FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KOUICHI TANIGUCHI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 09-15212
v.
KAN PACIFIC SAIPAN, LTD., doing D.C. No.
1:08-cv-00008
business as Marianas Resort and
OPINION
Spa,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of the Northern Mariana Islands
Alex R. Munson, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted
October 14, 2010—Honolulu, Hawaii
Filed March 8, 2011
Before: Michael Daly Hawkins, M. Margaret McKeown and
Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Rawlinson
3261
TANIGUCHI v. KAN PACIFIC SAIPAN 3263
COUNSEL
Douglas F. Cushnie, Saipan, MP, for the plaintiff-appellant.
Richard W. Pierce (argued), Law Office of Richard W.
Pierce, Saipan, MP, and Thomas Lynn Roberts (briefed),
Dooley, Roberts & Fowler, Tamuning, Guam, for the
defendant-appellee.
3264 TANIGUCHI v. KAN PACIFIC SAIPAN
OPINION
RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Kouichi Taniguchi (Taniguchi) instituted this
action against Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd. (Kan Pacific) after he
fell through a deck on Kan Pacific’s premises. Following a
grant of summary judgment in favor of Kan Pacific, the dis-
trict court awarded costs to Kan Pacific for translation ser-
vices incurred in the course of the litigation. Taniguchi
appeals this award of costs.1 We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm the district court’s ruling.
I. BACKGROUND
During a tour of property owned by Kan Pacific,
Taniguchi, a professional baseball player in Japan, fell
through a wooden deck. Immediately after the accident,
Taniguchi stated that he did not need medical attention.
Two weeks after the incident, Taniguchi informed Kan
Pacific that he had sustained various cuts, bruises, and torn
ligaments from the fall. As a result of these injuries,
Taniguchi allegedly incurred various medical, hospital, and
rehabilitative expenses and was compelled to cancel contrac-
tual obligations, resulting in a loss of income.
Taniguchi subsequently filed a negligence action against
Kan Pacific. Following discovery, both parties moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted Kan Pacific’s
motion. The district court also awarded costs to Kan Pacific,
including the costs of translating contracts and other docu-
ments from Japanese to English. Taniguchi filed a timely
notice of appeal.
1
Taniguchi’s challenge to the entry of summary judgment in favor of
Kan Pacific on the merits of the action, and other issues raised by
Taniguchi on appeal are resolved in a separate memorandum disposition
filed contemporaneously with this opinion.
TANIGUCHI v. KAN PACIFIC SAIPAN 3265
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review an award of costs for an abuse of discretion. See
Sea Coast Foods, Inc. v. Lu-Mar Lobster and Shrimp, Inc.,
260 F.3d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended. Whether
the district court has the authority to award costs is a question
of law reviewed de novo. Rouse v. Law Offices of Rory Clark,
603 F.3d 699, 702 (9th Cir. 2010).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Kan Pacific’s Entitlement To Costs
[1] Taniguchi contends that the district court erred by
awarding costs to Kan Pacific, because Kan Pacific’s insur-
ance company assumed responsibility for all costs incurred by
Kan Pacific during the litigation. Taniguchi relies on United
States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366, 380
(1949), for the proposition that the case must be “prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
However, that case is not persuasive because it addressed a
situation where the insurance company satisfied the insured’s
claim and then sued the tortfeasor as the insured’s successor-
in-interest. See id. at 368. A question was raised regarding
whether the insurance company could bring the action in its
own name rather than in the name of the insured. See id. The
United States Supreme Court ruled that an insurer who “has
paid an entire loss suffered by the insured, . . . is the only real
party in interest . . .” Id. at 380-81 (citation omitted). There
is no analogous situation in this case.
[2] Similarly, in Hilbrands v. Far East Trading Company,
Inc., 509 F.2d 1321, 1322-23 (9th Cir. 1975), we held that the
case must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in inter-
est. However, that case also involved a claim paid to the
injured party by the insurance company and a question as to
whether the case could be prosecuted by the insurance com-
pany who paid the benefits. See id. at 1322. The same analysis
3266 TANIGUCHI v. KAN PACIFIC SAIPAN
does not apply to a defendant whose defense costs are paid by
its insurer. Unlike an insured whose claim has been fully sat-
isfied, the defendant who remains liable for any money dam-
ages awarded to the plaintiff is still very much an interested
party. See, e.g., Manor Healthcare Corp. v. Lomelo, 929 F.2d
633, 639-40 (11th Cir. 1991) (permitting the recovery of costs
paid by an insurer). If we were to adopt Taniguchi’s sug-
gested analysis, a plaintiff could file lawsuits against an
insured defendant “without incurring litigation costs after los-
ing on the merits.” Id. at 639. In essence, Taniguchi’s reason-
ing punishes a prevailing party for being insured and violates
the provisions and intent of Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, which directs the award of costs to a pre-
vailing party. Thus, we hold that Kan Pacific was entitled to
seek an award of costs even though the cost of litigation was
paid by its insurer.
B. The Award of Translation Costs
[3] Taniguchi contends that the district court erred in
awarding costs for translation services used by Kan Pacific
during the litigation. Taniguchi cites to 28 U.S.C. §§ 18272
and 18283 to support his argument. However, Taniguchi’s
reliance on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1827 and 1828 is unavailing because
the district court judge awarded costs for translation fees pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6).4 Under § 1920(6), the district
2
28 U.S.C. § 1827(a) provides: The Director of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts shall establish a program to facilitate
the use of certified and otherwise qualified interpreters in judicial proceed-
ings instituted by the United States.
3
28 U.S.C. § 1828(a) provides: The Director of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts shall establish a program for the provi-
sion of special interpretation services in criminal actions and in civil
actions initiated by the United States (including petitions for writs of
habeas corpus initiated in the name of the United States by relators) in a
United States district court. The program shall provide a capacity for
simultaneous interpretation services in multidefendant criminal actions
and multidefendant civil actions.
4
28 U.S.C. § 1920 provides: A judge or clerk of any court of the United
States may tax as costs the following:
TANIGUCHI v. KAN PACIFIC SAIPAN 3267
court has discretion to award fees for the compensation of
interpreters in addition to the costs of “special interpretation
services under section 1828 . . .” Id.
As recognized by the parties, there is a circuit split con-
cerning the statutory interpretation of § 1920(6). The Seventh
Circuit has determined that “interpretation” and “translation”
have distinct meanings and has declined to award costs for
translation services. See Extra Equipamentos E Exportação
Ltda. v. Case Corp., 541 F.3d 719, 727-28 (7th Cir. 2008).
The Seventh Circuit described “[t]he specificity of section
1920(6), and the character of section 1920 as a whole” to
explain its expressed reluctance to include translators of writ-
ten documents within the definition of interpreters. Id. at 727.
The Seventh Circuit relied on what it thought to be the com-
mon understanding of an “interpreter” as one who translates
the spoken word rather than the written word. See id.
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the dictionary defi-
nition of “interpreter” could conceivably encompass “inter-
pretation . . . of a document.” Id. at 728. However, the court
was of the view that including translation of written docu-
ments within the definition would stretch the language of
§ 1920 too far. See id. Having drawn that line, the Seventh
Circuit denied the award of translation fees.
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts neces-
sarily obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of
any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for
use in the case;
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of
interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of spe-
cial interpretation services under section 1828 of this title.
3268 TANIGUCHI v. KAN PACIFIC SAIPAN
[4] In contrast, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that courts have
the authority to “interpret the meaning of items listed in
§ 1920(6),” and thus, awarding costs for translation of docu-
ments necessary for litigation is appropriate. BDT Products,
Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 405 F.3d 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2005).
The Sixth Circuit relied on a dictionary definition of interpret,
which included “to translate into intelligible or familiar lan-
guage.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In
essence, the Sixth Circuit concluded that “translation” ser-
vices and “interpretation” services are interchangeable. See
also Quy v. Air America Inc., 667 F.2d 1059, 1065 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (holding that a cost award for translation of Vietnamese
deposition testimony to English was “explicitly authorized by
28 U.S.C. § 1920(6)”).
[5] We are persuaded by the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning.
District courts are free to interpret the meaning of the cast of
categories listed within § 1920. See Alflex Corp. v. Underwrit-
ers Laboratories, Inc., 914 F.2d 175, 177-78 (9th Cir. 1990).
In § 1920(6), the word “interpreter” can reasonably encom-
pass a “translator,” both according to the dictionary definition
and common usage of these terms, which does not always
draw precise distinctions between foreign language interpreta-
tions involving live speech versus written documents. More
importantly, the Sixth Circuit’s analysis is more compatible
with Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
includes a decided preference for the award of costs to the
prevailing party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) (providing that
absent a federal statute, rule or court order to the contrary,
costs “should be allowed to the prevailing party”); see also
Quy, 667 F.2d at 1065-66 (concluding that translation of
deposition testimony was necessary). We therefore agree with
the Sixth and D.C. Circuits that within the meaning of
§ 1920(6), the prevailing party should be awarded costs for
services required to interpret either live speech or written doc-
uments into a familiar language, so long as interpretation of
the items is necessary to the litigation.
TANIGUCHI v. KAN PACIFIC SAIPAN 3269
[6] As Taniguchi alleged that his injuries caused him to
lose compensation from his negotiated contract deals, it was
necessary for Kan Pacific to have Taniguchi’s documents and
medical records translated to adequately prepare its defense.
Because we conclude that § 1920(6) contemplates the award
of costs for translation services, we hold that the district court
acted within its discretion when it determined that translation
services were necessary to render pertinent documents intelli-
gible to the litigants. See Haagen-Dazs Co., Inc. v. Double
Rainbow Gourmet Ice Creams, Inc., 920 F.2d 587, 588 (9th
Cir. 1990) (stating that district courts have discretion to deter-
mine what costs should be awarded).
IV. CONCLUSION
The district court acted within its discretion when it
awarded costs to Kan Pacific for expenses incurred to trans-
late relevant documents.
AFFIRMED.