FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
March 30, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSElisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
DERRICK R. PARKHURST,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 10-8078
ROBERT LAMPERT, Warden, Wyoming (D.C. No. 2:07-CV-00278-CAB)
Department of Corrections, MICHAEL (D. Wyo.)
MURPHY, Director, Wyoming
Department of Corrections, in their
official and individual capacities,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, TACHA and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is, therefore,
submitted without oral argument.
This appeal represents the second time this case is before this court. Derrick R.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Parkhurst, a prisoner in the custody of the Wyoming Department of Corrections (WDOC)
proceeding pro se, brought this action against the director of WDOC and the warden of
the Wyoming State Penitentiary (WSP) (collectively, Defendants) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, asserting that their refusal to deliver copies of his newsletter to prisoners in the
WSP violated his right to free expression under the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution and his right to freedom of speech and the press under the Wyoming
Constitution.
In the first appeal, after the United States District Court for the District of
Wyoming granted summary judgment on all claims in favor of Defendants, this court
remanded Parkhurst’s claims for injunctive relief against Defendants in their official
capacities to the district court to analyze WDOC Policy and Procedure (WPP)
#5.401(IV)(E)(6)(x)1, which Defendants assert as the basis for their refusal to deliver the
newsletters, pursuant to Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). See Parkhurst v. Lampert
(Parkhurst I), 339 F. App’x 855 (10th Cir. 2009). On remand, based on its Turner
analysis, the district court concluded that WPP #5.401(IV)(E)(6)(x) is reasonably related
to legitimate penological interests, granted summary judgment to Defendants on the
official capacity claims for injunctive relief and dismissed the action. ROA, Vol. 1 at
1
This is the revised version of the mail regulation in effect at the time Parkhurst’s
rights were allegedly violated, which was codified at WPP #5.401(IV)(C)(1)(k). ROA,
Vol. 1 at 156, 304. The current and former versions of this regulation are materially
identical as concerns the issues in this case. Compare id. at 147 (documenting WPP
#5.401(IV)(C)(1)(k)) with id. at 178 (documenting WPP #5.401(IV)(E)(6)(x)). Thus, our
analysis will refer to WPP #5.401(IV)(E)(6)(x).
2
455–56. Parkhurst appeals this decision. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Although the facts are described in detail in Parkhurst I, we provide a brief
summary of the relevant circumstances herein. As the chairman of the Wyoming
Prisoners’ Association (WPA) and an official of the Wyoming chapter of the Citizens
United for Rehabilitation of Errants (WY-CURE), Parkhurst published a combined
newsletter for these associations. ROA, Vol. 1 at 18–19. According to Parkhurst, this
newsletter provided “a review of current cases filed in the federal courts, and other
matters of interest to Wyoming prisoners.” Id. at 19. In 2006, Parkhurst shipped
approximately 693 copies of the newsletter together in one box addressed to the WSP. Id.
Within the box, the copies of the newsletter were individually addressed to specific
prisoners. Id. In addition to the newsletters shipped together, Parkhurst mailed
newsletters individually to certain prisoners, including himself. Id. at 64, 82.
Prison officials at the WSP refused to deliver the newsletters contained in the box
to the intended prisoner recipients based on WPP #5.401(IV)(E)(6)(x). Id. at 64–65. This
regulation provides, in relevant part, that: “[Non-privileged] [m]ail may be rejected if it
contains material not intended for the addressee; but rather material intended for other
parties.” Id. at 178. However, the newsletters that were individually mailed were
delivered to the intended prisoner recipients. Id. at 64, 82.
Parkhurst brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Defendants
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in their official and individual capacities, claiming that the refusal to deliver the
newsletters contained in the box violated his rights under the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution and under the Wyoming Constitution. Id. at 10–21. Parkhurst
sought an order prohibiting Defendants from refusing to deliver newsletters shipped in
this manner in the future and damages for the cost of reproducing and reissuing the
newsletters. Id. at 20.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all claims.
Id. at 222. This court affirmed the district court’s decision granting summary judgment to
Defendants on the individual capacity claims for damages based on qualified immunity.
Parkhurst I, 339 F. App’x at 862. However, this court reversed the district court’s
decision regarding the official capacity claims for injunctive relief and remanded the case
to the district court to analyze WPP #5.401(IV)(E)(6)(x) pursuant to Turner, and to
further develop the record as necessary. Id. at 860–61.
On remand, the district court ordered both parties to submit briefs regarding the
issues identified in Parkhurst I. ROA, Vol. 1 at 273–74. Parkhurst requested that the
district court remove its protective order on discovery and require Defendants to respond
to his interrogatories, which were submitted prior to his first appeal. Id. at 275–76. The
magistrate judge refused to remove the protective order because Parkhurst’s
interrogatories did not relate to the Turner analysis, id. at 289–97, and the district court
affirmed this decision, id. at 437. Defendants submitted a brief asserting that WPP
#5.401(IV)(E)(6)(x) satisfied the “legitimate penological interest test” established in
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Turner. Id. at 303–15. To support their argument, Defendants provided copies of the
Wyoming Mail Management Manual, id. at 321–61, and WPP #5.401, id. at 363–400. In
his response, Parkhurst did not address Defendants’ assertions concerning WPP
#5.401(IV)(E)(6)(x). See id. at 401–04.
Analyzing WPP #5.401(IV)(E)(6)(x) pursuant to Turner, the district court
concluded that the regulation “is facially valid.” Id. at 456. Thus, the district court
granted summary judgment to Defendants on the official capacity claims for injunctive
relief and dismissed the action. Id. Parkhurst appeals this decision.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Parkhurst contends that the district court improperly granted summary
judgment to Defendants on the official capacity claims for injunctive relief. “We review
the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court .
. . .” Wirsching v. Colorado, 360 F.3d 1191, 1195 (10th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment
is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Because Parkhurst is proceeding pro se, we construe his pleadings liberally. See Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1991).
As explained in Parkhurst I, the relevant inquiry in this case is whether WPP
#5.401(IV)(E)(6)(x) is “‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’” 339 F.
App’x at 860 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). To make this determination, the Supreme
Court in Turner identified four relevant considerations: (1) “whether the governmental
5
objective underlying the regulations at issue is legitimate and neutral, and [whether] the
regulations are rationally related to that objective,” Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,
414 (1989) (explaining the first Turner factor); (2) “whether there are alternative means
of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates,” Turner, 482 U.S. at 90; (3)
“the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and
other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally,” id.; and (4) whether
there are any “obvious, easy alternatives [that] may be evidence that the regulation is not
reasonable, but is an exaggerated response to prison concerns,” id. at 90–91 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The district court applied these factors and concluded that
WPP #5.401(IV)(E)(6)(x) is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. We
agree.
First, we conclude that WPP #5.401(IV)(E)(6)(x) has a legitimate and neutral
purpose and is rationally related to that objective. Defendants assert that WPP
#5.401(IV)(E)(6)(x) “was promulgated to help maintain order and safety” within the
WSP. ROA, Vol. 1 at 309. As explicitly stated in WPP #5.401(I)(A), the purpose of the
prison mail regulatory scheme is:
to establish a uniform set of guidelines and procedures which will be used by
Wyoming Department of Corrections’ correctional facilities to process incoming
and outgoing inmate mail in order to decrease the likelihood of the introduction of
contraband; decrease the likelihood of dissemination of information in violation of
this policy; promote the safety and security of staff, inmates and the public; and
promote the good order of the correctional facility.
Id. at 157 (emphasis added). In Thornburgh, the Supreme Court explained that
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“protecting prison security . . . [is] a purpose . . . [that] is central to all other corrections
goals.” 490 U.S. at 415 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, we agree with the
district court that WPP #5.401(IV)(E)(6)(x) has a legitimate purpose. Further, to assess
its neutrality, this court must inquire as to “whether [a] prison regulation[] restricting
inmates’ [constitutional] . . . rights operated . . . without regard to the content of the
expression.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Because WPP #5.401(IV)(E)(6)(x)
applies to all non-privileged mail regardless of content, see ROA, Vol. 1 at 176, we agree
with the district court that this is a neutral regulation.
Defendants assert that WPP #5.401(IV)(E)(6)(x) “‘is logically and rationally
connected to the legitimate interest of preserving safety and order within the prison
walls.’” Aplee. Br. at 16 (quoting the district court’s order at ROA, Vol. 1 at 452). In
Thornburgh, the Supreme Court explained that incoming publications present particular
types of security risks in prisons. 490 U.S. at 412–13. Publications targeted to general
audiences, even when individual inmates solicit these materials, “reasonably may be
expected to circulate among prisoners” with the potential to exacerbate tensions and cause
disruptive conduct. Id. at 412. As a result, the Supreme Court recognized that “prison
officials [must] be given broad discretion to prevent such disorder.” Id. at 413.
Defendants asserted that WPP #5.401(IV)(E)(6)(x) is intended to restrict “the inflow of
unsolicited mail into the prison.” ROA, Vol. 1 at 311. Defendants explained that
unsolicited, bulk mailings often contain opinions that non-subscribing inmates may find
inflammatory. Id. As a result, non-subscribing inmates exposed to these materials “may
7
feel compelled to act out to demonstrate their opposition to th[e unsolicited] view.” Id.
By restricting all bulk mailings, WPP #5.401(IV)(E)(6)(x) forecloses this source of
inmate discontent. Thus, this regulation is logically and rationally related to maintaining
prison safety and order.
Second, we conclude that Parkhurst had alternative means of exercising his
asserted rights. As the district court noted, Parkhurst “could, and did, individually
distribute several copies of the newsletter via individually and correctly addressed United
States mail, including one copy to himself.” Id. at 454. Further, the record establishes
that, after prison officials refused to deliver the newsletters contained in the box,
Parkhurst proceeded to distribute his newsletters each month in individual mailings to
approximately twenty-one prison inmates. Id. at 143. Because Parkhurst could distribute
his newsletters to prisoners in individual mailings, he had an alternative means of
exercising his rights.
Third, accommodating Parkhurst’s asserted rights and permitting delivery of bulk
mailings would have an impact on prison safety and order. As previously discussed,
unsolicited bulk mailings targeted to general audiences circulate throughout prisons with
the potential to exacerbate tensions, lead to unrest among prisoners, and cause disruptive
conduct. Beyond the safety concerns, Defendants contend that allowing bulk mailings
would impose a burden on prison resources – namely prison employee time to sort and
deliver the bulk mailings and facility space to store these items. Id. at 314.
Fourth, we conclude that WPP #5.401(IV)(E)(6)(x) is not an “exaggerated
8
response” to the legitimate penological interest of order and safety. In Turner, the
Supreme Court explained that “if an inmate claimant can point to an alternative that fully
accommodates the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests, a
court may consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable
relationship standard.” 482 U.S. at 91. Parkhurst failed to present any alternative means
of accommodating his rights.
Based on this analysis, we conclude that WPP #5.401(IV)(E)(6)(x) is facially valid
and that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Defendants on the
official capacity claims for injunctive relief. Parkhurst’s arguments to the contrary are
unavailing. Parkhurst asserts that the district court failed to adequately develop the record
on remand and that genuine issues of material fact exist. In Parkhurst I, we remanded this
case to the district court to analyze WPP #5.401(IV)(E)(6)(x) pursuant to Turner and to
further develop the record as necessary for that analysis. By ordering the parties to
submit briefs that address the issues identified in Parkhurst I, and by evaluating the
regulation based on the Turner factors, the district court adequately developed the record.
Further, the district court properly refused to remove its protective order on discovery
because the interrogatory requests Parkhurst sought to enforce did not relate to the Turner
analysis. See ROA, Vol. 1 at 201–10.
With regard to the alleged factual issues, Parkhurst has not raised a genuine issue
concerning any fact material to the Turner analysis. Specifically, Parkhurst declined to
address Defendants’ assertions regarding the legitimate penological interests of WPP
9
#5.401(IV)(E)(6)(x). Instead, Parkhurst contends that the refusal to deliver the newsletters
was based on the content of the newsletters rather than the asserted mail regulation. Aplt.
Br. at 2. This alleged factual issue is irrelevant to the Turner analysis. Further, as noted in
Parkhurst I, Parkhurst’s allegations concerning Defendants’ intent and motive for refusing
to deliver the newsletters are “conclusory, self-serving statement[s] unsupported by any
evidence.” 339 F. App’x at 862. As a result, Parkhurst failed to raise a genuine issue of
material fact.
III. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the district court’s decision. Further, we DENY Parkhurst’s motion
to proceed in forma pauperis and order him to immediately remit the unpaid balance due
of the filing fee.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Chief Judge
2
We note that, while this appeal was pending, Parkhurst accumulated his third
“strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Specifically, in
Parkhurst v. Pittsburgh Paints Inc., Nos. 10-8026, 10-8027, 2010 WL 4069430 at *2 (Oct.
19, 2010), this court held that: “With the dismissal of these two appeals, Mr. Parkhurst
has now earned at least three strikes under [28 U.S.C.] § 1915(g); accordingly, he may
bring no more civil actions or appeals under § 1915 unless he is under imminent danger
of serious physical injury.” As a result, Parkhurst may not proceed in forma pauperis in
any future civil filing unless he is “under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g).
10