UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4269
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ERNESTO GONZALEZ-TORRES,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior
District Judge. (2:09-cr-00678-PMD-1)
Submitted: February 3, 2011 Decided: March 10, 2011
Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Robert Haley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Michael Rhett DeHart, Assistant
United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ernesto Gonzalez-Torres appeals the twelve-month
sentence imposed following his guilty plea, pursuant to a
written plea agreement, to possession of counterfeit credit
cards, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2), (a)(3) (2006).
Counsel for Gonzalez-Torres filed a brief in this court in
accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
certifying that there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal,
but questioning whether (1) the district court erred in
accepting Gonzalez-Torres’s guilty plea; and (2) the court
imposed an unreasonable sentence. Gonzalez-Torres was informed
of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief but has not
done so. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Because Gonzalez-Torres did not move to withdraw his
guilty plea in the district court or raise any objections to the
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 colloquy, the colloquy is
reviewed for plain error. United States v. General, 278 F.3d
389, 393 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d
517, 524-27 (4th Cir. 2002). To demonstrate plain error, a
defendant must show that: (1) there was an error; (2) the error
was plain; and (3) the error affected his “substantial rights.”
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). A defendant’s
substantial rights are affected if the error “influenced the
defendant’s decision to plead guilty and impaired his ability to
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evaluate with eyes open the direct attendant risks of accepting
criminal responsibility.” United States v. Goins, 51 F.3d 400,
402-03 (4th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Martinez, 277 F.3d at 532 (holding that a defendant must
demonstrate that he would not have pled guilty but for the
error).
A review of the record reveals that the district court
fully complied with the requirements of Rule 11. The court
provided Gonzalez-Torres, a non-native English speaker, with an
interpreter, and his answers reflect a thorough understanding of
the proceeding. The court ensured that Gonzalez-Torres’s plea
was knowing and voluntary, that he understood the rights he was
giving up by pleading guilty and the sentence he faced, and that
he committed the offense to which he pled guilty. Accordingly,
we hold that the district court did not err in conducting the
plea colloquy.
Because Gonzalez-Torres did not request a different
sentence than the one ultimately imposed, we review his sentence
for plain error. See United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 578-
79 (4th Cir. 2010). We must begin by reviewing the sentence for
significant procedural error, including such errors as “failing
to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range,
treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the
[18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [2006] factors, selecting a sentence based
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on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the
chosen sentence including an explanation for any deviation from
the Guidelines.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
If there are no procedural errors, we then consider the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence, taking into account
the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Pauley, 511
F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007).
“When rendering a sentence, the district court ‘must
make an individualized assessment based on the facts
presented.’” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th
Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50). Accordingly, a
sentencing court must apply the relevant § 3553(a) factors to
the particular facts presented and must “state in open court”
the particular reasons that support its chosen sentence. Id.
The court’s explanation need not be exhaustive; it must be
“sufficient ‘to satisfy the appellate court that [the district
court] has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned
basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.’”
United States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 837 (4th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)).
When, as here, the district court imposes a within-
Guidelines sentence, the district court may “provide a less
extensive, while still individualized, explanation.” United
States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 639 (4th Cir. 2009), cert.
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denied, 130 S. Ct. 2128 (2010). That explanation must be
sufficient to allow for “meaningful appellate review” such that
we need “not guess at the district court’s rationale.” Carter,
564 F.3d at 329-30 (internal quotation marks omitted). However,
where a matter is conceptually simple “and the record makes
clear that the sentencing judge considered the evidence and
arguments,” we do not require an extensive explanation. Rita,
551 U.S. at 359.
We conclude that the district court’s sentence was
both procedurally and substantively reasonable. Gonzalez-
Torres’s sentence is within the applicable Guidelines range.
See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing
table). The district court used the correct Guidelines range
and understood that it was advisory. Furthermore, it is
apparent from the court’s discussion with counsel and Gonzalez-
Torres that it considered both parties’ arguments and had a
reasoned basis for its decision. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 359.
In accordance with Anders, we have examined the entire
record and find no other meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Gonzalez-Torres, in writing, of the
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Gonzalez-Torres requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
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frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on Gonzalez-Torres.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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