FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
March 24, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 04-4273
(D.C. No. 2:03-CR-178-02-DAK)
IRVEN DOUGLAS ADAMS, (D. Utah)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER
Before MURPHY and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges.*
In response to a motion filed by the appellant on March 22, 2011, the court now
recalls its mandate for the limited purpose of entering an Amended Order and Judgment
that replaces the original Order and Judgment issued in connection with this appeal on
January 2, 2007. The minor change to page 10 of the slip opinion is clerical in nature and
has no effect on the substantive analysis or outcome of the appeal. The Amended Order
and Judgment is filed nunc pro tunc to the original file date of January 2, 2007.
The on-line reporting services who make the decisions of this court available to the
*
The Honorable Michael W. McConnell, originally a member of this panel,
resigned his commission effective August 31, 2009. The two remaining members of this
panel, who are in agreement, have determined this matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
public or to customers of the reporting service shall withdraw the prior decision and shall
replace it with the accompanying Amended Order and Judgment.
An amended mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER
Clerk of Court
by: Douglas E. Cressler
Chief Deputy Clerk
2
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS January 2, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee
No. 04-4273
v. (D.C. No. 2:03-CR-178-02-DAK)
(Utah)
IRVEN DOUGLAS ADAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT**
Before MURPHY, SEYMOUR, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
Irven Douglas Adams was charged with five counts of distribution of
methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); one count of conspiracy to
distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; one count of possession of
ephedrine and pseudoephedrine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(c)(2); nine counts of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(I);
**
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App.
P. 32.1 (eff. Dec. 1, 2006) and 10th Cir. R. 32.1 (eff. Jan. 1, 2007).
and one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1956(h). He appeals his conviction and the district court’s imposition of a life sentence.
We affirm.
Prior to trial, Mr. Adams moved to sever two of the methamphetamine distribution
counts because he wished to testify regarding some of the charges but not others. The
district court denied the motion but indicated it would “fashion instructions” and “limit
cross” to ensure a “fair trial.” Rec., vol. III at 9. The court later stated that cross-
examination would be limited to those topics “reasonably related” to the questions asked,
and that “if [Mr. Adams] goes broad [the government is] entitled to go broad.” Rec., vol.
XIV at 19.
During Mr. Adams’ trial, the Supreme Court decided Blakely v. Washington, 542
U.S. 296, 313 (2004), holding that facts not admitted by petitioner or found by a jury may
not be used to establish a sentence above the prescribed statutory maximum. Due to
uncertainty as to Blakely’s impact on the federal sentencing guidelines, both parties
agreed to submit sentencing enhancement determinations to the jury in the form of special
verdicts. The form included sentencing related questions the jury was required to answer
only if it first found Mr. Adams guilty of the accompanying crime. Specifically, the jury
was required to determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether a “dangerous weapon was
possessed in connection with drug trafficking;” whether Mr. Adams
“was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants;”
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and the quantity of drugs involved. Rec., vol. I at 861. Mr. Adams did not object to the
inclusion of these additional sentencing related questions on the jury verdict form.
The jury convicted Mr. Adams on all counts and determined special verdicts in the
amount of drugs involved, that Mr. Adams was a leader or organizer of criminal activity,
and that a dangerous weapon was possessed in connection with drug trafficking. The
district court calculated Mr. Adams’ sentencing guidelines range to be life in prison and
imposed a life sentence. At sentencing, however, the court stated “[i]f the guidelines are
found to be unconstitutional . . . the sentence would be 360 months or 30 years.” Rec.,
vol XXI at 34.
On appeal, Mr. Adams argues he is entitled to a new trial because the district court
committed a structural error by combining guilt determinations and sentencing
enhancements in a single trial and verdict form, referring to this as “Blakelyization.” He
also asserts the court erred in denying his motion for severance. Finally, he contends the
court committed plain error by sentencing him in a mandatory fashion and requests we
apply the alternative sentence the court provided.
Mr. Adams contends the “Blakelyization” of his trial, the submission of guilt and
enhancement questions to the jury in a single proceeding, constitutes a structural error
warranting a new trial. Because Mr. Adams did not object at trial to the non-bifurcated
proceeding,1 we analyze this potential error under the four prong plain error test. United
1
Not only did Mr. Adams not object, his counsel asserted that a Blakelyized trial was to
his tactical advantage. See Rec., vol. XV (“Court: Blakely was decided during this trial.” Mr.
Adams’ counsel responded: “I told [Mr. Adams] that was probably the best thing going for
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States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 732 (10th Cir. 2005). “Plain error occurs when
there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and which (4)
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.
(citation and quotations omitted). A “structural error,” is a defect affecting “the
framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process
itself.” Id. at 733-34. Where this more serious type of error is at issue, the third prong of
the plain error test is relaxed, and structural errors “can be corrected regardless of their
effect on the outcome.” Id. at 733 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735
(1993)). Structural errors, however, are extremely rare. See Gonzalez- Huerta, 403 F.3d
at 734 (“if the defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a
strong presumption that any other constitutional errors that may have occurred are not
structural errors” (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (brackets
omitted)).
Mr. Adams contends his argument that the introduction of evidence pertaining to
both guilt and sentencing enhancements in a non-bifurcated trial qualifies as structural
error is supported by the Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005), not to fashion a remedy reliant on such a trial process. What Mr. Adams fails to
recognize, however, is that the Court eschewed this remedy not because doing so would
create widespread structural errors, but because such a system would have undermined
Congressional intent. Id. at 254. Having the jury decide sentencing issues clearly does
him.”).
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not constitute structural error.
Mr. Adams has not met the third prong under the traditional plain error test. The
evidence proffered regarding Mr. Adams’ sentencing issues – drug amounts, whether he
was a leader or organizer, the possession of a gun in connection with drug trafficking –
would have been admissible in a strictly guilt phase determination in relation to his
conspiracy and distribution charges. We are thus not persuaded that Mr. Adams’ ability
to present a defense was compromised, as he asserts. Accordingly, even assuming Mr.
Adams satisfied the first two prongs, he has failed to demonstrate prejudice. The
“Blakelyization” of Mr. Adams’ trial was not plain error.
Mr. Adams also contends the district court erred in denying his motions to sever.
A court may “order separate trials of counts” where a unified trial “appears to prejudice a
defendant.” FED. R .CRIM. P. 14(a). “Whether to grant severance under Rule 14 rests
within the discretion of the district court. . . .” United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420,
1427 (10th Cir. 1997). “The defendant bears a heavy burden of showing real prejudice
from the joinder of the two counts.” United States v. Martin, 18 F.3d 1515, 1518 (10th
Cir. 1994) (citations and quotations omitted). To establish “real prejudice, the defendant
must demonstrate that the alleged prejudice he suffered outweighed the expense and
inconvenience of separate trials.” Id. (citation and quotations omitted). In this case,
dozens of witnesses testified. The extensive evidence presented by the government
would have been admissible against Mr. Adams under Rule 404(b) to show intent or plan
regardless of severance. Moreover, presenting the same extensive evidence and witnesses
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in two separate trials is a time-consuming, inconvenient, and inefficient use of judicial
resources.
Mr. Adams sought a severance because he wished to testify regarding a limited
number of counts while avoiding cross-examination in relation to the rest of his charges.
At trial, the district court limited cross-examination, requiring Mr. Adams “not be
questioned about things [he] did not raise.” But Mr. Adams thereafter testified and
“opened the door basically on everything on [his] direct,” and therefore the government
was given wide latitude in cross-examination. Rec., vol. XXI at 19. There is no
prejudice to Mr. Adams where his decision to testify and the content he chose to discuss
on direct became the basis for cross-examination. Even if there were some prejudice to
be found here, it would not outweigh the cost of saddling the court, parties, and witnesses
with separate trials requiring presentation of repetitious evidence and testimony. The
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Adams motions’ to sever.
Finally, Mr. Adams asserts his life sentence must be reversed in light of Booker,
which held judge-found facts employed to enhance a defendant’s sentence beyond the
guideline range violate the Sixth Amendment. To rectify this constitutional infirmity, the
Court fashioned a broad remedy, making the guidelines advisory rather than mandatory in
all cases. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245. A district court’s failure to apply the guidelines as
advisory in accordance with Booker presents what we have termed a non-constitutional
error. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 731-32. Because Mr. Adams did not raise this issue
below, his claim on appeal is subject to plain error review. See id. at 732. The first two
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prongs of the plain error test are met here because the “mandatory application of the
Guidelines is error and that error is now plain.” United States v. Williams, 403 F.3d 1188,
1199-1200 (10th Cir. 2005). To satisfy the third prong of plain error review, Mr. Adams
must show “a reasonable probability that, but for the error claimed, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 733 (citation and
quotation omitted). He has done so here. During sentencing, the district court noted its
dissatisfaction with the mandatory guidelines sentence of life imprisonment and
expressed a preference to incarcerate Mr. Adams for a shorter term. See Rec., vol. XXI at
30 (“I think 360 months is long enough.”); id. at 31 (“if the guidelines go away” and
sentence length were to rest within the discretion of the district court, a 360 month
sentence would be “long enough.”). Mr. Adams has shown that the sentence he would
have received under a non-binding guidelines regime differs from the sentence he did
receive.
The fourth prong requires error that “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 732 (citation
and quotations omitted). We do not automatically “conclude that the fourth prong is met
as a matter of course” where “the third prong is satisfied.” Id. at 736. To satisfy the final
prong of the plain error test, therefore, Mr. Adams must make a greater showing than
simple prejudice as required by the third prong. The fourth prong “is formidable, as we
will only exercise our discretion when an error is ‘particularly egregious’ and the failure
to remand for correction would produce a ‘miscarriage of justice.’” United States v.
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Trujillo-Terrazas, 405 F.3d 814, 820 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted).
We found the fourth prong to be met in challenges to non-constitutional Booker
errors in Trujillo-Terrazas, 405 F.3d 814, and Williams, 403 F.3d 1188. In Trujillo-
Terrazas, 405 F.3d at 819, the district court applied a substantial mandatory sentencing
enhancement that failed to reflect the “relatively trivial” prior criminal history upon
which it was based. (Mr. Trujillo-Terrazas received a 16-point enhancement for arson, a
crime of violence, for flicking a lit match into an automobile in frustration at his ex-
girlfriend’s new love interest.) Id. Although we remanded for resentencing there, we
nevertheless expressed our discomfort with any notion of remanding in cases where the
“district court felt particular sympathy for” the defendant but the objective application of
the § 3553(a) factors did not warrant a lower sentence, as it did in Trujillo-Terrazas. In
such cases, a remand would be based upon the particular, subjective sympathies of an
individual judge, and a spate of remands on such a basis might have the opposite effect of
actually impugning “the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 732.2
2
In United States v. Williams, 403 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2005), the district court stated that
“the sentence I am about to impose is so grossly out of proportion to the offense conduct here
that it just smacks of something that certainly isn’t justice . . . I think this punishment is gross; I
think it’s immoral.” Id. at 1198. The court expressed frustration that the mandatory guidelines
failed to permit the court to consider the circumstances of the offense. See Id. at 1199 (“[he] had
a gun literally thrust at him, and he put it in his pocket, and he ends up getting shot, and I wonder
who the real victim in this case is.”). Applying the plain error test on appeal, we held the fourth
prong had been met. Although we did not expressly articulate the role of an objective § 3553(a)
analysis, the district court in Williams was essentially requesting the discretion it now holds
under § 3553(a)(1) to “consider the nature and circumstance of the offense” in imposing a
sentence. In Williams, as in Trujillo-Terrazas, an objective consideration of the § 3553(a)
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Here, Mr. Adams has not presented any evidence that objective consideration of §
3553(a) factors warrants a lesser sentence. To the contrary, at sentencing the district
court was “convinced [Mr. Adams] was a big drug dealer, ” rec., vol. XXI at 30, and the
court expressed no particular rationale for a shorter sentence that might suggest a lesser
sentence is warranted under § 3553(a). The court simply stated a general feeling that 30
years is a “long, long time.” Id. at 31. Prior to sentencing, Mr. Adams sought a
downward departure to reflect sentencing disparities between him and a co-defendant
who reached a plea agreement for a lower sentence and two other factors found in the
record on appeal at 943-48. None of these arguments for a lesser sentence “present[] a
compelling case that objective consideration of the § 3553(a) factors warrants a departure,
and perhaps a significant departure,” as was the case in Trujillo-Terrazas, 405 F.3d at
821. We decline to reverse Mr. Adam’s sentence based on plain error.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
factors, particularly § 3553(a)(1), supported a finding that the fourth prong was met.
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