Silva v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts

Not for Publication in West’s Federal Reporter

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

Nos. 08-1956, 08-2559

RICHARD A. SILVA, WALTER R. SILVA,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, JUSTICES OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS LAND COURT, RUTH PELLEGRINI,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]

Before
Howard, Selya, and Ebel, *
Circuit Judges.

William A. Hahn, with whom Hahn & Matkov was on the
briefs, for appellants.
David Aaron Guberman, Assistant Attorney General, with
whom Martha Coakley, Attorney General of Massachusetts, was
on the briefs, for appellees Commonwealth of Massachusetts
and the Justices of the Massachusetts Land Court.
Paul R. Collier III, with whom Roger Bertling, Michael
Flannery and WilmerHale Legal Services Center were on the
briefs, for appellee Ruth Pellegrini.

September 11, 2009

*
Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
 EBEL, Circuit Judge. In these appeals,

Plaintiffs-Appellants Richard A. and Walter R. Silva

challenge the district court’s decisions dismissing two

federal actions by which the Silvas challenged foreclosure

proceedings occurring in Massachusetts state court. Having

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND

The Silvas and Defendant-Appellee Ruth Pellegrini are

siblings. Their mother died in either 1975 or 1976. At the

time of their mother’s death, Pellegrini and her children

were living with her mother in the family home at 24

Clifford Street, Readville, Massachusetts. However, in her

will, the mother left the Readville home to the Silvas.

The Silvas, nonetheless, initially agreed that Pellegrini

could continue to live in the home. She did so, paying the

house taxes and utilities but no rent.

In 1976, the Silvas obtained a $25,000 loan from a

bank, securing that debt with a mortgage on the house at 24

Clifford Street. The bank recorded the mortgage in the

Suffolk County Registry of Deeds.

In 1981, the Silvas tried unsuccessfully to evict

Pellegrini. Because she refused to vacate the house, the

Silvas stopped making payments on the mortgage. As a

result, the bank started foreclosure proceedings in February

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1981. In order “[t]o avoid losing her home, Ms. Pellegrini

purchased the note” from the bank in May 1981. Pellegrini

recorded the bank’s transfer of its note to her in the

Suffolk County Registry of Deeds. The Silvas never made any

mortgage payments to Pellegrini.

A. Pellegrini’s foreclosure and state action to quiet title

In 2000, Pellegrini sought to foreclose on the mortgage

she had purchased from the bank almost twenty years earlier.

Pellegrini did so using a non-judicial foreclosure mechanism

provided for under Massachusetts law — foreclosure by entry.

See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, §§ 1-2. 1 In compliance with

1
Massachusetts General Laws ch. 244, § 1 provides that

[a] mortgagee may, after breach of condition of a
mortgage of land, recover possession of the land
mortgaged by an open and peaceable entry thereon,
if not opposed by the mortgagor or other person
claiming it, or by action under this chapter; and
possession so obtained, if continued peaceably for
three years from the date of recording of the
memorandum or certificate as provided in section
two, shall forever foreclose the right of
redemption.

Massachusetts General Laws ch. 244, § 2 further provides:

If an entry for breach of condition is made without
a judgment, a memorandum of the entry shall be made
on the mortgage deed and signed by the mortgagor or
person claiming under him, or a certificate, under
oath, of two competent witnesses to prove the entry
shall be made. Such memorandum or certificate
shall after the entry, except as provided in
section seventy of chapter one hundred and
eighty-five, be recorded in the registry of deeds
(continued...)

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the Massachusetts foreclosure-by-entry statute, Pellegrini

“entered” the home at 24 Clifford Street, observed by two

witnesses, and then recorded with the county registry of

deeds a notice of the foreclosure and a certificate from the

two witnesses attesting that the foreclosure by entry had

occurred. After the expiration of the three-year redemption

period that followed the foreclosure, see Mass. Gen. Laws

ch. 244, § 1, Pellegrini filed an action in the

Massachusetts Land Court, on September 22, 2003, seeking to

remove any cloud on her title to 24 Clifford Street. 2 The

1
(...continued)
for the county or district where the land lies,
with a note of reference, if the mortgage is
recorded in the same registry, from each record to
the other. Unless such record is made, the entry
shall not be effectual for the purposes mentioned
in the preceding section.

(Emphasis added.)
2
Although Pellegrini had complied with all of the
state-law requirements for effecting a foreclosure by entry,
she failed to comply with the Massachusetts procedures
implementing the federal Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50
U.S.C. App. §§ 501-96 (Supp. 2009). See generally Beaton v.
Land Court, 326 N.E.2d 302, 304 (Mass. 1975) (discussing
Massachusetts statutes implementing the federal Relief Act).
Among other things, the federal relief act protects military
personnel from foreclosure on their property while they are
on active duty. See 50 U.S.C. § 533(c) (as revised in
2003). Because there is no indication that either of the
Silvas fell under the protection provided by this federal
statute, however, Pellegrini’s failure to comply with the
Massachusetts procedures implementing the federal relief act
had no effect on the validity of the foreclosure. See
Beaton, 326 N.E.2d at 305 (noting that, “[i]f a foreclosure
(continued...)

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Silvas defended, arguing among other things that they were

being denied their property without due process. The Land

Court rejected that argument, concluding that the statutory

requirements for conducting a foreclosure by entry were

sufficient to satisfy due process and that Pellegrini had

complied with those statutory requirements. The Land Court,

therefore, entered judgment for Pellegrini, declaring that

she held title to 24 Clifford Street “free and clear of the

[Silvas’] claims.”

The Silvas filed a motion seeking reconsideration, which

the Land Court denied. But the Land Court apparently failed

to notify the parties of its decision, and the Silvas did

not discover the denial until four months later, after the

time to file an appeal had expired.

B. Silvas’ first federal action

Because it appeared that the Silvas would be unable to

pursue a timely appeal in the state-court action, they

instead filed a complaint in federal court, naming as

Defendants Pellegrini, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,

2
(...continued)
were otherwise properly made, failure to comply with the
[Servicemembers Civil] Relief Act would not render the
foreclosure invalid as to anyone not entitled to the
protection of that act”). But there would remain a cloud on
Pellegrini’s title until she filed suit to establish that
neither Silva was entitled to relief under the federal
statute. See id.

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and the Justices of the Massachusetts Land Court. Soon

thereafter, the Massachusetts Appeals Court agreed to hear

the Silvas’ untimely appeal from the Land Court decision.

In light of that, the federal district court dismissed the

Silvas’ federal action, based upon the Younger abstention

doctrine. 3

C. State appeal of the Land Court’s decision

Before the Massachusetts Appeals Court, the Silvas

argued again, among other things, that they had been denied

their property without due process. That state appellate

court upheld the Land Court’s decision, concluding that the

Silvas had received notice of the foreclosure through

Pellegrini’s compliance with the requirements of the

Massachusetts foreclosure-by-entry statute. See Pellegrini

v. Silva, 876 N.E.2d 498 (Table), 2007 WL 3333247, at

*2-3 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (unpublished). In light of that,

the Appeals Court further held that it need not address the

question of whether due process requirements even apply to

non-judicial foreclosures. See id. at *3.

3
“In the absence of extraordinary circumstances,
interests of comity and the respect for state processes
demand that federal courts should abstain from interfering
with ongoing state judicial proceedings.” Esso Standard Oil
Co. v. Lopez-Freytes, 522 F.3d 136, 143 (1st Cir. 2008)
(citing, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).

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 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court denied further

review. See Pellegrini v. Silva, 880 N.E.2d 413 (Table)

(Mass. Jan. 31, 2008). Although the Silvas could have at

that point sought further relief by filing a petition for a

writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, see

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a), 4 the Silvas did not pursue that avenue

of possible review.

D. Silvas’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion to reopen the first
federal action

In light of their final defeat in Massachusetts state

court, the Silvas filed a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion

seeking relief from the district court’s earlier decision

dismissing their first federal action. The district court

denied that Rule 60(b) motion. In appeal No. 08-1956,

currently before this court, the Silvas challenge that

decision.

4
Section 1257(a), 28 U.S.C., provides:

Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest
court of a State in which a decision could be had,
may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of
certiorari where the validity of a treaty or
statute of the United States is drawn in question
or where the validity of a statute of any State is
drawn in question on the ground of its being
repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of
the United States, or where any title, right,
privilege, or immunity is specially set up or
claimed under the Constitution or the treaties or
statutes of, or any commission held or authority
exercised under, the United States.

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E. Silvas’ second federal action

Less than a week after the Silvas filed their Rule

60(b) motion seeking to reopen their first federal action,

the Silvas filed a second federal action. This time, the

Silvas sued Pellegrini and the Commonwealth, again

challenging the state-court foreclosure proceedings. The

district court dismissed this second federal action under

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 5 The Silvas now appeal that

decision in appeal No. 08-2559.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Appeal No. 08-2559

We first address appeal No. 08-2559, in which the Silvas

challenge the district court’s decision to dismiss their

second federal action under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 6

1. Standard of review

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine implicates the district

court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. See Exxon Mobil Corp.

v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291-92 (2005);

see also Geiger v. Foley Hoag LLP Ret. Plan, 521 F.3d 60, 65

(1st Cir. 2008). Therefore, we will review the district

5
Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District
of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462
(1983).
6
Although this is the Silvas’ second appeal in time, it
makes sense analytically to address it first.

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court’s dismissal de novo. See Federacion de Maestros de

Puerto Rico v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de Puerto

Rico, 410 F.3d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Puerto

Ricans for Puerto Rico Party v. Dalmau 544 F.3d 58, 66 (1st

Cir. 2008).

2. Application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

28 U.S.C. § 1257 vests the United States Supreme Court

with exclusive “jurisdiction over appeals from final

state-court judgments.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463

(2006) (per curiam); see also Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at

291-92. In light of that exclusive jurisdictional grant,

“[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents the lower federal

courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by

‘state-court losers’ challenging state-court judgments

rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.’”

Id. at 460 (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284)(emphasis

added). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, however, is “confined

to [1] ‘cases brought by state-court losers [2] complaining

of injuries caused by state-court judgments [3] rendered

before the district court proceedings commenced and

[4] inviting district court review and rejection of those

judgments.’” Lance, 546 U.S. at 464 (numbering added)

(quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284); see also Coors

Brewing Co. v. Mendez-Torres, 562 F.3d 3, 19 (1st Cir.

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2009). Because it is clear in this case that the Silvas

were the unsuccessful parties in the state-court foreclosure

action, we focus on the remaining three factors set forth in

Lance.

a. Whether the Silvas’ second federal action
“complain[s] of injuries caused by state-court
judgments”

It is clear that the Silvas’ second federal action

complains of injuries caused by the state-court judgment

entered in the Massachusetts foreclosure action. In the

complaint in their second federal action, the Silvas

alleged:

Pellegrini used a state statute (MGL c. 244) in
such a way as not to require actual notice of
proceedings depriving them of their title to their
property . . .

. . . .

28. The Silvas raised the federal constitutional
due process issue under the Fifth And Fourteenth
Amendments at every level of the Massachusetts
state courts, but such courts chose not to address
the constitutional questions.

29. There is a real and actual controversy between
the parties in that defendant Pellegrini takes the
position that the state statute (c. 244) provides
for and allows the deprivation of real property
without actual and personal notification to the
record title holders, and the Silvas contend that
any such state law would be unconstitutional on its
face and/or as applied to the Silvas or their real
property under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution.

30. Moreover, defendant Pellegrini is taking the
position that since she followed MGL c. 244, and

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 even though the Silvas did not receive actual or
personal notification of what she was doing, that
under the state statute the Silvas have lost all
right, title and interest in their Readville house.

These alleged injuries stem directly from the judgment

entered in the state foreclosure action upholding the rights

of Ms. Pellegrini to take this very action. See Davison v.

Gov’t of Puerto Rico-Puerto Rico Firefighters Corps, 471

F.3d 220, 223 (1st Cir. 2006) (applying

Rooker-Feldman doctrine where, regardless of how the claim

is phrased, “the only real injury to Plaintiffs is

ultimately still caused by a state-court judgment”); see

also Puerto Ricans for Puerto Rico Party, 544 F.3d at 68 (in

determining whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies in

a given case, comparing the “core issues” raised in the

state-court action with those asserted in the federal

action).

b. Whether the state-court judgment in the
foreclosure proceeding “was rendered before”
the Silvas commenced their second federal
action

In determining whether the state-court judgment was

“rendered before the [federal] district court proceeding

commenced,” Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284, Exxon Mobil

directs that “a state court judgment is sufficiently final

for operation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine[] when ‘the

state proceedings [have] ended,’” Federacion de Maestros,

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410 F.3d at 24 (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291). The

First Circuit has further concluded that, for Rooker-Feldman

purposes, “when the highest state court in which review is

available has affirmed the judgment below and nothing is

left to be resolved, then without a doubt the state court

proceedings have ‘ended.’” 7 Id., at 24.

In this case, the state foreclosure proceeding had

certainly “ended” by the time the state’s highest court, the

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, denied the Silvas

further review on January 31, 2008. See Pellegrini, 880

N.E.2d at 413 (Table). The Silvas initiated their second

federal action two months later, on March 25, 2008. Thus,

the state-court proceedings had ended, for Rooker-Feldman

purposes, before the Silvas commenced their second federal

action.

c. Whether the Silvas’ second federal action
“invit[ed] district court review and rejection
of [the state-court] judgments”

The Silvas asserted two claims in their second federal

action: 1) seeking a declaration that any state law that

7
The First Circuit has also recognized two other
circumstances, not relevant here, when a state-court
proceeding will have “ended” for Rooker-Feldman purposes:
1) “if the state action has reached a point where neither
party seeks further action”; and 2) “if the state court
proceedings have finally resolved all the federal questions
in the litigation, but state law or purely factual questions
(whether great or small) remain to be litigated.”
Federacion de Maestros, 410 F.3d at 24-25.

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“allows the deprivation of property without actual and

personal notice to the record title holders of real

estate . . . is defective and unconstitutional under the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution”; and 2) alleging that Mass. Gen. Law ch. 244,

“to the extent that it does not require actual and personal

notification and a timely and meaningful opportunity to be

heard to protect one’s property, is unconstitutional on its

face and/or as applied to the Silvas and/or their real

estate.” As relief, the Silvas asked the district court to:

1. Enter a temporary restraining order enjoining
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, its courts,
counties, towns and any other public officer from
in any way enforcing, carrying out or acting upon
MGL c. 244 generally or as it is applied to the
Silvas and their property.

2. After hearing, enter a preliminary injunction
consistent with prayer 1 above.

3. Enter a temporary restraining order enjoining
defendant Pellegrini from alienating or encumbering
the Silvas’ house at 24 Clifford Street, Readville
pending resolution of this action.

4. After hearing, enter a preliminary injunction
consistent with prayer 3 above.

5. Declare MGL c. 244 and/or the Massachusetts
state foreclosure procedure either on their face or
as applied to the Silvas and their property
violates the United States Constitution, Amendments
Five and Fourteen, and 42 USC sec. 1983.

6. Award the Silvas their damages for any
unconstitutional application of MGL c. 244 to their
real estate in Readville, Massachusetts.

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 7. Award the Silvas their costs and legal fees
under 42 USC sec. 1988.

8. Such other relief as the Court deems just and
appropriate.

In order for the district court to grant the Silvas

this relief that they requested, the district court would

have “to declare that the state court wrongly decided [the

Silvas’] claim” in the state foreclosure action. Davison,

471 F.3d at 223. And “[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine

prevents [the district court] from doing this.” Id. This

bar applies notwithstanding that the Silvas are asserting in

their federal action a federal constitutional claim pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Diva’s Inc. v. City of Bangor, 411

F.3d 30, 42-43 (1st Cir. 2005) (applying Rooker-Feldman

doctrine to § 1983 action, but concluding that doctrine did

not deprive the federal district court of subject-matter

jurisdiction in that particular case).

The Silvas contend that their second federal action

seeks different relief than that sought in the state-court

foreclosure proceedings because, in federal court, they are

challenging the constitutionality of the Massachusetts

foreclosure-by-entry statute. It may be true that, “if the

plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation by an adverse

party independent of the injury caused by the state court

judgment, the [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine does not bar

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jurisdiction.” Davison, 471 F.3d at 222 (emphasis added).

But here, the Silvas themselves alleged in their federal

complaint that they “raised the federal constitutional due

process issue under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments at

every level of the Massachusetts state courts.” Thus, the

Silvas’ federal claim challenging the constitutionality of

the Massachusetts foreclosure-by-entry statute is not

“independent of the injury caused by the state court

judgment.” Davison, 471 F.3d at 222.

The Silvas counter that the state courts never addressed

the merits of their due process argument. But we cannot

agree. Both the Land Court and the Massachusetts Appeals

Court addressed and rejected the Silvas’ due process

argument.

The Massachusetts Land Court rejected the Silvas’ due

process argument by concluding that the recorded certificate

of entry was “adequate and proper notice, and the Silvas

cannot credibly claim that it violates due process.” This

conclusion was upheld by the Massachusetts Appeals Court,

which noted that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

previously ruled that the duly recorded entry under Mass.

Gen. Laws ch. 244, § 2 provided “full and authoritative

notice, to all persons,” citing, e.g., Bennett v. Conant, 10

Cush. 163, 167 (Mass. 1852). Pellegrini, 2007 WL 3333247,

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at *2. Full and authoritative notice to all persons would

satisfy due process notice requirements and, accordingly,

the Massachusetts Appeals Court apparently felt it was not

necessary in this case to address whether or not the due

process clause was even applicable because of the

possibility that a foreclosure by entry and recorded notice

might not involve state action: “this case presents no

‘occasion to determine whether the due process clause even

has any applicability to nonjudicial mortgage

foreclosures.’” Id. at *3 (quoting Beaton, 326 N.E.2d at

307 n.6). Thus, the Massachusetts courts expressly rejected

the Silvas’ due process claim.

Moreover, even if we were to assume the truth of the

Silvas’ allegation that, although they “raised the federal

constitutional due process issue under the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments at every level of the Massachusetts

state courts,” the state “courts chose not to address the

constitutional questions,” we would still conclude that

Rooker-Feldman bars the Silvas’ second federal action. This

court could not grant the Silvas the relief they request

without concluding that the Massachusetts state courts erred

in the decisions entered in the state foreclosure

proceedings. Cf. Davison, 471 F.3d at 223 (applying

Rooker-Feldman doctrine after rejecting federal plaintiffs’

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argument that they never got their “day in [state] court”

because of state court’s procedural ruling). The ruling of

the Massachusetts Appeals Court expressly rejected the

Silvas’ due process claim and no federal relief could be

granted without challenging that state court holding.

d. Conclusion as to the application of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine

For all of the foregoing reasons, the district court did

not err in dismissing the Silvas’ second federal action for

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine.

3. Preclusion principles provide an alternate reason
to affirm the district court’s decision to dismiss
the Silvas’ second federal action

Even if the district court erred in dismissing the

Silvas’ second federal action based upon Rooker-Feldman

principles, which we do not conclude, dismissal was, in any

event, appropriate under preclusion principles. See Aguilar

v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Div., 510 F.3d 1,

8 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that an appellate court can affirm

the district court’s decision to dismiss an action for lack

of subject-matter jurisdiction “on any ground made apparent

by the record (whether or not relied upon by the lower

court)”); see also SBT Holdings, LLC v. Town of Westminster,

547 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that appellate court

can “affirm a judgment of dismissal on any independently

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sufficient ground”) (quotation omitted); Hernandez-Santiago

v. Ecolab, Inc., 397 F.3d 30, 34 (1st Cir. 2005) (per

curiam) (noting that appellate court “could still affirm if

dismissal of the complaint would be the obvious result of a

remand”).

“Under the full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1738, a judgment rendered in a state court is entitled to

the same preclusive effect in federal court as it would be

given within the state in which it was rendered.”

Giragosian v. Ryan, 547 F.3d 59, 63 (1st Cir. 2008)

(quotation omitted), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2020 (2009).

Here, because the state foreclosure proceeding occurred in

Massachusetts courts, we will look to Massachusetts

preclusion principles. “Massachusetts recognizes two

distinct types of preclusion arising out of the maintenance

of prior litigation: res judicata (claim preclusion) and

collateral estoppel (issue preclusion).” Andrew Robinson

Int’l, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 547 F.3d 48, 52 (1st

Cir. 2008). Both apply here.

a. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars the
Silvas’ federal claims against Pellegrini

Res judicata, or claim preclusion, “prevents the

relitigation of all claims that a litigant had the

opportunity and incentive to fully litigate in an earlier

action.” Giragosian, 547 F.3d at 63 (quotation, alterations

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omitted) (applying Massachusetts law). Under Massachusetts

law, “[t]he operation of res judicata requires the presence

of three elements: (1) the identity or privity of the

parties to the present and prior actions, (2) identity of

the cause of action, and (3) prior final judgment on the

merits.” Andrews Robinson, 547 F.3d at 52 (quotation

omitted).

Those three elements are present here. First, the

Silvas’ federal claims asserted against Pellegrini involve

the same parties as were involved in the state foreclosure

proceeding.

Second, “Massachusetts deems causes of action identical

for claim preclusion purposes if they grow out of the same

transaction, act, or agreement, and seek redress for the

same wrong.” Id. (quotation, alterations omitted).

“Discrete theories of liability may constitute identical

causes of action for claim preclusion purposes if they are

based upon the same nucleus of operative facts.” Id.

(applying Massachusetts law). “Facts forming a common

nucleus are those meeting the following criteria: 1) whether

the facts are related in time, space, origin or motivation;

2) whether the facts form a convenient trial unit; and

3) whether treating the facts as a unit conforms to the

parties’ expectations.” Herman v. Meiselman, 541 F.3d 59,

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62-63 & 62 n.6 (1st Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted) (applying

federal and Massachusetts preclusion principles, which the

court noted were the same). It is clear that the Silvas’

federal claims asserted against Pellegrini in the second

federal action stem from the same nucleus of operative facts

as the claims at issue in the state foreclosure

action — P e l l e g r ini’s use of Massachusetts’

foreclosure-by-entry mechanism to take clear title to the

house at 24 Clifford Lane.

Lastly, as previously discussed, the state foreclosure

action is final. And the state courts’ resolution of those

proceedings was based upon the merits of the issues

presented.

b. Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars
the Silvas’ federal claims asserted against
the Commonwealth in the Silvas’ second federal
action

The Massachusetts courts use several
formulations interchangeably to describe the
prerequisites for issue preclusion, but the Supreme
Judicial Court recently stated that issue
preclusion applies when (1) there was a final
judgment on the merits in the prior adjudication;
(2) the party against whom preclusion is asserted
was a party (or in privity with a party) to the
prior adjudication; and (3) the issue in the prior
adjudication was identical to the issue in the
current adjudication. Additionally, [4] the issue
decided in the prior adjudication must have been
essential to the earlier judgment. Massachusetts
courts also require that [5] appellate review must
have been available in the earlier case before
issue preclusion will arise.

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Pisnoy v. Ahmed (In re Sonus Networks, Inc., Shareholder

Derivative Litig.), 499 F.3d 47, 56-57 (1st Cir. 2007)

(quotations, citations omitted) (several numbers added).

Those elements are met here as to the Silvas’ federal claims

asserted against the Commonwealth in the second federal

action.

First, as previously explained, there was a final

adjudication on the merits in the state foreclosure

proceeding. Second, clearly the parties against whom the

Commonwealth seeks to assert the prior state

adjudication — the Silvas — were parties to that prior state

proceeding.

Third, “[i]ssue preclusion prevents relitigation of the

same issues actually litigated in [the] earlier judgment.”

Id. at 62. “The question is whether there is anything in

the” Silvas’ second federal action “that amounts to a

significant change . . . from what was presented to the

state court.” Id. (quotation omitted.) There was not.

Fourth, the relevant issues adjudicated in the state

foreclosure proceeding — whether Pellegrini failed to give

the Silvas adequate notice of her foreclosure by entry, and

whether Pellegrini’s use of that state non-judicial

foreclosure mechanism deprived the Silvas of their property

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without due process — was essential to the state courts’

decisions upholding Pellegrini’s foreclosure by entry.

Lastly, appellate review was available and pursued by

the Silvas in the state foreclosure proceeding. For these

reasons, Massachusetts’ collateral estoppel or issue

preclusion principles bar the Silvas from pursuing the

claims they assert in their second federal action against

the Commonwealth.

c. Conclusion as to preclusion

As an alternative to dismissal on the basis of

Rooker-Feldman, we conclude, for the foregoing reasons, that

dismissal was appropriate based on preclusion principles.

B. Appeal No. 08-1956

Turning to appeal No. 08-1956, the Silvas challenge the

district court’s decision to deny their motion seeking

reconsideration, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) and (6), of

the court’s earlier decision to dismiss their first federal

action.

1. Standard of review

This court generally will review the district court’s

decision denying the Silvas’ Rule 60(b) motion for an abuse

of discretion. See United States v. 6 Fox Street, 480 F.3d

38, 46 (1st Cir. 2007). Where “the district court’s

exercise of discretion is premised on an erroneous legal

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principle,” however, “we review that legal error de novo.”

United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 272 F.3d 89, 100 (1st

Cir. 2001).

2. Rule 60(b)(5) and (6) relief

The district court dismissed the Silvas’ first federal

action based upon Younger abstention, in light of the

ongoing state foreclosure proceedings. After the

Massachusetts courts entered final judgment in the state

litigation, quieting title in 24 Clifford Street in

Pellegrini, the Silvas sought to reopen the first federal

action under Rule 60(b)(5) and (6).

In pertinent part, Rule 60(b) provides:

Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or
Proceeding. On motion and just terms, the court
may relieve a party or its legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons:

. . . .

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or
discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that
has been reversed or vacated; or applying it
prospectively is no longer equitable; or

(6) any other reason that justifies relief.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). “Although many courts have indicated

that Rule 60(b) motions should be granted liberally, [the

First] Circuit has taken a harsher tack. Because Rule 60(b)

is a vehicle for extraordinary relief, motions invoking the

rule should be granted only under exceptional

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circumstances.” Davila-Alvarez v. Escuela de Medicina

Universidad Central del Caribe, 257 F.3d 58, 63-64 (1st Cir.

2001) (quotations, citations, footnote omitted) (reading

this principle “with the gloss supplied by the Supreme Court

in Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship,

507 U.S. 380 (1993) (addressing “excusable neglect” under

Bankr. Rule 9006 and, by analogy, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b))).

Rule 60(b) “must be applied so as to recognize the

desirability of deciding disputes on their merits, while

also considering the importance of finality as applied to

court judgments.” Id. at 64 (quotation omitted).

Here, the Silvas have not shown that the district court

abused its discretion in refusing to reopen their first

federal action. The Silvas contend that the district court

should have granted them Rule 60(b) relief for this reason:

According to the Silvas, the district court originally

dismissed their first federal action under Younger

abstention principles, believing that the Massachusetts

courts would provide the Silvas with a full and fair

opportunity to litigate their due process challenge to

Pellegrini’s foreclosure by entry. The Silvas assert,

however, that the Massachusetts Appeals Court never

addressed their due process argument. Therefore, the Silvas

claim that the federal district court should have granted

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them Rule 60(b) relief from the earlier dismissal of their

first federal action, reopened that federal action and

addressed the merits of their federal claims.

We disagree with the Silvas that the state courts did

not address the Silvas’ due process argument. As previously

explained, both the Massachusetts Land Court and the

Massachusetts Appeals Court rejected the Silvas’ due-process

arguments. In light of that, we cannot conclude the

district court abused its discretion in refusing to reopen

the Silva’s first federal action. 8

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district

court’s decision to deny Rule 60(b) relief from its

dismissal of the Silvas’ first federal action, as well as

the district court’s decision to dismiss the Silvas’ second

federal action.

8
In light of our conclusion that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the Silvas Rule 60(b)
relief, we need not address Appellees’ other arguments.

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