United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2008-5105
PATRICIA R. SHARP, MARGARET M. HAVERKAMP,
and IVA DEAN ROGERS,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Edward R. Reines, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, of Redwood Shores, California,
argued for plaintiffs-appellees. With him on the brief were Michael R. Franzinger and
Azra M. Hadzimehmedovic, of Washington, DC.
Douglas K. Mickle, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division,
United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for defendant-
appellant. With him on the brief were Michael F. Hertz, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, and Bryant G. Snee, Assistant Director. Of
counsel on the brief were Kelly L. McGovern, Personnel Branch, Army Litigation
Division, United States Army, of Arlington, Virginia, and Scott Lafferty, Senior Associate
Counsel, Office of the General Counsel, Military and Civilian Pay Law Directorate,
Defense Finance and Accounting Service, of Cleveland, Ohio.
Appealed from: United States Court of Federal Claims
Judge George W. Miller
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
2008-5105
PATRICIA R. SHARP, MARGARET M. HAVERKAMP,
and IVA DEAN ROGERS,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims in 07-CV-547,
Judge George W. Miller.
______________________
DECIDED: August 26, 2009
_______________________
Before MAYER, CLEVENGER, and SCHALL, Circuit Judges.
MAYER, Circuit Judge.
The United States appeals the judgment of the United States Court of Federal
Claims, which denied its motion to dismiss, and granted the motion for summary
judgment of Patricia Sharp, Margaret Haverkamp, and Iva Rogers, permitting them to
receive Survivor Benefit Plan (“SBP”) payments unreduced by the amount of their
reinstated Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (“DIC”) payments. Sharp v.
United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 222 (2008). Because the Court of Federal Claims correctly
determined that 38 U.S.C. § 1311(e) partially repealed 10 U.S.C. § 1450(c)(1), we
affirm.
BACKGROUND
The appellees (collectively referred to in the singular as “Sharp”) are surviving
spouses of deceased veterans and military retirees of the United States Armed Forces,
each of whom remarried after age 57. This case centers on statutory interpretation and
involves two benefit programs: SBP, which is administered by the Department of
Defense, and DIC, which is administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs. SBP is
an insurance-style program allowing eligible servicemembers and military retirees to
elect to have premiums deducted from their pay in order to provide their spouses with
additional benefits after their deaths. 10 U.S.C. § 1448 (2006). As the surviving spouse
of a deceased military servicemember who chose to participate in SBP, Sharp is the
primary beneficiary of annuity payments that became effective the first day after her
spouse’s death. Id. § 1450(a). DIC is a separate benefit, which is automatically paid to
surviving spouses of veterans who died while on active duty or while suffering from a
service-connected disability. 38 U.S.C. § 1310(a) (2006) (“When any veteran dies . . .
from a service-connected or compensable disability, the Secretary shall pay [DIC] to
such veteran’s surviving spouse . . . .”). Sharp’s spouse died while on active duty or
while suffering from a service-connected disability. Thus, she is eligible to receive both
SBP and DIC benefits.
Prior to 2003, surviving spouses receiving DIC payments became ineligible to
continue receiving the benefit when they remarried. Congress responded by passing
the Veterans Benefits Act of 2003 (“the Veterans Benefits Act”), which restored DIC
benefits to surviving spouses who chose to remarry after age 57. Id. § 103(d)(2)(B)
(“The remarriage after age 57 of the surviving spouse of a veteran shall not bar the
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furnishing of benefits [relating to DIC] to such person as the surviving spouse of the
veteran.”). The Veterans Benefits Act also provided that, “notwithstanding any other
provision of law,” those remarried spouses who are simultaneously eligible for other
benefits inuring to surviving spouses of veterans do not suffer a reduction in their
benefits due to the DIC payments. Id. § 1311(e). 1
The SBP and DIC benefit schemes, however, have contradicting provisions
regulating offsets for those who receive both benefits. The SBP offset provision, which
went into effect September 21, 1972, calls for reducing SBP payments by the amount
the recipient receives in DIC benefits. 10 U.S.C. § 1450(c)(1) (2006) (“If . . . the
surviving spouse . . . is also entitled to [DIC] under section 1311(a) of title 38, the
surviving spouse . . . may be paid an annuity under this section, but only in the amount
that the annuity otherwise payable under this section would exceed that
compensation.”). As stated above, however, the DIC scheme appears to prohibit a
reduction in benefits, such as SBP payments, for widows like Sharp, notwithstanding
provisions of law like the offset language in the SBP statute. See 38 U.S.C. § 1311(e)
(2006). Nevertheless, the Department of Defense continued to enforce the SBP offset
1
The Veterans Benefits Act of 2003 provides in pertinent part:
In the case of an individual who is eligible for dependency and indemnity
compensation under this section by reason of section 103(d)(2)(B) of this
title who is also eligible for benefits under another provision of law by
reason of such individual’s status as the surviving spouse of a veteran,
then, notwithstanding any other provision of law (other than section
5304(b)(3) of this title), no reduction in benefits under such other provision
of law shall be made by reason of such individual’s eligibility for benefits
under this section.
38 U.S.C. § 1311(e) (2006) (effective Jan. 1, 2004).
2008-5105 3
provision, and reduced Sharp’s SBP payments by the amount she received in DIC
benefits.
On July 19, 2007, Sharp filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, asserting that
the government improperly reduced her SBP payments by the amount of her DIC
payments. The court granted summary judgment in her favor, holding that “section
1311(e) modifies or partially repeals 10 U.S.C. § 1450(c)(1) to the extent that SBP
payments are not to be reduced by the amount of DIC payments to those surviving
spouses who receive DIC by virtue of their having remarried after the age of 57.”
Sharp, 82 Fed. Cl. at 229. The government appeals, and we have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
DISCUSSION
We review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, reapplying the
same standard as the trial court. Palahnuk v. United States, 475 F.3d 1380, 1382 (Fed.
Cir. 2007). Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule
56(c) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims; see also Palahnuk, 475
F.3d at 1382.
I.
The statutory provisions at issue, 10 U.S.C. § 1450(c)(1) and 38 U.S.C.
§ 1311(e), are at odds: the SBP scheme calls for reducing SBP payments by the
amount the recipient receives in DIC benefits, whereas the post-2003 DIC scheme
prohibits such reductions for surviving spouses who remarry after age 57. Sharp urges,
2008-5105 4
and the trial court held, that by its plain language section 1311(e) modifies or partially
repeals section 1450(c)(1), so that surviving spouses who receive reinstated DIC by
virtue of remarrying after age 57 receive their SBP payments unreduced by the amount
of their DIC payments.
The government more restrictively reads the language of section 1311(e) as
precluding the reduction of benefits by DIC payments only for those benefits that are
paid to surviving spouses of veterans solely due to their status as surviving spouses.
In order for a surviving spouse of a veteran to receive SBP, the veteran must have been
eligible for retirement, 10 U.S.C. § 1448(a)(1), have chosen SBP coverage, id.
§ 1448(a)(2), and have paid premiums for the benefit, id. § 1452. Because eligibility for
SBP benefits includes requirements additional to one’s status as a surviving spouse of a
veteran, the government concludes that SBP benefits are not included in the section
1311(e) ambit of protection.
We agree with Sharp and the trial court. To determine Congress’ intent, we use
the traditional tools of statutory construction, beginning with the text of the statute.
Splane v. West, 216 F.3d, 1058, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing United States v.
Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 4 (1997)). Where the intent is unambiguously expressed by the
plain meaning of the statutory text, we give effect to that clear language without
rendering any portion of it meaningless. Id. Here, Congress’ intention to supersede all
other laws (except a provision not at issue in this case), and prevent a decrease in
some other benefit payment as a result of section 1311(e)’s restoration of DIC
payments to surviving spouses who remarry after age 57, is plain on the face of the
statute. 38 U.S.C. § 1311(e) (“[N]otwithstanding any other provision of law (other than
2008-5105 5
section 5304(b)(3) of this title), no reduction in benefits under such other provision of
law shall be made by reason of such individual’s eligibility for benefits under this
section.”). Because the “notwithstanding” clause applies to “any other provision of law,”
without relevant limitation, section 1311(e) cannot be given any effect unless its
language is construed to modify or partially repeal the earlier-promulgated section
1450(c)(1) to the extent necessary to resolve the offset conflict.
To the government’s unconvincing argument that the only benefits section
1311(e) was meant to protect from offset are those granted solely because of the
recipient’s status as the surviving spouse of a veteran, Sharp responds that the plain
language of section 1311(e) supports the reading that the statute applies to benefits for
which a recipient’s “status as the surviving spouse of a veteran” is a necessary but not
exclusive requirement. Sharp’s reading of the statute is more persuasive because, inter
alia, neither party has identified a statute that entitles one to benefits solely due to one’s
status as a veteran or a spouse of a veteran; benefits appear always to be otherwise
conditioned, e.g., filing necessary paperwork. The government’s position, on the other
hand, makes it effectively impossible for any benefit to gain offset protection from
section 1311(e). We therefore reject its interpretation, which would violate the canon
that we must “give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute” and should
avoid rendering any of the statutory text meaningless or as mere surplusage. Duncan
v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The government continues that the statute does not pertain to SBP benefits
because SBP is a retirement benefit and not a benefit that is conferred based on
veteran status. Although the government correctly states that not all veterans are
2008-5105 6
retirees, it also concedes that a military retiree will always be a veteran. 2 Thus, Sharp’s
status as the surviving spouse of a military retiree unequivocally confers status as the
surviving spouse of a veteran. Only military retirees and retirement-eligible
servicemembers are permitted to participate in SBP, so an SBP beneficiary always is a
surviving spouse (or dependent child) of a veteran. As such, the SBP offset provision,
10 U.S.C. § 1450(c)(1), represents “another provision of law” that makes benefits
available to an individual “by reason of such individual’s status as the surviving spouse
of a veteran” as contemplated by 38 U.S.C. § 1311(e). Because Sharp’s eligibility for
SBP is predicated upon her status as the surviving spouse of a veteran, her SBP
benefits are protected from offset.
II.
Even though we conclude that the plain language of 38 U.S.C. § 1311(e)
unambiguously precludes the DIC-SBP offset of 10 U.S.C. § 1450(c)(1), we take a look
at the legislative history “only to determine whether a clear intent contrary to the plain
meaning exists.” Glaxo Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg, 894 F.2d 392, 396 (Fed. Cir.
1990). To overcome the plain meaning of the statute, the party challenging it by
reference to legislative history must establish that the legislative history embodies “an
‘extraordinary showing of contrary intentions.’” Id. (quoting Garcia v. United States, 469
U.S. 70, 75 (1984)). The government has failed to present anything that comes close to
satisfying this burden.
2
Title 38 defines a veteran as “a person who served in the active military, naval, or
air service, and who was discharged or released therefrom under conditions other than
dishonorable.” 38 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2006).
2008-5105 7
The government first points to the Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) cost
estimate of the Veterans Benefits Act of 2003, which included the DIC-SBP offset in its
calculation, as evidence that Congress intended SBP offsets to remain in place. We are
unpersuaded. First, the CBO is not Congress, and its reading of the statute is not
tantamount to congressional intent. Second, Congress never ratified the CBO’s
interpretation, which was completed more than two weeks after Congress took final
action on the bill. Finally, section 1311(e)’s “notwithstanding” clause, which repealed
the DIC-SBP offset at issue, was not part of the bill’s original text, but was added by
amendment. As the trial court noted, the fact that the repeal was not included in the
original text of the bill could have resulted in a CBO calculation error or oversight. In
sum, the government’s CBO argument is not “an extraordinary showing” that Congress
intended the statute to mean something contrary to its unambiguous language.
To counter the government’s position, Sharp contends that the legislative history
of a bill considered by the preceding Congress and similar to the one that produced
section 1311(e) demonstrates that Congress conveyed its actual intent to partially
repeal the DIC-SBP offset. In 2002, Congress considered the Veterans’ and Survivors’
Benefits Expansion Act of 2002, which included language almost identical to the
provision in the Veterans Benefits Act of 2003. A House Veterans Affairs Committee
report discussing the 2002 legislation expressly stated that the provision at issue is
applicable to SBP payments. H.R. Rep. No. 107-472, at 6 (2002), reprinted in 2002
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1020, 1022 (“[T]he Committee has included language so that [retained
DIC payments] will be paid to all remarried surviving spouses, and that no reduction of
other benefits to which the surviving spouse may be entitled, such as Survivor Benefit
2008-5105 8
Plan payments, would occur.”). Although this committee report does not speak directly
to the language of the Veterans Benefits Act of 2003, it at least confirms that the
legislative history does not amount to an “extraordinary showing of contrary intention”
required to interpret section 1311(e) as not partially repealing the DIC-SBP offset.
“Surely an interpretation placed by the sponsor of a bill on the very language
subsequently enacted by Congress cannot be dismissed out of hand . . . simply
because the interpretation was given two years earlier.” United States v. Enmons, 410
U.S. 396, 405 n.14 (1973); see also Huffman v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341,
1347 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Congress did not release committee reports, but it is proper
for us to look to the legislative history from the [previous] Congress for guidance in
interpreting the [statute], because the language did not change.”).
Finally, the government relies on post-2003 congressional activity in its attempt
to prove that Congress did not intend a partial repeal of the DIC-SBP offset in 2003.
Specifically, it points to ongoing legislative efforts to effect a total repeal of the DIC-SBP
offset as evidence that if Congress had intended the Veterans Benefits Act of 2003 to
silently repeal the offset, it would have done so expressly and for all surviving spouses,
not just the narrow group of survivors who marry after age 57. This argument also is
unavailing.
As recognized by the trial court, there are many plausible explanations for
Congress’ decision to repeal the DIC-SBP offset only for surviving spouses who receive
DIC by reason of their having remarried after age 57. Perhaps Congress intended to
encourage marriage for older surviving spouses. Perhaps section 1311(e) simply
represents a first step in an effort to eventually enact full repeal. After all, the
2008-5105 9
servicemember paid for both benefits: SBP with premiums; DIC with his life. Perhaps it
was recognition that the political process is the art of the possible, and that prudence
counseled against making the perfect the enemy of the good. Whatever the reason, the
government has failed to make the “extraordinary showing of [Congress’] contrary
intentions” that would permit this court to construe section 1311(e) in a way that
eviscerates its plain language.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the judgment of the United States Court of Federal Claims is
affirmed.
AFFIRMED
2008-5105 10