PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 10-2341
_____________
GENERAL CATEGORY SCALLOP FISHERMEN,
Appellant
v.
SECRETARY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE; THE NATIONAL OCEANIC AND
ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION;
THE NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
District Court No. 3-08-cv-02264
District Judge: The Honorable Mary L. Cooper
Argued: January 27, 2011
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SMITH, Circuit Judge,
and STEARNS, District Judge*
(Filed: March 16, 2011)
*
The Honorable Richard G. Stearns, United States
District Judge for the United States District Court of
Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
1
Patrick F. Flanigan, Esq. (Argued)
P.O. Box 42
Swarthmore, PA 19081
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
Thekla Hansen-Young, Esq. (Argued)
United States Department of Justice
Environment & Natural Resources Division
P.O. Box 23795
L=Enfant Plaza Station
Washington, D.C. 20026-000
Attorney for Defendant-Appellee
OPINION
STEARNS, District Judge.
This appeal arises from a dispute over the right of
fishermen to access the Atlantic Sea Scallop Fishery. At
issue is an order of the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey denying summary judgment on all
claims by Appellants, who are former general category
scallop permit holders, while granting summary judgment
on all claims to Appellees Gary Locke, in his capacity as
Secretary of the United States Department of Commerce,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
2
(NOAA), and National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS).
We are asked to resolve: (1) whether NMFS complied with
the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. '' 701-
706, and the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 1976 (Magnuson-Stevens Act), 16
U.S.C. '' 1801-1883, when it promulgated regulations
implementing Amendment 11 to the Atlantic Sea Scallop
Fishery Management Plan, including a Acontrol date@ that
effectively terminated the access rights of general scallop
fishermen who were not established in the fishery prior to
November 1, 2004; (2) whether the process by which
Amendment 11 was adopted complied with the Magnuson-
Stevens Act requirement that public hearings be held in
Aappropriate locations in the geographical area@ that will be
affected by changes to a Fishery Management Plan (FMP);
(3) whether NMFS reasonably concluded that Amendment
11=s reliance on NMFS internal dataset to determine permit
eligibility complied with the Magnuson-Stevens Act=s
National Standard 2, which requires the use of the Abest
scientific information available@; and (4) whether NMFS
3
reasonably concluded that Amendment 11=s limitations on
the general category scallop fishery were consistent with the
Magnuson-Stevens Act=s National Standard 5, which
prohibits the implementation of any fishery management
measure that has Aeconomic allocation as its sole purpose.@
We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.2
I.
The Magnuson-Stevens Act
2
Before the District Court, the fishermen raised
several additional contentions: (1) that the loss of the use of
the Aunique fishing gear@ that they had purchased for the
scallop harvest constituted an unconstitutional taking; (2)
that Amendment 11 violated National Standard 3 by placing
the Northern Gulf of Maine (NGOM) fishery under a
separate management scheme; and (3) that Amendment 11
violated National Standard 4 by allocating a higher catch
limit to NGOM permit holders than to incidental catch
permit holders. Judge Cooper ably addressed these issues in
her opinion, and they are not being pressed by the scallop
fishermen on appeal. See Gen. Category Scallop Fishermen
v. Sec=y of U.S. Dep=t of Commerce, 720 F. Supp. 2d 564
(D.N.J. 2010).
4
The Magnuson-Stevens Act, as amended by Congress
in 1990 and 1996, delegates to NMFS, by and through the
Secretary of Commerce, the authority to implement a
comprehensive national fisheries management program in
order Ato prevent overfishing, to rebuild overfished stocks,
to insure conservation, to facilitate long-term protection of
essential fish habitats, and to realize the full potential of the
Nation=s fishery resources.@ See 16 U.S.C. ' 1801(a)(6).3
The Secretary=s authority is exercised through eight
Regional Fishery Management Councils composed of state
fishery managers, the regional NMFS fisheries
administrator, and representatives of the fishing,
environmental, and academic communities. The Councils
are responsible for preparing FMPs and recommending
implementing regulations for the Exclusive Economic Zone
that stretches 200 nautical miles seaward from the coastal
3
Under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, a Afishery@ is
either Aone or more stocks of fish that can be treated as a
unit for purposes of conservation and management that are
identified on the basis of geographic, scientific, technical,
recreational, or economic characteristics, or method of
catch,@ or Aany fishing for such stocks.@ 50 C.F.R. ' 600.10.
5
boundaries of the States within each region.4 The task of
approving an FMP falls to the Secretary of Commerce, who
is mandated to review the FMP to ensure that it complies
with the ten ANational Standards@ established by the
Magnuson-Stevens Act.5 See 16 U.S.C. ' 1851(a)(1) - (10).
The Secretary must also publish the proposed FMP and
accept public comment for a 60-day period before giving his
or her final approval. 16 U.S.C. ' 1854(a)(1)(B). An
implementing regulation goes through the same process of
review, although the Secretary may limit the period for
public comment to a minimum of 15 days. 16 U.S.C. '
1854(b)(1)(A). NMFS is the executive agency responsible
for overseeing the enforcement of an approved FMP and
any of its attendant regulations.
4
The Exclusive Economic Zone of the United States
extends the full 200 nautical miles permitted under
international law and treaty. 16 U.S.C. ' 1802(11); see Am.
Pelagic Fishing Co., L.P. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363,
1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004). A national state has sovereign rights
over natural resources, living and nonliving, within its
Exclusive Economic Zone.
5
The Secretary has delegated his authority under the
Magnuson-Stevens Act to promulgate regulations
implementing FMPs and their Amendments to NMFS.
6
The New England Fishery Management Council
and the Scallop Fishery
The development of the Atlantic Sea Scallop FMP is
the responsibility of the New England Fishery Management
Council (NEFMC). All parties agree that the NEFMC is
not an Aagency@ within the meaning of the APA. In 1994,
the Alimited access@ scallop FMP then in place was amended
(Amendment 4) to provide for an Aopen access@ fishery to
Aallow a flexible program for seasonal or opportunistic
fisheries targeting inshore scallops.@ Both Alimited access@
and Aopen access general category@ scalloping permits
authorized the harvest of up to 400 pounds of Atlantic sea
scallops daily. Only large-scale scallop boats, however,
were eligible for the Alimited access@ permits. Small-scale
scallop fishing vessels and vessels that harvested scallops as
an incidental bycatch were issued Ageneral category@
permits. The Appellants are small-scale general category
scallop fishermen.
After the passage of Amendment 4, the number of
general category permit holders exploded, fueling concerns
7
about overfishing.6 These concerns prompted the NEFMC
to consider regulatory responses to limit the number of
participants in the general category scallop fishery. On
August 31, 2004, the NEFMC published a ANotice of a
Public Meeting@ in the Federal Register announcing a three-
day meeting to be held from September 14-16, 2004, in
Fairhaven, Massachusetts, Ato consider actions affecting
New England fisheries in the exclusive economic zone.@
According to the meeting agenda, among the issues that
A[might] be discussed@ were Aactions to address overfishing@
and Aactions to cap or reduce general category scallop
landings and/or improve reporting measures.@
6
From 1994 to 2005, the number of general category
permits increased from 1,992 to 2,950, and the number of
general category vessels landing scallops more than tripled.
8
During the meeting, NEFMC Vice-Chairman Thomas
Hill announced his intention Ato propose a motion to
establish a control date effective [upon] publication of the
Federal Register . . . that would freeze the number of
permits in the fishery.@7 One of the participants (Maggie
Raymond of the Associated Fisheries of Maine) objected
that the subject of a control date Awas not posted on the
agenda [and so] this would be the only opportunity for the
public to speak to that.@ Hill replied that the NEFMC
Anever notifie[s] the public in advance,@ because it Adefeats
the purpose of the control date if you notify in advance.@
Hill=s motion to publish notice of a control date for the
general category permit scallop fishery was adopted by a
13-1 vote, with two abstentions.
NMFS published the notice in the Federal Register on
November 1, 2004. In relevant part, the Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) sought public comment on:
7
A control date Aprovides notice to anyone
subsequently entering a fishery that he is not assured of
continued participation in the fishery should a limited entry
scheme be implemented.@ Am. Pelagic Fishing Co., 379
9
F.3d at 1366 n.3.
10
proposed rulemaking to control future access
to the open access vessel permit category
(general category) Atlantic sea scallop fishery
if a management regime is developed and
implemented under [the Magnuson-Stevens
Act] to limit the number of participants in this
sector of the scallop fishery. . . . This
announcement is intended, in part, to promote
awareness of potential eligibility criteria for
future access so as to discourage speculative
entry into the fishery while the [NEFMC]
considers whether and how access to the
general category sea scallop fishery could be
controlled. The date of publication of this
notice, November 1, 2004, shall be known as
the Acontrol date@ and may be used for
establishing eligibility criteria for determining
levels of future access to the sea scallop
fishery subject to Federal authority.
69 Fed. Reg. 63341.
Amendment 11
In January of 2006, the NEFMC initiated a Ascoping@
process inviting the fishing public to participate in the
crafting of Amendment 11 to the Atlantic Sea Scallop
FMP.8 As announced, the purpose of Amendment 11 was
to establish Acriteria and authority for determining the
8
AScoping@ is a term of administrative art that
describes the process used by federal agencies to identify
public concerns over the management of land and natural
resources.
11
percentage of scallop catch allocated to the general category
fleet@ and to implement an Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ)
permit system. Between February of 2006 and June of
2007, the NEFMC held 35 public meetings in seven states
to discuss the adoption of Amendment 11. On April 11,
2007, the NEFMC submitted a Draft Supplemental
Environmental Impact Statement to NMFS, the final version
of which was submitted to NMFS on September 24, 2007.
The NEFMC formally adopted Amendment 11 on June 20,
2007. On December 17, 2007, NMFS published
Amendment 11 in the Federal Register with its proposed
implementing regulations and invited public comment
through January 31, 2008. On February 27, 2008, NMFS
adopted Amendment 11 on behalf of the Secretary of
Commerce. The final rule was published on April 14, 2008,
and took effect on July 1, 2008.
Amendment 11 significantly reduced the number of
vessels eligible to participate in the scallop harvest by
replacing the open access general category fishery with a
12
Alimited access general category@ (LAGC). Amendment 11
provides for three classes of LAGC scalloping permits: (1)
an IFQ permit; (2) a Northern Gulf of Maine permit; and (3)
an incidental catch permit. At issue in this appeal is the IFQ
permit, which allows a permittee to land up to 400 pounds
of shucked scallop meat per trip.9
9
A Atrip@ is defined as Athe time period that begins
when a fishing vessel departs from a dock . . . and that
terminates with a return to a dock . . . .@ 50 C.F.R. ' 600.10.
13
To be eligible for an IFQ permit, NMFS records must
confirm that the applicant vessel landed at least 1,000
pounds of scallop meat in any fishing year between March
1, 2001, and November 1, 2004. The vessel must also have
been issued a general category scallop permit during the
fishing year in which the qualifying landing was made. The
individual quota is determined by a formula that weights the
vessel=s best year of scalloping and the number of years it
has been actively engaged in scallop fishing. These
numbers are derived from NMFS landings data compiled
from dealer reports. A vessel owner may appeal the denial
of a permit to NMFS, but only on the ground that the data
NMFS relied on to determine eligibility was incorrect.10
10
Once issued, an IFQ permit may be transferred
from one scallop vessel to another with the approval of the
NMFS Regional Administrator. No single vessel issued an
IFQ permit may be allocated more than two percent of the
total allowable IFQ catch, nor may any individual have an
ownership interest in more than five percent of the catch
allocated to the scallop fleet.
14
Amendment 11 also allocates the scallop harvest
between the limited access fleet and the LAGC permit
holders.11 The estimated landings of scallops by boats with
incidental catch permits are first subtracted from the
projected annual scallop harvest. IFQ permit holders are
then allocated five percent of the remaining catch, while
almost all of the rest is apportioned to the limited access
scallop fishery.12 Most of the Appellant fishermen received
their first general scallop permit after the control date of
November 1, 2004; thus, they are not eligible to receive
LAGC scallop permits. For all practical purposes, their
scallop fishing days are over.
II.
Standard of Review
11
The NGOM Scallop Management Area is not
included in the total allowable catch as it is only an
occasional scallop fishery with Aunique characteristics.@
Appellants have dropped their challenge to the exclusion of
the NGOM from the calculation of the total allowable catch.
12
Half of one percent of the catch is given over to
limited access vessels that also hold IFQ permits.
15
This Court has jurisdiction to review the District
Court=s order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1291. We review the
District Court=s grant of summary judgment de novo and
apply a deferential standard in reviewing actions taken by
NMFS on behalf of the Secretary, particularly those that fall
within NMFS=s special expertise.13 See Marsh v. Oregon
Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377-378 (1989);
Cyberworld Enter. Techs., Inc. v. Napolitano, 602 F.3d 189,
195-196 (3d Cir. 2010). We may set aside the Secretary=s
action only if it is Aarbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,@ or
taken Awithout observance of procedure required by law.@ 5
U.S.C. '' 706(2)(A)-(D).
Although this Court may not substitute its judgment
for that of the Secretary, we may Aconsider whether the
[Secretary=s] decision was based on a consideration of the
13
The Magnuson-Stevens Act specifically directs
courts to look to the APA when reviewing an FMP
implementation action taken by the Secretary. See 16
U.S.C. '' 1855(f)(1) and (2). An implementing regulation
of an FMP may only be set aside on the grounds specified
in 5 U.S.C. '' 706(2)(A)-(D).
16
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of
judgment.@ Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). The scope of review,
however, is narrow B we must presume the validity of the
Secretary=s decision. Id. at 415. AThe Secretary=s
assessment of which fishery conservation and management
measures would be in the nation=s best interest is >a classic
example of a factual dispute the resolution of which
implicates substantial agency expertise.=@ Ace Lobster Co.,
Inc. v. Evans, 165 F. Supp. 2d 148, 165 (D.R.I. 2001)
(quoting Nat=l Fisheries Inst., Inc. v. Mosbacher, 732 F.
Supp. 210, 223 (D.D.C. 1990)).
III.
Issue 1: The November 1, 2004 Control Date
The principal argument made by the Appellant
fishermen is that the District Court erred in determining that
the NEFMC=s Acontrol date@ recommendation was not
subject to the rulemaking provisions of the APA.14 They
14
The scallop fishermen contend that the passage of a
control date constitutes a rule under the APA because it is a
17
reason that because NOAA and NMFS are agencies that
must answer to the notice and comment requirements of the
APA and the Magnuson-Stevens Act, the NEFMC by
extension is governed by the same constraints.15 Operating
from this premise, the fishermen find fault with almost
every step taken by the NEFMC in developing the control
date proposal. First, they object to the fact that notice of the
September 14-16, 2004 meeting was published in the
Federal Register Aonly@ 14 days in advance. Second, they
claim that the published agenda failed to make specific
mention of the possible adoption of a control date. Third,
the fishermen argue that Vice-Chairman Hill ambushed
them by bringing the motion to establish a control date to a
Awhole or a part of an agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect designed to
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.@ 5 U.S.C. '
551(4).
15
The fishermen concede B as they must B that the
NEFMC is not itself an Aagency@ falling directly under the
rulemaking requirements of the APA. See J.H. Miles &
Co., Inc. v. Brown, 910 F. Supp. 1138, 1159 (E.D. Va.
1995) (determining that the Mid-Atlantic Fishery
Management Council is not an Aagency@ within the meaning
of the APA).
18
snap vote, depriving them of a meaningful opportunity to
mobilize in opposition.16
The fishermen also object to the selection of
November 1, 2004, as the control date. They contend that
the NEFMC Aarbitrarily and capriciously let the specific
control date be determined by publication in the Federal
Register . . . by some unknown individual@ rather than by
the NEFMC members themselves. They further argue that
the publication of the control date in the Federal Register
did not amount to Awide publicity in the major fishing ports
of the region@ as 16 U.S.C. ' 1852(i)(2)(c) requires.
Finally, the fishermen contend that the NEFMC foreclosed
all meaningful opportunity for public comment by requiring
that all written comments on the Aproposed rule@ be
submitted by December 1, 2004, only one month after its
publication in the Federal Register.
The flaw in the fishermen=s argument is found in its
16
The scallop fishermen allege that the NEFMC
acted in violation of the notice and comment provisions of 5
U.S.C. '' 553(b)(1) and (3); 16 U.S.C. '' 1852(h)(3),
1852(i)(2)(c); Exec. Order No. 12866, ' 6(a)(1), 50 C.F.R.
' 600.135(a).
19
fundamental premise B that the publication by NMFS of the
NEFMC=s proposed November 1, 2004 control date
promulgated a rule. In fact, the control date did not become
a rule until NMFS adopted Amendment 11 on February 27,
2008. The November 1, 2004 ANPR=s title and content
made clear that the control date was a proposed rule and
nothing more.
This notification established November 1,
2004, as the control date for potential use in
determining historical or traditional
participation in the general category scallop
fishery. Consideration of a control date does
not commit the Council or NMFS to develop
any particular management system or criteria
for participation in this fishery. The Council
may choose a different control date, or may
choose a management program that does not
make use of such a date.
69 Fed. Reg. at 63342. Indeed, if the November 1, 2004
publication of the control date by NMFS were a rule, the
fishermen=s action would be time-barred by the Magnuson-
Stevens Act=s statute of limitations, which requires that a
petition for review of a final rule be filed within 30 days of
20
its publication.17 See 16 U.S.C. ' 1855 (f)(1).
We also agree with the District Court that NMFS
reasonably concluded that the steps taken by the NEFMC in
developing Amendment 11 complied with the procedural
requirements of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. See 16 U.S.C.
' 1854(a)(1). The NEFMC gave timely public notice of the
September 2004 meeting by publishing the date 14 days in
advance as the Magnuson-Stevens Act required. Id. '
1852(i)(2)(c). The meeting was announced in the Federal
Register and in various fishing publications distributed in
17
We are not without sympathy for the fishermen=s
response to the double bind in which they find themselves:
AAppellees want flexible rulemaking by passing substantive
rules and setting them aside for years only later
incorporating them into another rule. In the alternative, they
want that the control date is a rule, but then argue the
Fishermen are time-barred.@ However, the relief they seek B
the retroactive application of the rulemaking requirements
of the APA to the actions of the NEFMC in developing
Amendment 11 B is beyond the competence of this Court to
grant. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978) (A[T]he [APA]
established the maximum procedural requirements which
Congress was willing to have the courts impose upon
agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures. Agencies
are free to grant additional procedural rights in the exercise
of their discretion, but reviewing courts are generally not
free to impose them if the agencies have not chosen to grant
them.@) (footnote omitted).
21
the New England and Mid-Atlantic regions, including two
with combined circulations in the tens of thousands B
Commercial Fisheries News and National Fisherman. The
notice of the meeting was also posted on the NMFS website.
The success of the notice effort is demonstrated by the fact
that over 70 stakeholders attended the meeting.
We are also of the view that the November 1, 2004
publication of the proposed control date by NMFS came
reasonably close on the heels of the NEFMC vote. As
Appellees note, this publication was followed by a series of
notices and public hearings tracking the shaping of
Amendment 11 over the next three years. These hearings
culminated in the November and December of 2007
publication by NMFS of the final rule and the implementing
regulations and yet another round of public comment.18
The fishermen object more substantively to the fact
that the NEFMC meeting discussed a control date at all,
contending that the discussion and vote deviated from '
18
According to Appellees, at least four of the
Appellant fishermen submitted written comments
expressing opposition to the November 1, 2004 control date.
22
1852(i)(2)(c) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, which provides
that A[t]he published agenda of the [regular] meeting may
not be modified to include additional matters for Council
action without public notice or within 14 days prior to the
meeting date.@ Although the use of the specific term
Acontrol date@ in the proposed agenda might have been
preferable, the agenda referred to Aactions to address
overfishing@ as well as Aactions to cap or reduce general
category scallop landings.@ We think this sufficient to have
put the fishermen on notice that a control date might well be
one of the mechanisms put forward at the meeting for
reducing access to the scallop fishery.
Issue 2: Mandate to Hold Public Meetings in All
Geographic Areas
The fishermen next argue that the District Court erred
in concluding that the NEFMC complied Aat least
minimally@ with the mandate that public meetings to discuss
new management measures like Amendment 11 be held in
Aappropriate locations in the geographical area concerned.@
The locations also include areas under the authority of
23
another Council if the measures could Aaffect fishermen of
that area.@ 16 U.S.C. ' 1852(h)(3). Following the
publication of the November 1, 2004 ANPR, 35 public
meetings were held over a span of 18 months in Maine,
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut,
New Jersey, and Virginia. While it is true, as the fishermen
complain, that most of the meetings were held in the New
England region, that fact by itself is unsurprising, given that
Georges Bank is the most sensitive of the environs of
fishable Atlantic sea scallops.19 Three public meetings were
held outside of the jurisdiction of the NEFMC. Two of
these were held in New Jersey. The first meeting in
February of 2006 in Cape May attracted 150 participants. A
second New Jersey meeting held in May of 2007 in
Manahawkin drew another 30 fishermen. Later that month,
a third meeting in Newport News, Virginia, attracted some
25 participants.
We can find no authority that supports the
19
See Dvora Hart, Status of Fishery Resources off the
Northeastern U.S., NOAA (Dec. 2006),
http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/sos/spsyn/iv/scallop/.
24
fishermen=s assertion that NMFS was required to hold at
least one public meeting in every State comprising the New
England and the Mid-Atlantic regions, including Delaware,
Pennsylvania, Maryland and North Carolina. The
Magnuson-Stevens Act requires that public meetings Ashall@
occur Aat appropriate times and in appropriate locations in
the geographical area concerned, so as to allow all interested
persons an opportunity to be heard in the development of
fishery management plans and amendments to such plans, . .
. .@ 16 U.S.C. ' 1852(h)(3). Other than providing
extraneous dictionary definitions explaining that Ashall@ is a
word of affirmative command, the fishermen point to no
statute or regulation that required the NEFMC to convene a
meeting in every port of call on the Atlantic seaboard.
More meetings might have been held, but that is not to say
that the 35 that were held failed to satisfy ' 1852(h)(3).
Issue 3: National Standard 2
The fishermen next complain that the District Court
erred in finding that NMFS=s decision to rely on dealer
reports contained in its own database to calculate historical
25
scallop landings complied with National Standard 2.20 The
fishermen contend that the NMFS database is Aflawed@ and
that NMFS acted unreasonably in refusing to correct errors
in the compiled dealer reports by cross-checking the NMFS
data against the fishermen=s self-reported Vessel Trip
Reports (VTR) and the dealers= own datasets.
Under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, FMPs must
Acontain the conservation and management measures . . .
which are . . . consistent with the national standards, the
other provisions of this chapter, . . . and any other applicable
law.@ 16 U.S.C. ' 1853(a)(1)( C). National Standard 2
stipulates that A[c]onservation and management measures
shall be based upon the best scientific information
available.@ 16 U.S.C. ' 1851(a)(2). In deciding whether
scientific information is the Abest available,@ substantial
deference is accorded to the Secretary=s assessment of the
20
As will be recalled, to be eligible for a LAGC
permit, Amendment 11 requires an applicant to have landed
at least 1,000 pounds of shucked scallop meat during at least
one fishing year between March 1, 2000, and November 2,
2004. The fishermen do not challenge the eligibility
criteria, but rather the data used to calculate a fisherman=s
26
quality of what is available. See Washington Crab
Producers, Inc. v. Mosbacher, 924 F.2d 1438, 1448-1449
(9th Cir. 1990). See also C & W Fish Co., Inc. v. Fox, 931
F.2d 1556, 1652 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (a court=s task on review
is simply Ato determine whether the Secretary=s conclusion
that the standards have been satisfied is rational and
supported by the record.@).
We discern no error in the District Court=s
determination that the decision Ato utilize NMFS landings
data from dealer reports to determine whether a vessel met
the 1,000-pound landings criterion@ did not contravene
National Standard 2. AIt is well settled . . . that the Secretary
can act when the available science is incomplete or
imperfect, even where concerns have been raised about the
accuracy of the methods or models employed.@ North
Carolina Fisheries Ass=n, Inc. v. Gutierrez, 518 F. Supp. 2d
62, 85 (D.D.C. 2007). During the development of
Amendment 11, NMFS and the NEFMC recognized that
flaws existed in all of the available data groups, but
yearly scallop catch.
27
concluded that there were no practical or cost-effective
means of correcting the Amany errors in both VTR and
dealer datasets.@
To address errors or omissions in the NMFS data, the
framers of Amendment 11 adopted a suggestion made by a
public meeting participant that Aa full appeals process@ be
provided through which fishermen who were denied LAGC
permits could challenge the denial Aon the grounds that the
information used by the Regional Administrator was
incorrect.@ 73 Fed. Reg. at 20092. The appeals process
allows a rejected applicant to continue fishing pending the
outcome of the appeal to prevent any prejudicial delay. As
the District Court aptly observed, Amendment 11 does not
preclude the use of data the fishermen consider superior B
rather, it allows for its full consideration at an adversarial
hearing.
Issue 4: National Standard 5
The fishermen=s final objection is to the District
Court=s finding that the Secretary took sufficient account of
non-economic objectives in implementing Amendment 11.
28
National Standard 5 requires that A[c]onservation and
management measures shall, where practicable, consider
efficiency in the utilization of fishery resources; except that
no such measure shall have economic allocation as its sole
purpose.@ 16 U.S.C. ' 1851(a)(5). The fishermen argue
that AAmendment 11 is only an economic re-allocation of
the scallop resource among competing stakeholders.@ To
prevail on this claim, the fishermen are required to show
that the Secretary failed to consider any non-economic
objectives in promulgating Amendment 11. See Alaska
Factory Trawler Ass=n v. Baldridge, 831 F.2d 1456, 1460
(9th Cir. 1987).
That Amendment 11 had economic consequences is
undeniable. That it took into account Abiological,
ecological, and social objectives@ as well is readily apparent
from the record. See 50 C.F.R. ' 600.330(e). As NMFS
explained, the motivating force in the development of
Amendment 11 was the control of mortality in the general
category fishery and that economic considerations were
secondary. AAmendment 11 recognizes that, without
29
controls on the number of participants, the general category
fleet can expand, especially when the resource conditions
are very good[,] . . . [which] could contribute to overfishing
if combined with the full utilization of limited access
effort.@ 73 Fed. Reg. at 20098.21 There is ample evidence
in the record to support the District Court=s determination
that National Standard 5 was met.
IV.
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of
the District Court.
21
Amendment 11=s Final Supplemental
Environmental Impact Statement spells out that A[e]conomic
allocation is not the sole purpose of this action: the
measures are primarily intended to control mortality in the
general category fishing and do so in the most equitable and
efficient way possible while maintaining the historical
character of the fishery.@
30