FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 10 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WILLIAM LIGHTNER, No. 09-35905
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:08-cv-00259-BLW-
REB
v.
PAMELA HUNTSMAN; et al., MEMORANDUM *
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
B. Lynn Winmill, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 15, 2011 **
Before: CANBY, FERNANDEZ, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
William Lightner, an Idaho state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that defendants
violated his constitutional rights in connection with his designation as a Violent
Sexual Predator. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
novo. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003) (Rooker-Feldman);
Crooks v. Maynard, 913 F.2d 699, 700 (9th Cir. 1990) (judicial immunity);
Lukovsky v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008)
(statute of limitations).
To the extent that Lightner’s claims are based on the premise that the state
court decision affirming his designation as a Violent Sexual Predator was
erroneous, the district court properly dismissed the claims as barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.
280, 284 (2005) (the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars “cases brought by state-court
losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgments”).
The district court properly dismissed the claims against Judge Judd, Judge
Schroeder, and the State of Idaho, because these defendants are immune from
liability. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (barring injunctive relief against a judicial officer
“unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable”);
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, 302 F.3d 928, 957 n.28 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“‘The Eleventh Amendment bars suits which seek either damages or injunctive
relief against a state . . . .’” (citation omitted)).
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The district court properly dismissed Lightner’s remaining claims as time-
barred. See Idaho Code Ann. § 5-219(4) (two-year statute of limitations for
personal injury actions); Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009)
(§ 1983 actions are governed by the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal
injury actions, and a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the
injury which is the basis of the action).
Lightner’s contentions concerning accrual are unpersuasive. See Knox v.
Davis, 260 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001) (a mere continuing impact from past
violations does not give rise to a new cause of action); McConnell v. Critchlow,
661 F.2d 116, 118 (9th Cir. 1981) (a subsequent decision recognizing a cause of
action does not delay accrual of the limitations period). We are also not persuaded
by Lightner’s contention that the statute of limitations was tolled, including while
his state lawsuit was pending. See Young v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 874, 875 (9th Cir.
1990) (plaintiffs in § 1983 suits do not need to exhaust state judicial remedies).
Lightner’s remaining contentions, including those about the merits of his
claims, are unavailing.
AFFIRMED.
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