UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 00-20006
Summary Calendar
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MARINA N. HERNANDEZ,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY; TOM LAMBERT, in his Individual
and official Capacity; MILTON O’GILVEY, in his Individual and
Official Capacity; ARVIS ASKEW, in his Individual and Official
Capacity; MARVIN LEDET, in his Individual and Official Capacity;
MARVIN LEDET, in his Individual and Official Capacity; JEVETTA
PRICE DAVIS, in her Individual and Official Capacity,
Defendants - Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
H-97-CV-3917
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July 12, 2000
Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and PARKER, Circuit Judges:
PER CURIAM:*
Appellant Marina Hernandez, a former Metropolitan Police
Officer, was terminated after an investigation was concluded
involving the loss of her weapon, the second such infraction in a
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
four-month period. The investigators concluded that Hernandez was
intoxicated at the time she lost her weapon in violation of Metro
policies and rules. Following her termination, Hernandez brought
suit against her former employer, the Metropolitan Transit
Authority; a former supervisor, Tom Lambert; and three former co-
workers, Marvin Ledet, Arvis Askew, and Jevetta Price Davis,
asserting deprivations of her constitutional rights based on gender
and race in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, various state
civil rights statutes, and state common law. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all of
Hernandez’s claims. Hernandez appeals the grant of summary
judgment and the denial of an earlier motion to compel discovery.
Because we believe the merits of all the Appellant’s claims were
satisfactorily addressed by the district court and no reversible
error was committed, we AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment.
Furthermore, the district court did not err in granting
summary judgment without discussion on Appellant’s alleged claims
under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Garrity v. New
Jersey,. 385 U.S. 493 (1967). These alleged claims are not set
forth in Appellant’s pleadings, and even if they were, the courts
have not interpreted either case as providing a civil cause of
action. See, e.g., Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1291 (11th Cir.
1999); Warren v. City of Lincoln, Neb., 864 F.2d 1436, 1442 (8th
Cir. 1989) (“The reading of Miranda warnings is a procedural
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safeguard rather than a right arising out of the fifth amendment
itself.... Thus, the remedy for a Miranda violation is the
exclusion from evidence of any compelled self[-]incrimination, not
a section 1983 action”). According to Hernandez’s complaint, her
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims stem from alleged violations
of her constitutional right “to equal protection of the laws,” and
“discrimination on the basis of sex.” The merits of Hernandez’s
gender and race-based claims were thoroughly addressed by the
district court in its memorandum opinion and order granting summary
judgment. We AFFIRM the entry of judgment for the Appellees on
Hernandez’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims.
Finally, Appellant has failed to demonstrate that the district
court committed an abuse of discretion by denying her belated and
wide-ranging motion to compel discovery as to materials that were
either unavailable or had never been previously requested during
the almost two-year discovery period. We AFFIRM the denial of
Appellant’s motion to compel.
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