FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 10-30176
Plaintiff-Appellee,
D.C. No.
v.
2:10-cr-00001-
TIA LATRICE HARRELL, aka Tia RAJ-1
Latrice Marr,
OPINION
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 10, 2011*
Seattle, Washington
Filed March 17, 2011
Before: Raymond C. Fisher, Ronald M. Gould, and
Richard C. Tallman, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Tallman
*The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
3683
UNITED STATES v. HARRELL 3685
COUNSEL
Jenny A. Durkan, United States Attorney, Western District of
Washington, Vincent T. Lombardi II, Assistant United States
Attorney, Seattle, Washington, for plaintiff-appellee United
States of America.
Terrence Kellogg, Seattle, Washington, for defendant-
appellant Tia Latrice Harrell.
OPINION
TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:
Tia Latrice Harrell raises a question of first impression in
our Circuit: whether the “relating to” parentheticals within 18
U.S.C. § 1028A(c) limit the statute’s otherwise clear articula-
tion of which offenses may serve as predicates for application
of § 1028A(a).1We publish to make clear that the “relating
1
Section 1028A(a)(1) provides that “[w]hoever, during and in relation
to any felony violation enumerated in subsection (c), knowingly transfers,
possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of
another person shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such fel-
ony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 years.” Subsection (c)
thereafter provides:
(c) Definition.—For purposes of this section, the term “felony
violation enumerated in subsection (c)” means any offense that is
a felony violation of—
3686 UNITED STATES v. HARRELL
to” parentheticals do not limit the statute’s effect, but serve
simply as descriptive aids.
I
Harrell knew that she would never be approved to visit the
Washington Corrections Center in Shelton, Washington. The
center was trying to combat a growing problem with
smuggled-in contraband, and Harrell had a lengthy criminal
record and was under federal supervision at the time for bank
fraud.2 Her solution was simple: she assumed someone else’s
identity. In her written visitor’s application, Harrell listed
another individual’s name, date of birth, and Social Security
number, and, when she visited the facility, she presented a
Washington state identification card in that same person’s
name.
Harrell’s subterfuge did not last long, however. Corrections
officials discovered that one of the facility’s regular visitors
was on active supervision—a fact not reflected in their
records. By comparing photographs, they identified Harrell as
that visitor, and, during Harrell’s next visit, they confronted
her about her subterfuge. Before she was arrested, Harrell
admitted both her true identity and the fact that she had previ-
ously smuggled drugs into the facility.
***
(11) section 208, 811, 1107(b), 1128B(a), or 1632 of the
Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. [§§ ] 408, 1011, 1307(b),
1320a-7b(a), and 1383a) (relating to false statements relat-
ing to programs under the Act).
§ 1028A(c)(11) (emphasis added).
2
Notably, Harrell was convicted after she obtained numerous Washing-
ton state identification cards by using the Social Security numbers and
dates of birth of individuals whose identities had been stolen. She then
used these identifications to open bank accounts into which she deposited
counterfeit checks, withdrawing the funds before the checks were discov-
ered to be fraudulent.
UNITED STATES v. HARRELL 3687
On January 6, 2010, a grand jury returned a three-count
indictment against Harrell, charging her with one count of
Social Security number fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 408(a)(7)(B), one count of aggravated identity theft, in vio-
lation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, and one count of possession of
ammunition as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g). Harrell moved the district court to dismiss the
§ 1028A count for the same reasons she now raises on appeal.
The district court denied her motion. On March 3, 2010, she
pled guilty to the § 408(a)(7)(B) and § 1028A counts pursuant
to the terms of a conditional plea agreement, reserving the
right to appeal the district court’s denial of her motion to dis-
miss the § 1028A count. In return, the Government dismissed
the felon in possession charge. After being sentenced, Harrell
timely filed her notice of appeal.
II
Harrell claims that § 1028A does not apply to her because
the application of § 1028A(c)(11) is limited by the parentheti-
cal that follows its enumeration of specific predicate offenses.
She argues that the district court erred in not dismissing that
count because her conviction for violating § 408(a)(7)(B) was
not related to any attempt to “appl[y] for or obtain[ ] benefits”
under the Social Security Act. We do not agree.
The parenthetical is clearly a descriptive term, not a limit-
ing principle—a conclusion compelled by the fact that the
interpretation urged by Harrell is not supported by the plain
language of the statute and would render some of the statute’s
provisions meaningless.3 In so holding, we join with the First
Circuit on this very point, United States v. Persichilli, 608
3
Subsection (c)(11) is not the only subsection containing a “relating to”
parenthetical; rather, each of the eleven subsections contains a similar “re-
lating to” parenthetical that follows the enumeration of either specific stat-
utory sections or entire chapters of the United States Code. Cf.
§ 1028A(c).
3688 UNITED STATES v. HARRELL
F.3d 34, 40-41 (1st Cir. 2010), and adhere to the guidance of
our prior decision in United States v. Galindo-Gallegos, 244
F.3d 728, 734 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Therefore, the straightforward
reading of the parenthetical in the aggravated felony statute,
‘relating to alien smuggling,’ is that it merely describes and
does not limit subsection (ii) ‘transporting’ offenses that may
be a predicate for the aggravated felony.”), which concerned
the import of identical “relating to” parenthetical language in
8 U.S.C. § 1101.
“As in any case of statutory construction, our analysis
begins with ‘the language of the statute.’ And where the statu-
tory language provides a clear answer, it ends there as well.”
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999)
(citation omitted). To aid our inquiry, we rely on our estab-
lished rules of statutory construction, which instruct us to con-
sider not only the words used in a particular section but also
the statute as a whole. United States v. Cabaccang, 332 F.3d
622, 627 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“[W]e must interpret stat-
utes as a whole, giving effect to each word and making every
effort not to interpret a provision in a manner that renders
other provisions of the same statute inconsistent, meaningless
or superfluous.” (alteration in original) (quoting Boise Cas-
cade Corp. v. EPA, 942 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 1991)
(internal quotation marks omitted))).
[1] Reviewing the language of subsection (c)(11) alone, we
are hard-pressed to see how Congress might have intended the
parenthetical to be accorded a limiting effect rather than a
descriptive one. The phrase “relating to” does not itself imply
exclusivity; rather, it plainly reflects a descriptive character.
Persichilli, 608 F.3d at 40 (“But the [§ 1028A(c)(11)] paren-
thetical is not phrased as a limitation: it merely provides a
short-hand description of what several of the cited sections
primarily cover.”); id. at 41 (“A mere summary description of
a cross-reference, as in paragraph 11, . . . cannot alter the
unambiguous language that encompasses violations of section
UNITED STATES v. HARRELL 3689
208 without qualification.”); see also Galindo-Gallegos, 244
F.3d at 734.
In addition, as the Government contends in its briefs, to
accord the parenthetical a limiting effect would render Con-
gress’ inclusion of 42 U.S.C. § 1307(b) a superfluous nullity
as that section does not “relat[e] to false statements relating
to programs under the Act”—much less relate to “applying
for or obtaining [Social Security] benefits.” Cf.
§ 1028A(c)(11). Instead, § 1307(b) criminalizes the making of
false statements “with the intent to elicit information as to the
social security account number, date of birth, employment,
wages, or benefits of any individual” absent any regard for
whether those statements relate to a Social Security program.4
Because we must “mak[e] every effort not to interpret a provi-
sion in a manner that renders other provisions of the same
statute inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous,” this fact
alone would compel us to affirm the district court. Cabac-
cang, 332 F.3d at 627; see Galindo-Gallegos, 244 F.3d at 733
(“We reject Galindo-Gallegos[’] reading [of the “relating to”
4
In its entirety, § 1307(b) provides:
(b) Whoever, with the intent to elicit information as to the social
security account number, date of birth, employment, wages, or
benefits of any individual (1) falsely represents to the Commis-
sioner of Social Security or the Secretary that he is such individ-
ual, or the wife, husband, widow, widower, divorced wife,
divorced husband, surviving divorced wife, surviving divorced
husband, surviving divorced mother, surviving divorced father,
child, or parent of such individual, or the duly authorized agent
of such individual, or of the wife, husband, widow, widower,
divorced wife, divorced husband, surviving divorced wife, sur-
viving divorced husband, surviving divorced mother, surviving
divorced father, child, or parent of such individual, or (2) falsely
represents to any person that he is an employee or agent of the
United States, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, upon con-
viction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $10,000
for each occurrence of a violation, or by imprisonment not
exceeding 5 years, or both.
3690 UNITED STATES v. HARRELL
clause], because it does not make sense of all the words of the
statute.”).
[2] We do not have to rely simply on that point, however,
because there exists even more evidence refuting Harrell’s
claim. First, in § 1028A(c)(4), Congress provides a clear
example of the language it uses when it intends a limiting
clause. In contrast to the “relating to” parentheticals used in
every one of the eleven enumerated subsections in this sec-
tion, Congress provided:
(4) any provision contained in this chapter (relating
to fraud and false statements), other than this section
or section 1028(a)(7);
§ 1028A(c)(4) (emphasis added). As explained in Galindo-
Gallegos, Congress’ use of clear and distinct language when
it intends a limiting effect underscores the descriptive charac-
ter of the “relating to” parenthetical. 244 F.3d at 733-34.
Moreover, in other subsections, Congress used a
perfectly clear approach to articulate a limiting
rather than descriptive parenthetical. For example, in
subsection J, there is a descriptive parenthetical
using the same “relating to” form as the subsection
N parenthetical at issue in this case, followed by a
limiting parenthetical, “if it is a second or subse-
quent offense.” Subsection J can only be read as
using the “relating to” language as descriptive and
the “if” language as limiting, so there is no reason to
doubt that Congress meant the “relating to” language
in N to be descriptive as well. The function of the
descriptive language appears to be to make reading
the statute easier, so that one does not have to look
up each citation to see what it is about, and to protect
against scrivener’s error in getting the statute from
the drafting desk to the United States Code.
UNITED STATES v. HARRELL 3691
Id. at 734.
[3] Second, as has been described, Congress’ use of “relat-
ing to” parentheticals is widely understood to have a descrip-
tive import. E.g., Persichilli, 608 F.3d at 40-41; Galindo-
Gallegos, 244 F.3d at 733-34; United States v. Monjaras-
Castaneda, 190 F.3d 326, 330 (5th Cir. 1999) (“A parentheti-
cal is, after all, a parenthetical, and it cannot be used to over-
come the operative terms of the statute.” (quoting Cabell
Huntington Hosp., Inc. v. Shalala, 101 F.3d 984, 990 (4th Cir.
1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v.
Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 959-60 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding “relat-
ing to” parenthetical in 26 U.S.C. § 6531(6) descriptive);
United States v. Garner, 837 F.2d 1404, 1419 (7th Cir. 1987)
(“[W]hen read in context, the parenthetical ‘relating to brib-
ery’ does not limit the incorporation of [18 U.S.C. § ] 201
[into § 1961(1)(B)], but describes it. . . . As another court has
said, the parentheticals are only ‘visual aids,’ designed to
guide the reader through what would otherwise be a litany of
numbers.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States
v. Herring, 602 F.2d 1220, 1223 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that
the “relating to” parenthetical in 18 U.S.C. § 1961 was
“merely to aid identification of [18 U.S.C.] § 2314 rather than
to limit” its application). But see Evangelista v. Ashcroft, 359
F.3d 145, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2004). Harrell does not convince us
that we should treat the parentheticals in § 1028A(c) any dif-
ferently.
[4] Because we conclude that the plain text of § 1028A(c)
demonstrates that the “relating to” parentheticals serve as
descriptive aids intended by Congress “to make reading the
statute easier, so that one does not have to look up each cita-
tion to see what it is about, and to protect against scrivener’s
error in getting the statute from the drafting desk to the United
States Code,” Galindo-Gallegos, 244 F.3d at 734, that ends
our inquiry. We have no cause to trudge through the deep
mud of legislative history. See United States v. Gonzales, 520
U.S. 1, 6 (1997) (“Given the straightforward statutory com-
3692 UNITED STATES v. HARRELL
mand, there is no reason to resort to legislative history.
Indeed, far from clarifying the statute, the legislative history
only muddies the waters.” (citation omitted)). Neither do we
find the rule of lenity to be of any aid to Harrell’s claim. See
United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 17 (1994) (“The rule
of lenity, however, applies only when, after consulting tradi-
tional canons of statutory construction, we are left with an
ambiguous statute.”); see also Callanan v. United States, 364
U.S. 587, 596 (1961).
AFFIRMED.