United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 08-1063
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
GREGORY WRIGHT,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lipez, and Howard,
Circuit Judges.
Charles W. Rankin, with whom Michelle Menken and Rankin &
Sultan, were on brief for appellant.
Randall E. Kromm, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Michael J. Sullivan, former United States Attorney, was on brief
for appellee.
September 23, 2009
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. This is the second appeal
concerning a Terry stop which resulted in the entry of a
conditional guilty plea by appellant Gregory Wright for being a
felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In the
Terry stop at issue, Boston police officers recovered a gun from
Wright's sweatshirt pocket after Wright was observed leaning
forward from the backseat of a car to identify the officers,
quickly exiting and running from the car, clutching at the right
side of his sweatshirt while running, and ignoring the officers'
order to stop. Below, Wright moved to suppress the gun, but the
district court denied the motion, concluding that the officers had
reasonable suspicion to stop him. In Wright's first appeal, we
ruled that the district court's denial of the suppression motion
was tainted with legal error, and remanded for further proceedings.
United States v. Wright, 485 F.3d 45, 54 (1st Cir. 2007). On
remand, the district court again denied the motion, and Wright
renewed his appeal. This time, after a careful review of the
record, we affirm.
I. Background
A. The Prior Proceedings
The district court first denied Wright's motion to
suppress after an evidentiary hearing at which three officers
testified about the circumstances leading to his arrest. On
appeal, we held that the district court's conclusion that the
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officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Wright was based on a
legal error. The court interpreted Wright's running as "flight,"
and accepted the police officers' testimony that they saw Wright
clutch his sweatshirt, by linking those findings to the subsequent
discovery of the gun. Id. at 48.
We further held that the court's self-described
"backwards" reasoning fatally tainted its factual findings. See
id. at 48, 52 (quoting the district court as stating "Can I reason
backwards from the fact that what happened next was that the police
officers discovered the weapon on Mr. Wright? I think it is
undisputed he was carrying a weapon and I do so reason"). We
observed that it was "impossible to discern whether the court would
have concluded that Wright knowingly fled from the police if it had
not considered the eventual recovery of the gun." Id. at 52.
Similarly, we could not evaluate the court's finding on Wright's
hand movement because the court had used its "commonsense
assumption that the gun was heavy . . . [to] ma[k]e a factual
finding that Wright grabbed his sweatshirt because he was carrying
a heavy gun." Id. at 53. We concluded that the flaw in the
underlying factual findings invalidated the court's legal
conclusion that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop
Wright, requiring us to vacate the denial of the suppression
motion. Id.
In remanding the case for reconsideration, we also
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addressed the district court's discussion of the area where Wright
was stopped. The court had stated that it did not conclude that
the area was a "high crime area," a characterization that would
have been relevant to the inquiry into whether "the circumstances
[were] sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation,"
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000); see also id. ("[W]e
have previously noted the fact that the stop occurred in a 'high
crime area' among the relevant contextual considerations in a
[reasonable suspicion] analysis."). Because the district court
expressed uncertainty about whether the high crime area finding was
a legal question or a mixed question of fact and law, we clarified
that the character of a stop's location is a factual issue.
Wright, 485 F.3d at 53. We observed that the court might choose to
revisit the question upon remand. To assist its possible
reevaluation of the issue, we identified a number of relevant
factors to be considered. See id. at 53-54.
B. The Remand Proceedings
On remand, the district court solicited supplemental
briefing and heard oral argument from the parties, but took no
additional evidence. In its ruling from the bench, the court
expressly adopted the description of the stop set out in our prior
decision, with some modifications:
On the evening of November 8, 2004, a caravan
of four unmarked police cars was patrolling in
Dorchester, Massachusetts. The cars were
Crown Victorias, a model widely associated
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with police departments. The plainclothes
officers in the caravan were members of the
Boston Police Department Youth Violence Task
Force.
At about 7:45 p.m., the caravan was driving
north on Blue Hill Avenue and slowed down as
the lead car passed a vehicle that had just
pulled over in front of a mini-mart at 1216
Blue Hill Avenue. The parked car was
partially blocking one of two driveway
entrances to the mini-mart parking lot.
Officer Brown, who was seated in the lead
car's front passenger seat, looked to his
right as they passed the parked vehicle and
observed three people, one of whom he
recognized as Omar Edwards, a neighborhood
resident. He did not recognize the driver or
the passenger seated in the back seat of the
parked car.
Immediately after passing this parked vehicle,
Officer Brown's car pulled over to the right
parking lane, in front of the parked car. The
rest of the caravan came to a stop in the
right travel lane to the rear of the parked
car. The front passenger of the second police
car, Officer Bordley, then observed the back
seat passenger of the parked car, later
identified as appellant, lean forward as
though he was looking at the Crown Victoria
that had just pulled over in front of his car.
Wright then exited his car, on the passenger
side, and began to run southward down Blue
Hill Avenue. As he ran, Wright "grabbed
toward the front of his sweatshirt in the
vicinity of his waist."1
Officer Brown quickly exited his car, as did a
number of the other officers in the caravan.
The police ordered Wright to stop running, but
he did not obey this directive. Within a
1
The court added the phrase in quotation marks to the recitation
of the facts in our prior decision, which stated that Wright "put
one hand on the right side of his sweatshirt, grabbing or holding
onto the sweatshirt pocket." Id. at 47.
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matter of seconds, the officers caught up to
Wright, who resisted the officers' attempts to
frisk him.2 The police patted Wright down and
recovered a silver pistol from his sweatshirt
pocket. He was charged with being a felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
See id.
Based on these facts, Wright argued that the officers
lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him. He noted that the
officers' testimony suggested no suspicious motive either for
Wright's leaning forward in the car or for grabbing at his
sweatshirt. Instead, Wright argued that the officers' testimony
indicated that they had stopped Wright only because he had run from
the car. Wright asserted that running in those circumstances,
without more, was insufficient to justify the stop.
The government countered that the totality of the
circumstances demonstrated that the officers had reasonable
suspicion to stop Wright. The government argued that Wright's
running from the car, which it considered "flight," along with his
"clutching at either the waist or the side of the sweatshirt" were
sufficient to justify the stop. The government further contended
that a finding that the area in which the stop occurred was a "high
crime area" under Wardlow was not necessary. However, the
2
The district court concluded its reading of our factual summary
at this point, noting that it did not need to make further findings
because the officers "had already seized him prior to this finding
about resisting. So, there must be an adequate constitutional
basis to chase after him and seize him under the Fourth Amendment."
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government argued that the district court could take into account
"the officers' testimony regarding what . . . their particular
knowledge of that area was at that time."
After hearing argument from both sides, and after setting
forth its findings of fact, the district court ruled as follows:
So, there must be an adequate constitutional
basis to chase after [Wright] and seize him
under the Fourth Amendment, and it is to that
issue the Court now turns.
These are mixed issues of law and fact. I
conclude that the officers had no right to
seize Mr. Wright at the point when their, the
vehicles, both the one in front, the police
cars in front, and the two police cars behind,
came to park in front and back. They had no
right to seize him under the Fourth Amendment
simply because Officer Bordley saw him lean
forward. I do think that it is a reasonable
inference from Officer Bordley's testimony
that Officer Bordley thought, though he did
not expressly so testify, that Mr. Wright had
made [i.e., recognized] the unmarked police
car that had parked in front.
I infer from the testimony that, though things
happened in split second intervals, Mr. Wright
had started to run, I do not at this point say
flee, he had started to run before the
officers had started to run after him. The
Court infers, and again the testimony is what
it is, it's not explicit, I infer that the
officers ascribed some significance as they
are competent and experienced police officers
in that area of Boston to the fact that Mr.
Wright grabbed his side, clutched at something
in his sweatshirt. The Court infers that the
officers did in that split second draw the
inference that he might well possess a weapon.
Having drawn that inference, that is
sufficient under all the circumstances to
order Mr. Wright to stop, and when he did not
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stop, t[o] chase after him and seize him, the
actual seizure is when the officers came in
contact with Mr. Wright.
The court also revisited whether the Terry stop occurred in a high
crime area:
It's necessary I think to go a little further
in honor, out of respect to the reasoning of
the Court of Appeals, because I think this is
a very close case. I do not find that this
was a high crime area as the language is used
in Wardlow. The first time round I expressed
some unease with that definition. And my
unease continues. I don't make that finding.
I honor what I infer is the police officers'
experience and knowledge of the communities
which they patrol. . . . [T]he problem I
have with that Wardlow type of analysis,
candidly, is that the rights of the citizens
in the Dorchester area of Boston have to be
identical to the rights of citizens in Milton
and Wellesley. They have to be scrupulously
identical.
So, while I treat all the circumstances taken
as a whole and I draw inculpatory inferences
. . . from what I infer was the observations
of the officers and their response, their
immediate order to Mr. Wright to stop, I rule
that that would have been enough if the
officers had acted in the same fashion in
Wellesley or Milton, not because of this
particular area along Blue Hill Avenue is a
high crime area. I think I've said all that
needs to be said.
Wright renewed his appeal.
II. Discussion
On appeal, Wright again contends that the district court
erred in concluding, based on the totality of the circumstances,
that the officers in this case had reasonable suspicion to stop
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him.
A. The Legal Framework
Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and its progeny,
a police officer may briefly detain an individual for questioning
if the officer has "reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal
activity 'may be afoot.'" United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,
273 (2002) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7
(1989)); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (permitting such a stop
when "a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot"). "While no perfectly precise definition of
reasonable suspicion exists, it is well established that, in terms
of the continuum of knowledge, reasonable suspicion requires more
than a mere hunch but less than probable cause." United States v.
Ruidíaz, 529 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2008).
Reasonable suspicion requires "'a particularized and
objective basis' for suspecting the person stopped of criminal
activity." Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)
(quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)).
"Th[e] particularity requirement means, in effect, that such a
finding must be 'grounded in specific and articulable facts.'"
United States v. Espinoza, 490 F.3d 41, 47 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985)). The
"objective" component requires courts to "focus not on what the
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officer himself believed but, rather, on what a reasonable officer
in his position would have thought." Id.
We review the district court's findings of historical
fact, as well as inferences draw from those facts, for clear error,
which exists when we are left with a "'definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.'" See id. 46 & n.2 (quoting
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). We
review the district court's ultimate reasonable suspicion
determination de novo, Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699, although the
factual component of this "mixed question of law and fact" remains
subject to clear error review. Id. at 696. In reviewing this
determination, we are instructed by the Supreme Court to view the
"totality of the circumstances," and not engage in a "divide-and-
conquer analysis" whereby we determine whether each of the facts
supporting reasonable suspicion are "susceptible to an innocent
explanation." Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274. Thus, "[a] determination
that reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the
possibility of innocent conduct." Id. at 277.
Finally, when a district court has denied a motion to
suppress, "'we will uphold a denial of a motion to suppress if any
reasonable view of the evidence supports it.'" United States v.
Coccia, 446 F.3d 233, 237 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v.
Garner, 338 F.3d 78, 80 (1st Cir. 2003)).
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B. Application of the Framework
1. The Historical Facts
The district court adopted the recitation of the facts
contained in our prior opinion, and thus found the following
sequence of events that resulted in the instant Terry stop,
immediately after the car in which Wright was sitting "had just
pulled over in front of a mini-mart at 1216 Blue Hill Avenue. . . .
partially blocking one of two driveway entrances to the mini-mart
parking lot:"
(a) Wright "lean[ed] forward" from the
backseat of his car and then "exited his
car on the passenger side";
(b) Wright then "began to run southward down
Blue Hill Avenue";
(c) "As he ran, Wright put one hand on the
right side of his sweatshirt grabbing or
holding onto the sweatshirt pocket"; and
(d) "The police ordered Wright to stop running
but he did not obey this directive."
The parties largely do not dispute these facts on appeal.3 As to
the last finding above, Wright does not dispute that the stop did
not occur until Wright was physically restrained after the
3
Wright challenges the district court's finding, after reciting
the statement of facts from the prior opinion, that "Now, going
beyond what I'm reciting from the Appeals Court decision, I do find
that he grabbed toward the front of his sweatshirt in the vicinity
of his waist." (emphasis added). Because the location of the
clutching is not material, we will give Wright the benefit of the
doubt and rely upon the fact recited in our earlier opinion that
Wright clutched the side of his sweatshirt.
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officers' order to stop. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S.
621, 626 (1991) (holding that a directive to stop is not itself a
seizure). Accordingly, we consider Wright's refusal to stop as a
historical fact in determining whether the officers had reasonable
suspicion to stop Wright.
Of significance to this appeal, the district court did
not find that the area where the events took place was a high-crime
area as defined under Wardlow. Although the officers testified at
length that the area was a high-crime area,4 the government does
not press this position on appeal, nor does it claim that the
district court committed clear error with respect to this finding.
On appeal, Wright challenges two inferences made by the
district court based upon these historical facts. First, the
district court inferred that Officer Bordley, who observed Wright
leaning forward, "thought, though he did not expressly so testify,
4
Officer Brown testified that "[t]hat area of Blue Hill Avenue,
as well as that corridor, is a very high crime area consisting of
firearm violence, drug activity, street robberies, breaking and
enterings, all type of street crimes actually." Officer Celester
testified that the area is "a trouble spot. There's been shootings
there, there's been a lot of crime there. It's a high crime area."
Officer Bordley testified that "[t]he level of criminal activity
would be considered high for that area. Numerous arrests for drug
offenses, violent crimes, violent assaults, assaults and batteries,
firearms arrests, things of that nature." To counter this
testimony, Wright offered into evidence incident reports for August
2004 (the most recent prior to the stop) that showed that the area
where the stop occurred was not designated a "hot spot" by the
Boston Police Department. We discussed this testimony and the
incident reports in some detail in our prior opinion. See Wright,
485 F.3d at 49.
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that Mr. Wright had made [i.e., recognized] the unmarked police car
that had parked in front." Second, the district court inferred
that the officers inferred from Wright's clutching of the side of
his sweatshirt that the officers "ascribed some significance" to
that clutching and that "in that split second dr[e]w the inference
that he might well possess a weapon."
Wright argues that the district court's inferences
concerning the officer's subjective inferences are irrelevant.
Specifically, he argues that the proper focus is "not on what the
officer himself believes but, rather, on what a reasonable officer
in his position would have thought." Espinoza, 490 F.3d at 47; cf.
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996) ("[T]he Fourth
Amendment's concern with 'reasonableness' allows certain actions to
be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective
intent.") (emphasis in original).
We agree that the proper focus is an objective one, but
we disagree that the inferences made by police officers are
irrelevant in all instances. The Supreme Court has instructed
courts to afford "due weight" to the inferences made by police
officers based on their "experience and expertise." See Ornelas,
517 U.S. at 699. In Ornelas, for example, an officer testified
that "over the past nine years [he] had searched approximately
2,000 cars for narcotics," and, upon searching the car in that
case, noticed a loose panel that he inferred "might have been
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removed and contraband hidden inside." Id. at 693. The Court
stated:
To a layman the sort of loose panel below the
back seat armrest in the automobile involved
in this case may suggest only wear and tear,
but to [the officer], who had searched roughly
2,000 cars for narcotics, it suggested that
drugs may be secreted inside the panel. An
appeals court should give due weight to a
trial court's finding that the officer was
credible and the inference was reasonable.
Id. at 700.
Here, however, and as the district court admitted, the
officers did not testify to the inferences they purportedly made.
In the district court's words, the officers "did not expressly so
testify" as to their inferences and "the testimony is what it is."
Thus, unlike in Ornelas, the district court did not make
credibility determinations as to the officers' stated inferences.
Nor did the officers testify as to how their "experience and
expertise" provided support for the inferences they made. Instead,
the district court speculated as to what those inferences were,
and, with respect to the second challenged inference, even further
speculated that the inferences were reasonable because the officers
were "competent and experienced police officers in that area of
Boston." We cannot condone such speculation and agree with Wright
that, to the extent that the district court sought to supplement
the historical facts with such inferences, this was improper. Cf.
United States v. Spinney, 65 F.3d 231, 234 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting,
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in the context of a sufficiency of an evidence challenge, that
"[t]he appellate function, properly understood, requires the
reviewing court to take a hard look at the record and to reject
those evidentiary interpretations and illations that are
unreasonable, insupportable, or overly speculative").
However, we agree with the government that the district
court's inferences with respect to the officers' inferences are
better understood as implicit conclusions as to what a "reasonable
officer . . . would have thought." Espinoza, 490 F.3d at 47. The
record strongly suggests that this was the district court's
intention. After recounting its findings concerning the events
leading up the stop, the district court switched gears and stated
"there must be an adequate constitutional basis to chase after
[Wright] and seize him under the Fourth Amendment, and it is to
that issue that the Court now turns." (Emphasis added). Thus, the
district court indicated that it was switching from its factual
findings to its ultimate reasonable suspicion analysis. This is
confirmed by the district court's following statement that "[t]hese
are mixed issues of fact and law," which is not true of the
district court's findings of historical fact, but is true of its
ultimate determination whether reasonable suspicion exists in this
case. See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696 (noting that "[t]he first part
of the analysis involves only a determination of historical facts,
but the second is a mixed question of law and fact").
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Construing the district court's inferences as inferences
that a reasonable officer would have made does not end the matter.
To the extent that the district court's inferences are factual
inferences drawn from the historical facts, they are subject to
clear error review, "mindful throughout that when two or more
legitimate interpretations of the evidence exist, the factfinder's
choice between them cannot be deemed clearly erroneous." Espinoza,
490 F.3d at 46. To the extent that the district court's inferences
are ultimate conclusions as to what a reasonable officer would have
concluded based on the historical facts, and thus conclusions as to
whether reasonable suspicion exists, those conclusions are subject
to our de novo review.
Having reviewed the historical facts, we turn to whether
those facts support reasonable suspicion in this case.
2. The Reasonable Suspicion Analysis
In its analysis, the district court reviewed the
historical facts in sequence, building upon each prior event in
determining whether a reasonable officer would have reasonable
suspicion to stop Wright. For example, the district court noted
that, upon observing Wright leaning forward, that, at that point in
time, the officers "had no right to seize [Wright] under the Fourth
Amendment." Only later, after subsequent events, did the district
court rule that it "was constitutionally appropriate" to stop
Wright.
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We take the same approach. We review the sequence of
events, and any reasonable inferences drawn from those events, to
determine whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop
Wright. After examining this sequence and the totality of the
circumstances, we conclude that they had such reasonable suspicion.
a. Leaning Forward
We begin with the officers' testimony that they observed
Wright "lean forward" from the backseat.5 Although Wright does not
5
On appeal, the government also points out that the recognition
of Omar Edwards by Officer Brown should be considered in
determining reasonable suspicion. The government contends that
Edwards was a recent shooting victim and, thus, contributes to a
reasonable suspicion that Wright was engaged in unlawful activity.
See United States v. Martins, 413 F.3d 139, 150 (1st Cir. 2005)
(upholding inference that "victims in gang-area shootings often
were gang members themselves and tended to congregate with other
gang members"). However, there was no evidence that Wright was
connected to the Edwards shooting to permit an inference that
Wright (and not Edwards) may be involved in similar activity.
Moreover, Officer Brown, the officer who recognized Edwards,
testified that he did not attribute anything unusual to Omar
Edwards' presence, stating "it didn't strike me as odd" that he was
there, as "he lived in the area," "[h]e had a girlfriend or
something that I thought that lived there," and "I know he had
friends that lived in one of those gray houses." Because of the
lack of any connection of Edwards's shooting to Wright and the fact
that there were no other particularized facts suggesting that
Edwards's presence was suspicious, we conclude that a reasonable
officer would not infer from the presence of Edwards that Wright
was acting suspiciously.
This is not to say that Edwards's presence at the scene is
entirely irrelevant. A reasonable officer might not find a
shooting victim's presence unusual, but nevertheless could still
have a heightened interest in the vehicle in part because of the
victim's presence. Although Brown's presence does not by itself
suggest suspicious conduct by Wright, it is part of the melange of
background facts explaining why an officer would reasonably focus
on the activities of the vehicle's occupants.
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dispute that he leaned forward when the lead car passed and parked
in front of the car in which he was sitting, the district court
made a further finding as to what a reasonable officer would have
inferred from that action:
I do think that it is a reasonable inference
from Officer Bordley's testimony that Officer
Bordley thought . . . that Mr. Wright had made
the unmarked police car that had parked in
front.
Again, we note that although the district court attributed this
inference to Officer Bordley, this inference is better understood
as one a reasonable officer would have made.
Implicit in the district court's conclusion is that a
reasonable officer would have inferred from Wright's leaning
forward that Wright attempted to identify the lead car. Officer
Bordley, in fact, expressly testified that Wright leaned forward
"to observe the unmarked motor vehicle that had pulled over."
Since this inference is "plausible . . . based on the raw facts as
supportably found," Espinoza, 490 F.3d at 48, we consider it in our
analysis.
But the district court went even further and concluded
that a reasonable officer would have inferred that Wright "made,"
that is recognized, "the unmarked police car that had parked in
front." We only credit such a factual inference to the extent that
it has some basis in the record or upon the "background facts"
known by the district court. See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699.
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We conclude that the evidence supports a reasonable
inference that Wright "made" the lead car as a police car. In
United States v. Aitoro, for example, we concluded that it was
reasonable for the officers to stop two suspects who, upon seeing
them in plainclothes, exclaimed "Oh, shit" prior to fleeing. 446
F.3d 246, 252-53 (1st Cir. 2006). Granted, Wright did not state
"Oh, shit" or any other exclamation that was indicative that he
recognized the officers. However, Wright was observed leaning
forward in an attempt to identify the unmarked cars, and, shortly
thereafter, quickly exiting from the car. While less colorful than
the expression "Oh, shit," the timing of Wright's conduct in
quickly exiting the car after leaning forward would permit a
reasonable officer to infer that Wright "made" the lead car as a
police car.
On appeal, Wright contends that an inference that Wright
"made" the lead car as a police car is unreasonable because the
police cars in this case were unmarked. We disagree. In Aitoro,
the officers were in plain clothes, and we did not require evidence
of the recognizability of the officers by the suspect to support an
inference that the suspect recognized the officers in fleeing.6 In
6
In Aitoro, we noted in a footnote that the officers "stood out
like a sore thumb in the area" and that "[o]ne wore a BPD baseball
shirt, while the other two were visibly equipped with handcuffs,
flashlights, and police identification." Id. at 249 n.2. We
similarly note here that, although in plain clothes and in unmarked
police cars, the officers' presence was not opaque. Officer
Celester testified that "[s]ometimes we wear shirts that say Boston
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fact, in response to the suspect's argument that it was "dubious"
to conclude that he recognized the officers given that they "were
not in uniform and were standing perhaps 80 feet from the corner
when Aitoro and Williams came around the bend," we stated:
The reasonableness of a [stop] entails an
objective inquiry into the [stop] from the
perspective of the . . . officers, however, so
what is relevant is not whether Aitoro
actually perceived the officers as police
officers, but whether the officers reacted
reasonably on seeing him flee.
Id. at 253 (emphasis added). Thus, like in Aitoro, where the
suspect's exclamation of "Oh, shit" permitted the officers to infer
that they were recognized, here Wright's actions in leaning forward
and shortly thereafter exiting the car are also sufficient to
permit a reasonable officer to "react[] reasonably" and infer that
Wright "made" the unmarked car as a police car.
b. Running Southward
The parties do not dispute that Wright, shortly after
leaning forward, exited the car in which he was sitting and started
running southward, away from the lead car. The district court, in
describing the running, stated that:
Police Youth Violence Strike Force on them," and further testified
that the officers "always have our badges on us displayed like a
chain like I have now. We always have it out." We further note
that Officer Brown recognized Omar Edwards in the car, and it would
have been reasonable for the officers to conclude that Edwards
similarly recognized Officer Brown as a police officer and
communicated that information to the rest of the occupants in the
car, including Wright.
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I infer from the testimony that, though things
happened in split second intervals, Mr. Wright
had started to run, I do not at this point say
flee, he had started to run before the
officers had started to run after him.
On appeal, Wright seizes on the district court's use of the term
"flee," and argues that the district court made an express finding
that Wright's running southward does not constitute "flight." We
disagree, because the district court found all of the factual
components necessary to support a finding of flight. We thus
conclude that the district court's statements cannot be reasonably
read as a finding that Wright's running did not constitute flight.7
Although not strictly defined, the Supreme Court in
Wardlow described "flight" as the "unprovoked" running "upon
noticing the police." 528 U.S. at 124 (noting that "unprovoked
flight upon noticing the police" contributed to the officers'
reasonable suspicion in that case, and that "[h]eadlong flight --
wherever it occurs -- is the consummate act of evasion"). As we
have previously concluded, the district court reasonably inferred
that Wright "made" the lead car. Moreover, and as clumsily noted
by the district court above, Wright "had started to run before the
officers had started to run after him," which is supported by the
officers' testimony. Accordingly, Wright's running was "unprovoked
7
In the alternative, we conclude that, to the extent that the
district court found that there was not flight, such a finding was
clearly erroneous, since we have a "'definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.'" See Espinoza, 490 F.3d at 46
& n.1 (quoting Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 395).
-21-
. . . upon noting the police."
Wright argues on appeal that his running could not be
interpreted as flight because, in exiting the car, he ran in the
direction of the other unmarked police cars, which were behind the
car in which Wright was sitting. While true, this fact does not
defeat a finding of flight. As an initial matter, and as pointed
out by the government, the unmarked police cars were not directly
behind the car in which Wright was sitting. Although the testimony
showed that Wright's car was in the parking lane, the other police
cars were, as testified to by Officer Bordley, "stopped in the flow
of traffic," just to the right of the parking lane. Moreover,
Wright's recognition of the police cars after leaning forward was
only as to the lead car. Thus, in identifying the lead car as a
police car, Wright, like the suspects in Aitoro, "did an abrupt
about-face and sprinted in the reverse direction." 446 F.3d at 249
(internal quotation marks omitted). As events occurred "in split
second intervals," Wright did not have a great deal of time to
identify the unmarked cars that were roughly ahead of him and
change course accordingly.
c. Clutching
The parties do not dispute that, while running, Wright
made a clutching or grabbing motion to his sweater. However, the
district court included a further inference as to what a reasonable
officer would have inferred from that clutching:
-22-
I infer that the officers ascribed some
significance as they are competent and
experienced police officers in that area of
Boston to the fact that Mr. Wright grabbed his
side, clutched at something in his sweatshirt.
The Court infers that the officers did in that
split second draw the inference that he might
well possess a weapon.
As with the district court's earlier inference concerning whether
Wright "made" the car, we construe the Court's "infer[ence]" as one
that a reasonable officer would have made.8
The evidence certainly supports a reasonable inference
that Wright clutched at contraband. Wright made his clutching
motion while in flight, which supports a reasonable inference that,
whatever he was trying to secure, he wanted to keep it from the
officers. In fact, all of the officers testified to the closeness
of the clutching motion to his running away from the lead car.
Officer Bordley testified that Wright "grabbed his sweater, took
off running" and that, shortly thereafter, "[h]e grabbed his
sweater on the right side where the right pocket was." Officer
Celester also testified that, shortly after Wright "jumped out and
ran," he "appeared to pull something out of his waist area" and
that "[h]e was tugging with his right hand" around his "waist
8
In stating that it relies upon the officers' expertise in "that
area of Boston," the district court, at first glance, seems to
factor in the character of the area in support of its inference
that Wright was clutching at a weapon. Any such indication is
negated by the district court's later finding that the area was not
a high-crime area. Moreover, in context, the reference is better
read as an appeal to the expertise of the officers, rather than any
characteristics of the area.
-23-
area." Finally, Officer Brown testified that he observed "the rear
passenger exit the vehicle, stand up, and . . . he immediately
turned to his right and he grabbed onto like his sweatshirt
pocket," and further demonstrated where he grabbed the pocket,
stating to the district court that he "grabbed onto his hood
sweatshirt pocket right around here and began to run up Blue Hill
Avenue."
On appeal, the government "does not believe the inference
that Wright might possess a gun is essential to reasonable
suspicion," but nonetheless argues that the evidence supports such
an inference. We agree that the inference that Wright "might well
possess a gun" is not essential, as the evidence is sufficient to
support an inference that Wright was clutching at contraband, but
disagree that the evidence supports such an inference. The
government first argues that the district court found on remand
that the object in Wright's pocket was "heavy," but the weight of
the contents of Wright's pocket does not support an inference that
the pocket contains a weapon, as opposed to some other object.
Moreover, the government argues that "the court could also have
considered that guns are with some frequency carried in the pockets
or waist area and police know this." See, e.g., Aitoro, 446 F.3d
at 249 (noting that the officer there "saw Aitoro grab at the waist
of his pants, where [the officer] saw a bulge that he thought was
a gun); United States v. Woodrum, 202 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000)
-24-
("When he freed his right hand and exited the taxi, a gun fell out
of his jacket."); United States v. Alston, 112 F.3d 32, 33 (1st
Cir. 1997) ("Realizing that there was a gun in the pocket, the
officer removed it and arrested Alston."). But, again, the fact
that guns are frequently found in pockets (where else would they
be?) does not provide support for an inference that Wright was
carrying a weapon as opposed to something else that is frequently
kept in pockets, such as keys. Finally, the government points to
the presence of Omar Edwards to support an inference that Wright
was armed; however, we have already concluded that his presence
does not support a suspicion that Wright was engaged in similar
criminal activity. Thus, the fact that Wright clutched at his
pocket, even while in flight, cannot support an inference that the
object he clutched was specifically a weapon, and it was clear
error for the district court to so infer. See United States v.
McCoy, 428 F.3d 38, 41 (1st Cir. 2005) ("It is simply not
reasonable to infer that a driver is armed and dangerous because
the officers believe that he appears nervous and reaches toward the
car's console when approached by police, even in a high-crime
neighborhood").
d. Refusal to Stop
Unlike the other facts so far discussed, Wright's refusal
to obey the officers' order to stop, without a doubt, contributes
to a reasonable suspicion. Thus, as we have previously held, the
-25-
failure to heed an officer's order, while not conclusive of
reasonable suspicion itself, is supportive of it. See, e.g.,
United States v. Soares, 521 F.3d 117, 121 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding
that a defendant's refusal to follow police orders to keep still
and keep hands visible contributed to reasonable suspicion that
suspect was armed and dangerous). Other courts have so held. See
United States v. Lenoir, 318 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2003) ("A
suspect's failure to halt upon police command to do so," along with
other factors, "support a finding of reasonable suspicion.");
United States v. Johnson, 212 F.3d 1313, 1316-17 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(fact that suspect did not comply with order to put hands up but
continued to make motions consistent with hiding or retrieving
something contributed to finding of reasonable suspicion); United
States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 358-59 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing
cases finding failure to comply with police orders supported
reasonable suspicion).
e. The Totality of the Circumstances
We have noted that, in conducting a reasonable suspicion
analysis, "a fact that is innocuous in itself may in combination
with other innocuous facts take on added significance." Ruidíaz,
529 F.3d at 30. Accordingly, in our prior decisions we have upheld
Terry stops where the combination of "innocuous" facts culminates
in reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., id. at 30-32 (combination of
reliable tip from a 911 caller plus belligerence of suspect
-26-
resulted in reasonable suspicion); Soares, 521 F.3d at 120-21
(combination of time of night, high-crime area, and unusual
behavior resulted in reasonable suspicion); United States v.
Romain, 393 F.3d 63, 72 (1st Cir. 2004) (combination of 911 call,
suspect's visible agitation, and suspect's belligerence resulted in
reasonable suspicion).
Here, reasonable suspicion arises not just from the
combination of facts, but from their progression. We have
previously held that reasonable suspicion can be based on
"unfolding events," with suspicion accumulating as more innocent
interpretations of the historical facts fall by the wayside.
United States v. Sowers, 136 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1998) ("Based on
unfolding events, the trooper's attention (and, thus, his
reasonable suspicions) shifted away from the equipment violations
that prompted the initial stop toward a belief that the detainees
were engaged in more serious skulduggery. Such a shift in focus is
neither unusual nor impermissible."); see also Soares, 521 F.3d at
120 ("Several additional facts became known as the stop progressed,
which, taken together, created reasonable suspicion that Soares
might be armed and dangerous.").
So it is here. In this case, the lead police car was
first drawn to the car in which Wright was sitting when it parked
and partially blocked an entrance to a mini-mart. In short order,
Wright leaned forward, quickly exited from the car as if
-27-
recognizing the lead car as a police car, ran in the opposite
direction of the lead car, clutched at his side, and, crucially,
refused to stop when ordered to do so. As is clear from the
discussion above, each event recast each previous event in a
different light, such that, by the time that Wright refused to
stop, there was sufficient suspicion to question why he had leaned
forward, exited the car, clutched, and started running.
We conclude by emphasizing that the issue here is not
whether Wright's conduct could lead a reasonable officer to
conclude that it was certain that he was engaged in criminal
activity, or even that it was more probable than not that he was
engaged in such activity. Rather, the Supreme Court has stressed
that a Terry stop is permitted even if "the conduct justifying the
stop was ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation."
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125. In fact, "the very purpose of [Terry]
stops is to clarify ambiguous situations." 2 LaFave et al.,
Criminal Procedure § 3.8(d), at 327 (3d ed. 2007). We conclude,
based upon our review of the record, that Wright's actions were
sufficiently ambiguous as to whether there was criminal activity
afoot to justify the stop in this case.
Accordingly, we conclude that the totality of the
circumstances supports the district court's conclusion that the
officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Wright.
-28-
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the denial of Wright's motion
to suppress is affirmed.
Affirmed.
"Dissenting opinion follows"
-29-
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge, dissenting. The majority concedes
that the district court's most critical factual finding – that the
officers believed Wright might be carrying a gun – lacks record
support. It nevertheless manages to uphold the court's ultimate
finding of reasonable suspicion. It does so by creatively
interpreting or recasting other findings of the court, filling in
the gaps with its own speculation, and avoiding the district
court's explicit reliance on the location of the stop – "that area
of Boston" – in its reasonable suspicion analysis. As I shall
explain, the facts and inferences actually supported by the record
do not provide a sufficient foundation for the finding of
reasonable suspicion. Moreover, the district court's reliance on
the character of the neighborhood after declining to find it was a
"high crime area" is a far-reaching error that should not be
ignored. I therefore respectfully dissent.
I.
The majority reviews the events leading up to Wright's
stop in sequence, addressing Wright's challenges to the inferences
the court drew from the historical facts as part of its scrutiny of
each of Wright's four significant behaviors: (1) leaning forward
from the backseat of the car in which he was a passenger; (2)
quickly exiting the vehicle and running down the street; (3)
tugging at the right side of his sweatshirt; and (4) ignoring the
officers' orders to stop. I take a similar approach, but begin by
-30-
focusing on Wright's challenge to the two specific inferences
challenged by Wright: first, that Officer Bordley believed Wright
had identified the police car and, second, that several officers
who saw Wright running suspected he was carrying a weapon. Once
the landscape of permissible facts and inferences is established,
I explain why the totality of those circumstances fails to
establish a reasonable suspicion that Wright was engaged in
criminal activity.
A. The Court's Inferences about the Officers' Beliefs
1. The Role of Deference
Trial courts unquestionably have the "superior vantage
point" in examining the circumstances alleged to support reasonable
suspicion, United States v. Espinoza, 490 F.3d 41, 46 (1st Cir.
2007), and "a reviewing court should take care both to review
findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due
weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and
law enforcement officers." Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S.
690, 699 (1996). Deference is owed to the trial judge's ability to
"view[] the facts of a particular case in light of the distinctive
features and events of the community," and the police officers'
similar ability to see the facts in light of their "experience and
expertise." Id. The background facts known by the court and
officers "provide a context for the historical facts, and when seen
together yield inferences that deserve deference." Id.
-31-
Notwithstanding a trial judge's general familiarity with
a community, the judge's findings on the facts underlying a
particular seizure must draw support from the evidence in the
record. Such evidence frequently will include the officers' own
stated inferences about what they saw and heard. In Ornelas, for
example, where the Supreme Court examined the applicable standard
of appellate review for trial court rulings on reasonable
suspicion, the seizure at issue occurred after a deputy who was
searching the interior of a car noticed that a door panel felt
loose. Deputy Luedke "suspected that the panel might have been
removed and contraband hidden inside," and he discovered two
kilograms of cocaine when he dismantled the panel. Id. at 693.
Luedke testified that a rusty screw near the loose panel indicated
to him that the screw had been removed at some time. Although the
Supreme Court in Ornelas rejected deferential review for "ultimate
determinations of reasonable suspicion," id. at 697, it emphasized
that reviewing courts must defer to district court findings on
underlying facts and inferences such as those reported by Luedke.
To a layman the sort of loose panel below the
back seat armrest in the automobile involved
in this case may suggest only wear and tear,
but to Officer Luedke, who had searched
roughly 2,000 cars for narcotics, it suggested
that drugs may be secreted inside the panel.
An appeals court should give due weight to a
trial court's finding that the officer was
credible and the inference was reasonable.
Id. at 700.
-32-
2. Deference in this Case
The hierarchy of review described by the Court in Ornelas
– an appellate court giving due weight to the trial judge's finding
that the officer's stated inference was reasonable – cannot be
applied to the inferences that are challenged here. The findings
at issue – Officer Bordley's belief that Wright had "made" the
police car and that the officers believed Wright had a gun in his
pocket – were drawn solely by the court, without any testimony from
the officers, to whom the inferences were attributed. Bordley did
not testify that he believed Wright had identified the police car,
but only that he had seen Wright lean forward to look at the
unmarked cruiser. None of the three officers who testified that
Wright grabbed or tugged at the right side of his sweatshirt as he
ran reported a belief that he was carrying a weapon. Officer Brown
stated that, once Wright got out of the car, "he turned to his
right, grabbed onto his hooded sweatshirt pocket right about here
and began to run up Blue Hill Avenue." Officer Celester testified
that Wright was "tugging" at his clothes with his right hand, in
his "waist area," and that he "appeared to be trying to pull
something out of his waist area." Officer Bordley said that Wright
"stepped out of the motor vehicle, grabbed the right side of his
sweater and took off running up Blue Hill Avenue."
Importantly, although Officer Celester's testimony in
particular supports an inference that the officers believed Wright
-33-
was carrying something in his pocket, nothing in any of the
testimony provided a basis for the court to conclude that the
officers believed the item to be a weapon. They did not say that
he seemed to be carrying something heavy. They did not report
seeing a gun-like bulge in his pocket. This case would be very
different if there had been such testimony. If the officers had
reported some characteristic particularly suggestive of a weapon,
the court could have based its conclusion that they inferred Wright
was carrying a gun on that observation – even without the explicit
statements usually provided by officers as to their belief. See
United States v. Aitoro, 446 F.3d 246, 249 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting
that police officer "saw a bulge that he thought was a gun"); cf.
United States v. Moore, 235 F.3d 700, 702 & n.1 (1st Cir. 2000)
(noting that officer, who reported seeing defendant holding his
hand "clenched at his side as if he was attempting to conceal
something in it," testified that he thought it might be a weapon or
contraband). The district court thus drew an inference on behalf
of the officers that they did not articulate themselves, and the
inference relies on no fact suggesting that Wright had a gun,
rather than some other, lawful item, in his pocket. When someone
runs with something – anything (a cell phone, a wallet, a pack of
cigarettes) – in the front pocket of a sweatshirt, it is natural to
try to secure it.
Given the importance of the officers' "experience and
-34-
expertise" in identifying possible criminal activity, and the
natural inclination of officers to draw upon that experience in
explaining the significance of conduct that they have observed, I
am troubled by the district court's reliance on speculation to
assign the officers a state of mind that they could have – but did
not – disclose through their testimony. I understand that the
reasonable suspicion determination does not turn on "what the
officer himself believed but, rather, on what a reasonable officer
in his position would have thought." Espinoza, 490 F.3d at 47; see
also United States v. Ruidíaz, 529 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2008)
("Reasonableness in this context is a construct that must be judged
according to objective criteria . . . ."). In its effort to
rewrite the district court's decision, the majority concludes that
the court's statements about the officers' beliefs could be
interpreted as an imperfect way of expressing the court's view that
reasonable officers would have concluded that Wright had recognized
the police cruiser and would have believed that he might be
carrying a weapon. Even if that rephrasing accurately reflected
the court's findings, however, my concern would remain.
Where the officers themselves had the opportunity to
attribute a suspicious connotation to conduct they observed, but
did not do so, the court's speculative inferences are seriously
weakened. The officers on the scene are in the best position to
assess the significance of the developing facts, and the officers
-35-
here had every incentive to fully explain why they believed they
were justified in detaining Wright. Their failure to articulate
the beliefs the court attributes to them may indicate that they
lacked such perceptions of Wright's conduct, but whatever the
reason for their silence, the court's inferences about what a
reasonable officer could have believed lacked an important factual
indicator of such reasonableness – the expressed beliefs of the
officers on the scene. Cf., e.g., United States v. Dubose, No. 08-
2382, 2009 WL 2712322, at *3 (Aug. 31, 2009) (reporting officer's
testimony that he became suspicious because of defendant's actions,
including that defendant's "conduct was similar to the conduct
involved in other drug transactions in the area"); (United States
v. Soares, 521 F.3d 117, 118, 120 (1st Cir. 2008) (reporting
officer's testimony that movements in a car in which the defendant
was a passenger "concerned him" and that officers saw "'furtive
movements'" that were "'not ordinary'"); United States v. Taylor,
511 F.3d 87, 89 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing officer's testimony
that his "suspicions [were] aroused by [the defendant's]
uncharacteristically nervous demeanor and furtive movements");
United States v. Baskin, 401 F.3d 788, 792 (7th Cir. 2005)
(describing officer's testimony that her "suspicions were aroused"
by the defendant's driving); United States v. Chhien, 266 F.3d 1,
4 (1st Cir. 2001) (describing officer's increasing suspicions
during questioning of defendant); United States v. Montero-Camargo,
-36-
208 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (describing officer's
testimony about conduct by the defendants that had "aroused [the
officer's] suspicions").
Having stated my more general concern about inferences
founded only on speculation, I turn to closer scrutiny of the two
specific findings at issue.
3. "Making" the Police Car
The district court's first step in drawing the inference
that Bordley believed Wright had identified the unmarked car as a
police cruiser was unremarkable. Bordley testified that he saw
Wright lean forward from the backseat of the car "to observe the
unmarked motor vehicle that had pulled over," and the court
apparently inferred from that testimony that the officer believed
Wright was making an attempt to identify the vehicle or its
occupants. That inference from Bordley's testimony was certainly
reasonable.
In building on that initial inference, however, the court
evidently relied on its own familiarity with Dorchester and the
area's law enforcement practices to conclude that Wright would have
recognized the car as a police cruiser. During the original
evidentiary hearing, the trial judge stated that this inference was
"drawn from both this case and my presiding over time." He
explained:
[M]y natural inference is that though the
police are in those areas in unmarked cars and
-37-
in plain clothes, the cars are readily
identifiable to those people who interest
themselves in what the police are driving.
And that includes people who are absolutely
lawfully about, shopkeepers, people about
their business who once have been the victim
of a crime or the members of their family
[have been] victim[s] of a crime. The police,
because they buy in bulk to save money,
they're driving Crown Victorias.9
The court's own knowledge of the common use of Crown
Victorias as police cars not only led it to infer that Wright must
have recognized the car as a police cruiser, but also led it to
infer that Bordley thought that Wright had recognized it as such.
The court's inference about Bordley's thought process thus depended
on its treatment of public recognition of unmarked police cars as
a matter appropriate for judicial notice – an approach that I
cannot sanction. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) (stating that a
judicially noticed fact must be either "(1) generally known within
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned"). There is no ready
means to evaluate the accuracy of the court's inference, and there
9
In the original hearing, the court had stated that, when Wright
leaned forward, "he saw that it was an unmarked police
officer[sic], he knowledgeably recognized it as such." During the
remand hearing, the court did not explicitly attribute this
knowledge to Wright, instead referring only to the inference drawn
by Bordley. The court also did not repeat the common-knowledge
explanation to support its finding on Bordley's inference. I think
it is a fair assumption that it relied on the same rationale,
however, because the record contained no new evidence.
-38-
is likewise no basis for deeming public recognition of Crown
Victorias to be "generally known" in Boston.
Moreover, allowing the district court to rely on its own
knowledge, rather than evidence in the record, has the undesirable
consequence of preventing the defendant from testing the inference
through the adversary process. Indeed, the court's statement that
"the cars are readily identifiable to those people who interest
themselves in what the police are driving" does not tell us why the
court concluded that Wright in particular – at the time he exited
his vehicle – would have been likely to have such knowledge. Cf.
United States v. Southard, 700 F.2d 1, 26 (1st Cir. 1983) ("It is
one thing to take judicial notice of the driving time between New
Haven and the Rhode Island line. It is quite another to use this
fact as a basis for a finding that the defendant actually knew
it.").
Furthermore, the need for record support for such an
inference is implicit in our decision in United States v. Taylor,
511 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2007), which also involved a motion to
suppress a firearm seized during an investigatory stop. There, we
rejected the defendant's claim that the police had seized him at
the moment an unmarked Crown Victoria parked behind his vehicle
because, among other reasons, there was no evidence that the
defendant knew the Crown Victoria was a police car until he
recognized one of the officers when the officer approached the
-39-
defendant's car. Id. at 92. The District of Columbia Circuit also
has flagged the issue, questioning the propriety of crediting a
police officer's testimony that his unmarked car was "one of those
ones that everybody knows it's a police cruiser" in the absence of
a factual foundation on "public identification of police vehicles."
United States v. Johnson, 212 F.3d 1313, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
District court judges unquestionably have license to make
common-sense judgments about the circumstances surrounding police
stops. Such extra-record fact-finding, however, must be limited to
background matters that cannot reasonably be disputed. Wright's
knowledge of unmarked police cruisers is not such a matter. I
therefore reject as unsupported the court's inference that Bordley
– or any reasonable officer – would have concluded, based on
Wright's leaning forward from the backseat, that Wright had
recognized the unmarked cruiser as a police car.10
10
The majority ignores the lack of factual support for the court's
conclusion that Wright identified the Crown Victoria as a police
cruiser. Instead, it offers its own flawed speculation, concluding
that a reasonable officer could have inferred that Wright "made"
the car based on his quickly exiting the vehicle in which he was
riding. But the critical factual question that makes Wright's
identification of the police car relevant is whether Wright quickly
exited and ran because he saw the police officers – making his
quick exit from the car and his run down the street suspicious.
His running, then, cannot be the basis for the conclusion that he
recognized the car as a police vehicle. Such reasoning is circular
and unsupportable. In addition, I do not understand how the
majority can equate the quick exit from the car – conduct that
itself reflects no state of mind – with the revealing exclamation
"oh shit" in supporting an inference that Wright was running from
the police.
-40-
4. The Belief that Wright was Armed
The omission of testimony from the officers is even more
troubling with respect to the court's finding that the officers
believed that Wright was armed.11 This finding involves conduct
that is not ordinarily lawful (carrying a concealed weapon), and it
goes to the heart of the reasonable suspicion analysis. The
officers' failure to testify to their beliefs about the
significance of the conduct that they observed is not a mere
technical gap in the evidence. As noted above, the adversary
The majority's strained suggestion that Wright could have
recognized the officers because they always wore badges or police
department shirts is also unpersuasive. Wright was sitting in the
back seat of a car that was behind the car he leaned forward to
see. It was 7:45 p.m. in November – undoubtedly after dark. Even
if the officers were wearing badges any inference that Wright saw
them is unsupported and unreasonable on this record.
Finally, the majority creatively speculates not only that the
officers reasonably could have believed that Omar Edwards
recognized Officer Brown as a police officer, but also that he
communicated that information to Wright. Many scenarios are
possible, of course, but there is no factual support for such
speculation. An appeals court cannot simply make up inferences to
fill in the gaps in the record. Moreover, none of these arguments
was made by the government.
11
The district court explained its inference that the officers who
saw Wright run down Blue Hill Avenue believed he might have a gun
as follows:
The Court infers, and again the testimony is what it is,
it's not explicit, I infer that the officers ascribed
some significance as they are competent and experienced
police officers in that area of Boston to the fact that
Mr. Wright grabbed his side, clutched at something in his
sweatshirt. The Court infers that the officers did in
that split second draw the inference that he might well
possess a weapon.
-41-
process depends upon the ability of defense counsel to cross-
examine witnesses about their observations and the inferences that
they drew from them. If, for example, any of the officers here had
testified that he suspected Wright of carrying a weapon, defense
counsel could have asked why he drew that inference. The officer
may have been able to explain why, based on past experience or more
detailed observations, he drew the inference. On the other hand,
the officer's response may have revealed that he had no basis for
believing that Wright might be carrying a weapon. Cf. Espinoza,
490 F.3d at 47 (noting that the district court, after hearing the
arresting officer's testimony, found that his rationale for
following the defendant's van and commencing an investigation "was
bottomed on a pale patina of facts" and that the officer's actions
were "'based on nothing more than a hunch'"). Indeed, the
evidentiary gap may have occurred because Wright's hand motion did
not in fact cause the officers to suspect that Wright might be
carrying a weapon.
Two additional problems also are of critical significance
in my assessment of the weapon inference: (1) the court's reprise
of backwards reasoning, and (2) its reliance on the character of
the location, despite its finding that the events did not occur in
a "high crime area" within the meaning of Illinois v. Wardlow, 528
U.S. 119 (2000).
-42-
a. Backwards Reasoning
In announcing its ruling, the district court acknowledged
that the inferences it drew were based in part on the officers'
reaction to Wright: "I draw inculpatory inferences . . . from what
I infer was the observations of the officers and their response,
their immediate order to Mr. Wright to stop . . . ." The court's
approach was thus doubly flawed with respect to its inference that
the officers believed Wright might possess a weapon. First, the
inference was speculative because it lacked support from any
testimony from the officers or other evidence (such as evidence of
a bulge in Wright's pocket). Second, the court drew the inference,
in part, based on the officers' reaction. Given that the question
in a reasonable suspicion analysis is whether the officers could
lawfully take the action they took, their conduct will always
support a suspicious inference. The question is whether the
defendant's actions or appearance permitted the inference of
suspicious conduct that would justify the officers' conduct –
namely, that Wright might possess a weapon. The court's
inferential process was again impermissibly circular: because the
officers ran after Wright and ordered him to stop, they must have
thought he could be carrying a weapon. But the officers did not
profess such a belief, and neither the officers nor the court cited
facts that would support such an inference, apart from references
to "that area of Boston."
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b. The Character of the Area
The district court's analysis suggests that the
neighborhood where the events occurred heavily influenced the
inference concerning Wright's possession of a gun. The court twice
invoked the location of the arrest in explaining its ruling.
First, in drawing the inference that the officers suspected that
Wright "might well possess a weapon," the court stated:
I infer that the officers ascribed some
significance as they are competent and
experienced police officers in that area of
Boston to the fact that Mr. Wright grabbed at
his side, clutched at something in his
sweatshirt.
Second, in addressing the question of high crime area, the court
stated that it was honoring "what I infer is the police officers'
experience and knowledge of the communities which they patrol." In
the latter context, however, the court went on to say that it would
have reached the same conclusion on reasonable suspicion "if the
officers had acted in the same fashion in Wellesley or Milton" –
locations that the court appeared to contrast with Dorchester
because of lower levels of violent crime.
There are troubling inconsistencies in the court's
remarks.12 The court declined to find that the location was a "high
12
Rather than confronting these inconsistencies and the district
court's clear reliance on the nature of the area – as well as the
government's argument that the court properly did so – the majority
chooses to ignore the problem and read the court's reference to
"that area of Boston" as "an appeal to the expertise of the
officers." In my view, this convenient recasting of the record is
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crime area" within the meaning of Wardlow – a finding that would
have given the character of the area significance in the reasonable
suspicion inquiry. In explaining that conclusion, the court
emphasized that an individual's behavior, and the overall
circumstances surrounding a police stop, must be given the same
particularized scrutiny, no matter where they occur, to ensure
"that the rights of the citizens in the Dorchester area of Boston
[are] identical to the rights of the citizens in Milton and
Wellesley." These remarks reflect the unexceptional principle that
residents of poorer urban neighborhoods, where crime typically is
more prevalent than in nearby suburban communities, cannot be seen
as more likely to be involved in criminal activity simply because
of where they live. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache,
The "High-Crime Area" Question: Requiring Verifiable and
Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion
Analysis, 57 Am. U. L. Rev. 1587, 1589 (2008) [hereinafter The
"High-Crime Area" Question] (noting that the Supreme Court "has
never yet allow[ed] the character of the neighborhood to be the
sole justification for a stop based on reasonable suspicion").
Yet, the court's actual analysis belied this articulation
of the law. Despite rejecting the specific high crime area
finding, the court factored the officers' awareness of criminal
an unsupportable reading of the court's words and a regrettable
avoidance of one of the most troubling aspects of the district
court's decision.
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activity in "that area of Boston" into its assessment of how a
reasonable officer would perceive Wright's "clutching at something
in his sweatshirt." The court apparently concluded that a
reasonable officer, knowing the criminal history of the area, would
be entitled to think that Wright's hand movement indicated that he
might be carrying a weapon in his pocket.
The government endorses this two-tiered approach to the
character of the area, arguing that the prevalence of crime is
properly considered even if the location is not found to be "a
'high crime area' in the Wardlow sense." The government, which
does not argue on appeal that the court's Wardlow determination was
incorrect, stresses that the stop occurred in a location that the
officers on the scene nevertheless associated with assorted crimes.
It contends that their perception – supported by their testimony at
the suppression hearing13 – should be given weight in evaluating
their response to Wright's behavior.
The government's argument has large implications. In our
earlier decision in this case, we observed that the evidence
13
Officer Bordley stated that the neighborhood around the 1200
block of Blue Hill Avenue has a "level of criminal activity [that]
would be considered high for that area," with "[n]umerous arrests
for drug offenses, violent crimes, violent assaults, assaults and
batteries, firearms arrests, things of that nature." Officer
Celester testified that "we were experiencing a lot of crime . . .
during that period, so we were doing a lot of proactive policing"
and said the officers would "aggressively patrol areas, targeting
gangs and things like that." Officer Brown testified that he had
responded to "several shootings [and] drug investigations in that
area."
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relevant to a high crime area finding ordinarily should include
some combination of factors showing a link between the incidence of
specific criminal activity in the area and the police officers'
suspicions about the defendant. After all, the reasonable
suspicion justifying a Terry stop must be more than an "inchoate
and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,'" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 27 (1968), and it must be specifically focused on the individual
under scrutiny. When the officers have specific background
knowledge about that individual, they are able to view his conduct
in light of their prior information. In United States v. Am, for
example, we deemed the location of a Terry stop a permissible
consideration in a firearms case where the officers knew enough
about the history of the defendant to conclude reasonably that he
would be unlikely to walk unaccompanied in that area – known for
gang violence – unless he were armed. See 564 F.3d 25, 28 (1st
Cir. 2009).
Where the officers have no personal knowledge of the
defendant, however, the relevance of any background knowledge –
including the character of the neighborhood – logically depends on
whether it contributes to particularized suspicion concerning the
individual under observation. A high incidence of crime in an area
may provide such a link when the evidence establishes a similarity
between the crimes that most commonly occur there and the crime
suspected in the instant case. See United States v. Wright, 485
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F.3d 45, 54 (1st Cir. 2007) ("Wright I") (requiring a "nexus"
between the crime prevalent in the area and the crime suspected).
The strength of that link will turn, inter alia, on both temporal
proximity – how recently did such prior, similar crimes occur? –
and whether the geographic boundaries of the "area" or
"neighborhood" under scrutiny are limited. Id.
Such factors bring discipline to the high crime area
designation by establishing limiting principles that will assure,
in the district court's words, "scrupulously identical"
constitutional protection for residents of crime-ridden
neighborhoods as for other individuals, guarding against detentions
rooted only in generalized perceptions. The factors link a
neighborhood's experience with crime to the defendant's observed
conduct and thus give substance to the requirement of
particularized suspicion. A police officer who knows that crimes
of a certain type have recently been occurring in a sensibly
circumscribed area could expect more such crimes there, reasonably
increasing the officer's suspicions about conduct suggestive of
such a crime. Without a link to recent similar crimes, however,
there would be less reason to treat equivocal conduct as suspicious
– and more risk of an unjustified stop. See Johnson v. Campbell,
332 F.3d 199, 210 (3d Cir. 2003) ("[W]hen a stop is not based on
specific, objective criteria, 'the risk of arbitrary and abusive
police practices exceeds tolerable limits.'" (quoting Brown v.
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Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979))).
Establishing a link between the defendant's observed
conduct and the high crime area designation is essential in
protecting individual rights because of the decisive impact of that
designation in the reasonable suspicion calculus. When it applies,
every observed act is viewed through a more suspicious lens, and
commentators have observed that "a high-crime area designation
almost always shifts the analytical balance toward a finding of
reasonable suspicion." The "High-Crime Area" Question, 57 Am. U.
L. Rev. at 1590. This weighting is appropriate only if the
designation in fact "makes an officer's 'suspicion' about otherwise
innocent conduct in that area more reasonable." Id. at 1635.
Such a particularized focus in the high crime area
designation was implicit in Wardlow, where the defendant was
arrested for drug activity. The Supreme Court noted that the
officers were "converging on an area known for heavy narcotics
trafficking in order to investigate drug transactions," and they
were traveling in a four-car caravan "because they expected to find
a crowd of people in the area, including lookouts and customers."
528 U.S. at 121. The law enforcement focus was thus directed
toward current and ongoing drug trafficking. Wardlow was observed
standing next to a building holding an opaque bag, and he fled
after looking in the direction of the officers. Id. at 121-22.
The officers suspected Wardlow of narcotics activity – the very
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crime the officers expected to find in the area. See id. at 122
(noting that officer conducted a protective weapons search "because
in his experience it was common for there to be weapons in the near
vicinity of narcotics transactions").
In rejecting the high-crime area characterization for the
area of Blue Hill Avenue where Wright was stopped, the district
court necessarily concluded that the requisite links between the
area's criminal history and Wright's observed conduct were missing.
I discern no clear error in that conclusion. Unlike in Wardlow,
the officers here were not responding to specific reports of recent
crimes. Officer Bordley testified that they were not heading
toward a specific location, but "just happened to be in the
Mattapan area [of Dorchester] at the time." Officer Celester said
he and his colleagues had no special instructions that evening and
were in the area to do "proactive policing" and to "aggressively
patrol areas, targeting gangs and things like that."14
As noted, the officers did testify to their recurring
experiences with crime in the area. Bordley stated that he went to
the vicinity of the 1200 block of Blue Hill Avenue at least once
during each shift he worked and that he had made fifty or sixty
arrests in that area for various crimes, including drug offenses
14
Bordley testified that there was a high volume of drug
trafficking in that area at the time, but he had no memory of
whether he or other officers had made any arrests for such crimes
during October and early November 2004.
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and assault and batteries. He also had encountered "a couple of
shootings" there. He did not say when those arrests and shootings
occurred, however, and he had no specific recollection of the type
of arrests he or any members of his task force had made in October
and early November 2004.15
The empirical evidence in the record also fails to
connect the officers' general perceptions about high levels of
crime in the area to the specific time and location of Wright's
arrest, or show that firearms crimes were of particular concern
during that period. Defense counsel requested incident reports
from the Boston Police Department for all violent crimes involving
a firearm that occurred in October and early November 2004 within
1,000 feet of the location of Wright's arrest. Thirteen incidents
were listed, but the ten available reports showed only two episodes
(on October 12 and October 19) in which armed individuals had
threatened random individuals on the street.16 In addition,
15
The prosecutor asked Bordley if he had made arrests in that area
"before" – presumably meaning "before" Wright's arrest. Bordley
replied that he had made fifty or sixty arrests in the area for a
variety of crimes and had "[b]een in that area where there were a
couple of shootings." Bordley had been with the Boston Police
Department for eleven years by the time of the suppression hearing,
and he had been assigned to the Youth Violence Task Force for
approximately five years. It is a fair inference that he was
summarizing events that occurred throughout his time on the force.
16
Of the ten listed incidents for which reports were available,
the only additional incident clearly involving a firearm stemmed
from a personal dispute among co-workers at a Home Depot store.
Two other reports described firearms incidents outside the 1,000-
foot range, and the remaining reports described incidents in which
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although the Department typically prepared biweekly reports and
maps showing "hot spots" throughout the city,17 no statistics and
maps were generated between August 31 and November 8 – the date of
Wright's arrest – because the format of the Department's data
collection was being revamped during that period. Defense counsel
reported in an affidavit that the two most recent such reports,
from August 2004, showed that the nearest hot spots were 1.5 and
more than 2 miles from the Blue Hill Avenue location of Wright's
arrest.
In its post-remand memorandum to the district court, the
government asserted that the reasonableness of the officers'
perception of the location as a high crime area was "not
significantly undercut" by the crime reports offered by the
defendant as evidence that "the actual incidence of crime in this
area was not particularly high." The government noted that the
officers "relied on their extensive experience and a longer history
of information collected from the area in drawing the conclusion
that the neighborhood had experienced a high incidence of crime."
A generalized notion of the area's criminal history does
the original firearm information was not confirmed when the
officers went to the scene. One of the incidents for which a
report was unavailable was described as an assault with a dangerous
weapon.
17
Bordley explained that "by the map you could tell what crimes
occurred in what area, and you could tell which area had the more
crimes . . . by the number of hits that were happening . . . in
that place."
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not, however, establish any of the factors that we cited as
pertinent in considering whether a neighborhood is a "high crime
area" such that it should be given weight in the reasonable
suspicion calculus. When recent crimes of a particular type have
occurred in a reasonably circumscribed area in proximity to where
an individual is seen exhibiting conduct suggestive of that type of
crime, the location is relevant in interpreting that individual's
conduct. The individual's conduct is reasonably viewed more
suspiciously because it mirrors particular criminal conduct that
the observing police officers have reason to expect will recur in
that specific location.
By contrast, the catalog of crimes reported by the
officers in this case, drawn from their experiences over the years
patrolling in Dorchester, provides no link between any particular
crime the officers had reason to anticipate and Wright's observable
conduct. Many innocent acts can be construed as suggestive of some
kind of crime. If it were enough for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment reasonable suspicion analysis that crimes of various
types had regularly occurred along that stretch of Blue Hill
Avenue, virtually every act by every individual in the neighborhood
would be subject to heightened scrutiny and suspicion – a state of
affairs inconsistent with the principle of particularized
suspicion. See generally The "High-Crime Area" Question, 57 Am. U.
L. Rev. at 1628-31 (observing that, "[t]o alter fundamental Fourth
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Amendment protections, it would seem necessary that the area really
be qualitatively different," and proposing "an objective,
quantifiable approach" that would include "a geographic and
temporal limitation"). On this record, therefore, the district
court supportably concluded that the government's evidence fell
short of showing the links necessary to characterize the location
of Wright's arrest as a high crime area under Wardlow.
If, as the government urges, we were to consider the
general character of an area in the reasonable suspicion inquiry
notwithstanding a failure of proof on the high crime area
designation, we would be allowing anecdotal characterizations of an
area's criminal history to overwhelm the particularized analysis
that provides protection against arbitrary police conduct. If the
government is unable to persuade the district court that a location
warrants the high crime area designation in the relevant sense, the
officers' generalized perceptions of "high crime" cannot supplant
the deficiencies in evidence underlying the rejection of the high
crime area designation – here, the absence of a proven nexus, at
the relevant time, "between the type of crime most prevalent or
common in the area and the type of crime suspected in the instant
case," Wright I, 485 F.3d at 53-54.
I realize that it is tempting, in evaluating the
reasonableness of police officers' actions, to acknowledge and give
weight to their general knowledge that an area is dangerous, even
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without the more formal high crime area finding. Certainly, it is
unrealistic to think that police officers, or any reasonable
person, would be unaffected by the fact that crimes of various
types have regularly occurred in an area where they are walking or
driving. Nonetheless, if "a generic fear of what might happen in
a high-crime area" were enough to trigger the high crime area
factor in a reasonable suspicion inquiry, United States v. Martins,
413 F.3d 139, 150 (1st Cir. 2005), without any specific expectation
of criminal activity to focus law enforcement attention, the
protections afforded by the Constitution would too often be
compromised for the poor and minorities, who historically have
comprised "'almost all of the population in most of the
neighborhoods the police regard as high crime areas.'" Montero-
Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1138 n.31 (quoting David A. Harris, Factors
for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped and
Frisked, 69 Ind. L.J. 659, 677 (1994)); see also United States v.
Caruthers, 458 F.3d 459, 467 (6th Cir. 2006) ("[L]abeling an area
'high-crime' raises special concerns of racial, ethnic, and
socioeconomic profiling.").
The Fourth Amendment thus requires law enforcement
officers to resist the stereotypes associated with bad
neighborhoods and to ground their suspicion in "'specific and
articulable facts.'" Espinoza, 490 F.3d at 47. Indeed, the danger
in giving weight to police officers' general perceptions of an
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area, in the absence of a high crime area finding, is starkly
illustrated by the court's conclusion that the officers here
inferred that Wright might be carrying a gun. The district court
invoked the officers' experience and knowledge "in that area of
Boston" to draw an inference on behalf of the officers that is
otherwise without any factual foundation. But the general
awareness that crimes of various types regularly occur in
Dorchester cannot transform an ordinary movement – securing an item
in one's pocket while running – into a suspicious act. See United
States v. McKoy, 428 F.3d 38, 41 (1st Cir. 2005) ("It is simply not
reasonable to infer that a driver is armed and dangerous because
the officers believe that he appears nervous and reaches toward the
car's console when approached by police, even in a high-crime
neighborhood."). In this case, therefore, the officers' general
knowledge of crime in Dorchester is not an appropriate element of
the reasonable suspicion inquiry.
c. Conclusion on the Belief that Wright was Armed
Excluding the court's improper consideration of the
location, and absent testimony indicating that Wright's conduct or
appearance would suggest to a reasonable officer that he had a gun
in his pocket, the court's finding that the officers inferred that
Wright might be armed is unsupportable. The record tells us only
that the officers saw Wright clutching at his sweatshirt, near his
waist, as he ran. The district court thus lacked a sufficient
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evidentiary basis to infer that a reasonable officer would believe
that Wright might be carrying a weapon.18
B. Summary of Unsupported Facts and Inferences
My examination of the historical facts and inferences
underlying the district court's analysis has thus revealed multiple
flaws: (1) the impermissible reliance on the court's own professed
knowledge that the police drive Crown Victorias to infer that
Officer Bordley thought Wright, upon leaning forward, had
identified the unmarked cruiser as a police car, (2) the lack of
testimonial support for the court's pivotal inference that the
officers believed Wright might be carrying a weapon, (3) reliance
on the officers' general perceptions of "that area of Boston," and
(4) factoring the officers' response to Wright's conduct into the
calculus. These problems do not, however, necessarily prevent a
reviewing court from reaching the same conclusion as the district
court about reasonable suspicion based on an independent review of
the supportable historical facts and inferences. Hence, I now turn
18
The majority agrees that the district court improperly drew the
inference that the officers would have believed that Wright was
carrying a gun. In yet another revision of the district court's
opinion, the majority nonetheless holds that the court could have
reasonably concluded that a reasonable officer would have believed
that Wright was carrying contraband based on the same innocent
motion of clutching at his pocket while running. It relies solely
on its own finding of flight to reach that conclusion. The record,
however, can no more be read to support an inference that Wright
was carrying contraband than that he was carrying a gun, rather
than, in the majority's words, "something else that is frequently
kept in pockets, such as keys."
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to that inquiry.19
II.
This case is so difficult because it is hard to resist
looking at the events through the lens of their eventual outcome,
despite the principle that a seizure cannot be justified by its
results. From our present vantage point, it appears that Wright
almost certainly was fleeing from the police to avoid being found
with a gun that he possessed unlawfully. See McKoy, 402 F. Supp.
19
As I describe, the majority has bolstered its reasonable
suspicion analysis by taking a number of liberties with the record
and the district court's explanation of its decision:
(1) where the district court improperly framed its inferences in
subjective terms, the majority recasts them as imperfectly
expressed objective findings, see supra § 1.A.2;
(2) in addressing the court's finding that Wright recognized the
car in front of him as a police vehicle, the majority ignores the
district judge's reliance on his own background knowledge of Crown
Victorias and instead supplies multiple other rationales not argued
by the government and not supported by the record, see supra n.2;
(3) where the district court specifically said that Wright was not
fleeing when he first exited the vehicle in which he was riding,
the majority concludes that the court either did not mean what it
said or committed clear error, see infra n.14;
(4) the majority entirely ignores the district court's unmistakable
reliance on the nature of the area as support for its conclusion of
reasonable suspicion, see supra n.4;
(5) the majority concludes that the presence of Omar Edwards in the
vehicle with Wright was both irrelevant and relevant, see infra
n.12; and
(6) the majority concludes that the district court clearly erred in
finding that the officers reasonably could have believed Wright was
carrying a gun, but goes on – without any support – to find a basis
for believing that Wright had contraband in his pocket, see supra
n.10.
Given its unusual approach to the record and the district court's
decision, the majority's different outcome is unsurprising.
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2d at 316 ("[I]t is difficult [for courts] to conclude it was
objectively unreasonable for the officers to believe a suspect was
armed when in fact he was.)." That reality expressly crept into
the district court's original ruling on the suppression motion,
causing the court to reason backwards from the discovery of the gun
in assessing the officers' conduct. Indeed, remnants of that
improper reasoning contributed to the court's willingness on remand
to infer that the officers believed Wright had a weapon, even
without testimony from the officers that they possessed such a
belief or any evidence that the item in Wright's pocket was a gun
rather than something else.
In the Fourth Amendment context, however, it is
critically important that we not allow the ends to justify the
means. I have therefore been exacting in my review of the evidence
underlying the district court's ruling to prevent the knowledge of
the weapon he was carrying from influencing my view of the behavior
that preceded its discovery.
I thus turn to the totality of the circumstances
supported by the record to consider de novo whether the officers
had a reasonable suspicion justifying their decision to detain
Wright. Given the gaps in the record and the resulting defects in
the district court's findings, the facts that are properly
considered are limited. Like the majority, I do not treat the
location of the stop as a high crime area for purposes of my
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inquiry. Unlike the majority, I cannot rely on a reasonable
officer's having inferred, at the time Wright exited his vehicle,
that he recognized the police cruiser as such. Nor may I infer
that a reasonable police officer would have suspected, based on
Wright's clutching motion, that he was carrying a gun. The
circumstances that may be considered thus consist of four
historical facts: (1) Wright leaned forward from the backseat of
the car in which he was a passenger to try to identify the
occupants of the vehicle parked in front of him; (2) he then
quickly exited his car and ran down the street; (3) he clutched at
the pocket of his sweatshirt as he ran, and (4) when the officers
shouted at him to stop, identifying themselves as police officers,
he continued on his way up Blue Hill Avenue.20
I therefore proceed to look at each of these acts
chronologically, reviewing Wright's actions in sequence as the
police officers would have encountered them, before considering
their significance in combination.
20
As the majority points out, the government also cites as a
relevant fact Officer Brown's recognition of Omar Edwards, a recent
shooting victim, as the front-seat passenger in the car in which
Wright had been sitting. Like the majority, I fail to see how
Edwards' injury at some unspecified time in the past, with no
connection to Wright, could contribute to a finding of reasonable
suspicion that Wright was involved in unlawful activity on the
night he was seized. The majority goes on to make the cryptic
statement that, despite this irrelevance, Edwards' presence was not
entirely irrelevant. I have no idea what that means, and I see no
way in which the officers' focus on Brown or the vehicle plays a
part in the reasonable suspicion inquiry.
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A. Leaning Forward from the Back Seat
Wright's leaning forward in the car is not suspicious
conduct. Checking out the occupants of a car that has stopped near
one's own is an everyday act that by itself is not suggestive of
criminal conduct.
B. Running Down the Street
The district court explicitly resisted using the word
"flee" to describe Wright's initial running from the car,
accentuating that when Wright started to run, the running was not
yet flight.21 The court thus implicitly found that Wright's
departure lacked any characteristic that would permit a reasonable
officer to conclude that he was running from the officers rather
than to a pre-planned destination. The government has not
challenged this "no flight" finding, and it is a supportable view
of the ambiguous circumstances described by the officers.22
21
The court stated:
I infer from the testimony that, though things happened
in split second intervals, Mr. Wright had started to run,
I do not at this point say flee, he had started to run
before the officers had started to run after him.
22
Despite the government's failure to challenge the finding, the
majority concludes that the district court either did not find "no
flight" or that any such finding was clearly erroneous. The
majority relies, in part, on the unsupported inference that Wright
"made" the lead car in the caravan. The district court, however,
rejected characterizing Wright's running as flight despite its
finding that Wright would have identified the Crown Victoria as a
police vehicle. As I explain, the court reasonably found that the
officers could not at this juncture infer that Wright was fleeing,
and the majority may not reject that finding simply because it
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Wright's car had come to a stop in front of the mini-mart
before the police car pulled over, and Wright emerged from his
vehicle and started to run before the officers made any attempt to
approach him. I have already shown that the record lacks support
for a finding that Wright knew that Boston police officers use
Crown Victorias as unmarked cruisers, and none of the officers
testified to conduct by Wright suggesting that he ran from the car
because he recognized them as police officers. They did not
describe his exit from the vehicle as unusual, unexpected, or
otherwise seemingly designed to elude them.23 Wright then proceeded
straight up the street, and the officers were able to catch up to
him within seconds.
Running away, rather than walking, makes Wright's
departure potentially more suspicious. See Caruthers, 458 F.3d at
466 ("'[T]he speed of the suspect's movements may be relevant in
the totality of the circumstances'" (quoting United States v.
disagrees with it.
23
Officer Brown testified that as soon as Wright exited the
vehicle, he "turned to his right, grabbed onto his hooded
sweatshirt pocket right about here and began to run up Blue Hill
Avenue." He later elaborated: "It was real quick. It was just he
gets out, he looks to his left, grabbed his jacket pocket and he
proceeds to run up Blue Hill Avenue." Officer Celester testified
that, as the first car in the four-car caravan either "stopped or
drove by" Wright's vehicle, "the rear passenger jumped out and
ran." Officer Bordley's testimony was similar: "That occupant that
was in the rear seat ended up getting out of the rear seat, stepped
out of the motor vehicle, grabbed the right side of his sweater and
took off running up Blue Hill Avenue in the direction of Clarkwood
Street."
-62-
Gordon, 231 F.3d 750, 757 (11th Cir. 2000)). Running is reasonably
seen as "flight," however, only when other factors permit the
conclusion that the runner is acting in an unexpected or
unconventional way, or in response to police presence. See
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 ("Flight, by its very nature, is not
'going about one's business'; in fact, it is just the opposite.").
Here, Wright's behavior – exiting a newly parked car and
following a straight path up the main street – was fully consistent
with "'going about [his] business.'" Indeed, Wright points out
that he ran toward the three other unmarked cruisers in the
caravan.24 Moreover, his running was unaccompanied by other
circumstances that have been associated with flight, such as an
abrupt change in behavior, a suspicious utterance, or an odd or
indirect path. Cf. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 122 (describing
defendant's path "through the gangway and an alley"); United States
v. Lawshea, 461 F.3d 857, 859-60 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that
defendant "not only ran away from the officer, but he sprinted
around the same building three times"); Aitoro, 446 F.3d at 249
(recounting that defendant or his companion exclaimed "'Oh shit'"
after recognizing officers and then "'did an abrupt about-face and
sprinted in the reverse direction'"); United States v. Franklin,
323 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that defendant's
24
I agree with the majority that Wright's running toward the other
cars "does not defeat a finding of flight." It diminishes,
however, the significance of his running away from the lead car.
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flight was "particularly suspicious because of its nature and
duration," where defendant "ran away at full speed as soon as he
saw the officers" and "ran behind [a] building, climbed a fence,
sprinted across a parking lot and began to scale a second fence");
United States v. Harris, 218 Fed. Appx. 525, 528 (7th Cir. 2007)
(unpublished) (reporting that, when defendant spotted a marked
police cruiser, he "did an immediate and abrupt about-face and
walked across a muddy yard despite an available and cleaner
alternative route").
I thus accept the district court's implicit finding that
a reasonable officer would not have concluded that Wright was
fleeing from the officers when they saw him run from the car.
C. Clutching at the Sweatshirt
As I have recounted, there is no basis in the record for
inferring that Wright's clutching at his sweatshirt was anything
more than the natural motion of a runner seeking to protect an item
in his pocket from slipping out.
D. Refusing to Stop
Unquestionably, Wright's disregard of the officers' order
to stop is suspicious. Although an individual approached by an
officer who lacks reasonable suspicion of criminal activity may
ignore the police and go about his business, Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 498 (1983), we would ordinarily expect individuals with
nothing to hide to comply with direct police requests to stop, if
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for no other reason than to dispel suspicion. Wright's refusal to
stop makes it virtually inevitable that the pursuing officers would
believe – reasonably – that he had been deliberately running from
them when he exited his car, and was not merely departing quickly
for a previously scheduled rendezvous somewhere on Blue Hill
Avenue.
Nonetheless, I am not prepared to conclude that
reasonable suspicion is automatically established whenever an
individual fails to heed a police officer's command to stop
running. In this instance, only seconds had passed from the time
Wright started running until he was caught.25 If the order to stop
was Wright's first notice that the officers were focused on him –
and the record does not show otherwise – he had almost no time to
process their demand and consider his response before the officers
tackled him. In my view, reasonable suspicion does not arise from
the mere fact that a young man running down the street fails to
come to a sudden halt when police officers unexpectedly order him
to do so.
However, neither Wright's refusal to stop nor his other
behaviors may be considered in isolation. I therefore turn to an
assessment of the circumstances as a whole. See United States
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (noting that the factors must not
25
Officer Bordley testified that Wright ran a total of about fifty
or sixty feet from the car in which he had been riding to where he
was stopped.
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be considered "in isolation from each other"); Ruidíaz, 529 F.3d at
30 (noting that "a fact that is innocuous in itself may in
combination with other innocuous facts take on added
significance").
E. Totality of the Circumstances
My discussion makes it apparent that, up to the point the
officers directly engaged Wright by ordering him to stop, a
reasonable police officer would not have suspected that criminal
activity was afoot. Although the government asserts that Wright's
running and clutching – after he had leaned forward to look at the
Crown Victoria – was enough to justify the stop, those two actions,
on this record, were ordinary for the circumstances. Wright exited
a parked car immediately after looking at the vehicle that pulled
over in front of him and ran up the street, grabbing at his pocket
as would any runner seeking to secure an item as he ran. Even in
combination, these behaviors do not provide a "particularized"
basis for suspecting Wright of criminal activity.
I thus must consider whether Wright's failure to stop in
response to the police order, considered together with his earlier
actions, gave rise to reasonable suspicion. The question is close.
Certainly, the refusal to stop cast Wright's earlier running in a
new light, permitting a reasonable police officer to infer at that
point that Wright had run off initially because he realized the
occupants of the Crown Victoria were law enforcement officers.
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Critically, however, nothing in the record would permit a
reasonable officer, even in retrospect, to conclude that Wright's
otherwise innocent motion in clutching his sweatshirt suggested he
might have a gun or other contraband in his pocket. One can accept
such a conclusion only by giving in to stereotypes and adopting a
sinister explanation for Wright's behavior – i.e., that a twenty-
five-year-old man refusing to stop for the police in "that area" is
likely to be involved in violent conduct or drug activity, leading
to the inference that he might have a gun or narcotics in his
pocket. That logic, for reasons I have explored at length, is
impermissible. The only suggestive behaviors remaining, therefore,
are Wright's initial running and his later refusal to stop.
In these particular circumstances, that is simply not
enough. Wright was in an area where "aggressive patrolling" by the
police was routine; indeed, in its original ruling, the district
court found that the officers intended "to get out of their
cruiser, make inquiry of the Wright vehicle, if not of other
people, lawfully but aggressively to find out where they were going
and what they were doing." In that context, Wright's possible
decision to run off to avoid an encounter with the police tells us
little; innocent individuals would also be highly motivated to
avoid such an intrusion. See generally Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 132
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Among
some citizens, particularly minorities and those residing in high
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crime areas, there is also the possibility that the fleeing person
is entirely innocent, but, with or without justification, believes
that contact with the police can itself be dangerous, apart from
any criminal activity associated with the officer's sudden
presence."); id. at 133 (noting that "these concerns and fears are
known to the police officers themselves, and are validated by law
enforcement investigations into their own practices"); Amy D.
Ronner, Fleeing While Black: The Fourth Amendment Apartheid, 32
Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 383, 396 (2001) ("Because minorities and
residents of high crime areas are popular targets of police abuse,
they are also the ones most prone to run at the mere sight of the
police.").
As I have described, Wright's running throughout the
incident lacked suspicious characteristics – it began at a natural
point for departure, when he exited a vehicle; he ran directly down
a main street, and the officers reported no furtive gestures or
exclamations when he began to run; his continued running in the
face of an order to stop lasted for only moments before he was
apprehended. It is possible, of course, that Wright's behavior
would have become more suspicious if the pursuit had continued,26
26
Although not part of the district court's findings of fact,
Bordley testified that one officer (he thought it was Officer
Foley) had exited his car and "tried to grab" Wright as he passed,
and that "it slowed [Wright] up just enough so I was able to catch
up to him and grab him." This testimony does not tell us whether
Foley's action caused Wright to alter his course or how it "slowed
him up." Given the short span of the entire episode, it appears
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and he had used more evasive tactics to get away from the officers.
But those are not the facts we have here.
I recognize that reasonable suspicion is not defeated by
the possibility that the conduct observed was innocent. See
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125-26. Mere possibility, however, is also
not enough to establish reasonable suspicion. See United States v.
Urrieta, 520 F.3d 569, 578 (6th Cir. 2008) ("The Fourth Amendment
simply does not allow a detention based on an officer's 'gut
feeling' that a suspect is up to no good."). The facts before us
do not depict accumulating circumstances that, in totality, support
a reasonable suspicion that Wright possessed a gun or other
contraband, but show instead a consistent course of conduct that,
even taken as a whole, strengthens only the inference that Wright
did not want to interact with the police. See United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) ("[A]n assessment of the whole
picture must yield a particularized suspicion . . . ."); cf.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 130 n.4 (noting that, in Terry, "reasonable
suspicion was supported by a concatenation of acts, each innocent
when viewed in isolation, that when considered collectively
amounted to extremely suspicious behavior") (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Our reasonable suspicion analysis in Aitoro provides a
that Foley's action may have occurred almost simultaneously with
the stop.
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helpful contrast, showing the deficiencies in the evidence here.
In that case, a number of officers – more than five – had
positioned themselves in an area "'with frequent street-level drug
selling activity.'" 446 F.3d at 249. Defendant Aitoro was
arrested after he and another man abruptly reversed direction and
sprinted off when they saw three police officers get out of their
car. Aitoro sought to distinguish his case from Wardlow by
pointing out that the police in Wardlow "were specifically on the
lookout for drug-purchasing customers and scouts for drug
traffickers looking for approaching police," and that Wardlow was
seen carrying a bag that made him "a particular target for
suspicion. Id. at 253. We concluded, however, that two
significant facts "gave the police at least as much additional
basis for suspicion" that Aitoro was involved in drug trafficking
as the defendant's bag gave to the police in Wardlow: the
exclamation of "Oh shit" by Aitoro and an officer's sighting of a
bulge at Aitoro's waist that he thought was a gun. Id.
Here, we have no facts that are inferentially revealing
of criminal activity – such as the exclamation or the bulge – and
Wright's running is ambiguous in context. The gap between Wright's
refusal to obey the police order to stop and a supportable finding
of reasonable suspicion would perhaps be bridged if the officers
had testified to their rationale, arising from their expertise, for
responding as they did to the behaviors they saw. Little more is
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necessary in this case to cross the threshold from hunch to
reasonable suspicion. As I have noted, the analysis would be
different if the officers had described some characteristic of
Wright's pocket or other evidence that would support the belief of
a reasonable officer that he was carrying a gun or other
contraband. Without such evidence, however, Wright's running failed
to blossom into anything more sinister than an attempt to avoid the
officers – a perfectly lawful and, in context, predictable course
of action.
That so little substantiation might redeem the
government's case does not render the redemption unnecessary or
pointless. If the government is forced to make explicit the basis
for the officers' reactions, including why they might be suspicious
of conduct that otherwise appears innocent, the defense can
challenge that testimony and the truth-seeking purpose of the
adversary process can work. But if the constitutional
determination of reasonable suspicion rests on unsupported
inferences, judicially noticed facts, vague references to
experience or a general pattern of crime in the area, the
constitutional analysis becomes little more than a means of
justifying a search or seizure on the basis of its result.
"[W]e are cognizant of the important role that the police
play in keeping our citizens safe, and we do not lightly second
guess the decisions made by police officers in the field . . . ."
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Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 2003). At the
same time, however, we have an obligation to take seriously the
constitutional principles that protect individuals from unwarranted
law enforcement intervention. The real test of our commitment to
those fundamental principles occurs when we are asked to apply them
in close cases. Here, I are compelled to conclude that the
deficiencies in the district court's finding of reasonable
suspicion are not offset by the totality of the remaining
circumstances. In sum, I cannot identify "'specific and
articulable'" facts and inferences that are sufficiently grounded
in Wright's conduct to anchor a finding of reasonable suspicion.
Accordingly, unlike the majority, I would reverse the district
court's denial of Wright's motion to suppress and remand for entry
of an order granting the motion.
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