Wheeler v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

STEPHANIE H. WHEELER, 
Petitioner,
v.
NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING AND  No. 10-1164
DRY DOCK COMPANY; DIRECTOR,
OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
PROGRAMS,
Respondents.

On Petition for Review of an Order
of the Benefits Review Board.
(09-0570)
Argued: December 9, 2010

Decided: February 15, 2011
Before AGEE and WYNN, Circuit Judges,
and Patrick Michael DUFFY, Senior United States District
Judge for the District of South Carolina,
sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote the opin-
ion, in which Judge Wynn and Senior Judge Duffy joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Gregory Edward Camden, MONTAGNA,
KLEIN, CAMDEN, LLP, Norfolk, Virginia; Matthew W.
2 WHEELER v. NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING
Boyle, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Jonathan Henry Walker,
MASON, MASON, WALKER & HEDRICK, PC, Newport
News, Virginia, for Respondent. ON BRIEF: M. Patricia
Smith, Solicitor of Labor, Rae Ellen James, Associate Solici-
tor, Mark Reinhalter, Counsel for Longshore, Patricia M.
Nece, Counsel for Appellate Litigation, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington, D.C., for the
Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs.

OPINION

AGEE, Circuit Judge:

I.

Petitioner Stephanie H. Wheeler appeals from a decision of
the Benefits Review Board ("the Board"),1 denying her claim
for benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Com-
pensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 ("LHWCA" or "the
Act"). Respondent Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry
Dock Company ("the Employer") opposes the relief sought by
Wheeler. The Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation
Programs, United States Department of Labor ("the Direc-
tor"), supports Wheeler’s petition in this matter and joins in
her request for reversal of the Board’s decision.
1
The Benefits Review Board, an agency of the Department of Labor, is
the administrative appeals board for decisions of an administrative law
judge ("ALJ") arising under several statutes, including the Act. The Board
has authority to review the decision of an ALJ in order to determine
whether the ALJ’s findings are "supported by substantial evidence in the
record as a whole, are rational, and are in accordance with the law." Gil-
christ v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 135 F.3d 915, 918
(4th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). The Board’s decisions may be appealed
to the U.S. court of appeals in the circuit where the injury arose. 33 U.S.C.
§ 921(c).
 WHEELER v. NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING 3
Because we conclude that the term "compensation" in Sec-
tion 22 of the Act does not include the payment of medical
benefits, we affirm the Board’s decision.

II.

A.

This case requires us to determine the meaning and scope
of the term "compensation," as used in Section 22 of the
LHWCA.2 In particular, we must decide whether "compensa-
tion" under that statute includes voluntary payments by an
employer to a claimant’s medical providers.

The pertinent facts are undisputed. On May 26, 1992,
Wheeler sustained an injury to both knees while working for
the Employer. She sought and was awarded scheduled perma-
nent partial disability compensation, as well as a period of
temporary total disability compensation. Wheeler later sought
continuing permanent total disability compensation, which the
Employer contested. On August 14, 2002, the Administrative
Law Judge ("ALJ") issued an order denying Wheeler’s claim
for permanent total disability compensation. Wheeler
appealed, and the Board affirmed on September 12, 2003. No
further appeal was taken from that order, and by that date, the
Employer had completed its compensation payments for
Wheeler’s scheduled permanent partial disability.3
2
Sections referred to herein are found in 33 U.S.C. with the same sec-
tion numbers as are used in the Act except each is prefixed with a 9, e.g.,
Section 7 refers to 33 U.S.C. § 907.
3
Although Wheeler’s partial disability was determined to be "perma-
nent," it was a scheduled disability under § 902(c)(2). (See J.A. 64.)
Scheduled disability benefits are "payable for a specific duration regard-
less of the actual impact of the disability on the claimant’s prospects of
returning to . . . work." ITO Corp. of Baltimore v. Green, 185 F.3d 239,
242 n.3 (4th Cir. 1999) (describing the "apples-and-oranges" approach of
the statute depending on whether a particular disability is within the
schedule or not).
4 WHEELER v. NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING
Since the 2003 decision, Wheeler continued to seek regular
medical treatment for her knees, which the Employer autho-
rized and paid. This treatment included surgeries in 2006 and
2008 for a right total knee arthroplasty and left knee arthro-
plasty, respectively.

On September 13, 2007, Wheeler submitted a request for
modification of her permanent partial disability award, pursu-
ant to Section 22 of the Act, once again seeking total disabil-
ity benefits as a result of the deteriorating condition of her
knees. Specifically, Wheeler sought temporary total disability
from June 20, 2006 to June 13, 2007, temporary partial dis-
ability from June 14, 2007 to September 5, 2007 and tempo-
rary total disability from September 6, 2007 to the present and
continuing.

Her request for modification was rejected as untimely by an
ALJ Decision and Order because the request was not filed
within one year "after the date of the last payment of compen-
sation" or "after the rejection of a claim," as set forth in Sec-
tion 22. While Wheeler’s request for modification was filed
within one year of when the Employer last paid medical bene-
fits on Wheeler’s behalf, it was filed more than four years
after the Board’s last order in 2003 denying her claim for per-
manent total disability compensation.

In determining Wheeler’s request for modification was
untimely, the ALJ expressly rejected Wheeler’s argument that
the term "compensation" as used in Section 22 of the Act
includes the voluntary payment by an employer of a claim-
ant’s medical expenses. The ALJ concluded that Wheeler
filed her modification request more than one year after the
date on which the Board’s denial of her claim became final
in 2003 and that her current request was therefore time-
barred.

Wheeler appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Board. The
opinion and order of the Board affirmed the ALJ’s denial of
 WHEELER v. NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING 5
Wheeler’s modification request, finding the request was
untimely and thus time-barred.

Wheeler filed a timely petition for review of the Board’s
decision to this Court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 33
U.S.C. § 921.

B.

This Court reviews the Board’s decisions for errors of law
and to ascertain whether the Board adhered to its statutorily-
mandated standard for reviewing the ALJ’s factual findings.
Gilchrist v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 135
F.3d 915, 918 (4th Cir. 1998). As to the Board’s interpretation
of the Act, review is de novo, because the Board is not a
policy-making agency and its statutory interpretation is thus
not entitled to any special deference from the Court of
Appeals. Id. at 918.

C.

In pertinent part, Section 22 of the Act provides as follows:

Upon his own initiative, or upon the application of
any party in interest[,] . . . on the ground of a change
in conditions or because of a mistake in a determina-
tion of fact by the deputy commissioner, the deputy
commissioner may, at any time prior to one year
after the date of the last payment of compensation,
whether or not a compensation order has been
issued, or at any time prior to one year after the
rejection of a claim, review a compensation case . . .
[and] issue a new compensation order which may
terminate, continue, reinstate, increase, or decrease
such compensation, or award compensation.

33 U.S.C. § 922 (emphasis added). At issue here is the mean-
ing of the term "compensation" in the emphasized portion of
6 WHEELER v. NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING
the statute, which effectively sets a statute of limitations for
reopening a compensation order. In particular, for resolution
of the case at bar, if "compensation" includes the payment of
medical benefits, then Wheeler’s claim for modification is
arguably timely;4 if it does not, then her claim for benefits was
properly denied by the Board as time-barred.

The parties have not identified any court decisions directly
addressing whether the term "compensation" within Section
22 of the Act should be interpreted to include "medical pay-
ments." In resolving this issue of first impression, we look ini-
tially to the language of the Act itself:

If it is plain, we apply it according to its terms. To
determine whether the language is plain, we consider
the language itself, the specific context in which that
language is used, and the broader context of the stat-
ute as a whole. If the language is ambiguous, in that
it lends itself to more than one reasonable interpreta-
tion, our obligation is to find that interpretation
4
We say Wheeler’s claim is only arguably timely because the Employer
also argues that even if the term compensation includes "medical bene-
fits," it would only include medical benefits paid directly to the employee
and not benefits paid directly to healthcare providers, such as the monies
paid here. The Employer relies for this argument on the definition of
"compensation" in the Act as "the money allowance payable to an
employee or to his dependents," 33 U.S.C. § 902(12), and on the Fifth Cir-
cuit’s decision in Lazarus v. Chevron USA, Inc., which drew this distinc-
tion under Section 18(a) of the Act. 958 F.2d 1297, 1300-01 (5th Cir.
1992)(payments to an employee to reimburse him for medical costs that
he had incurred were "compensation" but payments to an employee’s
health care provider would not constitute "compensation" under that sec-
tion); see also Marshall v. Pletz, 317 U.S. 383, 391 (1943) (noting that
"[i]n the normal case . . . the insurer defrays the expense of medical care
but does not pay the injured employe[e]" directly and using that as support
for the fact that "compensation" in Section 13(a) did not include the pay-
ment of medical benefits). Because we conclude herein that compensation
in Section 22 does not include payment of medical benefits, we do not
reach this issue.
 WHEELER v. NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING 7
which can most fairly be said to be imbedded in the
statute, in the sense of being most harmonious with
its scheme and the general purposes that Congress
manifested.

Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Brown, 376
F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations and cita-
tions omitted).

The plain language of Section 22, however, does not
clearly indicate that "compensation" either includes or
excludes medical payments. By contrast, other provisions of
the Act, by their text or structure, do clearly reflect that the
payment of medical benefits may, or may not, constitute
"compensation." See, e.g., Md. Shipbuilding & Drydock Co.
v. Jenkins, 594 F.2d 404, 406-07 (4th Cir. 1979)
("compensation" in Section 4(a) includes medical benefits
because the section requires payment of "compensation pay-
able under sections [7, 8 and 9] of [the] Act"; its explicit ref-
erence to Section 7 (which pertains solely to medical services
and supplies) means that "compensation" includes medical
benefits); Lazarus v. Chevron USA, Inc., 958 F.2d 1297, 1303
(5th Cir. 1992) ("compensation" under Section 18(a) includes
medical benefits); Oilfield Safety & Mach. Specialties, Inc. v.
Harman Unlimited, Inc., 625 F.2d 1248, 1257 (5th Cir. 1980)
("compensation" under Section 28(a) includes medical bene-
fits); 33 U.S.C. § 906(a) ("[n]o compensation shall be allowed
for the first three days of the disability, except the benefits
provided for in Section [7] . . .", thereby including medical
benefits in compensation).

Additionally, although the Act includes a definition of
"compensation," that definition does not expressly state
whether the term should be interpreted to include medical
benefits. See 33 U.S.C. § 902(12) ("‘Compensation’ means
the money allowance payable to an employee or to his depen-
dents as provided for in this chapter, and includes funeral ben-
efits provided therein."). Moreover, the Supreme Court and
8 WHEELER v. NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING
this Court have held that the term "compensation" does not
include medical benefits in other places in the Act. See, e.g.,
Marshall v. Pletz, 317 U.S. 383, 390-91 (1943)
("compensation" in Section 13, which requires an employee
to file a claim for "compensation for disability" within one
year after the injury, does not include medical payments);
Brown & Root, Inc. v. Sain, 162 F.3d 813, 818-19 & n.4 (4th
Cir. 1998) ("compensation" in Section 33(g)(1) does not
include medical benefits, in light of fact that Section 33(g)(2)
refers to "compensation and medical benefits"; the inclusion
of "medical benefits" in subsection (2) suggests that its omis-
sion in subsection (1) was intentional).

In short, as noted by the Fifth Circuit, the term compensa-
tion is not utilized as a "term of art" in the Act. See Oilfield
Safety & Mach. Specialties, Inc., 625 F.2d at 1257. Rather, its
meaning varies among the statutes within the Act.

In this case, both the ALJ and the Board relied heavily on
the Supreme Court’s decision in Pletz, 317 U.S. 383. (J.A.
199-202 (ALJ decision); J.A. 209-10 (Board decision).) In
Pletz, the Supreme Court determined that the term "compen-
sation" in Section 13 of the Act did not include "medical aid."
317 U.S. at 390-91. Section 13 requires an employee to file
a claim for "compensation for disability" "within one year
after the injury, . . . except that if payment of compensation
has been made without an award on account of such injury . . .
a claim may be filed within one year after the date of the last
payment. . . ." Id. at 384 n.3 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 913)(ellipses
in original).

Because Pletz addressed a separate statute with different
language, we do not find it controlling. In particular, the pro-
vision at issue in Pletz specifically referred to "the right to
compensation for disability or death." 33 U.S.C. § 913(a).
This was an obvious reference to Sections 8 and 9 of the Act
(titled "Compensation for disability" and "Compensation for
death," respectively). The clear implication of Section 13’s
 WHEELER v. NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING 9
reference to compensation would logically exclude Section 7,
which is the provision governing medical benefits and titled
"Medical services and supplies." Thus, it is easy to see why
the Pletz Court did not read Section 13 to encompass the pay-
ment of medical benefits as compensation. By contrast, Sec-
tion 22 does not make reference to disability or death as does
Section 13. Thus, we find Pletz distinguishable and not con-
trolling precedent. Moreover, as already noted, there are other
provisions in the Act where the term "compensation" clearly
does include medical benefits. See Jenkins, 594 F.2d at 406-
07 ("compensation" in Section 4(a) includes medical bene-
fits).

While we do not find Pletz controlling, it is instructive. One
particular reason that is so is that Section 13 and Section 22
both establish statutes of limitation for filing compensation
claims under the Act and use similar language. Section 13
allows a claim to be "filed within one year after the date of
the last payment" and earlier in the same sentence refers to
"payment of compensation." Similarly, Section 22 allows
modifications and review of an award of compensation "at
any time prior to one year after the date of the last payment
of compensation." Thus, although there are differences, there
are also similarities in the language of the two sections that
counsel careful consideration of the reasoning of Pletz as we
analyze Section 22.

In view of the lack of any controlling precedent and the
lack of the clear inclusion or exclusion of medical benefits as
part of compensation in either the definition of "compensa-
tion" or the text and structure of Section 22, we conclude that
the meaning of "compensation" in Section 22 is ambiguous.
Accordingly, we must find the "interpretation . . . most fairly
. . . imbedded in the statute, in the sense of being most harmo-
nious with its scheme and the general purposes that Congress
manifested." Brown, 376 F.3d at 248 (citations omitted).
10 WHEELER v. NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING
D.

As explained by this Court in Brown,

[t]he LHWCA is a no-fault workers compensation
scheme that provides "employees with the benefit of
a more certain recovery for work-related harms"
while providing "employers with definite and lower
limits on potential liability than would have been
applicable in common-law tort actions for damages.
The LHWCA is thus designed to accommodate "em-
ployees’ interest in receiving a prompt and certain
recovery for their industrial injuries as well as . . .
the employers’ interest in having their contingent lia-
bilities identified as precisely and as early as possi-
ble.

376 F.3d at 249-50 (citations omitted).

The Director and Wheeler describe Section 22 as this Court
did in Betty B Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, by referring to
the modification procedure in Section 22 as "extraordinarily
broad" and "flexible, potent, easily invoked, and intended to
secure ‘justice under the act.’" 194 F.3d 491, 497-98 (4th Cir.
1999); see also O’Keeffe v. Aerojet-General Shipyards, Inc.,
404 U.S. 254, 255-56 (1971) (Section 22 allows modification
of an earlier compensation order "when changed conditions
. . . make[ ] such modification desirable in order to render jus-
tice under the act.").

Wheeler’s focus on the general purpose of Section 22 as a
whole, however, ignores the reality that the provision also
contains a statute of limitations. That is, both the Section 22
time bar and the initial one-year period for filing claims, see
33 U.S.C. § 913, are obviously limitations on the right of a
party to seek redress under the Act, even in cases where there
may be a meritorious claim. Indeed, a statute of limitations,
by its very nature, may result in the denial of otherwise meri-
 WHEELER v. NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING 11
torious claims. Gould v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 905 F.2d 738, 747 (4th Cir. 1990)("statutes of limita-
tions often make it impossible to enforce what were otherwise
perfectly valid claims")(quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444
U.S. 111, 125 (1979)). But statutes of limitations "serve
important, well-established purposes affirmed throughout our
jurisprudence. We are bound to give them effect until such
time as the creator of such provisions, the legislative branch,
exercises its prerogative to amend the statute." Gould, 905
F.2d at 747.

Thus, we must interpret Section 22 in a way so as to main-
tain the provision’s "extraordinarily broad" modification pro-
cedure, Betty B Coal Co., 194 F.3d at 497, while still giving
effect to the one-year limitations period it contains.

Notably, the legislative history of Section 22 reflects Con-
gress’s attempt to strike such a balance, and also supports the
conclusion that "compensation" in Section 22 does not
include payment of medical benefits. As originally enacted,
Section 22 permitted the modification of a prior order of com-
pensation only "during the term of an award." See Intercounty
Constr. Corp. v. Walter, 422 U.S. 1, 8 (1975) (citation omit-
ted). Courts construed this provision to limit the power to
modify a previous order to the "period of payments pursuant
to an award." Id. at 8-9. Because employers often paid bene-
fits voluntarily and completed making payments before a final
compensation order was entered, claimants were frequently
left unable to seek additional compensation because the "term
of the award" had expired with the last payment of compensa-
tion and that occurred long before they received an order. See
Intercounty Constr. Corp. v. Walter, 500 F.2d 815, 818 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), aff’d 422 U.S. 1 (1975).

In an attempt to remedy this situation, the United States
Employees’ Compensation Commission ("USECC"), which
then administered the Act, recommended that Congress
amend Section 22 to permit continuing review and modifica-
12 WHEELER v. NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING
tion of previously entered orders. Walter, 422 U.S. at 9. The
purpose of the USECC recommendation was to "broaden[]
the length of time during which the deputy commissioner
could exercise his power to modify previously entered
orders." Id.

As recounted by the Supreme Court in Walter, Congress
responded in 1934 by amending Section 22 and explained the
change as follows:

[This bill] amends section 22 of the existing act so
as to broaden the grounds on which a deputy com-
missioner can modify an award and also while
strictly limiting the period, extends the time within
which such modification may be made. . . .

The amendment is in line with the recommenda-
tion of the [USECC] except that it limits to 1 year
after the date of the last payment of compensation
the time during which such modification may be
made.

Walter, 422 U.S. at 10 (emphasis added) (alterations in origi-
nal) (quoting S. Rep. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 3-4
(1934); H.R. Rep. No. 1244, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1934)).

Thus, Congress explicitly rejected the recommendation that
modification be permitted with no time limitation, instead
restricting modifications to a one-year time period after cer-
tain events. See id. This legislative history further shows that
Congress’s inclusion of the one-year limitations period was
not accidental, and bolsters the conclusion that the Section 22
limitations period must not be construed in a way that strips
it of much of its force.

The Director argues that the legislative history does not
support a strict construction of any portion of Section 22. He
points to the Supreme Court’s decision in Metropolitan Steve-
 WHEELER v. NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING 13
dore Co. v. Rambo, 515 U.S. 291 (1995) ("Rambo I"), in
which the Supreme Court stated that Congress’s "unwilling-
[ness] to extend the 1-year limitations period in which a party
may seek modification" should not lead courts to

infer that Congress intended a narrow construction
of other parts of § 22, including the circumstances
that would justify reopening an award. We rejected
this very argument in Banks [v. Chicago Grain
Trimmers Ass’n, Inc., 390 U.S. 459, 465 (1968)],
and its logic continues to elude us. Congress’ deci-
sion to maintain a 1-year limitations period has no
apparent relevance to which changed conditions may
justify modifying an award.

515 U.S. at 298-99.

Unlike the Rambo I and Banks courts, however, we are not
tasked with interpreting a different portion of Section 22, but
with interpreting the statute of limitations itself and what
events trigger it. Cf. Rambo I, 515 U.S. at 293 (addressing
which conditions justify modification); Banks, 390 U.S. at
465 (suggesting that the legislative history might be relevant
to "the time period in which review was to be available," but
the history did not address the "grounds for review.").

Moreover, the interpretation urged by Wheeler and the
Director would, for all practical purposes, allow the statute of
limitations to be extended indefinitely, because each time any
medical treatment in some way related to a covered injury
was sought and paid, it would trigger the running of the one-
year period anew.5 For example, a claimant could seek
follow-up medical treatment for an injury at any time, and by
5
As pointed out by the Employer, the Director’s interpretation might
also have the unintended consequence of employers being hesitant to
promptly pay claims for medical expenses, knowing that doing so would
extend for another year any request for modification of compensation.
14 WHEELER v. NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING
doing so, re-open the period for modification of monetary
benefits. Holding as urged by the Director and Wheeler here,
therefore, would effectively create by judicial act the rule
Congress explicitly refused to adopt, that of a very broad —
if not unlimited — time period in which claims for modifica-
tion could be brought.

We also conclude that the purposes of Section 7 of the Act
are best respected by our interpretation of "compensation" as
excluding medical payments. That is, the word "compensa-
tion" appears ten other times in Section 22, in addition to the
phrase "after the date of the last payment of compensation,"
which we interpret here. For example, the Section allows for
review of a "compensation case" and allows modification of
any "compensation order." 33 U.S.C. § 922. Following the
basic canon of statutory construction that a term used more
than once within the same provision should be given an iden-
tical meaning, if possible, see, e.g. Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos
Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 479 (1992) (identical terms within
an Act are presumed to bear the same meaning), we should
give the term "compensation" the same meaning in every
place in Section 22.

If we interpret "compensation" as including medical bene-
fits in every other place the term appears in Section 22, how-
ever, then Section 22 would seem to allow restrictions on
medical benefits that are not envisioned by Section 7. For
example, if medical benefits were part of the term compensa-
tion throughout Section 22, then the provision would allow
the commissioner or deputy commissioner to "review a [med-
ical benefits] case . . . [and] issue a new [medical benefits]
order which may terminate, continue, reinstate, increase, or
decrease such [medical benefits] or award [medical benefits]."
Such a reading appears contrary to Section 7, which requires
an employer to furnish or pay for medical services and sup-
plies "for such period as the nature of the injury or the process
of recovery may require." That is, Section 7 does not contain
any time restrictions on the furnishing of (or payment of)
 WHEELER v. NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING 15
medical services. Interpreting Section 22 as the Director
urges, however, particularly if we were to interpret compensa-
tion consistently throughout that provision, would seem to
place a limitation on the payment of medical benefits in direct
conflict with Section 7.

Such a reading would also conflict with the Supreme
Court’s pronouncement in Pletz, that the time limitations for
bringing an initial claim for compensation do not apply to
claims for medical services. See 317 U.S. at 390-91.

For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that interpret-
ing "payment of compensation" in Section 22 to exclude an
employer’s payment of medical benefits is most harmonious
with the purpose of both the statute’s limitations period and
the Act as a whole.

Wheeler and the Director contend, however, that such a
reading of Section 22, i.e., one that excludes the payment of
medical benefits from compensation, will mean that whenever
a claimant is not receiving a disability award, and then has
previous workplace injuries that worsen to the point of requir-
ing additional medical care, she is not entitled to seek disabil-
ity benefits if it has been more than one year since she last
received disability benefits (or since such benefits were
rejected). However, this Court has enforced the Section 22
limitations period in other cases, even though it resulted in a
decision adverse to a claimant. See, e.g., House v. S. Stevedor-
ing Co., 703 F.2d 87, 89 (4th Cir. 1983) (rejecting claimant’s
suggestion that his request for modification should be deemed
timely filed because it was filed within one year of the time
the last payment of compensation would have been made had
the award been paid out in installments instead of in a lump
sum because Section 22 required that the modification claim
be filed within one year of the last payment, not when it
would have been paid had the payment been structured differ-
ently). Even in Betty B Coal Co., which recognized the broad
and generous scope of the modification remedy, there was no
16 WHEELER v. NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING
suggestion that the one-year limitations period could simply
be ignored. See 194 F.3d at 499 (referring to the earlier deci-
sion of Lisa Lee Mines v. Director, OWCP, 86 F.3d 1358,
1360, 1364 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) wherein this Court rec-
ognized that a claimant who wanted to "be a perpetual litiga-
tor" could simply file repeated requests for "modification" the
day before a year runs from the prior denial).

Moreover, as noted above, it is the nature of limitations
periods to sometimes work seemingly harsh results. Gould,
905 F.2d at 747. As the Supreme Court explained in interpret-
ing the limitations period in Section 13 of the Act,

[w]e are aware that this is a humanitarian act, and
that it should be construed liberally to effectuate its
purposes; but that does not give us the power to
rewrite the statute of limitations at will, and make
what was intended to be a limitation no limitation at
all . . . . While it might be desirable for the statute
to provide as [Wheeler] contend[s], the power to
change the statute is with Congress, not us.

Pillsbury v. United Eng’g Co., 342 U.S. 197, 200 (1952)
(cited in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Par-
ker, 935 F.2d 20, 24 (4th Cir. 1991)).

Applying the same reasoning here, this Court cannot inter-
pret Section 22 solely to ensure "justice under the Act" by
effectively writing the limitations period out of the statute. As
we have discussed above, the reading urged by the Director
would allow avoidance of the statute of limitations in Section
22 merely through the claimant seeking medical treatment,
even years after the injury and years after disability compen-
sation and compensation proceedings had ceased. Such a
reading strips the limitation period of nearly all meaning and
is not consistent with the Congressional intent. See id.6
6
The Director also relies heavily on Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v.
Rambo, 521 U.S. 121 (1997) ("Rambo II"). The Director contends the
 WHEELER v. NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING 17
E.

Because our conclusion is contrary to the interpretation
urged by the Director, we also explain briefly why we do not
defer to the Director proffered view. This Court has previ-
ously held that the Director’s "interpretation of the Act in its
briefs is entitled to some deference." Newport News Ship-
building & Dry Dock Co. v. Riley, 262 F.3d 227, 231 (4th Cir.
2001); see also Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.
v. Director, OWCP, 315 F.3d 286, 294 n.8 (4th Cir. 2002)
(where Director had "consistently maintained" the same posi-
tion since an earlier court decision, the position was not
merely a litigating position and was entitled to deference). But
see Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212-13
(1988) (no deference is due to the Director’s interpretation
where it appears to be merely a litigating position, and is not
based on or supported "by regulations, rulings, or administra-
tive practice").

Skidmore v. Swift & Co. instructs that the level of deference
owed to an agency’s interpretation of an act it is tasked with
administering depends upon "the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control."
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).

Supreme Court’s willingness to allow a "nominal award" procedure in
Rambo II, where the claimant had only a potential disability, means that
the Supreme Court "would give an equally liberal interpretation" to com-
pensation in Section 22 to ensure that Wheeler is not denied compensation
for her actual work-related disability. Conversely, the majority’s holding
in Rambo II requires that something be timely done by the claimant in
order to keep open the possibility of future disability payments in the
event of a worsening medical condition. This would appear to bolster the
Employer’s position here. In any event, because we do not find Rambo II
to significantly aid our decision here, we do not discuss it further.
18 WHEELER v. NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING
The Director candidly admits that he has never before taken
a formal position on the issue before us, but asserts that is
because the issue has never arisen. (Supp. Brief for Fed. Resp.
at 6-7). Nonetheless, the Director argues that his position here
is thorough in its consideration of the issue, employs valid
reasoning, and is consistent with his position on related issues
in previous litigation. Finally, the Director asserts there is
"‘no reason to suspect’ that [his] interpretation of section 22
‘does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment on
the matter in question.’" (Id. (citing Newport News Shipbuild-
ing & Dry Dock Co., 315 F.3d at 294 n.8).)

As to the "consistency" factor, it is difficult to gauge
whether the Director’s position here is consistent, since he
freely admits that he has never taken a position on this precise
issue before. Further, the Director does not point us to any
"regulations, rulings or administrative practice" to support his
viewpoint. It seems just as valid a conclusion that the Direc-
tor’s argument is a new litigating position as he can adduce
no evidence of an agency position despite Section 22’s place
in the Act for decades.

While we do not doubt that the Director has been thorough
in considering the issue, we do not find his reasoning con-
vincing. In particular, as discussed above, we believe that the
Director’s interpretation of Section 22 greatly undermines the
effect of the limitations period in that statute and is inconsis-
tent with the intent of Congress as the legislative history illus-
trates. Additionally, the Director’s reading of "compensation"
to include medical benefits in Section 22 renders that provi-
sion potentially inconsistent with both Section 7 and the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 13 in Pletz. Section
7 makes clear that medical benefits are not subject to any stat-
ute of limitations, but must be paid at any time if related to
the injury. Similarly, Pletz makes clear that claims for medi-
cal benefits are not subject to the limitations period in Section
13 of the Act, which governs the filing of initial claims for
benefits.
 WHEELER v. NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING 19
Because we find the Director’s reasoning flawed, therefore,
and his position unpersuasive, we do not defer to the Direc-
tor’s position. See Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d
360, 365 (4th Cir. 2000) (declining to defer to an agency’s
position taken in a brief where it was not persuasive, because
it is "entitled to respect only to the extent that [it has] the
power to persuade") (citations and internal quotations omit-
ted); Weyher/Livsey Constructors, Inc. v. Prevetire, 27 F.3d
985, 988 (4th Cir. 1994) (declining to defer to the Director’s
interpretation of the LHWCA where it is "both unreasonable
and contrary to Congress’ clear intent, as expressed in the
Act’s text and structure" and noting that the court’s "duty is
to enforce the will of Congress, notwithstanding the Direc-
tor’s interpretation").

III.

For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the term
"compensation" in 33 U.S.C. § 922 does not include voluntary
payments by an employer for medical services provided to an
employee. As such, the payments of such services do not
extend the Section 22 limitations period. Because Wheeler did
not file her request for modification within the one year
period set forth in Section 22, it is time-barred. Accordingly,
we find no error in the decision of the Board. The decision of
the Board is therefore

AFFIRMED.