Case: 10-20124 Document: 00511415664 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/17/2011
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
March 17, 2011
No. 10-20124 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff–Appellee
v.
MARLON RAFAEL PINO GONZALEZ,
also known as Marlon Rafael Pino,
also known as Marlon Rafael Pino-Gonzalez,
also known as Jose Alfredo Sovalbarro,
Defendant–Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
Before KING, DeMOSS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
EDWARD C. PRADO, Circuit Judge:
Marlon Rafael Pino Gonzalez appeals the sentence assigned to him for
illegally reentering the country after having been deported. He argues that
the district court miscalculated his criminal-history points by including a state
misdemeanor conviction in which his waiver of counsel was constitutionally
invalid. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Gonzalez, a Nicaraguan citizen, pleaded guilty to illegally reentering the
United States after having been deported subsequent to a conviction for an
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No. 10-20124
aggravated felony, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). The presentence
investigation report (PSR) assessed a total of seven criminal-history points,
three of which were attributable to a 2008 South Carolina misdemeanor
conviction for unlawful entry into an enclosed place. The seven criminal-history
points yielded a criminal-history category of IV. Based on a total offense level
of 21 and a criminal-history category of IV, the advisory Guidelines range was
57 to 71 months.
Prior to the sentencing hearing, Gonzalez filed a written objection to the
PSR in which he argued that the South Carolina conviction should not
be included in his criminal history because he had neither been represented
by counsel nor made a constitutionally valid waiver of counsel before pleading
guilty. Specifically, he argued that the South Carolina judge had not explicitly
informed him of his right to appointed counsel. He attached to his objection the
transcript of the South Carolina plea colloquy, which showed the following
exchange between the state trial judge and Gonzalez:
THE COURT: All right, sir. I need you to understand
that you are entitled to have a lawyer at
this proceeding. Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And you wish to give up your right to have
that lawyer? Do you wish [to] give up your
right to a lawyer?
THE DEFENDANT: Uh-huh (Affirmative), yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. Now, sir, I need for you to
understand I’m of the very strong opinion
it is never a wise thing to do for a lay
person to represent themselves in a court
of law, especially one like this that involves
a criminal matter. Do you understand
that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
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THE COURT: All right. I tell you what, sir, if ever during
this process you get a little bit too nervous
or you change your mind and you feel you
need to go talk to [a] lawyer just let me
know and I’ll allow you to step down, okay?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
The district court overruled his objection and sentenced him to sixty
months’ imprisonment. Had the district court sustained the objection, the
criminal-history category would have been III, and the advisory Guidelines
range would have been 46 to 57 months. Gonzalez appeals.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review a district court’s sentencing guidelines interpretations de
novo and its findings of fact for clear error.” United States v. Rubio, 629 F.3d
490, 492 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
“The Sixth Amendment safeguards to an accused who faces incarceration
the right to counsel at all critical stages of the criminal process. The entry of a
guilty plea, whether to a misdemeanor or a felony charge, ranks as a ‘critical
stage’ at which the right to counsel adheres.” Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 80–81
(2004) (citations omitted). The Constitution requires that “any waiver of the
right to counsel be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id. at 87–88. In Tovar,
the Supreme Court held that this “constitutional requirement is satisfied when
the trial court informs the accused of the nature of the charges against him, of
his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of allowable
punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea.” Id. at 81. Finally, “the
Constitution requires collateral review of a defendant’s prior conviction used to
enhance a federal sentence . . . when the defendant alleges that the conviction
was obtained in violation of [his] Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” United
States v. Longstreet, 603 F.3d 273, 276 (5th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).
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The question raised in this case is whether a waiver of counsel is
constitutionally invalid where a trial judge, before accepting a guilty plea from
an uncounseled defendant, did not specifically inform him of his right to
appointed counsel. The Supreme Court was faced with a very similar question
in Tovar, where the defendant maintained that his waiver of counsel was invalid
because he “was never made aware by the court . . . of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation.” 541 U.S. at 85 (alteration in original)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The case thus concerned “the
extent to which a trial judge, before accepting a guilty plea from an uncounseled
defendant, must elaborate on the right to representation.” Id. at 81.
In answering this question, the Court did not delineate or describe how a
trial court should “inform[ ] the accused . . . of his right to be counseled regarding
his plea.” Id. Rather, the Court asked the broader question of whether Tovar’s
waiver of counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, stating:
We have described a waiver of counsel as intelligent when the
defendant “knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes
open.” We have not, however, prescribed any formula or script to be
read to a defendant who states that he elects to proceed without
counsel. The information a defendant must possess in order to
make an intelligent election, our decisions indicate, will depend on
a range of case-specific factors, including the defendant’s education
or sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature of the
charge, and the stage of the proceeding.
Id. at 88 (citations omitted).
That was the approach followed by this court in Mallard v. Cain, 515 F.3d
379 (5th Cir. 2008), United States v. Benavides–Hernandez, 151 F. App’x 337
(5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (unpublished), and United States v. Rea–Tapia, 134
F. App’x 711 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (unpublished), under circumstances
very similar to this case. See Mallard, 515 F.3d at 382 (basing its determination
on the fact that the defendant “fail[ed] to provide any evidence or make an offer
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of proof that he did not know he had a right to counsel at trial or to appointed
counsel” (emphasis added)); Rea–Tapia, 134 F. App’x at 714 (describing the
“ultimate question” as “whether [the defendant] knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right to counsel”).
The closest case on point is Benavides–Hernandez, in which the defendant
argued that his two previous uncounseled guilty pleas were invalid because he
did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. 151 F. App’x at
338. Just as in this case, the defendant asserted that, during his plea colloquy,
the magistrate judge “informed [him] that he had the right to counsel,” but
“did not expressly inform [him] that he had the right to court-appointed counsel
if he could not afford an attorney.” Id. at 339. We conceded this fact, but held
that the defendant had nevertheless “not met his collateral-attack burden of
showing that his waiver of counsel . . . was not competent and intelligent”
because he “did not provide evidence or make an offer of proof that he did not
know he had a right to appointed counsel.” Id. at 340 (emphasis added). While
unpublished, Benavides–Hernandez is highly persuasive because we explicitly
rejected the identical argument that Gonzalez advances here.
We look to state law for the appropriate burden of proof in a collateral
attack on an uncounseled conviction. Mallard, 515 F.3d at 382 (citing Tovar,
541 U.S. at 92). Under the law of South Carolina, where Gonzalez’s prior
conviction was obtained, it is the defendant’s burden to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he did not competently and intelligently
waive his right to the assistance of counsel. United States v. Guerrero–Robledo,
565 F.3d 940, 944 (5th Cir. 2009); State v. Payne, 504 S.E.2d 335, 338 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1998). The South Carolina court in Payne relied on that state’s
presumption of regularity given to final judgments to reach this conclusion. 504
S.E.2d at 338. That presumption applies equally here. See id. at 336, 338
(applying the presumption where the available portion of the transcript was
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inconclusive as to whether the defendant’s constitutional rights had been
violated).
We find that Gonzalez has not met his burden to show that his waiver of
counsel in the South Carolina proceeding was constitutionally invalid.
Significantly, Gonzalez does not assert that he was unaware of his right to court-
appointed counsel at his plea colloquy. He simply asserts that the court failed
to specifically advise him of this right. See Tovar, 541 U.S. at 85 (finding it
significant that Tovar did not assert that he was unaware of his right to counsel
prior to pleading guilty and at the plea hearing). The factors that courts are to
consider in assessing the voluntariness of a waiver of counsel—including the
stage of the proceedings, the defendant’s background, age, experience, and the
straightforwardness of the charge—also weigh in favor of finding that Gonzalez’s
waiver was voluntary. See id. at 88 (listing the factors); Mallard, 515 F.3d at
382–83 (applying the factors). At the time of the South Carolina proceeding,
Gonzalez was thirty-four years old and had previously served seven years for an
aggravated assault conviction, in which he had been represented by counsel. See
Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 37 (1992) (“We have previously treated evidence of
a defendant’s prior experience with the criminal justice system as relevant to the
question whether he knowingly waived constitutional rights . . . .”). He faced
sentencing on a relatively straightforward crime (unlawful entry into an
enclosed place) with a correspondingly brief sentence (thirty days in prison,
which he had already served). He had a ninth-grade education. Finally, the
exchange in question took place at a plea hearing. See Mallard, 515 F.3d at 382
(noting, in discussing an allegedly constitutionally invalid guilty plea, that a
pretrial stage “allows for a less searching or formal colloquy”) (citing Patterson
v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 299 (1988)).
In light of these facts, the transcript excerpt that Gonzalez presented in
support of his argument is insufficient to meet his burden to show that his
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waiver of counsel in the South Carolina proceeding was not knowing and
intelligent. The waiver was therefore constitutionally valid, and the district
court properly considered the South Carolina conviction in sentencing Gonzalez.
AFFIRMED.
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