UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-5133
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ERIC BAILEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
(1:09-cr-00017-CCB-1)
Submitted: February 18, 2011 Decided: March 18, 2011
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Allen H. Orenberg, THE ORENBERG LAW FIRM, North Bethesda,
Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, Clinton J. Fuchs, Andrea L. Smith, Assistant United
States Attorneys, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Eric Bailey entered a conditional plea of guilty to
possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006), reserving the right
to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
On appeal, Bailey challenges both the validity of the search
warrant that led to discovery of the weapon in question and the
court’s application of the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule. Finding no error, we affirm.
“Generally, evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment is subject to suppression under the exclusionary rule,
the overarching purpose of which is to deter future unlawful
police conduct.” United States v. Andrews, 577 F.3d 231, 235
(4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted),
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1031 (2009). “The deterrence
objective, however, is not achieved through the suppression of
evidence obtained by an officer acting with objective good faith
within the scope of a search warrant issued by a magistrate.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “under . . .
[the] good faith exception [in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897 (1984)], evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant
issued by a neutral magistrate does not need to be excluded if
the officer’s reliance on the warrant was objectively
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reasonable.” Andrews, 577 F.3d at 236 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
An officer’s reliance on a warrant will not be
“objectively reasonable,” however, in four circumstances:
“where (1) probable cause is based on statements in an affidavit
that are knowingly or recklessly false; (2) the magistrate fails
to perform a neutral and detached function and instead merely
rubber stamps the warrant,” United States v. Gary, 528 F.3d 324,
329 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Leon, 468 U.S. at 914-15); (3) the affidavit is “so lacking in
indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its
existence entirely unreasonable,” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923
(internal quotation marks omitted); or “(4) the warrant was so
facially deficient that the executing officer could not
reasonably have assumed it was valid.” Gary, 528 F.3d at 329.
We may proceed directly to the question of good faith without
first considering the underlying validity of the warrant.
United States v. Legg, 18 F.3d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing
Leon, 468 U.S. at 925). This court reviews a district court’s
application of the Leon exception de novo. United States v.
DeQuasie, 373 F.3d 509, 520 (4th Cir. 2004).
Bailey argues that the exclusionary rule does not
apply because the search warrant affidavit misled the magistrate
to believe that a controlled buy of heroin took place at the
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residence at which police recovered the firearm and that the
affidavit was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to
render belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. Bailey
fails to allege that the warrant was based on any “knowingly or
recklessly false statements in the affidavit,” Gary, 528 F.3d at
329, because the affidavit does not indicate where the
controlled drug buy took place. Thus, the district court
correctly determined that it was the fact of the sale, and not
the location, that established probable cause to search Bailey’s
residence. Moreover, the search warrant affidavit set forth
specific allegations linking Bailey to drug activity and
establishing his residence. In light of the relevant law, these
allegations are more than sufficient to establish that reliance
on the warrant was reasonable. See, e.g., United States v.
Williams, 548 F.3d 311, 319-22 (4th Cir. 2008). Accordingly,
the district court did not err in denying Bailey’s motion to
dismiss and motion for reconsideration.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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