Leiva-Perez v. Holder

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM ALEXANDER LEIVA-PEREZ,  No. 09-71636
Petitioner,
Agency No.
v.
 A094-773-199
ERIC H. HOLDER JR., Attorney
General, ORDER AND
OPINION
Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals

Filed April 1, 2011

Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw, Raymond C. Fisher and
Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam Opinion

4319
4322 LEIVA-PEREZ v. HOLDER

COUNSEL

Richard Miyamoto, Phung, Miyamoto & Diaz, LLP, Los
Angeles, California, and Salman Alam, Newport Beach, Cali-
fornia, Appointed Pro Bono Amicus Curiae Counsel for the
petitioner.

Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division,
Thomas B. Fatouros, Senior Litigation Counsel, Lynda Do
and Karen Y. Stewart, Civil Division/Office of Immigration
Litigation, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for the
respondent.
 LEIVA-PEREZ v. HOLDER 4323
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

William Alexander Leiva-Perez filed a petition for review
of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal
and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Tor-
ture (CAT). Along with his petition for review, Leiva-Perez
filed a motion for a stay of removal. Pursuant to Ninth Circuit
General Order 6.4(c)(1), Leiva-Perez’s motion caused a tem-
porary stay to issue. See De Leon v. INS, 115 F.3d 643, 644
(9th Cir. 1997). We hereby grant Leiva-Perez a stay of
removal pending determination of his case on its merits and
issue this opinion to clarify our standard for stays of removal
in light of Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749 (2009).

I. Background

Before passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No.
104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546, aliens appealing a deci-
sion of the BIA were generally entitled to an automatic stay
of their orders of removal pending judicial review. See 8
U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(3) (repealed 1996). With IIRIRA, Congress
eliminated the automatic stay provision, but left intact the
authority of the courts of appeal to grant stays as a matter of
discretion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B) (2006); see also
Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 477, 480 (9th Cir. 2001) (en
banc).

[1] Congress did not specify the standard that courts
should apply in evaluating an alien’s request to stay his
removal pending our adjudication of his petition for review.
In Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513 (9th Cir. 1998), we decided
to apply “the same standards employed by district courts in
evaluating motions for preliminary injunctive relief” to those
4324 LEIVA-PEREZ v. HOLDER
stay requests. Id. at 514. We explained that to justify a stay
under that standard:

Petitioner must show either a probability of success
on the merits and the possibility of irreparable
injury, or that serious legal questions are raised and
the balance of hardships tips sharply in petitioner’s
favor. These standards represent the outer extremes
of a continuum, with the relative hardships to the
parties providing the critical element in determining
at what point on the continuum a stay pending
review is justified.

Id. (citations omitted). This “continuum” was essentially the
same as the “sliding scale” approach we long applied to
requests for preliminary injunctions, whereby “the elements
of the preliminary injunction test are balanced, so that a
stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker show-
ing of another.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632
F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011).

[2] The Abbassi formulation remained our standard for
stays of removal until an aspect of it—its treatment of the
irreparable harm factor—was rejected as too lenient in Nken.
Nken’s principal holding was that stays of removal are gov-
erned by “the traditional test for stays,” rather than 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(f)’s higher standard for enjoining an alien’s removal,
but it also endeavored to clarify “what that [traditional stay]
test is.” 129 S. Ct. at 1760.1

Nken began by noting the four factors that have been con-
sidered when evaluating whether to issue a stay:
1
Subsection 1252(f)(2) of Title 8 provides in full: “Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, no court shall enjoin the removal of any alien pur-
suant to a final order under this section unless the alien shows by clear and
convincing evidence that the entry or execution of such order is prohibited
as a matter of law.”
 LEIVA-PEREZ v. HOLDER 4325
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong
showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits;
(2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured
absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will
substantially injure the other parties interested in the
proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.

Id. at 1761 (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776
(1987) (quotation marks omitted)). “The first two factors,”
Nken said, “are the most critical.” Id.

[3] We will say more about each of these factors in a
moment, but pause first to emphasize that while, as we
develop later, Nken raised the minimum permissible showing
of irreparable harm necessary to justify a stay of removal, it
did not disturb the overall manner in which courts balance the
various stay factors once they are established. Nken held that
if the petitioner has not made a certain threshold showing
regarding irreparable harm—and we discuss what that thresh-
old is below—then a stay may not issue, regardless of the
petitioner’s proof regarding the other stay factors. See Nken,
129 S. Ct. at 1760-61. Our precedent varied from Nken as to
the irreparable harm threshold, but not as to the bedrock
requirement that stays must be denied to all petitioners who
did not meet the applicable irreparable harm threshold,
regardless of their showing on the other stay factors. See
Abbassi, 143 F.3d at 514. By the same token, even certainty
of irreparable harm has never entitled one to a stay. See Nken,
129 S. Ct. at 1760 (“A stay is not a matter of right, even if
irreparable injury might otherwise result. It is instead an exer-
cise of judicial discretion. . . .” (citation and quotation marks
omitted)). In short, a proper showing regarding irreparable
harm was, and remains, a necessary but not sufficient condi-
tion for the exercise of judicial discretion to issue a stay.

Aside from raising the irreparable harm threshold, Nken did
not directly address the common practice of courts to balance
the relative equities of the stay factors. We find it significant,
4326 LEIVA-PEREZ v. HOLDER
though, that Nken twice invoked Hilton as stating the “tradi-
tional” test for stays, and that Hilton endorsed the same bal-
ancing approach sanctioned by Abbassi. See Nken, 129 S. Ct.
at 1756 (citing Hilton as setting forth the “traditional” test for
stays); id. at 1760 (same).

Hilton considered the circumstances under which a federal
court of appeals should stay the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus following the district court’s granting of the writ,
thereby maintaining the petitioner’s custodial detention pend-
ing the resolution of the state’s appeal. After noting the vari-
ous interests of the state and the petitioner that the court could
take into consideration in adjudicating the stay request, Hilton
explained that the balance of the relative equities “may
depend to a large extent upon determination of the State’s
prospects of success in its appeal.” 481 U.S. at 778.

Where the State establishes that it has a strong likeli-
hood of success on appeal, or where, failing that, it
can nonetheless demonstrate a substantial case on
the merits, continued custody is permissible if the
second and fourth factors in the traditional stay anal-
ysis militate against release. Where the State’s show-
ing on the merits falls below this level, the
preference for release should control.

Id. (citations omitted). We take Nken’s endorsement of Hilton
as an indication that we should continue to employ the type
of “continuum” articulated in Abbassi, albeit with a few
refinements discussed below.

Further, in a closely analogous situation—a request for a
stay pending the filing and disposition of a petition for a writ
of certiorari—the Supreme Court recently emphasized the use
of a flexible approach bearing a strong resemblance to the
Abbassi continuum. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct.
705, 710 (2010) (per curiam) (“In close cases the Circuit Jus-
tice or the Court will balance the equities and weigh the rela-
 LEIVA-PEREZ v. HOLDER 4327
tive harms to the applicant and to the respondent.”); see also
Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 129 S. Ct.
2275, 2276 (2009) (per curiam) (same).

We note, too, that a panel of our court recently reached a
similar conclusion to ours as to the effect of recent Supreme
Court cases—in particular, Winter v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008)—on the continu-
ing viability of the “sliding scale” approach to preliminary
injunctions. See Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131-32. Wild Roc-
kies held that although Winter had raised the bar on what must
be shown on the irreparable harm prong to justify a prelimi-
nary injunction, it did not alter our authority to balance the
elements of the preliminary injunction test, so long as a cer-
tain threshold showing is made on each factor. See id. (“[W]e
hold that the ‘serious questions’ approach survives Winter
when applied as part of the four-element Winter test. In other
words, ‘serious questions going to the merits’ and a hardship
balance that tips sharply toward the plaintiff can support issu-
ance of an injunction, assuming the other two elements of the
Winter test are also met.”). Although there are important dif-
ferences between a preliminary injunction and a stay pending
review, discussed at length in Nken, see 129 S. Ct. at 1756-59,
we do not believe they would support a balancing approach
for preliminary injunctions but not stays.

If anything, a flexible approach is even more appropriate in
the stay context. Whereas “the extraordinary remedy of
injunction” is the means by which a court “directs the conduct
of a party . . . with the backing of its full coercive powers,”
a stay operates only “upon the judicial proceeding itself . . . .
either by halting or postponing some portion of the proceed-
ing, or by temporarily divesting an order of enforceability.”
Id. at 1757-58 (quotation marks omitted). In other words,
although “[a] stay pending appeal certainly has some func-
tional overlap with an injunction,” id. at 1758, stays are typi-
cally less coercive and less disruptive than are injunctions.
See id. (“An alien seeking a stay of removal pending adjudi-
4328 LEIVA-PEREZ v. HOLDER
cation of a petition for review does not ask for a coercive
order against the Government, but rather for the temporary
setting aside of the source of the Government’s authority to
remove.”).

[4] We therefore conclude that the general balancing
approach used in Abbassi remains in place, and move on to
consider whether and—if so, how—Nken affects the individ-
ual elements to be balanced.

II. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

[5] The first showing a stay petitioner must make is “a
strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits.” Id.
at 1761 (quoting Hilton, 481 U.S. at 776) (quotation marks
omitted). There is some uncertainty as to the exact degree of
likely success that stay petitioners must show, due principally
to the fact that courts routinely use different formulations to
describe this element of the stay test. See Mohammed v. Reno,
309 F.3d 95, 100-02 (2d Cir. 2002) (collecting cases). What
is clear, however, is that to justify a stay, petitioners need not
demonstrate that it is more likely than not that they will win
on the merits.

[6] As the Second Circuit has noted, Nken “did not suggest
that this factor requires a showing that the movant is ‘more
likely than not’ to succeed on the merits.” Citigroup Global
Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd.,
598 F.3d 30, 37 (2d Cir. 2010). Indeed, the case from which
Nken takes the stay standard, Hilton, permitted a stay to issue
upon “demonstrat[ion] [of] a substantial case on the merits,”
so long as the other factors support the stay. Hilton, 481 U.S.
at 778. With regard to the likelihood of success factor, Nken
said only that “[i]t is not enough that the chance of success on
the merits be ‘better than negligible,’ ” and that “[m]ore than
a mere ‘possibility’ of relief is required.” 129 S. Ct. at 1761
(citations omitted). Insofar as we have long required more on
the “likelihood of success” factor than what Nken rejected, we
 LEIVA-PEREZ v. HOLDER 4329
do not believe Nken changed that aspect of the Abbassi for-
mulation. See Abbassi, 143 F.3d at 514 (requiring a stay peti-
tioner to show either “a probability of success on the merits”
or that “serious legal questions are raised,” depending on the
strength of the petitioner’s showing on the other stay factors).

We find additional evidence that this stay factor does not
require the moving party to show that her ultimate success is
probable from other post-Nken opinions. In an opinion
released several months after Nken, Justice Breyer, sitting as
a Circuit Justice, explained that “whether the stay applicant
has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the
merits” means, in the context of a stay pending a petition for
writ of certiorari, “that it is reasonably likely that four Justices
of this Court will vote to grant the petition for writ of certio-
rari, and that, if they do so vote, there is a fair prospect that
a majority of the Court will conclude that the decision below
was erroneous.” O’Brien v. O’Laughlin, 130 S. Ct. 5, 6 (2009)
(Breyer, in chambers) (citing Hilton, 481 U.S. at 776)
(emphases added). A few months later in Hollingsworth, the
full Supreme Court used similar language, but replaced “rea-
sonably likely” with “a reasonable probability.” 130 S. Ct. at
710. Likewise, in the preliminary injunction context, this cir-
cuit has held that so long as other requirements are met, “seri-
ous questions going to the merits . . . can support issuance of
a preliminary injunction.” Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135.

Such a rule, moreover, makes good sense. A more stringent
requirement would either, in essence, put every case in which
a stay is requested on an expedited schedule, with the parties
required to brief the merits of the case in depth for stay pur-
poses, or would have the court attempting to predict with
accuracy the resolution of often-thorny legal issues without
adequate briefing and argument. Such pre-adjudication adju-
dication would defeat the purpose of a stay, which is to give
the reviewing court the time to “act responsibly,” rather than
doling out “justice on the fly.” Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1757. As
the Court said in Nken, “[t]he whole idea is to hold the matter
4330 LEIVA-PEREZ v. HOLDER
under review in abeyance because the appellate court lacks
sufficient time to decide the merits.” Id. at 1760; see also
Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1140 (Mosman, D.J., concurring)
(“In this setting, it can seem almost inimical to good judging
to hazard a prediction about which side is likely to succeed.”);
Mohammed, 309 F.3d at 102 (holding that a stay of removal
may issue even when the alien’s chance of ultimate success
is less than 50 percent because, “[i]f the likelihood were more
than 50 percent, the appellant would be required to persuade
the stay panel that he was more likely than not to win the
appeal before the merits panel, just to obtain the critical
opportunity to maintain the status quo until the merits panel
considers the appeal”).

[7] There are many ways to articulate the minimum quan-
tum of likely success necessary to justify a stay—be it a “rea-
sonable probability” or “fair prospect,” as Hollingsworth, 130
S. Ct. at 710, suggests; “a substantial case on the merits,” in
Hilton’s words, 481 U.S. at 778; or, as articulated in Abbassi,
143 F.3d at 514, that “serious legal questions are raised.”2 We
think these formulations are essentially interchangeable, and
that none of them demand a showing that success is more
likely than not. Regardless of how one expresses the require-
ment, the idea is that in order to justify a stay, a petitioner
must show, at a minimum, that she has a substantial case for
relief on the merits.

III. Irreparable Harm

[8] While Nken did not affect Abbassi’s likelihood of suc-
cess prong, it did overrule that part of Abbassi that permitted
2
See also, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1046 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“a substantial probability of success”); Kenyeres v. Ashcroft,
538 U.S. 1301, 1306 (2003) (Kennedy, J., in chambers) (“a reasonable
likelihood”); Mori v. Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 454 U.S. 1301, 1303
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers) (“a reasonable probability of success
on the merits”).
 LEIVA-PEREZ v. HOLDER 4331
a stay to issue upon the petitioner “simply showing some
‘possibility of irreparable injury.’ ” Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1761
(quoting Abbassi, 143 F.3d at 514) (emphasis added).
Although Nken did not say what ought to replace Abbassi’s
“possibility” standard, it quoted Winter for the proposition
that the “ ‘possibility’ standard is too lenient.” Id. (quoting
Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 375). Winter, in turn, was clear in hold-
ing that “plaintiffs seeking preliminary relief [are required] to
demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of
an injunction.” 129 S. Ct. at 375 (emphasis in original).

[9] We read Nken’s reference to Winter in this context as
indicating that to obtain a stay of removal, an alien must dem-
onstrate that irreparable harm is probable if the stay is not
granted. In other words, an alien’s burden with regard to
irreparable harm is higher than it is on the likelihood of suc-
cess prong, as she must show that an irreparable injury is the
more probable or likely outcome. Cf. Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d
at 1131-32 (reaching the same conclusion in the preliminary
injunction context).

Nken did not make explicit this differential treatment of the
level of irreparable harm and likelihood of success on the
merits, but there is support for it in the text of the traditional
stay test. Whereas the question on the irreparable harm stay
factor is “whether the applicant will be irreparably injured
absent a stay,” the first stay factor asks “whether the stay
applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to suc-
ceed on the merits.” Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1761 (emphases
added). The former inquiry asks what will happen, while the
latter asks, in essence, whether the stay petitioner has made a
strong argument on which he could win. We have already
explained why, on a stay application, a court often cannot rea-
sonably determine whether the petitioner is more likely than
not to win on the merits, but typically it is easier to anticipate
what would happen as a practical matter following the denial
of a stay. As the Wild Rockies concurrence pointed out in the
preliminary injunction context:
4332 LEIVA-PEREZ v. HOLDER
While the Supreme Court [in Winter] cabined th[e]
flexibility [of the sliding scale approach] with regard
to the likelihood of harm, there are good reasons to
treat the likelihood of success differently. As
between the two, a district court at the preliminary
injunction stage is in a much better position to pre-
dict the likelihood of harm than the likelihood of
success. In fact, it is not unusual for the parties to be
in rough agreement about what will follow a denial
of injunctive relief.

Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1139 (Mosman, D.J., concurring).

In addition to rejecting our “possibility” standard, Nken
emphasized the individualized nature of the irreparable harm
inquiry. See Nken, 129 S. Ct. 1760-61; see also Hilton, 481
U.S. at 777 (“[T]he traditional stay factors contemplate indi-
vidualized judgments in each case.”). In particular, Nken held
that “[a]lthough removal is a serious burden for many aliens,
it is not categorically irreparable.” 129 S. Ct. at 1761.

Before IIRIRA, noncitizens were not permitted to pursue
petitions for review once they had left (or were removed
from) the United States because “the petition abated upon
removal.” Id. Therefore, the pre-IIRIRA automatic stay provi-
sion “reflected a recognition of the irreparable nature of
harm” caused by removal: a noncitizens’s removal prevented
her from obtaining judicial review. Id. With IIRIRA, how-
ever, Congress permitted noncitizens to pursue their petitions
for review even post-removal, “and those who prevail can be
afforded effective relief by facilitation of their return, along
with restoration of the immigration status they had upon
removal.” Id. Because Congress eliminated the source of cate-
gorical irreparable harm—the prohibition on pursuing peti-
tions for review from abroad—Congress also did away with
the automatic stay.

[10] For the same reason, Nken explained, we can no lon-
ger assume that “the burden of removal alone . . . constitute[s]
 LEIVA-PEREZ v. HOLDER 4333
the requisite irreparable injury.” Id. Instead, a noncitizen must
show that there is a reason specific to his or her case, as
opposed to a reason that would apply equally well to all aliens
and all cases, that removal would inflict irreparable harm—
for example, that removal would effectively prevent her from
pursuing her petition for review, or that, even if she prevails,
she could not be afforded effective relief. See id.; see also,
e.g., Desta v. Ashcroft, 365 F.3d 741, 748 (9th Cir. 2004) (“If
Desta or others like him are required to return to their coun-
tries of origin while they petition for review by this court,
they may not be able to return to this country even if they are
eventually successful on the merits of their petitions.”)

In asylum, withholding of removal and CAT cases, the
claim on the merits is that the individual is in physical danger
if returned to his or her home country. Consideration of the
likelihood of such treatment, determined apart from merits
issues such as whether any physical abuse would be on
account of a protected ground for asylum and withholding
purposes, or whether the alien is barred from relief as a crimi-
nal alien, should be part of the irreparable harm inquiry. See
Kenyeres v. Ashcroft, 538 U.S. 1301, 1305 (2003) (Kennedy,
J., in chambers) (“An opportunity to present one’s meritorious
grievances to a court supports the legitimacy and public
acceptance of a statutory regime. It is particularly so in the
immigration context, where seekers of asylum and refugees
from persecution expect to be treated in accordance with the
rule-of-law principles often absent in the countries they have
escaped. A standard that is excessively stringent may impede
access to the courts in meritorious cases.”).3 In addition, as we
have previously held, “[o]ther important [irreparable harm]
factors include separation from family members, medical
needs, and potential economic hardship.” Andreiu v. Ashcroft,
253 F.3d 477, 484 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
3
The merits questions would, of course, be pertinent to the independent
likelihood of success factor.
4334 LEIVA-PEREZ v. HOLDER
We do not intend the examples provided here to be an
exhaustive treatment of the ways in which an alien can dem-
onstrate irreparable harm. Indeed, in light of the individual-
ized consideration stay requests are to be afforded, such a
treatment would be impossible.

IV. Public Interest

[11] As for the third and fourth factors—assessing how a
stay would affect the opposing party and the interest of the
public—they merge where, as is the case here, the govern-
ment is the opposing party. See Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1762.
Here, too, Nken emphasized that we are to consider the partic-
ulars of each individual case, and may not “simply assume
that ‘[o]rdinarily, the balance of hardships will weigh heavily
in the applicant’s favor.’ ” Id. (quoting Andreiu, 253 F.3d at
484) (alteration in original). While we consider the “public
interest in preventing aliens from being wrongfully removed,
particularly to countries where they are likely to face substan-
tial harm,” we are also mindful of the fact that there is also
a public interest “in prompt execution of removal orders,”
which “may be heightened” in certain circumstances, such as
those involving “particularly dangerous” noncitizens. Id.

We emphasize that although petitioners have the ultimate
burden of justifying a stay of removal, the government is
obliged to bring circumstances concerning the public interest
to the attention of the court. Nken’s admonition that we can-
not base stay decisions on assumptions and “blithe asser-
tion[s],” id., applies with equal force to the government’s
contentions in opposing stay requests. The relevant circum-
stances would include any reason to believe that the petitioner
would not in fact be removed were the stay denied.

[12] In sum, and for the sake of clarity, we hold that in
light of Nken’s impact on our prior precedent, a petitioner
seeking a stay of removal must show that irreparable harm is
probable and either: (a) a strong likelihood of success on the
 LEIVA-PEREZ v. HOLDER 4335
merits and that the public interest does not weigh heavily
against a stay; or (b) a substantial case on the merits and that
the balance of hardships tips sharply in the petitioner’s favor.
As has long been the case, “[t]hese standards represent the
outer extremes of a continuum, with the relative hardships to
the parties providing the critical element in determining at
what point on the continuum a stay pending review is justi-
fied.” Abbassi, 143 F.3d at 514.

V. Application

With these precepts in mind, we turn to Leiva-Perez’s par-
ticular case. We hold that a stay of removal is warranted.

[13] First, Leiva-Perez has demonstrated that he is likely to
suffer irreparable harm if returned to his home country, El
Salvador. Leiva-Perez testified before the IJ, who found
Leiva-Perez credible, that he was personally targeted for
extortion and savage beatings by a particular group of individ-
uals affiliated with the Farabundo Martí National Liberation
Front (“FMLN”), a political party. These actions, if carried
out after removal, would certainly constitute irreparable harm.
Leiva-Perez’s testimony indicated that the extortion and beat-
ings are indeed likely to recur if he is forced to return to El
Salvador. Accordingly, Leiva-Perez has made a sufficient
showing that irreparable harm is probable, absent a stay.

He has also demonstrated a sufficiently strong likelihood of
success on the merits. The BIA’s sole reason for dismissing
Leiva-Perez’s asylum appeal was that he had failed to estab-
lish a nexus between the persecution he has suffered and his
claimed protected ground, political opinion. See Soriano v.
Holder, 569 F.3d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009). Because Leiva-
Perez filed his application after the REAL ID Act went into
effect, he must demonstrate that his political opinion was “one
central reason” why he was personally targeted for persecu-
tion. See Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 740-41 (9th
Cir. 2009).
4336 LEIVA-PEREZ v. HOLDER
[14] The IJ stated that the beatings and extortion Leiva-
Perez suffered were not on account of his political opinion
because they were simply “criminal matters.” The BIA seem-
ingly agreed, suggesting that Leiva-Perez had merely “a gen-
eral fear of crime and violence.” “[A] generalized or random
possibility of persecution” is, of course, insufficient to support
an asylum claim. Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir.
1998) (quotation marks omitted). But that does not mean that
where, as may be the case here, the persecutors were moti-
vated by an economic or other criminal motive in addition to
a protected ground, the petitioner cannot show a nexus. As we
held in Parussimova, “an asylum applicant need not prove
that a protected ground was the only central reason for the
persecution she suffered,” as “a persecutory act may have
multiple causes.” 555 F.3d at 740. Moreover, “an applicant
need not prove that a protected ground was the most impor-
tant reason why the persecution occurred.” Id. Although we
emphasize that our review is preliminary at this point, Leiva-
Perez has a substantial case—a case which raises serious legal
questions, or has a reasonable probability or fair prospect of
success—that the BIA erred in requiring more of a nexus than
is warranted under Parussimova. He has therefore made a suf-
ficiently strong showing of likely success on the merits.

[15] As for the final two factors of the stay analysis, Leiva-
Perez argues that the relative equities weigh heavily in his
favor, based principally on the public’s interest in ensuring
that we do not deliver aliens into the hands of their persecu-
tors and the fact that he is not currently detained, and there-
fore the government is incurring no expense while he seeks
judicial review. The government has made no arguments to
the contrary, nor any showing as to whether the Department
of Homeland Security will actually take steps to remove
Leiva-Perez relatively soon if the stay is denied. On these
facts, the public interest weighs in favor of a stay of removal.

[16] In sum, Leiva-Perez has demonstrated that irreparable
harm is probable absent a stay, that he has a substantial case
 LEIVA-PEREZ v. HOLDER 4337
on the merits and that the balance of hardships tips sharply in
his favor. Accordingly, his request for a stay pending review
of his petition for review is granted.

VI. Conclusion

Insofar as Abbassi and its progeny permitted noncitizens to
obtain a stay of removal pending adjudication of their peti-
tions for review upon showing that irreparable harm was any-
thing less than probable, those cases were overruled by Nken.
That said, so long as the alien has made the threshold showing
that irreparable harm is probable absent a stay, we continue
to weigh the relative equities along the Abbassi “continuum,”
delineated on one end by a showing of a strong likelihood of
success on the merits and that the public interest does not
weigh heavily against a stay; and, on the other end, by a
showing of a substantial case on the merits and that the bal-
ance of hardships tips sharply in favor of a stay. Because
Leiva-Perez has met his burden as to each factor and the over-
all balance tips in his favor, we grant his motion for a stay of
removal pending the resolution of his petition for review.

STAY GRANTED.