[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 08-10732 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DECEMBER 23, 2008
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 06-00038-CR-1-MMP
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ALAN JESSE CROSSLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(December 23, 2008)
Before ANDERSON, DUBINA and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Alan Jesse Crossley appeals his conviction for conspiracy to
manufacture, distribute, and possess with intent to distribute marijuana plants, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. On appeal, Crossley argues that the district court
erred by not suppressing the evidence the officials seized at his house, because his
consent was the product of an illegal detention.
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district
court’s factual findings for clear error, and review de novo the application of the
law to the facts. United States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 774 (11th Cir. 2006). The
facts are construed in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed below. Id.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S.
Const. amend. IV. A seizure occurs “‘when the officer, by means of physical force
or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.’” United
States v. Franklin, 323 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 n.16, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). The
Supreme Court has held:
Law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition of unreasonable seizures merely by approaching
individuals on the street or in other public places and putting
questions to them if they are willing to listen. Even when law
enforcement officers have no basis for suspecting a particular
individual, they may pose questions, ask for identification, and request
consent to search [property]-provided they do not induce cooperation
by coercive means. If a reasonable person would feel free to terminate
the encounter, then he or she has not been seized.
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United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200-01, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 2110, 153
L.Ed.2d 242 (2002) (internal citations omitted). We have held that the following
factors are relevant in determining whether a seizure occurred include:
whether a citizen’s path is blocked or impeded; whether identification
is retained; the suspect’s age, education and intelligence; the length of
the suspect’s detention and questioning; the number of police officers
present; the display of weapons; any physical touching of the suspect,
and the language and tone of voice of the police.
Perez, 443 F.3d at 778 (quotations omitted). An officer’s statement that an
individual is the focus of an investigation also is a relevant factor. See United
States v. Puglisi, 723 F.2d 779, 783 (11th Cir. 1984). However, an officer’s
statement that he believes that the defendant is involved in drug activity, without
more, is insufficient to establish that the defendant was seized. See United States
v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 597 n.13 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc).
In United States v. De La Rosa, 922 F.2d 675 (11th Cir. 1991), the district
court determined that the initial encounter between the defendant and the officers
was a non-coercive encounter to which the Fourth Amendment did not apply. Id.
at 678. In De La Rosa, an officer (1) blocked the defendant’s car, which was
parked in front of his apartment, (2) identified himself to the defendant, who was
exiting the car after returning to his apartment, (3) requested and received the
defendant’s driver’s license, and (4) elicited permission to search the defendant’s
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car before returning the license. Id. at 677-78. We held that, under the totality of
the circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt free to leave, and thus, the
officer did not seize the defendant within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 678.
Base on our review of the record, we conclude that the district court did not
err in denying Crossley’s motion to suppress, based on its finding that, under the
totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt free to leave.
Accordingly, we affirm Crossley’s conviction.
AFFIRMED.
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