United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 08-1340
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellant,
v.
JAMES TOBIN,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Boudin and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
Andrew Levchuk, Department of Justice, Criminal Division,
Public Integrity Section, with whom William M. Welch II, Chief,
Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Public Integrity Section,
Nicholas Marsh, Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Public
Integrity Section, Michael DuBose, Chief, Department of Justice,
Criminal Division, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property
Section, and Albert Rees, Department of Justice, Criminal Division,
Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, were on brief for
appellant.
John G. Kester with whom Dane H. Butswinkas, Tobin J. Romero,
Jonathan Kravis and Williams & Connolly LLP were on brief for
appellee.
January 7, 2009
BOUDIN, Circuit Judge. The government's appeal in this
case presents the question of whether 47 U.S.C. §
223(a)(1)(D)(2000), which criminalizes "mak[ing] or caus[ing] the
telephone of another repeatedly or continuously to ring, with
intent to harass any person at the called number," requires a
subjective purpose to harass, or whether it suffices that the
caller can foresee that the victim will feel abused or distressed.
The factual and procedural background can be briefly summarized.
James Tobin served as New England Regional Director of
the Republican National Committee and Regional Political Director
for the National Republican Senatorial Committee. During a visit
to New Hampshire prior to the 2002 general election, Tobin spoke
with Charles McGee, Executive Director of the New Hampshire
Republican State Committee, who proposed a scheme to disrupt the
New Hampshire Democratic Party's operations on Election day.
Tobin gave McGee the contact details of an acquaintance,
Allen Raymond, who owned a telephone business which served
candidates and campaigns. Tobin called Raymond to tell him to
expect McGee's call. McGee and Raymond subsequently spoke and e-
mailed on several occasions to plan how telemarketers would tie up
the phone lines of Democratic Party offices and the firefighters
union in order to disrupt their efforts to provide free rides to
the polls.
-2-
On Election Day, this phone jamming scheme was called off
by John Dowd, McGee's direct superior. But before Dowd's
instructions were fully communicated, nearly 1,000 telephone calls
were placed to five Democratic Party numbers and a firefighters
union, and the operation successfully jammed the recipients'
telephone lines for two hours. The evident purpose of the endeavor
was to paralyze the Democratic get-out-the-vote efforts by tying up
their telephones.
Raymond and McGee both pled guilty to violating 47 U.S.C.
§ 223(a)(1)(C)(2000), which focuses on completed phone calls rather
than ringing.1 Tobin was tried in December 2005 on several
different counts. The jury convicted Tobin of one count of
conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000), and one count of aiding and
abetting, id. at § 2, both related to the making of repeated
harassing phone calls, 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(D); but the jury
acquitted him of conspiring to interfere with constitutional
rights, 18 U.S.C. § 241. He was sentenced to ten months in jail.
Tobin appealed, arguing that the jury had been
erroneously instructed and claiming that an acquittal should have
been ordered based on insufficient evidence. We agreed that the
1
This provision punishes one who "makes a telephone call or
utilizes a telecommunications device, whether or not conversation
or communication ensues, without disclosing his identity and with
intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person at the
called number or who receives the communications." The government
indicted Tobin on this count as well but voluntarily dismissed it
during Tobin's trial.
-3-
instruction had been overbroad--in effect, licensing conviction
wherever there was "any repeat calling done in bad faith." United
States v. Tobin, 480 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2007). But we declined
to order an acquittal, noting that a critical issue of statutory
construction, not fully developed by either side on appeal, would
likely affect whether Tobin could be prosecuted. The conviction
was vacated and the case remanded to the district court.
On remand, the district judge considered, as the remand
contemplated, whether it suffices under subsection (D) to know that
the called party will feel abused or distressed. Tobin, 480 F.3d
at 61-62. To the contrary, the district judge concluded that "a
specific purpose to cause emotional upset in a person at the
telephone number called" was required and, finding that the
government had insufficient evidence to meet this mens rea
requirement, entered a judgment of acquittal. United States v.
Tobin, 545 F. Supp. 2d 189, 192 (D.N.H. 2008).
The government now appeals, arguing that section
223(a)(1)(D)'s "intent to harass any person at the called number"
does not require purpose but only knowledge of probable
consequences. Tobin, who defends the district court's reading,
also offers a threshold objection: he notes that the government may
not appeal a criminal case "where the double jeopardy clause of the
United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution," 18
U.S.C. § 3731, and argues that this is just such a case.
-4-
Tobin does not argue, nor could he under governing
precedent,2 that double jeopardy protection attached immediately
upon this court's reversal of his trial conviction and therefore
barred a remand for further proceedings. Rather, Tobin relies on
the district court's judgment of acquittal on remand as the event
that triggered protection against further proceedings. Tobin
argues that once a district court has entered a judgment of
acquittal, double jeopardy bars the government's appeal.
Double jeopardy jurisprudence is as much a creature of
history and judicial precedent as of logic. One established rule
is that an acquittal of a defendant because the evidence offered by
the prosecution is insufficient, ordered by the judge after the
jury has been empaneled, effectively bars an appeal even though a
jury has never spoken. Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462
(2005). But in this case, the district court's "acquittal" was
before any new impanelment, so another established rule disposes of
Tobin's argument here: jeopardy (here, after a vacatur of a
conviction and a remand) does not attach until a jury has been
sworn.
See United States v. Carpenter, 494 F.3d 13, 26 (1st Cir.
2
2007)("where the first conviction was vacated for legal error, not
insufficiency of evidence, the concept of continuing jeopardy rules
out a double jeopardy claim based on purported insufficiency of
evidence at the first trial") (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Accord United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 90-
91 (1978); United States v. Recio, 371 F.3d 1093, 1106 (9th Cir.
2004); United States v. Pearl, 324 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir.
2003).
-5-
In Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 392 (1975)
(internal citations omitted)(emphasis added), the Supreme Court
declared:
It is, of course, settled that “a verdict of
acquittal . . . is a bar to a subsequent
prosecution for the same offence.” But the
language of cases in which we have held that
there can be no appeal from, or further
prosecution after, an "acquittal" cannot be
divorced from the procedural context in which
the action so characterized was taken. The
word itself has no talismanic quality for
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. In
particular, it has no significance in this
context unless jeopardy has once attached and
an accused has been subjected to the risk of
conviction.
Applying this principle, Serfass explained: "[T]he
courts have found it useful to define a point in criminal
proceedings at which the constitutional purposes and policies are
implicated by resort to the concept of 'attachment of jeopardy.' In
the case of a jury trial, jeopardy attaches when a jury is
empaneled and sworn." Serfass, 420 U.S. at 388 (citation omitted).
This is mechanical and perhaps arbitrary, but it is the line that
the Supreme Court has drawn and the circuits have followed. See,
e.g., United States v. Frye, 372 F.3d 729, 734 (5th Cir. 2004);
United States v. Dilg, 700 F.2d 620, 624 n.2 (11th Cir. 1983).
Ordinarily district judges in a criminal jury case have
no occasion to weigh the evidence before a jury is impaneled. They
do sometimes dismiss indictments (e.g., because of alleged
insufficiency of the charge), see United States v. McInnis, 601
-6-
F.2d 1319, 1322-23 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Greater
Blouse, Skirt & Neckwear Contractors Ass'n, 228 F. Supp. 483, 486-
87 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), but double jeopardy does not in such cases bar
appeal by the government--jeopardy never having attached. See
Serfass, 420 U.S. at 389. Similarly, despite the use of the term
"acquittal," jeopardy had not yet attached here when the district
judge acted;3 of course, jeopardy had attached when the original
jury was impaneled but the remand had wiped that slate clean.
The procedure followed by the district judge was perhaps
unorthodox since acquittals are normally ordered only after
evidence has been presented, but the government does not complain
of that; nor does it claim in its brief either that a reasonable
jury could have convicted on the present evidence under the
subjective-purpose reading the judge gave to the statute, or that
it had other evidence unknown to the district judge. It merely
disputes the district judge's reading of the statute, just as Tobin
did on the prior appeal.
This brings us to the merits of the appeal. "Few areas
of criminal law pose more difficulty than the proper definition of
the mens rea required for any particular crime." United States v.
Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403 (1980). We review pure questions of
3
Even after jeopardy has attached (or, in this case,
reattached), just what constitutes an "acquittal" by the trial
judge in a jury case does not necessarily depend on the label
chosen by the judge. See Smith, 543 U.S. at 468; Gonzalez v.
Justices of Mun. Court of Boston, 420 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2005)
-7-
statutory interpretation de novo, United States v. Jaca-Nazario,
521 F.3d 50, 56 (1st Cir. 2008), and properly begin with the
statutory language, id., but in this instance the wording of the
critical phrase--"with intent to harass any person at the called
number" is inconclusive.
Although the word "intent" can often mean with
"knowledge" that a particular result will follow, it sometimes
instead requires a "purpose" to bring about a specific end. E.g.,
United States v. Houlihan, 937 F. Supp. 75, 76 (D. Mass. 1996)
("intent to retaliate" in 18 U.S.C. § 1513 requires proof either of
"sole and abiding purpose" or "purpose . . . mixed in with other
purposes"). To avoid this confusion, the ALI Model Penal Code
chose to avoid the term "intent," identifying knowledge or purpose
as the more exact identifiers. See Wechsler, The Challenge of a
Model Penal Code, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1097 (1952). Legislatures,
however, have remained attached to the term.
Nor does the structure of section 223(a)(1)(D) clearly
delineate just what state of mind Congress sought to specify as the
scienter requirement here. The other subsections are variously
worded; but the first three--(A), (B) and (C)--involve suspicious
or even malign conduct (obscene calls, child pornography, non-
disclosure of identity). Thus, it thus makes sense to read their
intent requirement as satisfied by mere knowledge of consequences;
-8-
by contrast, causing a phone to ring multiple times is not
inherently vicious.4
The fifth provision, (E), is addressed primarily to one
who "makes repeated telephone calls . . . during which conversation
ensues, solely to harass," and (interpolating "in order to" from
context) this provision does appear to look to purpose rather than
knowledge. But the inference for subsection (D) is uncertain: one
could stress in Tobin's favor that, as with ringing, the conduct is
not necessarily wicked, or one could contrast the "solely to"
phrasing with (D) and draw an inference against Tobin's position.
Neither inference is clearly stronger than the opposite.
Finally, legislative history is not helpful. The main
aim of the statute was to criminalize phone calls placed to harass
or frighten the receiver--in particular war veterans and their
families. E.g., 114 Cong. Rec. 4933 (1968). Concern over obscene
calls to women was also voiced. See, e.g., 111 Cong. Rec. 26477
(1965). Phone jamming does not seem to have been a principal
concern and the few scattered references to phone lines being tied
up involved what appears to have been purposive harassment. E.g.,
id. at 26,476, 26,477; 114 Cong. Rec. 4933.
4
Subsection (A) condemns calls that are obscene or involve
child pornography made "with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or
harass another person" and knowledge in such cases has been found
sufficient. See ApolloMedia Corp. v. Reno, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1081,
1096 (N.D. Cal. 1998); see also United States v. Eckhard, 466 F.3d
938, 947-48 (11th Cir. 2006) (rejecting defendant's objection that
the jury was not instructed to require specific intent).
-9-
We are therefore cast back on more general
considerations. For most crimes "intent" in the sense of knowledge
is enough, see Bailey, 444 U.S. at 404; for example, when a
defendant points a gun at the victim's head and pulls the trigger,
the knowledge that death will result is ordinarily sufficient. But
the distinction sometimes matters; this can be especially so for
conduct which may be defensible only if done for a benevolent
purpose (a doctor swabbing a wound may foreseeably cause
considerable pain) or where bad purpose magnifies the harm (e.g.,
racially motivated crimes).
There is nothing inherently wicked or even suspect about
multiple phone calls, even when the repeated phone calls and
resultant ringing are annoying or distressing to someone who
refuses to answer. Imagine repeated calls to warn that a fire is
sweeping the neighborhood. Or, suppose repeated calls to sell a
product or to solicit a contribution--where ringing is suffered
rather than taking the phone off the hook for all calls. Nothing
in subsection (D) suggests that it was designed to mediate such
difficult problems.
The government assured us at oral argument that it can
distinguish such cases. But we are not willing to construe over-
generously a criminal statute to cover cases that should not be
made criminal in the hope (usually but not invariably borne out)
that prosecutors will exercise restraint in the interest of common
-10-
sense. The district court's original bad-faith instruction showed
full awareness of the problem when it interpolated a bad faith
requirement, but its solution was not in the statute (and itself
turned on a relatively vague concept).
By contrast, reading the statute to require a "purpose"
to harass solves the problem. A number of states, although by no
means all, do construe their own harassment statutes in this
fashion, e.g., Galloway v. State, 781 A.2d 851, 870-71 (Md. 2001);
it conforms with our own reading of subsection (E) which deals with
the counterpart problem where the phone is answered rather than
left to ring; and while it does not extend the statute to some
thoroughly bad conduct--such as the scheme in this case--a proper
statute could easily be written to do so.
Some states have statutes that forbid deliberate
disrupting of communication, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, §
4684-B(2) (2008). But not all states have such laws and, given the
integrated character of the national telephone network, it is
perhaps surprising that no federal statute provides similar
protection. The apt solution is not to stretch out of shape a law
about harassment by ringing, but for Congress to prescribe such
deliberate interference by whatever means.
We need not invoke the rule of lenity, see United States
v. Godin, 534 F.3d 51, 61 (1st Cir. 2008), for this is not a
typical case of ultimate ambiguity which requires choosing the more
-11-
lenient reading. Rather, the misfit between the statute and the
conduct is obvious, but alternative constructions can fairly be
considered. It is only when the implications of the broader
reading are thought through that the choice between the two
readings becomes clear--not to achieve undeserved leniency in this
case, but to avoid a construction that would be affirmatively
dangerous in others.
If the government claimed that it had evidence that Tobin
had a purpose to harass, it would likely be entitled to a trial on
the issue--subject always to the risk of directed verdict after it
closed if the evidence were insufficient. But the government has
conceded in its brief--and plausibly so--"that harassment was not
[Tobin's] subjective purpose," and we accept its concession that
assuming the statute requires proof of purpose (and we so hold),
"Tobin prevails, and this case ends."
Affirmed.
-12-