United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 07-2662
ORLANDO RODRÍGUEZ,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
SUZUKI MOTOR CORPORATION,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Aida M. Delgado-Colón, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lipez, and Howard,
Circuit Judges.
Peter John Porrata, with whom Law Offices of Peter John
Porrata, was on brief for appellant.
Antonio Gnocchi-Franco, with whom Gnocchi Franco Law Offices,
Larry M. Roth, and Law Office of Larry M. Roth, P.A., were on brief
for appellee.
June 22, 2009
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff, Orlando Rodríguez
("Rodríguez") brought this diversity action against Suzuki Motor
Corporation ("Suzuki") alleging that a manufacturing defect in his
Suzuki motorcycle caused the injuries he sustained in a motorcycle
accident. The United States District Court for the District of
Puerto Rico granted Suzuki's motion for summary judgment on the
ground that the complaint was barred by the applicable one-year
statute of limitations. Rodríguez appeals the dismissal on the
theory that under Puerto Rico law, his previously filed complaint
against other entities that were jointly and severally liable with
Suzuki tolled the statute of limitations for the instant action
against Suzuki. After careful consideration, we reverse.
I. Background
As this is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we
"view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party
and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the same." Chadwick
v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 41 (1st Cir. 2009).
This action arises out of an accident that occurred on
June 22, 2001. On that day, at approximately 1:30 a.m., Rodríguez
was driving his Suzuki GSX/1300R motorcycle along Las Américas
Express Road in Puerto Rico, when he started to experience a
shaking on the front fork of the motorcycle, the handlebars, and
grips. Suddenly, he fell off the motorcycle on to the road.
Rodríguez alleges that he was surprised as there was no reason for
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the fall to have occurred. When he looked at the motorcycle, he
noticed that the frame had split in half and separated the front
fork from the rest of the frame. Rodríguez alleges that as a
result of this motorcycle accident he suffered various injuries.
On June 20, 2002, Rodríguez, who was at that time a
citizen of Florida, filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico (the "2002 Action") against
the retail seller of the Suzuki motorcycle, Rainbow Motors Inc.
("Rainbow"), a Puerto Rico corporation. Rodríguez amended the
complaint on October 16, 2002 to include the distributor of the
motorcycle, Panorama Motors Inc. ("Panorama"), also a Puerto Rico
corporation. In his complaint, Rodríguez alleged that the injuries
he sustained were a direct and proximate result of the motorcycle's
defective design, a manufacturing defect, defendants' negligent
marketing, and defendants' failure to adequately warn. Rodríguez's
complaint in the 2002 Action did not name the manufacturer of the
motorcycle, Suzuki, as a defendant.
On March 7, 2003, Rainbow moved to file a third-party
complaint against Suzuki, a Japanese corporation. Because Suzuki
is a foreign corporation, Rainbow was required to follow the
procedures established for service under the Hague Convention and
these requirements caused some delay.1 On March 19, 2003 Rainbow
1
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(1) (providing that an individual in a
foreign country may be served "by any internationally agreed means
of service . . . such as those authorized by the Hague Convention
-3-
filed a motion to stay the litigation until Suzuki was joined as a
party. On March 25, 2003, the district court denied this motion.
On June 4, 2003, Rainbow moved to voluntarily dismiss, without
prejudice, its third-party complaint against Suzuki. The court
granted this motion. On November 10, 2003, Rodríguez moved to
voluntarily dismiss the 2002 Action without prejudice. The court
granted this motion as well.
On May 10, 2004, Rodríguez commenced a new action in the
federal district court by filing a complaint against Suzuki (the
"2004 Action"). The 2004 Action did not name Rainbow or Panorama
as defendants.2 On February 9, 2005, the court dismissed the 2004
Action without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) because,
despite various extensions, Rodríguez had not completed service of
process against Suzuki.
On February 6, 2006, Rodríguez, again in the federal
district court, filed a new action against Suzuki (the "2006
Action"), from which this appeal arises. As was the case with the
2004 Action, Rainbow and Panorama were not named as defendants in
the 2006 Action. Suzuki moved for summary judgment on the ground
on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra Judicial Documents");
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(2) (providing that a corporation outside the
United States must be served in any manner prescribed by Rule 4(f)
for serving an individual).
2
Rodríguez admits that he chose not to include Rainbow and
Panorama in the 2004 Action in an effort to preserve federal
diversity jurisdiction. At the time Rodríguez filed the 2004
Action, his residence had changed to Puerto Rico.
-4-
that Rodríguez had failed to file his suit within the applicable
one-year statute of limitations for tort actions under Puerto Rico
law. Rodríguez opposed summary judgment, relying on Puerto Rico's
"solidarity doctrine" to argue that his 2002 Action against
Panorama and Rainbow, with whom Suzuki was jointly and severally
liable, tolled the statute of limitations with respect to the
later-filed actions against Suzuki. The district court granted
Suzuki's motion for summary judgment. Rodríguez v. Suzuki Motor
Corp., No. 06-1144, slip op. (D.P.R. Aug. 29, 2007) (opinion and
order granting summary judgment).
The district court held that Rodríguez failed to bring
his suit within the applicable one-year prescriptive period from
the date that he was put on notice of his injury, the
manufacturer's defect, and the manufacturer's identity. Id. at *7.
The district court further held that the 2002 Action did not toll
or reset the statute of limitations with respect to Rodríguez's
claims against Suzuki. Id. at *11. Finding that solidarity
existed between Suzuki, Rainbow and Panorama, the court noted that
"[i]nasmuch as the 2002 Action was timely filed," the solidarity
doctrine would have allowed Rodríguez to amend his 2002 complaint
to add Suzuki, but "[Rodríguez] made an affirmative decision not to
do this." Id. at *9. Rather, Rodríguez chose to voluntarily
dismiss the 2002 action and then file a subsequent complaint. The
court explained that in order for a prior suit to toll and reset
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the statute of limitations with respect to a subsequent suit,
Puerto Rico law requires "identicality" of claims, relief
requested, and defendants. Id. at *10 (quoting Rodríguez-García v.
Mun. of Caguas, 354 F.3d 91, 98 (1st Cir. 2004)). Noting that
"Suzuki was not a party to the 2002 Action, and neither Rainbow nor
Panorama were sued in the 2004 Action," the court concluded that
the "2002 Action did not continue to preserve or toll the Statute
of Limitations against [Suzuki] since the 2004 Action was not
identical." Id. at *11. Finding the 2004 Action to be untimely,
it held that "the case at bar [was] likewise untimely." Id.
Rodríguez timely appealed from the district court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of Suzuki.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
"We review the district court's decision to grant
defendant's motion for summary judgment on statute of limitations
grounds de novo, construing the record in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party." Douglas v. York County, 433 F.3d 143,
149 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Hadfield v. McDonough, 407 F.3d 11, 15
(1st Cir. 2005)). "We will affirm if, based on our independent
review of the evidentiary record, there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the undisputed facts indicate that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id.; see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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"Under the 'Erie Doctrine', federal courts sitting in
diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law."
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996).
In Puerto Rico, the prescription of civil actions is a question of
substantive rather than procedural law. See Rodríguez-Narvaez v.
Nazario, 895 F.2d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 1990); García-Pérez v.
Corporación de Servicios para la Mujer y la Familia, etc., 174 P.R.
Dec. ----, 2008 TSPR 114, 2008 WL 2717833, at *4 (P.R. June 30,
2008). Thus, as this case comes before us under our diversity
jurisdiction, we must apply Puerto Rico substantive law to resolve
the statute of limitations issue in dispute.
"As a federal court sitting in diversity, our task is to
'interpret and apply as best we can the state rules of decision.'"
Norton v. McOsker, 407 F.3d 501, 506 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Catex
Vitol Gas, Inc. v. Wolfe, 178 F.3d 572, 576 (1st Cir. 1999)). We
rely "on pronouncements of the state supreme court" and "ultimately
'our task is to ascertain the rule the state court would most
likely follow under the circumstances, even if our independent
judgment on the question might differ.'" Id. (quoting Wolfe, 178
F.3d at 576-77).
B. Statute of Limitations
Rodríguez's action was brought under Puerto Rico's tort
statute, Article 1802 of the Civil Code, see P.R. Laws Ann. tit.
31, § 5141, to which a one-year statute of limitations applies.
-7-
See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5298(2). The statute of limitations
or prescriptive period for such tort actions begins to run "from
the time the aggrieved person has knowledge thereof." P.R. Laws
Ann. tit. 31, § 5298(2); see also García-Pérez, 2008 WL 2717833, at
*4 (stating that the statute of limitations starts to run once the
injured party knows both that he has suffered a harm and who is
responsible for it).
Rodríguez does not dispute the applicability of the one-
year prescription period to his action against Suzuki. The
accident giving rise to Rodríguez's injuries undisputedly took
place on June 22, 2001, and Rodríguez makes no contention that the
action accrued at a later date. Nor is there any dispute that the
instant action was filed on February 6, 2006, well past one year
from the accrual of the cause of action.3 Thus, unless the
prescription period was effectively tolled, the instant action is
time-barred. "Although prescription is an affirmative defense,
once it has been raised, the burden of proving that prescription
has been interrupted shifts to the plaintiff." See Tokyo Marine &
Fire Ins. Co. v. Pérez y Cía., 142 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1998)
(citing Puerto Rico cases).
3
The district court found that Rodríguez "had actual notice of
the identity of [Suzuki] no later than March 19, 2003," as this was
the day when Rainbow moved to stay the 2002 action until Suzuki
could be joined. See Rodríguez, at *7 n.4. Whichever of these
dates is the actual date of accrual, there is no question that the
2006 Action was filed more than one year thereafter.
-8-
C. Tolling
Rodríguez argues that because the statute of limitations
was "tolled" as a matter of Puerto Rico law by his filing of
intervening actions in 2002 and 2004, the district court erred in
finding that the instant tort action against Suzuki was time-
barred. Rodríguez's argument proceeds as follows. He argues that
by filing the 2002 Action against Rainbow and Panorama within one-
year of the accident, on June 20, 2002, Rodríguez "tolled" the
statute of limitations with respect to all parties jointly and
severally liable with those companies, including Suzuki, even
though Suzuki was never a party to the 2002 Action. Rodríguez
further contends that when the 2002 Action was dismissed without
prejudice on November 10, 2003, the one-year statute of limitations
was reset and began to run anew, rendering his 2004 Action against
Suzuki, filed six months later on May 10, 2004, timely as well.
Finally, Rodríguez contends that when the 2004 Action was dismissed
without prejudice on February 9, 2005, he again had one year from
that date to file a subsequent action. Thus, Rodríguez takes the
position that when he filed the instant action within 362 days from
the dismissal of the 2004 action, on February 6, 2006, the action
had not prescribed. We agree.
Article 1873 of Puerto Rico's Civil Code provides three
mechanisms by which the prescription of actions can be interrupted
or "tolled": "[(1)] [B]y their institution before the courts, [(2)]
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by extrajudicial claim of the creditor, and [(3)] by any act of
acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor." P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31,
§ 5303; see also Tokyo Marine, 142 F.3d at 4. When a plaintiff
tolls the statute of limitations by bringing an action before the
courts, "the mere filing of the complaint has a tolling effect,"
rather than service of the summons. See Durán-Cepeda v. Morales-
Lebrón, 12 P.R. Offic. Trans. 776, 779 (1982). Moreover, the
filing of an action tolls the statute of limitations even if
"plaintiffs voluntarily dismiss[] the action without prejudice
before the defendants ha[ve] been summonsed." Silva Wiscovich v.
Weber Dental Mfg. Co., 19 P.R. Offic. Trans. 592, 604 (1987)
(resolving question certified to it by this court); see also Silva-
Wiscovich v. Weber Dental Mfg. Co., 835 F.2d 409, 410 (1st Cir.
1987) (subsequent review after Puerto Rico Supreme Court addressed
certification question).
"Under Puerto Rico tolling rules, which are based on the
Spanish civil law, the institution of an action in court is
commonly held not only to interrupt the running of the applicable
statute of limitations but, at least in the event of a voluntary or
usual non-prejudicial dismissal of the original action, to cause
the entire limitations period to run anew from the date the
previous action came to a definite end." López-González v. Mun. of
Comerío, 404 F.3d 548 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Silva-Wiscovich, 835
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F.2d at 410).4 An action comes to a "definite end," inter alia, on
the date upon which such action is voluntarily dismissed without
prejudice. See Rodríguez-García, 354 F.3d at 97 (quoting Silva-
Wiscovich, 835 F.2d at 410).
Applying these tolling principles to the facts before us,
we can conclude that if Rodríguez had in fact interrupted the
statute of limitations with respect to his products liability suit
against Suzuki when he instituted the 2002 Action (see infra,
Section II.D.), then this tolling effect persisted until that
action came to a "definite end" on November 10, 2003, when it was
voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. At that point, the
statute of limitations was reset and began to run anew for another
year. The filing of the 2004 Action within that year was therefore
timely. As the 2004 Action was also dismissed without prejudice,
then, by the same logic, the filing of the 2006 Action within one
year of its dismissal, was timely as well.
4
See also Rodríguez-García, 354 F.3d at 97 (Once an action "comes
to a definite end," the statute of limitations is reset and "begins
to run anew from th[at] date."); Rodríguez-Narvaez, 895 F.2d at 43
("It is . . . well established that once the period of limitations
is interrupted through any of the ways available under Puerto Rico
laws and the tolling ends, the statute of limitations begins to run
anew."); Sánchez Montalvo v. Autoridad de los Puertos, 153 P.R.
Dec. 559, 568 (2001) (certified translation) ("The effect of the
mechanisms of interruption is that the prescriptive term must be
computed again completely from the moment in which is produced the
act which interrupts."); Durán-Cepeda, 12 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 777
(citing Feliciano v. A.S.A., 93 P.R. 638 (1966) for the proposition
that "a whole new term begins to run at the termination of an
action whose institution tolled the statute of limitations.").
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Though not raised by the parties, we note one caveat to
our interpretation of Puerto Rico's tolling provisions -- the issue
of due diligence. The usual rule under Puerto Rico law is that the
filing of a judicial action tolls the statute of limitations and,
if the action is dismissed without prejudice, the limitations
period is reset and starts to run again from that date. See Silva-
Wiscovich, 19 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 603-04. Although Rodríguez's
2004 Action was dismissed by the district court as a result of
Rodríguez's failure to complete service of process upon Suzuki in
a timely manner, it was nevertheless dismissed "without prejudice."
Thus, under the usual Puerto Rico tolling rule, the statute of
limitations would re-run for the full period from the date of the
dismissal. Id. This approach, however, may be in tension with
"common law and equitable principles," under which "an involuntary
dismissal made without prejudice but as a sanction does not toll
the statute of limitations." See López-González, 404 F.3d at 554
(emphasis added and citing cases); see also Hilton Int'l Co. v.
Unión de Trabajadores, 833 F.2d 10, 11 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating
that "dismissal by the court for punitive or other reasons, even
though labeled (sic) 'without prejudice,' is, in fact, with
prejudice if the statute of limitations has run," noting that "any
other result . . . would be most unfair.").
Faced in López-González with the question of applying
these tolling principles to a federal § 1983 action governed by
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Puerto Rico's statute of limitations law,5 we held that we "[could
not] say for sure whether similar considerations would lead a
Puerto Rico court" to follow the common law rule and "make an
exception . . . to its civil law restart tolling principle," in the
event dismissal was imposed as a sanction. 404 F.3d at 554.
Nevertheless, we noted that in Durán-Cepeda the Puerto Rico Supreme
Court had suggested a possible exception to the restart rule
"'[f]or cases where the [tolling] rule is abused or used in bad
faith.'" Id. (quoting Durán-Cepeda, 12 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 785
n.1); see also, Silva-Wiscovich, 19 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 601
(citing same footnote in Durán-Cepeda). We concluded that
"[w]hatever the correct reading of Puerto Rico's law," given the
plaintiff's "flagrant and abusive delay," the application of Puerto
Rico's restart tolling principle to that case, would be
inconsistent with "federal policies underlying 42 U.S.C. § 1983."
Id. Thus we declined to apply Puerto Rico's restart rule to the
dismissed action. López-González, 404 F.3d at 554-55.
Applying the principles of López-González to the case
before us, we are cognizant of the possibility that the judgment
dismissing Rodríguez's 2004 Action, though labeled "without
5
Federal law under § 1983 borrows a state's coordinate rules on
tolling unless they are inconsistent with the federal Constitution
and law, or with the federal policy underlying § 1983.
Rodríguez-García, 354 F.3d at 97. While Puerto Rico is not a
state, our court has treated Puerto Rico as if it were a state for
purposes of the application of this rule. See, e.g., id.
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prejudice," may have been intended as a sanction for Rodríguez
unjustifiably delaying service of process upon Suzuki. In that
case it would seem hardly equitable to reward Rodríguez for his
lack of due diligence by granting him another year within which to
file his claim. Nevertheless, the instant action, unlike the
§ 1983 claim in López-González is purely a question of Puerto Rico
tort law. Moreover, the district court was not explicit as to
whether dismissal was intended as a sanction or as to whether
Rodríguez, in fact, acted in bad faith. Under these circumstances,
we feel that we are bound to adhere to the usual rule and apply
Puerto Rico's restart rule to the involuntary dismissal without
prejudice of Rodríguez's 2004 Action. Thus, provided that the
tolling effect extends to Rodríguez's suit against Suzuki, the 2006
Action, filed within one year of the dismissal of the 2004 Action,
will be considered timely.
D. Identicality and Solidarity
Suzuki argues that whatever tolling effect the filing of
the 2002 Action may have had, it does not save the instant action
against Suzuki, because this action is not "identical" to the 2002
Action. Suzuki is correct that § 5303 does not toll the statute of
limitations "'for all claims arising out of the same facts.'"
Rodríguez-García, 354 F.3d at 97 (quoting Fernández v. Chardón, 681
F.2d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 1982)). Rather, instituting an action before
the courts pursuant to § 5303 only tolls the statute of limitations
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with respect to "identical" subsequent actions. See id. (citing
Cintrón v. Estado Libre Asociado de P.R., 27 P.R. Offic. Trans. 582
(1990)); see also Del Valle v. Vornado Realty Trust, 515 F. Supp.
2d 222, 226 (D.P.R. 2007) (explaining that "in order for a prior
judicial action to toll the statute of limitations as to a later
filed complaint, it is necessary that the second complaint assert
a cause of action identical to the one asserted in the first
action"). This rule is known as the "identicality requirement."
Rodríguez-García, 354 F.3d at 97. We have held that, in order to
be "identical" under § 5303, the claims asserted in the subsequent
action (1) "must seek the same form of relief" as the first action;
(2) "must be based on the same substantive claims"; and (3)
"provided that other Puerto Rico tolling statutes do not rescue the
claims on other grounds . . . must be asserted against the same
defendants in the same capacities; new defendants should not be
added." Id. at 98. This "identicality requirement" serves to
"prevent[] plaintiffs from circumventing the notice function of the
statute of limitations by asserting different claims in belated
federal court complaints." Id. at 97.
Suzuki relies on the identicality requirement to argue,
as the district court held, that the 2002 Action did not toll or
reset the statute of limitations as it pertains to the claims
against Suzuki because there was no "identicality" of parties
between the 2002 Action and the subsequent suits. Specifically,
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Suzuki argues that because Rodríguez never sued Suzuki in the 2002
Action and never sued Rainbow or Panorama in the 2004 Action, the
2004 Action was not "identical" to the 2002 Action, and therefore
the 2002 Action did not toll the statute of limitations with
respect to Suzuki. Because the 2004 Action was untimely, Suzuki
reasons, it could not serve to toll the statute of limitations with
respect to the instant action against Suzuki, which was not filed
until 2006, and therefore, this action was properly dismissed. We
disagree. As noted above, "identicality" has been read to include,
inter alia, a requirement that for a prior suit to have a tolling
effect upon a subsequent suit, it must be asserted against the same
defendants, but only "provided that other Puerto Rico tolling
statutes do not rescue the claims on other grounds." Rodríguez-
García, 354 F.3d at 98 (emphasis added). In this case, we find
that another provision of Puerto Rico law known as the "solidarity
doctrine" rescues this claim.
The solidarity doctrine, rooted in Article 1874 of the
Puerto Rico Civil Code "is based on the theory that there is one
obligation, shared by several debtors." Tokyo Marine, 142 F.3d at
6.6 In such situations, "the interruption of prescription against
6
The concept of "solidary liability" or "obligación solidaria,"
which is the original term in Spanish, "is a term of art which is
similar to, but not strictly synonymous with 'joint and several
liability.'" Tokyo Marine, 142 F.3d at 4 n.1. "The essential
feature of solidarity is that the solidary debtors are jointly
responsible for the same obligation." Id. at 5 (citing Puerto Rico
cases).
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one defendant also interrupts the prescription of claims against
any other defendants who are solidarily liable with the first."
Tokyo Marine, 142 F.3d at 4 (citing P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5304
and Arroyo v. Hosp. La Concepción, 130 P.R. Dec. 596, 606 (P.R.
June 5, 1992)); see also P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5304
("Interruption of prescription of actions in joint obligations
equally benefits or injures all the creditors or debtors."). Thus,
in situations where various defendants are held to be "solidarily
liable" with each other, this doctrine has been interpreted to
allow for the "timely inclusion of a solidary tortfeasor not
originally included in an action." See Arroyo, 130 P.R. Dec. at
607-08 (quoting official translation). The theory is that "[t]he
interruption of the prescription of the cause of action based on
[a] unitary obligation . . . need only be performed once." Tokyo
Marine, 142 F.3d at 6. Relying on the solidarity doctrine,
Rodríguez argues that Suzuki, the manufacturer of the motorcycle,
is solidarily liable with Rainbow, the retailer, and Panorama, the
distributor, and that therefore, by filing the 2002 action against
Rainbow and Panorama, Rodríguez "tolled the statute of limitations
against all joint tortfeasors including [Suzuki]."
The threshold question is whether there is in fact
solidarity between Rainbow or Panorama and Suzuki such that the
interruption of the statute of limitations as to the former
prejudiced the latter. Solidarity exists under Puerto Rico law
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"when several people take part or cooperate in causing a wrong."
Arroyo, 130 P.R. Dec. at 604. The Puerto Rico Supreme Court has
held that "joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable." Tokyo Marine,
142 F.3d at 6 (citing Arroyo, 130 P.R. Dec. at 603); see also id.
at 6-7 ("[A]rticle 1874 of the Civil Code applies to joint
tortfeasors, so that the timely filing of a suit against one joint
tortfeasor had interrupted the prescription of the suit against the
other tortfeasors."). "Under article 1802, when the negligent acts
of more than one person have adequately caused a harm, each such
person is a joint tortfeasor who is liable in full to the plaintiff
for the harm caused." Id. at 6. The district court found it
"clear" that solidarity exists in this case between Panorama,
Rainbow and Suzuki. We agree. As the district court explained:
Plaintiff alleges that [Suzuki], Rainbow and
Panorama sold a motorcycle that was amongst
other things, negligently designed, tested,
assembled, packaged, marketed, advertised and
sold. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff
seeks compensation for pain and suffering, as
well as the cost of the Motorcycle. Since
[Suzuki] was the manufacturer of the
Motorcycle, and Plaintiff's claim is one for
product liability, it is clear that solidarity
amongst the defendants exists.
Rodríguez, at *8-9. The district court's finding of solidarity is
further bolstered by Puerto Rico's adherence to the theory of
strict tort liability in cases involving products liability.
Aponte-Rivera v. Sears Roebuck de P.R., Inc., 144 P.R. Dec. 830,
838-39 (1998) (official translation); see also Del Rosario-Ortega
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v. Star-Kist Caribe, Inc., 130 F. Supp. 2d 277, 284 (D.P.R. 2001)
(noting that "[in] a cause of action in products liability, . . .
as a matter of public policy, each and every entity involved in the
chain of distribution is strictly liable to the consumer") (citing
Ferrer-Delgado v. Gen. Motors Corp., 100 P.R. Dec. 246, 257-58
(1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546 (2005)). Thus, under Puerto Rico
law, "all those who take part in the manufacturing and distribution
chain of a product are solidarily liable, along with the
manufacturer, to the injured party." Aponte-Rivera, 144 P.R. Dec.
at 838 n.6.
Concluding that Panorama, Rainbow and Suzuki are in fact
solidarily liable, we must now address Rodríguez's argument that
his 2002 Action, filed against parties solidarily liable with
Suzuki, effectively tolled the statute as to his subsequent actions
against Suzuki. Though no single case is entirely controlling,
this argument has substantial support in the case law. For
example, in Tokyo Marine, plaintiff, the subrogee for an imported
automobile dealer (Mitsubishi), brought a tort action under Article
1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code against Pérez y Cía., the owner
of a storage facility where plaintiff's automobiles were stored,
for property damage to Mitsubishi's vehicles resulting from their
storage in Pérez y Cía.'s facility. See 142 F.3d at 2-3. The
cause of action, which was filed more than one year after it had
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accrued, had been dismissed by the district court on grounds that
it was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Id. at 3.
The issue before us was "whether the plaintiff interposed an
'extrajudicial claim' . . . that successfully interrupted the
prescription of the cause of action before the original one-year
term expired." Id. at 4. We held that it did. Id. at 4-5. We
reasoned that Tokyo Marine effectively tolled the statute of
limitations pursuant to Article 1873 by filing, within the
limitations period, an extrajudicial claim letter against Pérez y
Cía.'s liability insurer, UAC. Id. We further reasoned that
because Pérez y Cía. was solidarily liable with its insurer, under
Article 1874, "the timely interruption of prescription as to UAC
had a like effect as to its insured." Id. at 10. Thus, we
reversed the district court's conclusion that the challenged claim
was time barred, and amended the judgment accordingly. Id. at 10-
11.
A similar result was reached by the Puerto Rico Supreme
Court in Sánchez Montalvo, 153 P.R. Dec. 559. In that case, the
plaintiff, who was injured in an airport terminal, filed an
extrajudicial claim letter against the Port Authority on the day of
the accident. Id. at 562-63. No extrajudicial letter or other
tolling mechanism, however, was timely filed against American
Airlines, which controlled the area where the accident took place,
even though plaintiff was on notice that American could be liable.
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Id. at 572-73. Two years later plaintiff filed an action under
article 1802 against the Port Authority and American Airlines. Id.
The trial court dismissed the action against American as time-
barred, reasoning that plaintiff failed to interrupt the statute of
limitations as to American. Id. at 574. Nevertheless, the Puerto
Rico Supreme Court reversed the dismissal. Id. The supreme court
held that "[t]he cause of action in regards to [the Port Authority]
not being time barred, and joint liability between [the Port
Authority] and American having been alleged, the interruption of
the prescriptive term with regards to [the Port Authority]
interrupted the term equally for American." Id. (citing Martínez-
Díaz v. E.L.A., 132 P.R. Dec. 200 (1992); see also García-Colón v.
García-Rinaldi, 340 F. Supp. 2d 113, 126 (D.P.R. 2004) (holding
that by sending extrajudicial claim letter to one physician,
malpractice plaintiff effectively tolled the statute of limitations
as to the other joint tortfeasors including another physician and
the hospital, thereby rendering suit against the others, outside
the one-year limitations period, timely).
Suzuki acknowledges that these cases support the
proposition that "the filing of an extrajudicial claim letter
toll[s] the running of the statute of limitations, even against
those parties to whom a tolling letter had not been sent," but
attempts to distinguish them on the ground that Rodríguez did not
file an extrajudicial claim, but rather, instituted a judicial
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action. We find this distinction unpersuasive. As noted above,
Article 1873 provides three mechanisms which can be employed to
toll the statute of limitations, and these include, inter alia,
filing an "extrajudicial claim" and "instituti[ng] [an action]
before the courts." P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5303. Neither the
statute nor the case law provide a basis for differentiating among
these mechanisms with respect to the consequences of solidarity
upon their operation, nor does Suzuki provide us such a basis. In
fact, the case law suggests the contrary. For example, in Tokyo
Marine, when discussing the § 5303 tolling mechanism in the context
of the solidarity doctrine, we stated as follows:
[T]he interruption of prescription against one
defendant also tolls the statute against any
other defendants who are solidarily liable
with the first. Regardless of the method
used, when the prescriptive period is
successfully interrupted, the full period
begins to run again.
142 F.3d at 4 (emphasis added and footnote and citation omitted).
Although in Tokyo Marine the statute of limitations was tolled via
the filing of an extrajudicial claim letter, we stated that the
result would be no different in the event of a prior suit tolling
the statute of limitations for a subsequent suit. See id. at 7
(noting that "the interruption of prescription as to one solidary
debtor affects the other solidary debtors, so that a suit against
one joint tortfeasor may be filed up to one year after judgment is
entered in a suit against another joint tortfeasor" (citation
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omitted)); see also García-Pérez, 2008 WL 2717833, at *7 (noting
that filing a judicial or extrajudicial claim against a tortfeasor
interrupts the prescription period in question as to the rest of
the solidary tortfeasors). This reading is also the one most
consistent with other provisions of Puerto Rico law, including
Article 1097 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[a] creditor
may sue any of the joint debtors or all of them simultaneously" and
that "[t]he actions instituted against one shall not be an obstacle
for those that may be brought subsequently against the others, as
long as it does not appear that the debt has been collected in
full." P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 3108 (emphasis added).
Moreover, there are other cases on point in which the
timely filing of a judicial action has been found to toll the
statute of limitations as to new defendants who are solidarily
liable with those against whom the action was initially filed. For
example, in García-Molina v. Gobierno de la Capital, the plaintiff
sued the Municipality of San Juan and its insurer for injuries
sustained in a car accident while plaintiff was a passenger, but
failed to sue either the owner or the driver of the vehicle. 72
P.R. Dec. 138, 141 (1951) (official translation); see also
Hernández-Moreno v. Serrano-Marrero, 719 F. Supp. 70 (D.P.R. 1989)
(discussing García-Molina). Codefendants, the municipality and its
insurer, then moved to file a third-party complaint against the
owner of the vehicle outside the limitations period. García-
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Molina, 72 P.R. Dec. at 141-42. Addressing the timeliness issue,
the Puerto Rico Supreme Court noted, citing sections 1094 and 1874
of the Civil Code, that "actions instituted against any one of the
joint debtors shall prejudice all of them" and that "[i]nterruption
of prescription of actions in joint obligations equally benefits or
injures all the creditors or debtors." Id. at 148. Applying the
solidarity doctrine, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court thus concluded
that "[t]he original complaint against the third-party plaintiffs
[the municipality and its insurer] having been filed within one
year," "prescription against the third-party defendants [the owner
and driver of the vehicle] had been interrupted and the third-party
complaint was therefore timely filed." Id. at 148-49.
Similarly, in Torres-Vázquez v. Commercial Union Ins.
Co., longshoreman brought a tort action under Puerto Rico law
against a marine terminal, but did not file a complaint against the
marine terminal's liability insurer until four years after the
incident. 367 F. Supp. 2d 231, 234-35 (D.P.R. 2005). The insurer
sought to dismiss the complaint as barred by the applicable one-
year statute of limitations, but the district court denied the
motion. Id. at 239-40. The court, relying on our interpretation
of Puerto Rico law in Tokyo Marine, held that because the original
complaint against the marine terminal had been filed in a timely
fashion, "there is no doubt that the statute of limitations for all
tortfeasors jointly liable, as is [the insurer], was stalled for
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the interruption against one tortfeasor benefits all others." 367
F. Supp. 2d at 240. Thus, the amended complaint adding the marine
terminal's insurer as a defendant four years after the incident was
held to be timely. Id.
Suzuki attempts to distinguish this line of cases on the
ground that in these cases the plaintiffs took advantage of the
tolling effect of the previously filed judicial complaint to file
a complaint against additional solidarily liable tortfeasors in the
same action rather than in a subsequent suit. In contrast,
Rodríguez seeks to rely on the tolling effect of the 2002 Action in
a subsequent action against the alleged joint tortfeasor. However,
we see no basis for regarding this distinction as dispositive. If
initiating a judicial action against a tortfeasor tolls the statute
of limitations as to all other tortfeasors jointly and severally
liable with the first, as the solidarity doctrine provides, and
that action is dismissed without prejudice thereby permitting its
re-institution before the courts, there is no basis for concluding
that the tolling effect of the initial action somehow ceases as a
result of the dismissal, especially given that Puerto Rico provides
for the reset of the statute of limitations upon dismissal.
To be sure, we are not holding that identicality is
inapplicable when tolling the statute of limitations in suits
involving solidarily liable tortfeasors. Rather, for a prior
judicial or extra-judicial claim to toll the limitations period for
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a later-filed suit against a solidary tortfeasor, the later suit
must nevertheless contain the same substantive claims and seek the
same relief. As we stated in Rodríguez-Narvaez, "tolling the
statute as to one jointly and severally liable defendant tolls it
as to all, but the tolling is effective with regard only to
identical causes of action." 895 F.2d at 43 (citation omitted).
In this case, we conclude that the causes of action stated in the
2002, 2004 and 2006 Actions were identical, in that each was a
products liability action seeking damages resulting from the same
alleged defects in Rodríguez's Suzuki motorcycle.
The requirement of identicality of parties, however,
cannot apply where the parties against whom the statute of
limitations was tolled and those parties ultimately sued are
solidarily liable for the same obligation. We find this
interpretation to be the clearest way of reconciling the
identicality requirement with the solidarity doctrine as those
concepts are applied in Puerto Rico law. To hold otherwise and
allow the identicality requirement to preclude additional
defendants from being later sued, where the prescription period has
been effectively tolled against other defendants solidarily liable
with those defendants, would directly violate the principle that
the "interruption of prescription of actions in joint obligations
equally benefits or injures all the creditors or debtors." See
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5304. In other words, mandating
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"identicality of parties" between a prior and subsequent suit as a
prerequisite to tolling, where the solidarity doctrine allows a
prior suit against one solidary tortfeasor to toll the statute of
limitations with respect to a subsequent lawsuit against other
tortfeasors solidarily liable with the first, would render the
solidarity doctrine meaningless.
Thus we read the solidarity doctrine as requiring that,
with respect to identical causes of action, the filing of a
judicial action against one solidarily liable defendant tolls the
statute as to all defendants solidarily liable with the first.
This is the case regardless of whether the later-sued tortfeasors
are brought into the initial action that created the tolling effect
or they are sued in a subsequent action. These principles compel
a result in Rodríguez's favor.
Accordingly, we conclude that Rodríguez effectively
tolled the statute of limitations as to his later-filed actions
against Suzuki, pursuant to sections 5303 and 5304 of title 31 of
the Puerto Rico Civil Code, by timely bringing before the court an
identical cause of action against parties solidarily liable with
Suzuki. The instant action having been filed within the
limitations period, which reset after the dismissal of those prior
actions, the district court erred in holding Rodríguez's claims to
be time-barred.
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III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment entered
in favor of Suzuki and against Rodríguez is reversed.
Costs are granted to appellant.
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