10-28-ag
Rrapi v. Holder
BIA
Rohan, IJ
A098 404 045
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
New York, on the 24th day of February, two thousand eleven.
PRESENT:
ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
REENA RAGGI,
Circuit Judges.
_______________________________________
JETMIR RRAPI,
Petitioner,
v. 10-28-ag
NAC
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
______________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Andrew P. Johnson, Law Offices of
Andrew P. Johnson, New York, N.Y.
FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney
General; Anthony W. Norwood, Senior
Litigation Counsel; Micheline
Hershey, Attorney, Office of
Immigration Litigation, Civil
Division, U.S. Department of
Justice, Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner, Jetmir Rrapi, a native and citizen of
Albania, seeks review of a December 8, 2009, decision of the
BIA affirming the September 12, 2005, decision of
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Patricia A. Rohan denying his
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Jetmir
Rrapi, No. A098 404 045 (B.I.A. Dec. 8, 2009), aff’g No.
A098 404 045 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y. City Sept. 12, 2005). We
assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
and procedural history of the case.
Where, as here, the BIA affirms the IJ’s credibility
determination and does not reject any of the IJ’s grounds
for decision, we “review both the BIA’s and IJ’s opinions --
or more precisely, we review the IJ’s decision including the
portions not explicitly discussed by the BIA.” Yun-Zui Guan
v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005). The
applicable standards of review are well-established. See,
e.g., Corovic v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2008);
Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir. 2008).
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Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse
credibility determination. Pursuant to the REAL ID Act,
which governs this case, an adverse credibility
determination may be based on an asylum applicant’s
demeanor, the plausibility of his or her account,
inconsistencies in his or her statements, and the
consistency of such statements with other evidence, without
regard to whether they go “to the heart of the applicant’s
claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). The IJ reasonably
found Rrapi not credible because: (1) his testimony was
“vague and lacking in specific credible detail,” J.A. 135;
(2) he testified inconsistently regarding his membership in
the Democratic Party; (3) he testified inconsistently
regarding the dates and number of times he was arrested and
beaten; (3) he testified inconsistently regarding when he
received medical treatment for injuries he allegedly
sustained as a result of a beating due to his membership in
the Democratic Party; and (4) he provided insufficient
corroboration to rehabilitate his otherwise incredible
testimony. See J.A. 131-36; see also Xiu Xia Lin v.
Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 166-67 (2d Cir. 2008). Moreover, no
reasonable factfinder would have been compelled to credit
his explanation that he provided inconsistent testimony
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because he was “confused.” See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d
77, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2005). Although Rrapi asserts that the
inconsistencies relied on by the IJ were too minor to
support an adverse credibility determination, “an IJ may
rely on any inconsistency or omission in making an adverse
credibility determination as long as the ‘totality of the
circumstances’ establishes that any asylum applicant is not
credible.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167(quoting 8 U.S.C. §
1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). To the extent that Rrapi argues that
the IJ erred by relying on his failure to mention two
arrests in his asylum application, we have held that
omissions and inconsistencies are “functionally equivalent”
for purposes of an adverse credibility finding. Id. at 166
n.3.
Because the aforementioned findings provide ample
support for the IJ’s adverse credibility determination, we
need not reach Rrapi’s remaining arguments that he
established past persecution or a well-founded fear of
future persecution. The IJ’s adverse credibility
determination was fatal to his application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and CAT relief. See Paul v.
Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
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For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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