UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4096
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ANTONIO CAMERON,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:07-cr-00331-BO-1)
Submitted: December 20, 2010 Decided: February 9, 2011
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Rudolph A. Ashton, III, MCCOTTER, ASHTON & SMITH, P.A., New
Bern, North Carolina, for Appellant. John Stuart Bruce, Acting
United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Jennifer P. May-Parker,
Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Antonio Cameron appeals the eighty-four-month sentence
imposed after we remanded his case for resentencing in
accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006), and United States v.
Carter, 564 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2009). On appeal, Cameron argues
that the sentence imposed on remand was procedurally
unreasonable because the district court did not follow proper
procedure in imposing an upward variant sentence, provide an
individualized assessment based on the § 3553(a) factors and the
facts of the case, or adequately support the upward variance.
Cameron also contends that the district court erred in not
limiting its inquiry to the appropriateness of an upward
departure based on the Government’s motion. Finding no
reversible error, we affirm.
In fashioning a sentence, the district court must
first calculate the proper sentencing range prescribed by the
Guidelines. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). The
court must then consider that range in light of the parties’
arguments regarding the appropriate sentence and the factors set
out in § 3553(a) before imposing its sentence. Id. at 49-50.
If the court determines that a sentence outside the applicable
sentencing range is appropriate, “the court’s stated reasons for
[imposing such a sentence] must be sufficiently compelling to
support the degree of the variance.” United States v. Lewis,
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606 F.3d 193, 201 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “[A] major departure should be supported by a more
significant justification than a minor one.” Gall, 552 U.S. at
50.
Because Cameron properly preserved his claims, we
review for reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard,
reversing unless any sentencing error was harmless. United
States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576, 578 (4th Cir. 2010); see
Gall, 552 U.S. at 46. First, we must ensure that the district
court did not commit any “significant procedural error,” such as
failing to properly calculate the applicable Guidelines range,
failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, or failing to
adequately explain the sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The
district court is not required to “robotically tick through
§ 3553(a)’s every subsection.” United States v. Johnson, 445
F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006). However, “a talismanic
recitation of the § 3553(a) factors without application to the
defendant being sentenced does not demonstrate reasoned
decisionmaking or provide an adequate basis for appellate
review.” Carter, 564 F.3d at 329. Rather, the district court
“must place on the record an ‘individualized assessment’ based
on the particular facts of the case before it. This
individualized assessment need not be elaborate or lengthy, but
it must provide a rationale tailored to the particular case at
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hand and adequate to permit ‘meaningful appellate review.’” Id.
at 330 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50) (internal footnote
omitted). Further, in imposing a variant sentence, the district
court “must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that
the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the
degree of the variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.
Once we have determined there is no procedural error,
we must then consider the substantive reasonableness of the
sentence, taking into account the totality of the circumstances.
Id. at 51. We may not presume an outside-Guidelines sentence is
unreasonable. Id. “[We] may consider the extent of the
deviation, but must give due deference to the district court’s
decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the
extent of the variance.” Id.
Keeping the above standards in mind, we conclude that
the district court did not err in declining to limit its inquiry
to the appropriateness of an upward departure, see United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (stating that the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 “makes the Guidelines effectively
advisory. It requires a sentencing court to consider Guidelines
ranges, but it permits the court to tailor the sentence in light
of other statutory concerns as well.”) (internal citation
omitted), or in deciding to impose an upward variant sentence.
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Additionally, we conclude that the sentence imposed was both
procedurally and substantively reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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