § 21. Additionally, Pfizer

moved to dismiss Fernández’s ERISA claims, arguing she

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failed to exhaust the administrative remedies outlined in

Pfizer’s benefits plan.

Finally, in April 2005, Sánchez, on behalf of E.P.S. and

R.P.S., appeared for the first time and answered Fernández’s

amended complaint. Sánchez acknowledged the district

court’s federal question and supplemental jurisdiction.

Sánchez also filed a cross-claim, on behalf of her

daughters, against Pfizer and Adorno for wrongful death.

Sánchez’s cross-claim set forth essentially the same

allegations as those contained in the complaint she filed

nine months earlier in the Puerto Rico commonwealth court.

Pfizer moved to dismiss Sánchez’s cross-claim, yet again

asserting employer immunity under WACA § 21. Sánchez

received an extension of time until June 6 to oppose

Pfizer’s motion to dismiss her cross-claim. On June 7,

Sánchez filed a second request for an extension. The

district court did not grant the second extension. Instead,

on June 8, the district court issued an Opinion and Order

addressing Pfizer’s respective motions to dismiss. See

Fernández-Vargas v. Pfizer Pharm., Inc., 394 F. Supp. 2d 407

(D.P.R. 2005). That same day, the district court denied as

moot Sánchez’s second motion for an extension of time to

respond to Pfizer’s motion to dismiss.

The district court first denied Pfizer’s motion to

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dismiss Fernández’s ERISA claims. According to the court,

Fernández’s allegation that Pfizer had refused to provide

her benefits before she filed her lawsuit was sufficient to

establish exhaustion under the notice-pleading standard.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Second, the district court

addressed whether Pfizer was entitled to immunity from suit

under WACA § 21. The court initially considered the

preclusive effect of the SIF’s decision. Because Pfizer was

not a party to the SIF proceedings, the court reasoned that

Pfizer was not precluded from challenging the SIF’s decision

and asserting immunity under the Act. See Fernández-Vargas,

394 F. Supp. 2d at 413.

Turning to the merits, the district court concluded the

SIF had interpreted the WACA too narrowly and, thus, wrongly

concluded Pagán’s death was not compensable under the Act.

The court cited numerous Puerto Rico court decisions holding

“that if an accident occurs on an employer’s premises, the

causal connection required to make the injury compensable is

satisfied.” Id. at 414 (collecting cases). Even assuming,

contrary to the SIF’s finding, that the shooting was

intentional, the court reasoned that “where the intentional

aggression is unexplained or without a known motive, the

benefit of the doubt favors the worker, and it must be

assumed that the aggression was ‘work-related’ and,

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therefore, compensable.” Id. at 415 (collecting cases).

Because neither Fernández nor Sánchez alleged any motive

behind Pagán’s shooting or provided any explanation for it,

the district court held (1) Pagán death was compensable

under the WACA, and (2) Pfizer was entitled to the immunity

provided by § 21. Accordingly, the court dismissed

Fernández’s wrongful death claim and Sánchez’s wrongful

death cross-claim against Pfizer. 1

As part of its dismissal order, the court scheduled a

show cause hearing to determine “whether cross-claimants

[E.P.S. and R.P.S., through Sánchez] should remain in . . .

[Fernández’s] ERISA suit and, if so, whether they [we]re

appropriately joined as co-defendants.” Id. at 416.

Sánchez filed a motion to reconsider the court’s dismissal

of her cross-claim. 2 Therein, Sánchez suggested for the

first time that Adorno had a motive for shooting Pagán

related to an “emotional relationship,” and that discovery

1
The district court declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the wrongful death claims against Adorno
given those claims were sufficiently separate from
Fernández’s ERISA claims. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). Accordingly, the district court
dismissed the wrongful death claims against Adorno without
prejudice. See Fernández-Vargas, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 415-16.
2
While the Federal Rules do not provide for a “motion
to reconsider,” a district court has the inherent power to
reconsider its interlocutory orders, and we encourage it to
do so where error is apparent. See Warren v. American
Bankers Ins., 507 F.3d 1239, 1243 (10th Cir. 2007).

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was necessary to establish such motive.

With Sánchez’s motion to reconsider pending, Pfizer

moved for summary judgment on Fernández’s ERISA claims.

Pfizer again asserted Fernández’s failure to exhaust her

administrative remedies. Fernández, whose counsel had been

permitted to withdraw on July 6, never responded.

Consequently, on August 22, Pfizer asked the court to deem

its motion for summary judgment unopposed. Pfizer further

moved to dismiss Fernández’s case for failure to prosecute.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

Oddly, the district court granted Sánchez an extension

of time to respond to Pfizer’s motion for summary judgment

– a motion that by all appearances was directed solely at

Fernández’s ERISA claims. Sánchez filed a formal opposition

to Pfizer’s motion for summary judgment on August 29, 2005.

Sánchez for the first time argued she had alleged, as part

of her cross-claim, ERISA-based claims on behalf of E.P.S.

and R.P.S. Sánchez urged the court to forego ruling on

Pfizer’s motion and allow discovery.

On August 30, the district court granted Pfizer’s motion

to dismiss Fernández’s action for failure to prosecute. The

next morning, the court held a show cause hearing on the

lawsuit’s continued viability in light of two outstanding

matters: (1) Sánchez’s motion to reconsider the court’s

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prior dismissal of her wrongful death cross-claim against

Pfizer, and (2) Sánchez’s opposition to Pfizer’s motion for

summary judgment on Fernández’s ERISA claims. That

afternoon, the court entered an order denying Sánchez’s

motion to reconsider without comment. The court then

dismissed the case in its entirety and entered final

judgment thereon:

There being no pending ERISA cause of action
pleaded by cross-claimants, the remaining portion
of this case is DISMISSED. Any ERISA-type claims
by the . . . [Sánchez] claimants are not properly
before the court and are, if at all, premature.
The dismissal as to any future ERISA claims by
these claimants is without prejudice.

Fernández-Vargas v. Pfizer Pharm., Inc., Civ. No. 04-2236

(JAF), Order (D.P.R., Aug. 31, 2005).

Sanchez filed another motion to reconsider which,

properly construed, constituted a motion to alter or amend

the judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). In her motion,

Sánchez suggested, for the first time, that the district

court’s judgment was “null” because Fernández’s son,

C.J.P.F., (1) had an unspecified conflict of interest with

his mother and (2) lacked legal representation at a crucial

stage of the proceeding. Sánchez asserted the court’s

failure to appoint C.J.P.F. a guardian ad litem rendered its

judgment void. Sánchez also argued that she had alleged a

cause of action under ERISA, and summary judgment was

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premature prior to discovery. With Sánchez’s Rule 59(e)

motion outstanding, Pfizer moved the court for injunctive

relief pursuant to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2283. Pfizer urged the court to enter a permanent

injunction precluding Sánchez and her family from

relitigating the issue of Pfizer’s immunity from suit in

commonwealth court.

In November 2006, the district court denied Sánchez’s

Rule 59(e) motion and enjoined her and her family from

relitigating the immunity issue. See Fernández-Vargas v.

Pfizer Pharm., Inc., Civ. No. 04-2236 (JAF), 2006 WL 3254463

(D.P.R., Nov. 8, 2006) (unpublished). The court again

rejected Sánchez’s argument that she had actually pled ERISA

claims against Pfizer. The Court declined to address the

need for a guardian ad litem to represent C.J.P.F., or for

discovery. The court viewed these arguments as “premised on

the [erroneous] supposition that they [Sánchez and her

daughters] had an ERISA cross-claim against Pfizer in the

first instance.” Id. at *4.

Turning to Pfizer’s motion for injunctive relief, the

district court recognized that Sánchez’s wrongful death

cross-claim against Pfizer was identical to her wrongful

death claim pending in commonwealth court. The court

reasoned that because it had already conclusively determined

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WACA § 21 rendered Pfizer immune from Sánchez’s wrongful

death cross-claim, permitting Sánchez to relitigate the

immunity issue in commonwealth court would cause Pfizer

irreparable harm. See id. at *8. Consequently, the court

issued the injunction against Sánchez and her family. See

28 U.S.C. § 2283. Sánchez appealed. Our jurisdiction

arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

II.

On appeal Sánchez challenges the district court’s

judgment on four grounds. First, Sánchez argues Pfizer’s

removal of Fernández’s complaint to federal court was

improper and the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction

over the action from the outset. Second, she claims the

court improperly dismissed her cross-claim against Pfizer

based on the erroneous view that WACA § 21 provided Pfizer

immunity from suit. Third, she suggests the court’s failure

to appoint Fernández’s son, C.J.P.F., a guardian ad litem

renders its judgment a nullity. Finally, Sánchez asserts

the court improperly enjoined her from pursuing her wrongful

death claim against Pfizer in commonwealth court.

A.

Sánchez’s argument that the district court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction presents a legal question we

consider de novo. See United Seniors Ass’n, Inc. v. Philip

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Morris USA, 500 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 2007) (reviewing de

novo the district court’s “implicit legal conclusion” that

it had subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint). Our

resolution of Sánchez’s jurisdictional concern need not

detain us long. Whether Pfizer’s removal of Fernández’s

original commonwealth action to federal court was defective

is immaterial. Fernández amended her complaint to plainly

allege subject-matter jurisdiction in the context of her

ERISA claims. Once Fernández did so, any initial

jurisdictional defect in removal was cured. See Brough v.

United Steel Workers, 437 F.2d 748, (1st Cir. 1971)

In Brough, we plainly held that a federal claim, raised

for the first time in an amended complaint, cured any

jurisdictional defects in an action otherwise improperly

removed from state court. Id. at 750. When Fernández

amended her complaint, the district court undoubtedly

possessed original federal question jurisdiction over her

ERISA claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental

jurisdiction over her wrongful death claim pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1367.

Sánchez’s cross-claim against Pfizer acknowledged both

the court’s original and supplemental jurisdiction under

§§ 1131 and 1367, respectively. Courts have long recognized

that a party “cannot voluntarily invoke and then disavow

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federal jurisdiction.” New Mexico v. General Elec. Co., 467

F.3d 1223, 1236 n.23 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations

omitted); accord Bernstein v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 738 F.2d

179, 185-86 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing Brough). Accordingly,

we reject Sánchez’s challenge to the district court’s

subject matter jurisdiction in this case. 3

B.

Next we consider Sánchez’s argument that Pfizer is not

immune from suit under WACA § 21. This issue arose within

the context of Pfizer’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and

we consider it de novo. See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School

Comm., 504 F.3d 165, 176 (1st Cir. 2007); see also Manager

of the State Ins. Fund v. Flores Hermanos Cement Prod., 7

3
Sánchez’s argument that ERISA does not provide
Fernández a private right of action does not bear upon the
district court’s subject matter jurisdiction, but only upon
the question of whether Fernández stated a cause of action
under ERISA. In Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Serv.
Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635 (2002), the Supreme Court rejected the
argument that a law’s failure to provide a private right of
action bears upon the district court’s jurisdiction to
entertain suit. The Court explained that, unless the claim
is “wholly insubstantial or frivolous” or “made solely for
the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction,” the “absence of a
valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does not
implicate subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 642-43.
Section 1132(a)(1)(B) of ERISA plainly provides that a plan
“participant or beneficiary” may bring a “civil action” “to
recover benefits due him under the terms of the plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to
clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the
plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). Fernández’s ERISA claims
were hardly “insubstantial or frivolous.”

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P.R. Offic. Trans. 860, 860-62 (P.R. 1978) (characterizing

an employer’s immunity under the WACA as an absolute

“defense” based on the complete absence of a cause of

action); 6 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson’s Workers’

Comp. Law § 100.01[2], at 100-3 (2007) (hereinafter Larson)

(describing an employer’s claim of immunity in the workers’

compensation context as an affirmative defense).

At the outset, we, like the district court, recognize

that because Pfizer was not a party to Fernández’s action

before the SIF, the SIF’s decision that Pagán’s death was

not compensable under the WACA does not bind Pfizer. In

Negrón v. C.I.T. Fin. Serv., 11 P.R. Offic. Trans. 828 (P.R.

1981), the SIF denied benefits to the beneficiaries of the

decedent. The Industrial Commission upheld the SIF’s

decision and the beneficiaries took no further appeal. See

11 P.R. Laws § 11 (providing for appeals from SIF decisions

to the Industrial Commission); see also id. § 8 (providing

for appeals from Industrial Commission decisions to the

“courts of justice”). Instead, they filed a wrongful death

suit against the employer in Puerto Rico commonwealth court.

In rejecting the SIF’s decision, the Puerto Rico Supreme

Court said this about the preclusive effect of that prior

decision upon the employer:

Although the Fund’s ruling denying compensation
rights is final and unappealable, because the

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 Commission’s upholding resolution was not appealed,
the employer, petitioner herein, was not a party to
that administrative proceeding. The Fund’s ruling
is res judicata between the Fund and the employee’s
beneficiaries, respondents herein. But that
administrative ruling cannot represent a bar in the
judicial ambit in order to determine its
correctness to the effect of the exclusiveness
[i.e., immunity] clause invoked by the petitioner.
Since it was not a party to said action, the ruling
is not res judicata as far as the petitioner is
concerned.

Negron, 11 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 832-33. The court

concluded that neither it, nor the employer, was bound “by

an erred ruling of the Fund and the Commission.” Id. at

834. Similarly, neither we, nor Pfizer, are bound by the

SIF’s decision that Pagán’s death was not compensable.

As such, we assess Pfizer’s entitlement to immunity

under WACA § 21 anew. We conclude the SIF construed the

WACA’s scope of coverage too narrowly. López-Cotto v.

Western Auto of Puerto Rico, Inc., No. CC-2006-248, slip op.

(P.R., May 17, 2007) (Certified Translation MC-2007-380),

best illustrates our conclusion. In that case, employees of

defendant Western Auto locked López, a fellow employee,

inside the men’s restroom at the store. López apparently

had notified management that a lock on the outside of the

restroom door attracted practical jokesters. As part of

their practical joke, López’s coworkers emptied the contents

of a fire extinguisher underneath the door. López suffered

“permanent pulmonary damage and post-traumatic stress

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disorder.” Id. at 2. López sought benefits from the SIF.

The SIF labeled the incident a “work accident,” and awarded

López compensation.

Subsequently, López and his conjugal partner sued

Western Auto for damages in commonwealth court. The trial

court refused to dismiss the complaint on the basis of

employer immunity. The Puerto Rico Court of Appeals

reversed, holding Western Auto enjoyed immunity under WACA

§ 21. López and his partner appealed to the Puerto Rico

Supreme Court, where they unsuccessfully argued that the

appellate court erred when it ruled on the employer’s lack

of intent “in the abstract,” without allowing discovery or

permitting an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 7. Importantly,

the supreme court understood the question of WACA § 21

immunity to turn solely on whether Western Auto had

“intentionally” caused López’s injuries:

An examination of the facts arising from the file
of the case show that, at the most, the only thing
that may be charged on the mentioned employer,
regarding the incident occurred, is having been
negligent by not having corrected the situation of
the lock of the bathroom in spite of having been,
allegedly, advised of it prior to the occurrence of
the facts. In this kind of situation, ordinarily,
the worker does not have any cause of action
whatsoever against the employer. The argument of
petitioners – to the effect that López Cotto was a
victim of an intentional act of the employer – is
totally unwarranted. . . . [T]he most that could be
charged on Western Auto is that it was negligent.

[I]n the complaint filed, the plaintiffs allege,

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 “in the alternative,” that Western Auto is
responsible for the intentional acts of López
Cotto’s coworkers. They are not right. . . .
[W]hen the person who intentionally injures the
employee, is not the employer, in its personal
capacity or a person who is an “alter ego” of the
employer or corporation . . . and whether it is a
mere employee or supervisor, a cause of action in
damages against the employer for the acts committed
by its employees is not proper.

Id. at 11-12 (emphasis added).

In view of López-Cotto, we have little choice but to

conclude that the gunman Adorno’s mental state is only

tangentially related to the question of whether Pagán’s

death was compensable under the WACA. 4 Certainly, Sánchez

has not suggested that Adorno was the “alter ego” of Pfizer.

Under López-Cotto’s rationale, Sánchez, to withstand

Pfizer’s § 21 immunity defense, must establish that Pfizer

“intentionally” caused Pagán’s death. See id. at 12.

Larson, a leading commentator on workers’ compensation

law, explains the usual meaning of “intentional” within the

worker’s compensation context. His view is undoubtedly

4
In 1962, the Puerto Rico Legislature amended the WACA
to extend the benefits of “such an important social
legislation” to cases where a worker is intentionally and
illegally assaulted by a coworker or other third party.
Ortiz-Perez v. State Ins. Fund, No. CE-93-471, slip op. at
6 (P.R., Oct. 31, 1994) (Certified Translation MC-2007-229).
Prior to that time, the WACA denied compensation benefits to
any worker suffering injury or death due to a third person’s
criminal act. In amending the WACA, the legislature sought
“to adapt the local law to the modern trends in the scope of
work accident compensation that liberalized the restrictions
as to what constitutes a work accident.” Id at 5.

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consistent with López-Cotto’s view:

[T]he common-law liability of the employer cannot,
under the almost unanimous rule, be stretched to
include the accidental injuries caused by the
gross, wanton, wilful, deliberate, intentional,
reckless, culpable, or malicious negligence, . . .
or other misconduct by the employer short of a
conscious and deliberate intent directed to the
purpose of inflicting an injury.

Larson, supra § 103.03, at 103-7 - 103-8 (emphasis added)

(footnotes omitted). “Even if the alleged conduct . . .

includes such elements as . . . wilfully failing to furnish

a safe place to work . . . [or] failing to protect employees

from crime, . . . the conduct still falls short of the kind

of actual intention to injure that robs the injury of

accidental character.” Id. § 103.03, at 103-8 - 103-9

(footnotes omitted).

Sánchez argues, as López did in López-Cotto, that we

should direct the district court to allow discovery on the

intent issue. But Sánchez’s cross-claim alleges only that

“Pfizer acted with intentional, negligent and reckless

disregard in preventing, avoiding and/or detecting firearms

within its premises . . . [and] failing to investigate and

adequately supervise its workforce.” Fernández-Vargas v.

Pfizer Pharm., Inc., Civ. No. 04-2236 (JAF), Answer to

Amended Complaint (D.P.R., April 25, 2005) (emphasis added).

In other words, Sánchez alleges Pfizer failed to ensure a

safe workplace for its employees, despite having a written

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policy forbidding its employees from possessing firearms on

the plant’s premises. These allegations do not amount to a

claim that Pfizer, consciously and deliberately intended to

cause Pagán death. See Larson, supra § 103.03, at 103-8 -

103-9. Perhaps like Western Auto in López-Cotto, Pfizer was

careless or indifferent to the need for a safe workplace.

Such nonfeasance, however, falls far short under Puerto Rico

law of the intent required to deprive Pfizer of the benefits

of WACA immunity.

To be sure, a worker’s assault upon a coworker may not

be compensable if based on animosity or conflict arising out

of a “purely private and personal” matter between the

workers. See Ortiz-Perez v. State Ins. Fund, No. CE-93-471,

slip op. at 7 (P.R., Oct. 31, 1994) (Certified Translation

MC-2007-229). But Sánchez’s cross-claim contains no

allegation that some private and personal conflict between

the two men motivated Adorno’s action. The SIF found that

Adorno was threatening Pagán “in a joking manner” when the

gun went off. None of the allegations in Sánchez’s cross-

claim contradict the SIF’s finding. Sánchez’s cross-claim

alleges only that Pfizer is responsible “for the negligent,

careless and reckless acts caused by the employee [Adorno].”

The cross-claim makes no reference to Adorno’s motivation.

Adorno’s motive for shooting Pagán, if he had one,

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remains unapparent and unexplained. Given Puerto Rico

courts’ recognition of “the doctrine of neutral or

unexplained assaults,” which provides WACA coverage in

cases where “an employee is injured as a consequence of an

assault without an apparent and unexplainable motive,”

Pagán’s death undoubtedly was compensable under the WACA.

And the SIF erroneously held otherwise. Ortiz-Perez, slip.

op. at 10-11. Consequently, the district court properly

held that WACA § 21’s employer immunity shielded Pfizer from

Sánchez’s wrongful death cross-claim.

C.

Next, we address Sánchez’s argument that the district

court’s failure to appoint C.J.P.F., Fernández’s minor son,

a guardian ad litem pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c) voids

its judgment. Among other things, Rule 17(c) provides that

where a minor is “not otherwise represented in an action,”

a federal court “shall appoint a guardian ad litem . . . or

shall make such other order as it deems proper for the

protection of the [minor].” The decision as to whether to

appoint a special representative for a minor under Rule

17(c) rests within the district court’s sound discretion.

And we will not disturb that decision absent an abuse of

discretion. See Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Ctr.,

Inc. v. Melton, 689 F.2d 281, 285 (1st Cir. 1982).

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 State law generally governs the capacity of one to sue

as a representative of another. See id. Puerto Rico law

grants parents a wide range of rights in the exercise of

“patria potestas.” These include the right to represent

their minor children in civil litigation. See Ex Parte

Torres-Ojeda, 18 P.R. Offic. Trans. 549, 556-57 (P.R. 1987).

Absent some conflict of interest between a parent and child,

or apparent wrongdoing on behalf of the parent, that right

surely encompasses the right to decide whether to proceed

with the prosecution of a civil lawsuit by weighing the

attendant costs and benefits. Cf. P.R. R. Civ. Pro. 45.2

(prohibiting a default judgment against a minor unless such

minor is represented “by the father, mother, . . . or other

such representative who has appeared therein”); accord Fed.

R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) (same). After all, a parent is presumed

to act in the best interest of her child. See Suboh v.

District Attorney’s Office, 298 F.3d 81, 92 (1st Cir. 2002).

Consistent with this view, we have interpreted Rule

17(c), specifically the language “not otherwise represented

in an action,” as “permitting appointment of a . . .

guardian ad litem when it appears that the minor’s general

representative has interests which may conflict with those

of the person he is supposed to represent.” Melton, 689

F.2d at 285 (internal quotations omitted). Similarly, we

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have interpreted the district court’s authority to “make

such orders as it deems proper for the protection of the

[minor]” as encompassing situations “where it is clear” the

interests of the parent and child conflict. Id. at 286.

The district court implicitly recognized Fernández’s

right to act as the representative of her minor son,

C.J.P.F., from the outset of this action. We seriously

doubt Sánchez, having no natural or other official

relationship to C.J.P.F., has any standing under Rule 17(c)

to challenge the nature of that representation. See id. at

285; see also Charles Alan Wright, Arthur K. Miller & Mary

Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1570, at 503 (2d

ed. 1990)(explaining that a court may properly refuse to

appoint a guardian under Rule 17(c) where the appointment

“is sought for ulterior reasons that have nothing to do with

protecting the [minor]”). Notably, Sánchez never formally

moved the court to appoint C.J.P.F. a new representative.

Rather, Sánchez claimed in her Rule 59(e) motion that

Fernández and C.J.P.F. had some unspecified conflict of

interest requiring an appointment. Sánchez has provided us

with only vague, unverified assertions, and we have no idea

what that conflict might be. 5

5
Rule 59(e) “does not allow a party to advance
arguments that could and should have been presented to the
(continued...)

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 Our careful review of the documents Pfizer filed in

support of its summary judgment motion on Fernández’s ERISA

claims indicate that Fernández, in all likelihood, failed to

exhaust the administrative remedies contained in Pfizer’s

employee-benefit plan. See Madera v. Marsh USA, Inc., 426

F.3d 56, 61 (1st Cir. 2005) (construing ERISA to require

exhaustion of administrative remedies). Absent evidence or

a course of conduct suggesting otherwise, we presume

Fernández saw nothing to be gained by continuing to expend

resources on a case in which she and C.J.P.F. had little

chance of prevailing. We see no conflict inherent in

Fernández’s decision not to respond to Pfizer’s motion for

summary judgment, and we presume she acted in C.J.P.F.’s

best interests. See Suboh, 298 F.3d at 92. Thus, we reject

Sánchez’s challenge to the district court’s judgment based

5
(...continued)
district court prior to judgment.” DiMarco-Zappa v.
Cabanillas, 238 F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir. 2001) (internal
quotations and ellipses omitted). Sánchez recognizes as
much by claiming, without citation to a single pertinent
authority, that the district court’s civil judgment is
simply void based on its failure to appoint C.J.P.F. a
guardian ad litem. Of course, a void judgment may be
vulnerable to attack at any point. See Baella-Silva v.
Hulsey, 454 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 2006) (“A void judgment is
to be distinguished from an erroneous one, in that the
latter is subject only to direct attack. A void judgment is
one which, from its inception, was a complete nullity and
without legal effect.”) (internal quotations and ellipses
omitted). We view Sánchez’s claim that the district court’s
judgment is void as nothing more than a forlorn attempt to
forestall the entry of final judgment in this case.

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upon its failure to appoint C.J.P.F. a guardian ad litem.

D.

Lastly, we review the district court’s decision to

enjoin Sánchez’s commonwealth action under the Anti-

Injunction Act for an abuse of discretion. See Zurich

American Ins. v. Superior Court, 326 F.3d 816, 824 (7th Cir.

2003). Within this context, we evaluate the court’s

underlying factual findings for clear error and its legal

interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act de novo. Id. For

our purposes, we are concerned only with the “relitigation

exception” to the Act. The Anti-Injunction Act prohibits a

federal court from “grant[ing] an injunction to stay

proceedings in State court except . . . where necessary

. . . to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2283. “The words ‘protect or effectuate’ in § 2283 are

generally viewed as incorporating the principles of res

judicata and collateral estoppel, which come into play only

when there is a final judgment or appealable order to be

protected or effectuated.” See James v. Bellotti, 733 F.2d

989, 993-94 (1st Cir. 1984).

The relitigation exception provides that where a federal

court has conclusively decided an issue, it may prevent the

unsuccessful party from relitigating that same issue in

state court. Application of the exception (1) reinforces

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the preclusive effect of federal court judgments, (2)

ensures the finality of federal court decisions, and (3)

prevents harassment through repetitive state court

proceedings of those litigants prevailing in federal court.

The relitigation exception applies where, because of

preclusion principals, the state court should not hear a

case but still may do so. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal

Jurisdiction § 11.2, at 751-52 (5th ed. 2007).

Certainly, a federal court should not lightly undertake

the task of deciding whether to enjoin state court

proceedings. That injunctive relief may issue does not mean

it must issue. See SMA Life Assurance Co. v. Sanchez-Pica,

960 F.2d 274, 276 (1st Cir. 1992). The court needs a

“substantial justification” for issuing such injunction.

Id. at 277. And the general prerequisites for injunctive

relief must usually be met. See James, 733 F.2d at 993.

Based on concerns of comity and federalism, a federal court

must ask whether requiring the moving party to raise a

preclusion defense in state court would be the wiser course.

At the same time, the court must remain mindful that the

state court’s rejection of a preclusion defense effectively

proscribes a federal court from issuing a subsequent

injunction to effectuate its judgment. See Parsons Steel,

Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 524 (1986)

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(holding the relitigation exception was limited “to those

situations in which the state court has not yet ruled on the

merits of the res judicata issue”).

With these precepts in mind, we decline to disturb the

district court’s injunction in this case because it is

substantially justified. 6 Puerto Rico’s employer immunity

defense “is of an absolute character which creates a legal

immunity in favor of an insured employer against any other

action: in other words there is no cause of action.” Flores

Hermanos Cement Prod. 7 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 861-62. As a

defense from suit rather than a defense from liability, the

immunity provided by WACA is effectively lost if a case is

allowed to proceed against the very employer it is designed

to shield. See Lowinger v. Broderick, 50 F.3d 61, 64 (1st

Cir. 1995). Allowing wrongful death proceedings against

Pfizer to continue in Puerto Rico commonwealth court would

wrongly require Pfizer to answer a claim that the law does

not recognize. As such, the district court did not abuse

its discretion in concluding that such proceedings would

6
That the district court’s injunction enjoined Sánchez
and her family, rather than the commonwealth court, is
immaterial. An injunction issued against a party under the
Anti-Injunction Act is the same as an injunction issued
against a court. See In re G.S.F. Corp., 938 F.2d 1467,
1478 n.9 (1st Cir. 1991), abrogated in part on other
grounds, Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249
(1992).

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constitute irreparable harm to Pfizer. 7 See Metro-Goldwyn

Mayer, Inc. v. 007 Safety Prod., Inc., 183 F.3d 10, 15 n.2

(1st Cir. 1999) (listing the factors to be considered before

issuing injunctive relief). Moreover, the injunction does

not harm the public interest, but rather serves “the public

policy of the Commonwealth [of Puerto Rico] . . . favoring

the unique liability enacted by the [WACA].” López-Cotto,

slip op. at 8.

For all the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the

district court is affirmed.

7
We are not unsympathetic to the loss E.P.S. and R.P.S.
have suffered as a result of their father’s death. Sánchez,
however, failed to fully protect her daughters’ interests
when she failed to pursue, to the fullest extent, available
administrative remedies under the WACA. While Sánchez never
filed a claim with the SIF, the record reflects the SIF
mailed notice to Sánchez at her last known address informing
her and her daughters of the SIF’s decision to deny
compensation to Pagán’s beneficiaries. Recall that when
Fernández filed her compensation claim she properly informed
the SIF that both E.P.S. and R.P.S. were the dependent
daughters of the decedent. The notice of the SIF’s decision
mailed to Sánchez plainly explained her daughters’ right to
appeal the SIF’s unfavorable decision. Once the current
litigation was underway, Sánchez, or perhaps more accurately
her counsel, continued to exhibit the indifference which
brings us to this point. A belated answer to Fernández’s
complaint, a failure to timely file responses to Pfizer’s
motions, and a penchant for raising arguments for the first
time in motions to reconsider emphasize this point.

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