FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
TENTH CIRCUIT March 29, 2011
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
CARL DEMETRIUS MITCHELL,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 10-7077
(D.C. No. CIV-09-308-RAW-KEW)
BRUCE HOWARD, Warden,
(E.D. Okla.)
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
Before LUCERO, EBEL and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Carl Demetrius Mitchell, an Oklahoma state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks to
appeal the district court’s dismissal of his § 2241 habeas petition alleging a denial of due
process during an August 2008 prison disciplinary proceeding that resulted in Mitchell’s
loss of earned good-time credits. We construe Mitchell’s Notice of Appeal and Opening
Brief as a request for a certificate of appealability (COA). Exercising jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a), we conclude that Mitchell has not made a substantial
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, we deny his request for a
COA and dismiss this appeal.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Carl Mitchell has been in the custody of the Oklahoma Department of
Corrections (ODOC) since June 2002. The record shows that on August 8, 2008, while
Mitchell was incarcerated at the Jackie Brannon Correctional Center (JBCC) in
McAlester, Oklahoma, the JBCC law library supervisor observed Mitchell walking away
from the prison canteen when he was supposed to be at his assigned housing unit
checking in from his job at the law library. Inmates from Mitchell’s housing unit were
not permitted to go to the canteen on that particular day, a fact that Mitchell knew. Four
days later, Mitchell was issued a disciplinary report charging him with a violation of
ODOC Rule 03-1, which prohibits a prisoner from being present in an authorized area.1
During a subsequent investigation of the report, Mitchell declined to present any
documentary evidence to the investigating officer and indicated that he did not wish to
call any witnesses at his disciplinary hearing.
Mitchell appeared before a disciplinary hearing officer (DHO) on August 14,
2008. Relying on the librarian’s report that Mitchell was present in an unauthorized area
and the fact that Mitchell failed to present any witnesses or documentary evidence to
1
Pursuant to ODOC Rule 03-1, an inmate may not be present “[o]utside defined
boundaries within [the] facility as defined by [the] facility or present in a restricted area.”
Department Offender Disciplinary Procedures, OP-060125, Attach. A, § 03-1, available
at http://www.doc.state.ok.us/offtech/060125aa.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2011).
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support his defense, the DHO found Mitchell guilty of the alleged misconduct. As a
sanction, the DHO revoked ninety of Mitchell’s earned good-time credits. The JBCC
warden affirmed the DHO’s decision on September 5, 2008, and the ODOC Director
denied Mitchell’s final administrative appeal on October 1, 2008.
On January 9, 2009, Mitchell filed a petition for judicial review in the Oklahoma
County District Court pursuant to Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 564.1. That court denied relief on
March 4, 2009, and the journal entry of the court’s final order was filed on March 6,
2009. On April 21, 2009, Mitchell appealed to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
(OCCA). But the OCCA dismissed the appeal as untimely, explaining that “[a]n appeal
to this Court, from the final order of the District Court adjudicating the petition for
judicial review, must be filed within thirty (30) days from the date the District Court
order is filed with the Clerk of the District Court.” Mitchell v. Okla. Dep’t of Corr., No.
REC-2009-367 (Okla. Crim. App. May 22, 2009).
On August 12, 2009, Mitchell filed an application for § 2241 habeas relief in the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, alleging that he was denied due
process during the August 2008 disciplinary proceeding. On September 9, 2010, the
district court dismissed Mitchell’s petition as procedurally barred because Mitchell failed
to file for relief in the OCCA within the thirty-day time period prescribed by OCCA
rules. Mitchell then filed a motion for reconsideration in which he argued that his
procedural default should be excused because the clerk of the state district court failed to
mail him a certified copy of the journal entry of the court’s final order—without which he
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could not initiate an appeal in the OCCA—and because he was “actually innocent” of the
disciplinary charge against him. The district court found both arguments without merit
and denied the motion on October 29, 2010. That same day, the district court also denied
Mitchell’s request for a COA.
On appeal, Mitchell urges this Court to excuse his procedural default and to grant
relief on the merits of his claim.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
A state prisoner seeking habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 must obtain a
certificate of appealability (COA) before this Court may consider the merits of his appeal.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 867 (10th Cir. 2000);
see also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (“[U]ntil a COA has been issued
federal courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to rule on the merits of appeals from habeas
petitioners.”). In order to obtain a COA, an applicant must make “a substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Where, as here, the
district court has dismissed a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the
merits of the prisoner’s constitutional claims, “a COA should issue when the prisoner
shows . . . that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid
claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (emphasis added). “Each component of the
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§ 2253(c) showing is part of a threshold inquiry, and a court may find that it can dispose
of the application in a fair and prompt manner if it proceeds first to resolve the issue
whose answer is more apparent from the record and arguments.” Id. at 485. The COA
determination “does not require full consideration of the factual or legal bases adduced in
support of the [petitioner’s constitutional] claims.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336. Instead,
we conduct “an overview of the claims in the habeas petition and a general assessment of
their merits.” Id.
After reviewing Mitchell’s appellate filings, the district court’s orders, and the
record on appeal, we conclude that “jurists of reason” could not “find it debatable
whether [Mitchell’s] petition states a valid claim of the denial of [due process].” Slack,
529 U.S. at 484. Accordingly, we need not examine the district court’s procedural ruling
and Mitchell’s arguments that his procedural default should be excused. See United
States v. Springfield, 337 F.3d 1175, 1178 (10th Cir. 2003) (exercising the discretion to
proceed directly to the issue of whether the petitioner had made a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right and declining to review the district court’s procedural
ruling).
II. Due Process Claims
Mitchell’s habeas petition alleges that the JBCC disciplinary proceedings violated
his due process rights for three reasons: (1) the DHO failed to produce and review
exculpatory evidence—namely, a “security work-crew log” that allegedly would have
shown that Mitchell signed in at his housing unit before proceeding to the canteen; (2) the
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DHO failed to support her finding of guilt with a written statement of the reasons and
evidentiary basis for the finding; and (3) there was no evidence to support the DHO’s
finding of guilt. Each of these claims lacks merit.
“It is well settled that an inmate’s liberty interest in his earned good time credits
cannot be denied without the minimal safeguards afforded by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.” Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1444 (10th Cir. 1996)
(internal quotation marks omitted). But because “[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are
not part of a criminal prosecution, . . . the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such
proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).
Where a prison disciplinary hearing may result in the loss of good time credits, . . .
the inmate must receive: (1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges;
(2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals,
to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a
written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the
disciplinary action.
Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) (citing Wolff, 418
U.S. at 563–67). Further, “revocation of good time does not comport with the minimum
requirements of procedural due process unless the findings of the prison disciplinary
board are supported by some evidence in the record.” Id. (emphasis added) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
A. Failure to Consider the Security Work-Crew Log
In his habeas petition, Mitchell claims that during his disciplinary hearing he
requested that the DHO review the security work-crew log that was maintained at
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Mitchell’s housing unit on August 8, 2008.2 According to Mitchell, this log would have
shown that he signed in at his housing unit before proceeding to the canteen; therefore, it
would have rebutted the librarian’s statement that Mitchell was at the canteen instead of
checking in at his assigned housing unit.
Due process requires a DHO to produce and review evidence alleged by a prisoner
to be supportive of his defense unless doing so would be “unduly hazardous to
institutional safety or correctional goals.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566; Howard v. U.S.
Bureau of Prisons, 487 F.3d 808, 813–14 (10th Cir. 2007). But assuming, without
deciding, that the DHO in this case committed error by refusing to consider the work-
crew log, the error was harmless to Mitchell and therefore cannot form the basis of a due
process claim. See Howard, 487 F.3d at 814–15 & n.5 (recognizing that a DHO’s
unjustified refusal to review a videotape alleged to be exculpatory might constitute
harmless error and remanding to the district court to make “a determination of
harmlessness on a fuller factual record”); cf. Grossman v. Bruce, 447 F.3d 801, 805 (10th
Cir. 2006) (“[E]rrors made by prison officials in denying witness testimony at official
hearings are subject to harmless error review.”).
A DHO’s failure to review documentary evidence alleged to be exculpatory is
2
We note that nothing in the record provides proof that Mitchell requested
production of the work-crew log at the disciplinary hearing. All the record shows is that
Mitchell did not request this document when he met with the investigating officer and
was provided with copies of all of the evidence that would be presented to the DHO.
Nevertheless, for present purposes we will assume that Mitchell did make such a request.
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harmless if that evidence would not actually help the prisoner because his theory of
exculpation is legally incorrect. See Howard, 487 F.3d at 814 n.5; Griffin v. Brooks, 13
F. App’x 861, 864 (10th Cir. July 12, 2001) (unpublished). Here, Mitchell’s theory is
that the work-crew log would have demonstrated his innocence of the alleged misconduct
by proving that he signed in at his housing unit before proceeding to the canteen. This
theory is flawed because it misconstrues the nature of the charge against him. Mitchell
was charged with being present in an unauthorized area, in violation of ODOC Rule 03-1.
The librarian’s description of the incident makes clear that Mitchell was not authorized to
be at the canteen on August 8, 2008, because he was assigned to Housing Unit B, and, as
Mitchell knew, only inmates assigned to Housing Unit C were permitted to go to the
canteen that day. (R. at 28–29.) Thus, whether Mitchell signed in at his housing unit
before proceeding to the canteen is legally irrelevant, as Mitchell’s conduct of being
present at the canteen without authorization violated Rule 03-1 in any event.3 For this
reason, the DHO’s failure to produce and review the work-crew log was not prejudicial to
Mitchell, and the error, if any, was harmless.
B. Failure to Provide a Written Statement of Reasons
Mitchell’s second claim, that the DHO failed to provide a written statement of the
3
Significantly, ODOC Rule 03-3 prohibits “[f]ailure to follow sign-in/sign-out
procedures.” Department Offender Disciplinary Procedures, OP-060125, Attach. A,
§ 03-3, available at http://www.doc.state.ok.us/offtech/060125aa.pdf (last visited Mar. 5,
2011). Although Rule 03-3, like Rule 03-1, falls under a general heading labeled
“Present in Unauthorized Area” in the ODOC procedures manual, id., Mitchell was
charged only for a violation of Rule 03-1.
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reasons for her finding of guilt, is contradicted by the record. The DHO filled out a form
titled “Disciplinary Hearing Report.” (R. at 33.) In a section labeled “Evidence relied on
for finding of Guilt,” the DHO explained that she relied on the librarian’s description of
the incident and the fact that Mitchell produced no evidence to the contrary. (Id.) We
have no difficulty in concluding that this written statement meets the due process
requirements announced in Wolff. See, e.g., Mitchell, 80 F.3d at 1445 (holding that
written statement that inmate was found guilty on the basis of officer’s report satisfied
Wolff); Taylor v. Wallace, 931 F.2d 698, 703 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that written
statement that inmate was found guilty on the basis of confidential witness testimony
satisfied Wolff).
C. Lack of Evidence to Support the DHO’s Finding
Mitchell’s final claim, that no evidence supported the DHO’s finding of guilt, is
similarly belied by the record. The “some evidence” standard of Hill is satisfied if “there
is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the [DHO].”
Hill, 472 U.S. at 455–56 (emphasis added). Even if the only evidence supporting the
DHO’s decision “might be characterized as meager,” we cannot say that a due process
violation occurred as long as “the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of
the [DHO] were without support or otherwise arbitrary.” Id. at 457. Here, the librarian’s
statement that Mitchell was present at the canteen without authorization amounts to direct
evidence of a violation of ODOC Rule 03-1 and easily satisfies the “some evidence”
requirement.
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CONCLUSION
Because we conclude that jurists of reason could not debate whether Mitchell’s
§ 2241 habeas petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right, we
DENY Mitchell’s request for a COA and DISMISS this appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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