United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 08-2100
ANTWAN CRAWFORD; DARRICK WILSON; ANTHONY TUCKER,
Plaintiffs,
MAC S. HUDSON; DERRICK TYLER,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
v.
HAROLD W. CLARKE, Commissioner of the
Massachusetts Department of Correction,
Defendant, Appellant,
KATHLEEN DENNEHY,
Defendant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, and Selya, Circuit Judges,
and Tashima,* Senior Circuit Judge.
Richard C. McFarland, Legal Division, Department of
Correction, with whom Nancy Ankers White, Special Assistant
Attorney General, was on brief for appellant Harold W. Clarke.
Michael Kendall, with whom Neal E. Minahan, David Quinn
Gacioch, and McDermott Will & Emery LLP, were on brief for
appellees Hudson and Tyler.
August 24, 2009
*
Of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. The Commissioner of the
Massachusetts Department of Correction (the "DOC") appeals an
injunction entered in favor of the plaintiffs-appellees Mac S.
Hudson and Derrick Tyler (together, the "Plaintiffs"). After
careful consideration, we affirm.
The Plaintiffs are Muslim inmates in the custody of the
DOC. In 2001, they filed a non-class action complaint, later
amended, asserting that the Commissioner violated their right to
freely exercise their religion.
At issue in this appeal is the ability to participate in
Jum'ah, which is "a Friday group prayer that is obligatory for
Muslims." Hudson v. Dennehy, 538 F. Supp. 2d 400, 404 n.4 (D.
Mass. 2008). At the time of the filing of their Amended Complaint,
the Plaintiffs were housed in an special management unit ("SMU") at
MCI-Cedar Junction known as "Ten Block." SMUs are housing units
separate from the general population of the prison "in which
inmates may be confined for reasons of administrative segregation,
protective custody, or disciplinary detention." 103 Mass. Code
Regs. 423.06. Plaintiffs alleged that, "[w]hile segregated, [they]
are denied the right to attend mandatory Jumah services." They
further alleged that "[p]risoners with televisions may participate
in the prison's Jumah services, which are broadcast via closed-
circuit televisions," but that "[t]he DOC presently denies [the
Plaintiffs] access to a television and, therefore, access to Jumah
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services." In their prayer for relief, the Plaintiffs sought "a
permanent injunction ordering Defendant . . . to allow Plaintiff to
attend all Jumah services either in person or via closed-circuit
television."
The district court conducted a six-day bench trial
concerning Plaintiffs' claims.1 After trial, the district court
applied the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
("RLUIPA"), which provides that:
No government shall impose a substantial
burden on the religious exercise of a person
residing in or confined to an institution, as
defined in [42 U.S.C. § 1997], even if the
burden results from a rule of general
applicability, unless the government
demonstrates that imposition of the burden on
that person-
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental
interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). The district court ruled that "[t]he
DOC's ban on personal participation in Jum'ah services by inmates
confined in Ten Block serves the compelling State interest of
rehabilitating prisoners and promoting good order." Hudson, 538 F.
Supp. 2d at 412. However, the court further ruled that "[t]he ban
on participation by Ten Block inmates in Jum'ah services by
1
The trial encompassed other religious freedom claims as well,
but the district court's resolution of those claims is not
challenged on appeal.
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closed-circuit television is not the least restrictive means of
vindicating" the compelling state interests of the DOC, noting that
"the DOC does not contend that there is any technical reason that
prevents the broadcast of Jum'ah services by closed-circuit
television to Muslim inmates in Ten Block." Id. at 412 & n.24.
The district court later entered an injunction requiring
closed-circuit broadcasting of Jum'ah "[w]henever Plaintiffs are
housed in the Special Management Unit,"2 not limiting its
injunction to the SMU at MCI-Cedar Junction. When the Commissioner
sought clarification, the district court confirmed that the
injunction required closed circuit television broadcasts of Jum'ah
services in any SMU in which Plaintiffs may be housed in the
future.
The Commissioner then moved for reconsideration,
attaching the affidavit of Jeffrey Quick, the DOC's Director of
Resource Management (the "Quick Affidavit"). The Quick Affidavit
outlined the significant technical, operational, physical plant,
and cost impediments to providing closed-circuit television
broadcasts to certain SMUs located at prisons other than MCI-Cedar
2
The injunction states in relevant part:
Whenever Plaintiffs are housed in the Special Management
Unit, Defendant shall provide access to a closed circuit
television set that displays, through sound and images,
a live broadcast of such communal Jum'ah services as are
regularly held on each and every Friday for the duration
of their incarceration . . . .
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Junction. The Quick Affidavit further noted that Tyler was
"presently incarcerated in the general population of MCI-Cedar
Junction," and that Hudson was "presently incarcerated at [Old
Colony Correctional Center] and is housed in the general
population."
That same day, the district court denied the motion for
reconsideration, stating:
After hearing, the motion is denied without
prejudice. Plaintiff Hudson is currently
confined in general population at the Old
Colony Correctional Facility. Accordingly,
there is no actual controversy appropriate for
judicial resolution.
The Commissioner subsequently filed a notice of appeal that listed
only the denial of the motion for reconsideration.
As an initial matter, the Plaintiffs contend that the
only decision on appeal is the district court's denial of the
Commissioner's motion for reconsideration. They point out that
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 provides that "[t]he notice
of appeal must . . . designate the judgment, order, or part thereof
being appealed," Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B), and the notice of
appeal here only lists the denial of the motion for
reconsideration.3 Indeed, "an appeal from an order denying such a
3
The notice states in full:
Notice is hereby given that Harold W. Clarke,
Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of
Correction, defendant in the above named case, hereby
appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the
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motion is generally not considered to be an appeal from the
underlying judgment." Chamorro v. Puerto Rican Cars, Inc., 304
F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2002) (discussing a motion for
reconsideration).
However, "our precedents encourage us to construe notices
of appeal liberally and examine them in the context of the record
as a whole." Id. Although the notice of appeal only lists the
denial of the motion for reconsideration, it references the "Final
Judgment with Regard to Broadcast of Jum'ah Services in Special
Management Units Other Than Ten Block." "Read in context, this
reference is consistent with a desire to have this court review the
propriety of the" injunction with respect to Jum'ah services. Id.
at 4 (noting that notice of appeal only listing denial of motion
for reconsideration also referenced dismissal for want of
prosecution, which reflected an intent to reach the dismissal).
Moreover, "both sides have fully briefed the merits, and
undertaking appellate review of the original order . . . would not
unfairly prejudice" the Plaintiffs. See id. Although we recognize
that "rescue missions are not automatic, and litigants will do well
to draft notices of appeal with care," we will give the
First Circuit from the Order denying Defendant's Motion
for Reconsideration of Final Judgment with Regard to
Broadcast of Jum'ah Services in Special Management Units
Other Than Ten Block, entered in this action on June 19,
2008.
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Commissioner the benefit of the doubt and treat the injunction
itself as properly before us. Id. at 3.
"[T]he scope of [an] injunction is reviewed for abuse of
discretion." Esso Standard Oil Co. v. López-Freytes, 522 F.3d 136,
142-43 (1st Cir. 2008). The Commissioner contends that the
district court erred by entering a prospective injunction that
applies to all SMUs without making findings as to whether SMUs
other than Ten Block are suitable for closed circuit television
broadcasts of Ju'mah services. Thus, according to the
Commissioner, the prospective injunction violates the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (the "PLRA"), which requires "prospective
relief" to be "narrowly drawn, extend[] no further than necessary
to correct the violation of the Federal right, and [be] the least
intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal
right." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). The Commissioner also relies
on RLUIPA, contending that the DOC can demonstrate that it has a
"compelling governmental interest" in not providing closed circuit
broadcasting of Ju'mah services to SMUs other than Ten Block given
the high cost of providing such services, see Baranowski v. Hart,
486 F.3d 112, 125 (5th Cir. 2007) (compelling interest standard met
under RLUIPA when prison budget not adequate to cover Kosher
meals), and the resultant imposition such a requirement would put
on the Commissioner's discretion to assign the Plaintiffs to
different facilities.
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We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion. Although the Plaintiffs' allegations in their Amended
Complaint focused on the lack of closed-circuit broadcasting in Ten
Block, their prayer for relief was not limited to Ten Block.
Plaintiffs plainly sought system-wide relief. Despite being on
notice of this claim for relief, the Commissioner did not present
during the bench trial any of the evidence contained in the Quick
Affidavit, despite having the "onus" to show that the burden it
placed on the Plaintiffs' religious exercise "furthers a compelling
governmental interest and . . . that the burden is the least
restrictive means of achieving that compelling interest." Spratt
v. R.I. Dep't of Corrs., 482 F.3d 33, 38 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding
that, under RLUIPA, once a plaintiff establishes a substantial
burden on the exercise of his or her religion, the "onus shifts to
the government"). Instead, the Commissioner provided evidence that
the DOC's system-wide policy banning televisions in SMUs was due to
(1) the temporary nature of SMU detention; (2) the security risks
associated with having a television in an inmate's cell; and
(3) the DOC's desire to avoid any incentive for inmates to seek SMU
detention. A witness, MCI-Cedar Junction Deputy Superintendent
Lisa Mitchell, testified that there was no technical reason that
prevents the broadcast of Jum'ah services by closed-circuit
television to Muslim inmates in Ten Block, but the Commissioner did
not provide evidence that this was not the case for other
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facilities. In fact, the Commissioner provided testimony, through
its Acting Deputy Commissioner, John Marshall, that the DOC sought
to create a universal SMU policy to alleviate any differences in
SMU policies among various facilities.
Given the record before it, the district court tailored
an injunction that was consistent with the PLRA's directive that
all "prospective relief" be "narrowly drawn," "extend[] no further
than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right," and
be the "least intrusive means necessary to remedy the violation of
a Federal right." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). The Plaintiffs
established a substantial burden on the exercise of their religion,
and, in evaluating whether to enable Plaintiffs to participate in
Jum'ah services in person or provide closed-circuit broadcasting of
such services, the district court found that providing closed-
circuit broadcasting was the least intrusive means to alleviate
that burden on the Plaintiffs. See Hudson, 538 F. Supp. 2d at 412.
The Commissioner put nothing in the record to differentiate
facilities other than Ten Block on the issues of compelling
governmental interest or least restrictive means. Moreover, under
RLUIPA, the Commissioner had the burden to put forward his
additional evidence at trial and failed to do so. See Spratt, 482
F.3d at 38. The district court is not a mind reader, and, given
the Commissioner's failure to provide the additional evidence
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contained in the Quick Affidavit at trial, we conclude that no
abuse of discretion occurred in framing the injunction.
For substantially the same reasons, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in denying the Commissioner's motion
for reconsideration. "We review a trial court's decision denying
a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a judgment for manifest abuse
of discretion." Vasapolli v. Rostoff, 39 F.3d 27, 36 (1st Cir.
1994). We have emphasized that Rule 59(e) "does not provide a
vehicle for a party to undo its own procedural failures, and it
certainly does not allow a party to introduce new evidence or
advance arguments that could and should have been presented to the
district court prior to the judgment." Aybar v. Crispin-Reyes, 118
F.3d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1997). As the Commissioner sought to
introduce evidence that he could have advanced at trial but chose
not to, the district court's denial of the motion for
reconsideration did not amount to an abuse of discretion.
We conclude by emphasizing that, under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), the Commissioner is free to move for
relief from the injunction when "applying it prospectively is no
longer equitable." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5); see also Esso, 522
F.3d at 149-50 (rejecting claim that "the scope of [the] injunction
was overly broad because it lacks an express provision for
termination of the injunction," noting the availability of Rule
60(b)(5)). Moreover, under the final judgment entered in this
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case, the district court retained jurisdiction "for the purpose of
enabling any party to this Judgment to apply to the Court for . . .
the modification of the injunctive provisions of this Judgment."
In fact, the district court, in its denial of the Commissioner's
motion for reconsideration, demonstrated a willingness to address
the injunction should circumstances require it, that is, if the
Plaintiffs (or either of them) are about to be housed in an SMU
other than Ten Block. Thus, if and when the time comes, the
Commissioner will have an avenue to press its concerns.
For the foregoing reasons, the entry of the injunction in
this case is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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