UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4942
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JOSE JAVIER REYES-MARQUEZ,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
Chief District Judge. (1:08-cr-00155-JAB-1)
Submitted: March 14, 2011 Decided: April 4, 2011
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, Mireille P. Clough,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley E. Rand, United States
Attorney, Lisa B. Boggs, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jose Javier Reyes-Marquez was convicted of bank
robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d) (2006), and
use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2006). He served his
active sentence and was released to supervision in September
2007. After learning that Reyes-Marquez had been arrested by
North Carolina authorities, his probation officer petitioned the
district court to revoke supervised release. Reyes-Marquez
admitted the violations, and the district court sentenced him to
thirty-six months’ imprisonment as to Count One, to run
consecutively to a twenty-four-month sentence as to Count Two.
This appeal followed.
Reyes-Marquez challenges the substantive
reasonableness of his supervised release revocation sentences. *
He concedes that the Guidelines instruct courts to impose such a
sentence to run consecutively to any other sentence the
defendant is serving, and that the district court had the
authority to order the sentences here to run consecutively.
However, Reyes-Marquez contends that the cumulative effect of
imposing the maximum sentence on each count, consecutive to each
*
Reyes-Marquez does not contest the procedural
reasonableness of his sentences.
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other and to the state and federal sentences underpinning the
release violation, renders his sentence plainly unreasonable.
We affirm.
We review the sentence under the plainly-unreasonable
standard. See United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546
(4th Cir. 2010). The first step in this review requires a
determination of whether the sentence is unreasonable. United
States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006). “This
initial inquiry takes a more ‘deferential appellate posture
concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion’ than
reasonableness review for [G]uidelines sentences.” United
States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439) (applying plainly-unreasonable standard
of review for probation revocation). Only if the sentence is
procedurally or substantively unreasonable does the inquiry
proceed to the second step of the analysis to determine whether
the sentence is plainly unreasonable. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-
39.
A sentence imposed on revocation of supervised release
is substantively reasonable if the district court stated a
proper basis for concluding the defendant should receive the
sentence imposed, up to the statutory maximum. Id. at 440. “A
court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a
revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a
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post-conviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement
of reasons for the sentence imposed.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court did not exceed the statutory
maximum, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i), 2113(d), 3559(a),
3583(b), and we conclude that the court stated a proper basis
for the sentence imposed. The district court recognized that
the policy statement range under the Guidelines was fifteen to
twenty-one months, but it determined that such a sentence would
be insufficient “because of the Defendant’s extensive history of
violent conduct.” Instead, the district court imposed a
sentence within the statutory maximum sentence for each count,
stating that, given the nature and circumstances of the case,
imposing such a sentence was “necessary to meet the sentencing
objectives of punishment and deterrence [and to], provide
protection for the public.”
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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