FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 09-50394
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
v. 2:08-cr-00461-
ZHI YONG GUO, aka Jackson, JFW-2
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted
November 1, 2010—Pasadena, California
Filed March 17, 2011
Before: Harry Pregerson, Kenneth F. Ripple,* and
Susan P. Graber, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Graber
*The Honorable Kenneth F. Ripple, Senior United States Circuit Judge
for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
3693
UNITED STATES v. GUO 3695
COUNSEL
Fay Arfa, Fay Arfa, a Law Corporation, Los Angeles, Califor-
nia, for the defendant-appellant.
Christopher D. Grigg, Assistant United States Attorney, Los
Angeles, California, for the plaintiff-appellee.
OPINION
GRABER, Circuit Judge:
A jury convicted Defendant Zhi Yong Guo of knowingly
3696 UNITED STATES v. GUO
and willfully conspiring to export, and attempting to export,
ten export-controlled thermal imaging cameras without a
license. We affirm because the statute of conviction is constitu-
tional.1
I. BACKGROUND
The United States restricts the export of technologies that
it deems potentially dangerous to national security. A compli-
cated framework of statutes, executive orders, and regulations
effects those restrictions. This case concerns one such export-
controlled technology, namely, thermal imaging cameras.
Thermal imaging cameras convert heat energy into live
video, allowing users to see the images around them at any
time of day or night. Anyone who wants to take or send a
thermal imaging camera of the kind restricted by United
States regulations to an export-controlled country must first
obtain a license from the Department of Commerce. Failure
to obtain such a license subjects the offender to civil and
criminal penalties under 50 U.S.C. § 1705.
Defendant worked as an engineer in Beijing, China, where
he owned and operated a company devoted to developing
photoelectric technologies. He is a Chinese citizen and
national. In early 2004, Defendant became interested in
acquiring U.S.-made thermal imaging cameras. He pursued
several avenues to try to obtain the cameras but did not suc-
ceed until late 2007, when he convinced a friend to help him.
Defendant’s friend and accomplice, Tai Wei Chao, is a
United States citizen. At the time, Choa worked for a com-
pany that maintained offices in the United States and China.
1
Defendant makes several arguments in his appeal. Here, we deal only
with his argument that 50 U.S.C. § 1705 is unconstitutionally vague. We
address the remaining issues in a separate memorandum disposition filed
this date.
UNITED STATES v. GUO 3697
Defendant instructed Chao to purchase a certain type of
export-controlled thermal imaging camera made by a com-
pany based in the United States called FLIR Systems. Neither
Defendant nor Chao had a license to export the cameras. Chao
enlisted the help of another friend of his, who owned and
operated a printing business in San Gabriel, California. Chao
placed an order for three FLIR cameras and had them shipped
to California. Chao’s friend then sent the cameras to China,
and Defendant paid Chao a $900 commission when Chao
delivered the cameras to Defendant.
Chao’s order aroused the suspicions of FLIR’s export com-
pliance staff. They thought it strange that a printing company
needed highly developed thermal imaging cameras. FLIR
alerted the Department of Commerce to Chao’s order, and
agents from the Department of Commerce began to track
Chao’s activities.
Several months after the first shipment of FLIR cameras
arrived in China, Defendant decided to travel to the United
States to get more cameras. With Chao’s help, Defendant
obtained a visa and entered the United States. In the mean-
time, Chao ordered ten more FLIR cameras and had them
shipped to his friend in California. Chao came to the United
States, picked up the shipment of cameras from his friend, and
met Defendant in Los Angeles. Defendant packed three of the
cameras in his suitcase, concealing them in shoes. Chao
packed the remaining seven cameras in his two bags, which
he concealed in articles of clothing as well.
Five days later, Defendant and Chao went to Los Angeles
International Airport, intending to fly back to China. They
checked the bags and delivered them to the screening check-
point. They proceeded through security to their gate, where
federal agents intercepted and arrested them.
A grand jury indicted Defendant and Chao on charges of
knowingly and willfully conspiring to export, and attempting
3698 UNITED STATES v. GUO
to export, ten export-controlled cameras to China without a
license. Chao pleaded guilty and cooperated with the govern-
ment. Defendant went to trial. After five days of testimony,
a jury convicted Defendant of both charges. Defendant timely
appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant challenges his conviction under 50 U.S.C.
§ 1705, arguing that the statute is too vague to satisfy the con-
stitutional demands of due process. A criminal statute is void
for vagueness if it is “not sufficiently clear to provide guid-
ance to citizens concerning how they can avoid violating it
and to provide authorities with principles governing enforce-
ment.” United States v. Jae Gab Kim, 449 F.3d 933, 942 (9th
Cir. 2006). We review de novo a vagueness challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute. United States v. Purdy, 264 F.3d
809, 811 (9th Cir. 2001).
A. The Statutory and Regulatory Scheme
[1] Title 50 U.S.C. § 1705(a) makes it unlawful for “a per-
son to violate, attempt to violate, conspire to violate, or cause
a violation of any license, order, regulation, or prohibition
issued under this chapter.” Section 1705(c) provides criminal
penalties for anyone who “willfully commits, willfully
attempts to commit, or willfully conspires to commit . . . an
unlawful act described in subsection (a) of this section.”
[2] Two related sections within this chapter, §§ 1701 and
1702, empower the President to regulate “any transactions in
foreign exchange,” § 1702(a)(1)(A)(i), to deal with “any
unusual and extraordinary threat . . . to the national security
. . . of the United States, if the President declares a national
emergency with respect to such threat,” § 1701(a). By Execu-
tive Order No. 13,222, President George W. Bush declared
that “the unrestricted access of foreign parties to U.S. goods
and technology . . . constitute[s] an unusual and extraordinary
UNITED STATES v. GUO 3699
threat to the national security . . . of the United States.” 3
C.F.R. 783, 783 (2002). The Executive Order, together with
the authority allocated to the President by 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701
and 1702, authorized the continued enforcement of certain
regulations previously promulgated, called the Export Admin-
istration Regulations. 15 C.F.R. pts. 730-744 (2010)
[3] The Export Administration Regulations contain two
provisions that are relevant to our discussion here. First, Sup-
plement No. 1 to Part 774, entitled the Commerce Control
List, contains the list of commodities, software, and technol-
ogy subject to control. Each entry on the Commerce Control
List has a particular export control classification number,
describes the technical characteristics of the items classified
with that number, and identifies the particular reasons for con-
trolling the export of those items. Second, Supplement No. 1
to Part 738 contains the Commerce Country Chart, which lists
the restrictions relevant to each foreign country by setting out
the reasons for control applicable to each country. A person
can determine whether the regulations control the export of a
particular item by (1) connecting the item to the relevant
description in the Commerce Control List; (2) identifying the
reasons for control applicable to that item; and (3) looking to
see whether any of the reasons for control of that item are
checked off next to the relevant country on the Commerce
Country Chart.
[4] Here, for example, export control classification number
6A003.b.4.b pertains to thermal imaging cameras incorporat-
ing certain focal plane arrays, of the kind that Defendant
attempted to export.2 That classification has three reasons for
2
Specifically, the regulation makes subject to export control thermal
imaging cameras incorporating
[n]on-“space-qualified” non-linear (2-dimensional) infrared
“focal plane arrays” based on microbolometer material having
individual elements with an unfiltered response in the wavelength
range equal to or exceeding 8,000 nm but not exceeding 14,000
nm.
15 C.F.R. pt. 774, supp. 1, No. 6A002.a.3.f (incorporated by reference into
No. 6A003.b.4.b).
3700 UNITED STATES v. GUO
its control: national security, regional stability, and anti-
terrorism. The entry for China on the Commerce Country
Chart shows restrictions for both national security and
regional stability. Accordingly, the regulations required
Defendant to obtain an export license before taking his ther-
mal imaging cameras to China, and 50 U.S.C. § 1705(a) made
it a crime for him knowingly to attempt to export the cameras
without such a license.
B. The Vagueness Challenge
[5] We recognize that putting together the pieces of this
regulatory puzzle is not easy. To understand the crime with
which Defendant was charged, one must look at four sources
and read them together: the statute, § 1705(a); Executive
Order No. 13,222; and two implementing regulations, the
Commerce Control List in 15 C.F.R. Part 774 and the Com-
merce Country Chart in 15 C.F.R. Part 738. But a statute does
not fail the vagueness test simply because it involves a com-
plex regulatory scheme, or requires that several sources be
read together, and Defendant has not directed us to a single
case in which we have held otherwise. See United States v.
Kennecott Copper Corp., 523 F.2d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 1975)
(rejecting a vagueness challenge premised on the complexity
of a similar regulatory scheme and observing that the scheme
was “simple as compared with some other statutory schemes
carrying criminal penalties, such as the federal income tax
statutes and regulations”).
[6] Rather, the test is whether the text of the statute and its
implementing regulations, read together, give ordinary citi-
zens fair notice with respect to what the statute and regula-
tions forbid, and whether the statute and regulations read
together adequately provide for principled enforcement by
making clear what conduct of the defendant violates the statu-
tory scheme. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56
(1999). Although complicated, the Export Administration
Regulations describe in detail the technologies subject to
UNITED STATES v. GUO 3701
export control. That detailed description gave Defendant clear
warning that the cameras he sought to export fell within the
licensing requirement of the export regulations. Those regula-
tions also provide law enforcement with clear guidance as to
what technologies they may police. Because the regulations
apprise those who take the time and effort to consult them as
to what may and may not be taken to other countries without
a license and do not allow for arbitrary enforcement, the regu-
lations satisfy due process.
[7] Moreover, the scienter requirement in § 1705(c) further
alleviates any concern over the complexity of the regulatory
scheme. To convict Defendant of willfully violating
§ 1705(a), the government was required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Defendant knew that a license was
required for the export of the particular thermal imaging cam-
era he was dealing with, and that Defendant intended to vio-
late the law by exporting or attempting to export such a
thermal imaging camera to China without such a license. The
requirement that § 1705(c) places on the government to prove
Defendant’s knowledge of the law “ ‘mitigate[s] a law’s
vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice
to the complainant that his conduct is proscribed.’ ” Jae Gab
Kim, 449 F.3d at 943 (quoting Vill. of Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982));
see also United States v. Quinn, 401 F. Supp. 2d 80, 100-01
(D.D.C. 2005) (rejecting a vagueness challenge to the export
administration regulations because “ignorance of the law is a
defense” and, therefore, “concerns about defendants being
convicted under a law that they could not have reasonably
understood are alleviated”).
III. CONCLUSION
[8] Statutes and regulations are often complex, and neces-
sarily so. But complexity is not the same as vagueness. The
export administration regulations describe in great detail the
technologies for which the government requires a license for
3702 UNITED STATES v. GUO
export. And, to convict anyone under 50 U.S.C. § 1705, the
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
person knew that he needed a license but did not get one. We
therefore see no danger that a person could violate 50 U.S.C.
§ 1705 unwittingly, and we reject Defendant’s vagueness
challenge.
AFFIRMED.