FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 15 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 10-30127
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 3:09-cr-00002-TMB-1
v.
MEMORANDUM *
BRUCE EDWARD CROSS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska
Timothy M. Burgess, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 10, 2011 **
Seattle, Washington
Before: FISHER, GOULD and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Bruce Edward Cross appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress evidence discovered during an investigatory stop of his vehicle. We
review the denial of the motion to suppress de novo, and affirm. See United States
v. Jennen, 596 F.3d 594, 598 (9th Cir. 2010).
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
“Officers have reasonable suspicion when ‘specific, articulable facts . . .
together with objective and reasonable inferences, form the basis for suspecting
that the particular person detained is engaged in criminal activity.’” United States
v. Choudhry, 461 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Lopez-
Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2000)). We assess reasonable suspicion in
light of the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Montero-Camargo,
208 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The totality of the circumstances
here – including the officer’s training, experience and specific knowledge about the
woman’s prior arrest, Cross’ location in a known area of prostitution late at night,
and the woman’s appearance and conduct – gave the officer reasonable suspicion
to believe the occupants of Cross’ vehicle were engaged in criminal activity
involving prostitution, thereby justifying the investigatory stop.
AFFIRMED.
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