NOTE: This disposititon is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2006-3414
MICHAEL D. CHAMBERS,
Petitioner,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Respondent.
Michael D. Chambers, of New Smyrna Beach, Florida, pro se.
Elizabeth Thomas, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division,
United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent. With her on
the brief were Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, David M. Cohen, Director,
and Bryant G. Snee, Assistant Director.
Appealed from: United States Merit Systems Protection Board
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2006-3414
MICHAEL D. CHAMBERS,
Petitioner,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Respondent.
__________________________
DECIDED: February 7, 2007
__________________________
Before GAJARSA, LINN, and MOORE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Michael D. Chambers (“Chambers”) seeks review of the initial decision of the
administrative judge (“AJ”) for the Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”), Chambers
v. Dep’t of the Interior, No. AT-0831-05-0395-I-2 (M.S.P.B. Mar. 29, 2006) (“Initial
Decision”), which became the final decision of the Board after the Board denied his
petition for review, Chambers v. Dep’t of the Interior, No. AT-0831-05-0395-I-2
(M.S.P.B. Aug. 16, 2006). In that decision, the Board denied Chambers law
enforcement officer (“LEO”) credit for his service as a Park Ranger, GS-7, at Cape
Canaveral National Seashore. We review the Board’s decision for substantial evidence.
See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). Because the Board’s decision that Chambers failed to prove
that he was a law enforcement officer within the Civil Service Retirement System
(“CSRS”) statutory definition is supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.
The gravamen of Chambers’ petition is that notwithstanding the Board’s findings,
his position involved law enforcement and should be considered to be a LEO position
under CSRS. At issue, however, is not the ordinary or casual definition of “law
enforcement,” but CSRS’s technical definition, which specifically excludes the everyday
patrol duties in which Chambers was engaged. See 5 U.S.C. § 8331(20). Even though
Chambers did engage in “the apprehension, investigation, or detention of individuals
suspected of or who have violated the criminal laws of the United States,” id., the
Incident Reports that Chambers submitted to the Board reflect that such activities were
relatively infrequent. See Initial Decision, slip op. at 11. This is consistent with both his
written position description and the averments of the Superintendent of Canaveral
National Seashore, Wendell Simpson. See id., slip op. at 7–10.
These facts constitute substantial evidence in support of the AJ’s finding that
these activities were not the primary duties of Chambers’ position. It follows that he was
not a “law enforcement officer” within the narrow CSRS definition. The LEO statuses of
Chambers’ coworkers are irrelevant because they are not covered by CSRS and the
decisions in their cases were made on the basis of their own separate situations and
evidence.
COSTS
No costs.
2006-3414 2