In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 10-2045
C HRISTOPHER T INSLEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
INTEGRITY F INANCIAL P ARTNERS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 09 C 7925—James F. Holderman, Chief Judge.
S UBMITTED O CTOBER 21, 2010—D ECIDED F EBRUARY 11, 2011
Before E ASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and M ANION and
H AMILTON, Circuit Judges.
E ASTERBROOK, Chief Judge. After being dunned for a
debt, Christopher Tinsley retained a lawyer, who sent
the debt collector (Integrity Financial Partners) a letter
stating that Tinsley refuses to pay and lacks assets that
the creditor could seize. The letter concluded: “we
request that you cease all further collection activities
and direct all future communications to our office.” The
2 No. 10-2045
debt collector has refrained from calling or writing to
Tinsley but did call the lawyer with a request for pay-
ment. Tinsley then filed this suit under 15 U.S.C. §1692c(c),
a section of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
that, Tinsley contends, prohibits debt collectors from
contacting a debtor’s legal counsel as well as the
debtor himself, once the debtor refuses to pay.
Here is the text of §1692c(c):
If a consumer notifies a debt collector in writing
that the consumer refuses to pay a debt or that
the consumer wishes the debt collector to cease
further communication with the consumer, the
debt collector shall not communicate further
with the consumer with respect to such debt,
except—
(1) to advise the consumer that the debt col-
lector’s further efforts are being terminated;
(2) to notify the consumer that the debt collec-
tor or creditor may invoke specified remedies
which are ordinarily invoked by such debt
collector or creditor; or
(3) where applicable, to notify the consumer
that the debt collector or creditor intends to
invoke a specified remedy.
If such notice from the consumer is made by
mail, notification shall be complete upon receipt.
The district court concluded that a lawyer is not “the
consumer” and granted summary judgment to the debt
No. 10-2045 3
collector. The court relied on §1692c(d), which defines
the word “consumer” for the purpose of §1692c to
include “consumer’s spouse, parent (if the consumer is
a minor), guardian, executor, or administrator.” This
list excludes lawyers, the court observed.
Tinsley’s principal argument on appeal is that, whether
or not a debtor’s lawyer is “the consumer”, the lawyer
is the debtor’s agent, so notice to the lawyer should be
treated as notice to the debtor. Tinsley observes that
15 U.S.C. §1692a(2) defines “communication” as “the
conveying of information regarding a debt directly or
indirectly to any person through any medium.” Anything
a debt collector says to a debtor’s lawyer is an indirect
communication to the debtor. Our opinion in Evory v.
RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 773 (7th
Cir. 2007), relied on §1692a(2) when holding that docu-
ments sent to a debtor’s lawyer must contain the infor-
mation that is required to be in documents sent directly
to the debtor. Accord, Allen v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 2011
U.S. App. L EXIS 587 at *9 (3d Cir. Jan. 12, 2011). It
follows, Tinsley maintains, that, once a debtor invokes
his rights under §1692c(c), any communication to either
the debtor or his lawyer is forbidden, unless it comes
within one of the subsection’s three provisos. At least
one district judge has accepted this argument, Startare
v. Credit Bureau of North America, LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist.
L EXIS 54830 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2010), though as far as we
can tell no appellate court has done so. (Nor has any
appellate court rejected it; this appears to be the first
time the issue has reached a court of appeals.)
4 No. 10-2045
The language of §1692c(c), read together with §1692a(2)
and the rule that a communication to an agent is
deemed to be a communication to the principal, supports
Tinsley’s argument. But we have yet to consider sub-
sections (a) and (b) of §1692c, which put matters in a
different light. Here is the full text of §1692c:
Communication in connection with debt collec-
tion
(a) Communication with the consumer generally
Without the prior consent of the consumer given
directly to the debt collector or the express permis-
sion of a court of competent jurisdiction, a debt
collector may not communicate with a consumer
in connection with the collection of any debt—
(1) at any unusual time or place or a time
or place known or which should be known to
be inconvenient to the consumer. In the ab-
sence of knowledge of circumstances to the
contrary, a debt collector shall assume that the
convenient time for communicating with a
consumer is after 8 o’clock antemeridian
and before 9 o’clock postmeridian, local time
at the consumer’s location;
(2) if the debt collector knows the consumer is
represented by an attorney with respect to
such debt and has knowledge of, or can
readily ascertain, such attorney’s name and
address, unless the attorney fails to respond
within a reasonable period of time to a com-
No. 10-2045 5
munication from the debt collector or unless
the attorney consents to direct communica-
tion with the consumer; or
(3) at the consumer’s place of employment if
the debt collector knows or has reason to
know that the consumer’s employer prohibits
the consumer from receiving such communi-
cation.
(b) Communication with third parties
Except as provided in section 1692b of this title,
without the prior consent of the consumer given
directly to the debt collector, or the express per-
mission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or as
reasonably necessary to effectuate a postjudgment
judicial remedy, a debt collector may not com-
municate, in connection with the collection of
any debt, with any person other than the con-
sumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency
if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the
attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the
debt collector.
(c) Ceasing communication
If a consumer notifies a debt collector in writing
that the consumer refuses to pay a debt or that
the consumer wishes the debt collector to cease
further communication with the consumer, the
debt collector shall not communicate further with
the consumer with respect to such debt, except—
6 No. 10-2045
(1) to advise the consumer that the debt collec-
tor’s further efforts are being terminated;
(2) to notify the consumer that the debt collec-
tor or creditor may invoke specified remedies
which are ordinarily invoked by such debt
collector or creditor; or
(3) where applicable, to notify the consumer
that the debt collector or creditor intends to
invoke a specified remedy.
If such notice from the consumer is made by
mail, notification shall be complete upon receipt.
(d) “Consumer” defined
For the purpose of this section, the term “con-
sumer” includes the consumer’s spouse, parent
(if the consumer is a minor), guardian, executor, or
administrator.
Subsections (a) and (b) provide valuable context. Tinsley’s
argument makes hash of them, because if the word
“consumer” is replaced by “lawyer” (whether because
a lawyer is a “consumer” or because a communication to
a lawyer is an indirect communication to a consumer)
both subsections become gibberish.
Subsection (a)(2) tells us that a debt collector who
knows that a consumer is represented by an attorney
must communicate only with the lawyer. Replace the
word “attorney” in this subsection with “consumer,” and
it goes haywire. It would then say that, if a debt collector
knows that a consumer is represented by a consumer,
No. 10-2045 7
the debt collector must communicate with the con-
sumer rather than the consumer. The problem is not
simply that the words “consumer” and “attorney” must
mean different things in this subsection (which in con-
nection with §1692c(d) implies that they mean dif-
ferent things throughout §1692c). It is that the point of
subsection (a)(2) is to tell the debt collector that it is OK
to communicate with the debtor’s attorney even when
it is forbidden to communicate with the debtor. On
Tinsley’s understanding of “consumer” and §1692a(2),
by contrast, once a debt collector knows that a debtor
has a lawyer, it becomes illegal to communicate with
either the debtor or the lawyer—because any communi-
cation with the lawyer is an “indirect” communication
with the client, and thus forbidden. That would be an
implausible understanding of §1692c(a)(2). Why would
Congress have provided that hiring a lawyer makes it
impossible for the debtor and debt collector to communi-
cate through counsel?
Suppose that, after a debtor hires a lawyer, the debt
collector approaches counsel with a settlement pro-
posal. You can’t negotiate terms without first demanding
(some) payment. Subsection (c)(2) and (3) permits the
debt collector to inform counsel that a suit is impending.
If that’s permissible, settlement negotiations also should
be possible, so that litigation can be averted. Yet any
settlement proposal made to the lawyer would have to
be discussed with the client, which would amount to
an indirect communication to the consumer. Tinsley’s
understanding of §§ 1692a(2) and 1692c would throw a
monkey wrench into ordinary pre-litigation discussions
between lawyers.
8 No. 10-2045
Now consider subsection (b). This subsection says
that, except with a debtor’s or a court’s permission (or
in connection with post-judgment proceedings), a debt
collector must not communicate with persons “other
than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting
agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the
attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collec-
tor.” Once again this tells us that “consumer” and the
debtor’s “attorney” mean something different. An un-
avoidable implication of subsection (b) is that it is per-
missible to communicate with the consumer’s attorney
whether or not the consumer or a court has approved
in advance. On Tinsley’s reading of “consumer” and
§1692a(2), however, this subsection loses its meaning.
Because Tinsley’s understanding causes serious
problems for the structure and operation of subsections
(a)(2) and (b), and is not supported by subsection
(d)—which, recall, does not include the debtor’s lawyer
in the definition of “consumer”—we conclude that §1692c
as a whole permits debt collectors to communicate
freely with consumers’ lawyers. A debtor who does not
want to be pestered by demands for payment, settle-
ment proposals, and so on, need only tell his lawyer not
to relay them.
This conclusion is consistent with Evory, which did not
concern §1692c. To the contrary, the holding of Evory that
debt collectors must furnish debtors’ lawyers with the
same information that goes in notices sent directly to
debtors supposes that debt collectors are free to contact
debtors’ known lawyers under §1692c(a)(2) and (b),
No. 10-2045 9
something that Tinsley’s interpretation of the statute
would forbid. Integrity Financial Partners did just what
Tinsley’s lawyer requested: it “direct[ed] all further
communications to our office.” Doing this did not
violate the Act.
A FFIRMED
2-11-11